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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
 The history of Latin America, and more specifically that of its political system 
as seen from the perspective of political science, denotes a series of constants easily 
accessible from the intellectual repertoire of even the common citizen. Some of those 
constants are a product of its colonial background, a sort of intuitive path dependence, 
such as the political and economic dominance of European descendants, or the role of 
the Catholic Church in national debates. Other constants are a consequence of the 
international politics of primarily the 20th century, specifically the relationship 
between the United States of America and nations of this hemisphere, with all the 
implications it had (and continues having): markets structured around the export of 
agricultural commodities and other natural resources; or the reliance on United States 
as a source of both financial aid in the form of remittance from expatriates, and of 
political and military intervention during periods of national or international conflict.  
 But the largest group of constants in Latin American history, although not 
exclusive to this region, represents those factors that have been domestically bred and 
nurtured: populist leaders, clientelistic politics, weak political parties, an ineffective 
judicial system, and above (and in many cases also behind) them all, corruption. 
 It is indeed corruption which would probably take the post as the most 
recurrent and consistent element in Latin American politics, a position that is only 
slightly grasped by surveys that frequently find it to be among the top national 
problems as identified by the citizenry. The cases of corruption in the region are so 
pervasive and frequent that the University of Chile had no problem in creating a 
database of those of them that had been ‘socially significant’ (i.e. had attracted 
extensive media attention) for the period 1998-2008 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, identifying as much as 252 cases (Universidad de Chile, 
2010). The scandals, however, continue and in recent years there have been 
emblematic cases such as Hotesur1 (2014~) in Argentina, Lava Jato2 (2014~) in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hotesur is the name given to a case of alleged tax irregularities perpetrated by a hotel operator owned 
by Argentinian president Cristina Fernández and her family. The case eventually evolved into an 
investigation of money laundering after evidence surfaced that businessman Lázaro Báez, also under 
investigation for presumably winning public contracts through political connections, had used Hotesur 
to funneled money towards the presidential family for years. 
2 Lava Jato is the name given to a criminal investigation originally focused on money laundering, but 
later expanding to cover a corruption network involving senior officials of the Brazilian government 
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Brazil, La Línea3 (2015~) in Guatemala, White House4 (2014~) in Mexico, among 
many others.  
According to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), in 2012 Latin America as a region was “doing worse than the global average” 
(Salas, 2012), and based on the 2013 CPI it was stated that “[d]espite many new 
transparency and anti-corruption regulations that states have agreed to comply with, 
the effect appears to have been minimal” (Turi Gargano, 2013). Indeed, between 2002 
and 2011 the regional average (including the Caribbean) had consistently remained 
around the 3.5 level in the ten-point scale of the CPI, with a very modest 
improvement from 2008 onwards. In the governance indicators of the World Bank 
data a similar stagnation is apparent, with the control of corruption remaining low and 
stable from 2000 to 2009 (UNDP, 2012). During the same period, on the other hand, 
the region endorsed international anti-corruption mechanisms such as the Mechanism 
for Follow-up on Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (MESICIC), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC) and its Review Mechanism, the Andean Plan to Fight Against Corruption 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico), and others. The mismatch between international commitments and 
domestic anti-corruption reforms in Latin America, hence, is both evident and deep. 
Turning to the specific case of Peru, a country that can be said to represent a 
typical case in the region,5 it is clear that corruption permeates almost every aspect of 
political life regardless of international discourse. According to Alfonso W. Quiroz in 
his book Corrupt Circles: A history of Unbound Graft in Peru (2008), which 
addresses the issue of public malfeasance in the country from 1750 to 2000, “[t]here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and construction firms for allegedly using the state-controlled petroleum company Petrobras to award 
contracts at inflated rates in exchange for bribes. With corruption activities spanning over a decade, the 
criminal case is considered to be the biggest corruption scandal in Brazilian history.  
3 La Línea case involves the alleged set up of a customs corruption ring in Guatemala by which 
officials charged lower import duties in exchange for kickbacks. As a consequence of the scandal 
several high-level officials were arrested, including vice president Roxana Baldetti and even president 
Otto Pérez Molina, after Congress had stripped the latter of his immunity. 
4 White House is the name of a scandal involving Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto and his wife, 
and derives from a luxurious mansion of US$ 7 million considered to be propriety of the presidential 
family, but which has been revealed to be actually owned by a construction company tied to the award 
of a multibillion-dollar public contract. 
5 In 2006 the regional CPI average, excluding the Caribbean, was exactly the same as Peru’s score, 3.3; 
while by 2013 the difference was only of 0.2 (Pozsgai Alvarez, 2015). 
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has been no historical period or cycle of little or no corruption; all the cycles surveyed 
were characterized by moderately high, high, and very high indicators of corruption” 
(p. 432). A quick review of the daily headlines in Lima would probably make any 
passerby agree immediately with Quiroz’ bleak assessment of Peruvian history. Such 
is the reality of its political system when asking about the spread and frequency of 
corrupt activities involving public officials, and no elected president in the past 
twenty years has been exempted of at least one major corruption scandal putting his 
moral capacity to govern in question. 
 Then came the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), which developed 
into a full-fledged criminal organization pursuing the capture of the State and 
effectively changed the way the system had traditionally experienced corruption and 
coped with it (Pariona Arana, 2012).  
With Fujimori’s regime the game stepped up to a whole new level, and 
therefore new rules had to be implemented to deal with it. And although political 
actors have kept showing similar patters of behavior as in the past, the complexity and 
dynamics of this new era has somehow accelerated the cycles referred to by Quiroz, 
and added a complexity that forces social scientists to reinterpret the role of 
corruption in the Peruvian system. But, perhaps more importantly, this era finally saw 
the rise of the natural counterpart of corruption, that which had already been raging 
around the world for at least a decade: Anti-corruption policies. 
Just as natural as thinking of medicine when considering diseases, anti-
corruption efforts are the logical answer of the political system to the presence of 
public malfeasance. Yet, notwithstanding the place that the topic of corruption has in 
current scholarship, politics, business analyses and public opinion, it was not until 
relatively recent that the issue was considered taboo among leaders and bureaucracies 
around the world, and that the citizenry would only have a clear image of its 
destructive effects when exposed to high-profile cases of national impact (and still 
then, most of the debate tended to transpire around ethical issues), those which are 
now called grand corruption cases. Among the few scholars who discussed the topic 
an initial agenda had taken form that focused on the definition, nature and 
characteristics, on the one hand, and the effects or consequences it had for the 
political system and the economy, on the other; but such scientific enquiry was 
largely theoretical due to the natural unavailability of data regarding such kind of 
illicit activities. This way, a predominant debate took place between those authors 
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who would treat corruption as an evil of public life, and those who would give 
attention to the potentially beneficial effects of such phenomenon given certain 
specific conditions (a debate that was later dubbed as grease the wheels versus sand 
in the wheels, first popularized by the works of Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; and 
Huntington, 1968, from the grease camp). 
In time, thanks to the political pressure exerted by the United States on 
international fora to make the problem of corruption part of the mainstream political 
debate, and the development by international non-governmental organization (NGO) 
Transparency International of its CPI, the set was finally ready in the 1990s to 
undertake the long-overdue task of understanding and fighting malfeasance in the 
public sphere. That decade saw the explosion of academic work on the subject, the 
pouring of financial aid to underdeveloped countries and regions exclusively for this 
problem, the production of international legal instruments aimed at fighting 
corruption, the formation of international and domestic NGOs and fora dealing with 
different tasks related to the issue, and even the involvement of the private sector in 
reducing transnational bribery. It was the beginning of an informal movement with 
formal actors, institutional arrangements, and a plethora of newly developed tools 
which has seen a steady increase in financial resources ever since. Florencia 
Guerzovich (2012), looking at the activities of this international anticorruption 
movement, has appropriately described the last three decades as focused, first, on 
standard setting (1990s), then on developing diagnostics (2000s), and finally on 
policy-making (2010s), summing up the way the movement’s agenda has been 
evolving. 
The brief description of the evolution of the topic has the purpose of showing 
not only the rise of the international concern with corruption per se, but more 
importantly the late but welcomed introduction of informed and scientific discussion 
of policies and activities designed to fight that scourge. With it, both sides of the 
subject can now be focused on, the problem as much as the proposed solutions; and 
yet, when it comes to actual accomplishments, it becomes painfully clear (as will be 
pointed out as one of the major pillars of the present work) that we presently know 
much more about corruption than we do about how to defeat it. 
Current scholarship on corruption usually starts by defining it in line with 
United Nations’ unofficial wording: the misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997, p. 31; Treisman, 2000, p. 399; Seligson, 2002, p. 408; Anderson and 
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Tverdova, 2003, p. 92; UNODC, 2004a, p. 11; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, 
p. 577; McCann and Redlawsk, 2006, p. 798; Balán, 2011, p. 4). Following a 
definition agreed upon, scholars have (except for the rare outlier) unanimously and 
completely put an end to the old grease versus sand debate, and found corruption to 
be harmful on a multidimensional level, a point not questioned anymore even in cases 
of red-tape. Thus, briefly going through the major consequences that corruption has 
for the overall health of all social subsystems, Pozsgai Alvarez (2013, p. 3) 
summarizes: 
 
Corruption erodes democracy by breaking the rule of law (Seligson, 2002, p. 
410; Bratton, 2007, p. 106), hindering the effective exercise of civic and 
political rights (Bailey, 2006), and damaging any process of inclusion of the 
most vulnerable sectors of the population (McCann and Redlawsk, 2006, p. 
797); it damages the economy by reducing the total amount of foreign direct 
investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), diverting resources from productive 
to rent-seeking activities (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 577; 
Morris, 2004, p. 4; Goudie and Stasavage, 1998, p. 113), increasing 
transaction costs (Seligson, 2002, p. 409), and limiting the availability of 
information required to conduct regular business operations; and probably in 
the most pernicious dimension, corruption reallocates public resources away 
from areas such as education and health (Mauro, 1995, 1997), and, overall, it 
reduces the level of generalized trust that society requires to develop social 
capital (Uslaner, 2008; Rothstein, 2005, p. 131) , which in time has a direct 
effect on both democracy and economic growth. These consequences are felt 
even more deeply in developing countries, where the resource diversion has a 
direct impact on the poor by limiting the amount and quality of social 
programs, and where political clientelism affects political choices and 
participation (for a comprehensive review of issues related to corruption see 
Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002). 
 
As we have already mentioned above, besides having for the first time easily 
accessible, cross-country, multi-year data to use in corruption-related research, the 
1990s was a period dedicated to the setting of standards regarding effective 
institutional means to control corruption in society, a task that heavily relied on 
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exporting “good practices” from successful anti-corruption stories such as those of 
Hong Kong and Singapore, to countries that were deemed to be permeated by 
corruption, sometimes to the point of evidencing systemic corruption. Eastern Europe, 
Africa, and to a lesser degree East Asia and Latin America, became the target of 
international cooperation agencies, donors and NGOs. A secondary source of anti-
corruption activities that were offered by these international actors was based on 
academic work by experts from the World Bank and other reputed scholars already 
famous for their expertise on the topic. In turn, the results of these proposed and 
implemented activities would be eventually assessed (both officially by the donor 
agent, and unofficially by the academia) and the conclusions would give path to a new 
cycle of spread, implementation and assessment of anti-corruption efforts, until the 
tools were mostly agreed upon by theory and experience. At the beginning of the 
2000s, the United Nations, through its Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, who 
was in charge of the organization’s effort to combat corruption) published a so-called 
package comprising several publications, all summarizing the body of knowledge 
attained so far on anti-corruption under a banner reading “EQUIP YOURSELF.” To 
be sure, even if it was not clear the way to defeat corruption, most international actors 
seemed to agree on the best ways to fight it. 
Going back to Peru, it is possible to see that, while the international anti-
corruption movement was taking form, the country was experiencing never before 
seen levels of state capture and high-level corruption, even if it was not yet perceived 
by the public at the moment. According to José Ugaz (2014), ex ad hoc procurator 
hired to represent the Peruvian government in the prosecution of Alberto Fujimori and 
Vladimiro Montesinos’ criminal network, although the exact amount of money 
illicitly obtained during the 1990-2000 period was never known, different opinions 
point to a number ranging from US$600 millions up to several billion dollars. On the 
other side, Quiroz (2008, p. 420) finds that the estimated costs of Fujimori-
Montesinos’ corruption are “between $1.4 and $2 billion.” Whatever the actual 
amount, however, the additional costs of corruption generated by the 1990-2000 
regime of President Alberto Fujimori in terms of the damage done to the political, 
social and economic systems of the country is perhaps impossible to estimate. 
Regarding the current topic of anti-corruption efforts, at least, there is no doubt that 
Peru had no possibility of riding the international wave while Fujimori stayed in 
power. 
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It was not until the collapse of the Fujimori regime, and the subsequent 
creation of a transitional government led by Valentín Paniagua, that Peru really 
started adopting and implementing effective anti-corruption measures, and it did so 
with an explosive beginning. In the short nine months that President Paniagua stayed 
in power, before giving way to a newly constitutionally elected president (Alejandro 
Toledo, 2001-2006), the apparatus dubbed anti-corruption subsystem was put in 
place, made up of an specialized Procurator’s Office, District Attorneys, Courts of 
law, and an Anti-Corruption Police Unit,6 with the sole task of investigating and 
prosecuting Vladimiro Montesinos and his network. In time, the District Attorneys 
and Courts of law would evolve in full-fledged anti-corruption bodies, with the 
mandate to fight not only the criminal acts conducted by the Fujimori government, 
but all instances of corruption of national importance (Pariona Arana, 2012). Together 
with the subsystem, a package of legal instruments to facilitate investigation, 
prosecution and the recovery of assets was adopted (Ugaz, 2014), where the Law of 
Efficacious Collaboration had probably the biggest impact. These systemic efforts to 
confront the realization that the country had been controlled by a mafia-like 
organization were not only unprecedented for its magnitude, but primarily for the 
speed and strength with which they were carried on. Ugaz (2014, p. 247) states that, 
only between November of 2000 and January of 2002, Peruvian authorities “managed 
to freeze US$250 millions [of stolen assets] in various bank accounts of different 
countries and recovered US$75 millions.” 
It would seem from this brief overview that Peru has been able to effectively 
combat corruption; however, the reality differs from a shallow account of major 
official activities.  
As much as Peru has indeed successfully entered the period described by 
Guerzovich (2012) as centered on technical diagnostics, particularly through the 
rounds of review conducted by MESICIC, actual policy changes have been scarce, 
and the execution of anti-corruption legislation has proven far from ideal in reality.  
From the part of policy reform and implementation, the United Nations 
Development Programme reports (albeit for the whole Latin American region, and not 
Peru exclusively) on the implementation levels of the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption (IACAC) using data from MESICIC, saying that “there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Anti-Corruption Police Unit was actually officially adopted under Toledo’s government, three 
weeks after assuming office. 
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alarmingly low level of satisfactory compliance with the recommendations (less than 
10%) in core preventive areas, such as access to information, strengthening the 
oversight bodies and prevention of conflicts if interest” (UNDP, 2012, p. 46). 
Regarding other areas, “[t]here is a more favorable trend, but always within the lower 
ranges (below 30%)” (p. 46). Finally, “the follow-up reports show that the majority of 
the recommendations given to governments are not implemented satisfactorily, nor 
are they properly reported to the MESICIC, casting doubt about the government’s real 
willingness and ability to commit to them” (p. 45). 
The Peruvian case may be even bleaker. According to the Task Force Against 
Corruption (GTCC, 2010), of 51 recommendations made by MESICIC in the first 
Round of review (2004), 43 are still pending information or requiring additional; and 
of 26 recommendations made in the second round of review (2007), 21 are still 
pending information or requiring additional attention. 
From the part of execution of anti-corruption legislation, specifically that 
aimed at enforcement, a document elaborated by Justicia Viva (a department of 
human rights organization Instituto de Defensa Legal—IDL) in 2005 informed that 
“after four and a half years of creation of the anti-corruption judicial subsystem, the 
number of processes that has been completed is very limited: 20 out of 205, 
representing a mere 10% of the total”7 (Siles, 2005, p. 60). As a consequence of the 
slow pace of prosecution, “145 people accused of corruption perpetrated in the 90s 
were benefitted with the application of the statue of limitations only during 2010 and 
2011”8 (AP, 2011/09/06). 
While the actual execution of anti-corruption measures is by itself a common 
problem for policy makers, be it related to the prevention or control of corruption, the 
core of the issue is the adoption and effective implementation of solid policies to fight 
malfeasance in the public and private spheres, and of them, prevention becomes the 
most important and discussed element in the current era. It also is, at least in Peru, the 
area where less progress has been made. The reason is simple: prevention usually 
represents a more massive, complex, dynamic and costly endeavor compared to 
policies related to control/enforcement, which are rooted on traditional legislative and 
administrative processes that in most cases has existed (even if only partially) in 
normative structures dating back to the beginning of the constitutional republic.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Translated from Spanish. 
8 Ibid. 
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To give an example, the UNCAC chapter on preventive measures stipulates 
that the State shall promote the participation of society, collaborate in international 
programmes and projects, create effective anti-corruption bodies, establish and 
manage a professional civil service, provide adequate remuneration to civil servants, 
promote their education and awareness of corruption-related issues, develop systems 
of transparency and prevention of conflict of interests, strengthen the procurement 
systems, and engage in administrative simplification, among several others. On the 
other hand, the UNCAC chapter on criminalization and law enforcement employs 
almost half of its articles in prescribing or recommending the passing of legislation to 
make various corrupt activities a criminal offence under national law. Naturally, if we 
could presuppose the existence of political resources ready to be spent in the 
enactment of such legislation, the implementation of half that chapter would take only 
the time needed to draft the bills, debate their specific content, and have them enter 
into force. 
 
Problem Formulation 
In sum, while Peru has made some progress over the past fifteen years in 
fighting corruption and developing an anti-corruption body of norms and policies, 
actions have been generally scarce, far apart, seemingly unresponsive to popular 
dissatisfaction, and for the most part inconsistent with international commitments 
such as the IACAC and the UNCAC. This situation raises a crucial question: What 
explains Peru’s limited adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies 
between 2000 and 2014? 
The question that inspires the present study is composed of two points. First, 
there is a need to identify under what circumstances anti-corruption policies are 
adopted and implemented in Peru. For example, we need to ask why the anti-
corruption subsystem was created, and why did it focus on control. While the intuitive 
answer may point at the need to prosecute the Fujimori-Montesinos network, it does 
not explain why it was eventually dismantled, first operatively and then officially. It 
does not explain why it did not spawn a similar effort in terms of preventive policies, 
or why subsequent scandals of grand corruption involving the president failed to 
produce an equally strong reaction, either. In other words, while we may be urged to 
attribute the Peruvian anti-corruption subsystem to the particularities of the historic 
moment, such a practice does not provide us tools to assess other events that may be 
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similar in nature. The same could be said of other moments in the past history when 
anti-corruption policies seemed to have been successfully adopted and implemented. 
Are all of them supposed to be attributed to the specificities of the historic situation, 
or do they share a common pattern that may shed light on the drivers and triggers for 
anti-corruption reform? 
The second point of our question regards to the majority of policies that were 
not adopted and implemented; or, to put it another way, to the reasons why popular 
dissatisfaction and international monitoring failed to trigger the production of anti-
corruption policies by the Peruvian government. For example, while the videos of 
presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos bribing other political and social actors 
kick-started the anti-corruption era in Peru in 2000, the so-called Petrogate scandal of 
2008 involving audio recordings of corrupt deals in lucrative petroleum contracts did 
not accomplish to produce the much needed reform of the legislation on lobbies, or 
even see the effective prosecution of the actors involved. To what can we attribute the 
different consequences for the anti-corruption agenda of these two corruption 
scandals? If not all corruption cases produce relatively equal pressure to fight it, there 
must be a factor for which the field has not accounted yet, and which may hold the 
key to explain the limited level of adoption and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies. 
 
Literature Gap 
What does almost three decades of intensive scholarly production have to say 
about these questions? When it comes to addressing not corruption, not even anti-
corruption policies, but specifically anti-corruption reform as a separate dimension of 
the phenomenon that also needs to be ascertained, there is unsurprisingly a complex 
array of answers that, in general terms, fall under at least one of five approaches: 
authors taking a principal-agent, top-down approach (the most prominent include 
Klitgaard, 1988; Langseth et al., 1997; and, Kaufmann, 1998, among others); authors 
turning to a principal-agent, bottom-up discussion (Kisubi, 1999; Brunetti and Weder, 
2003; and, Kpundeh, 2005, among others); authors looking into the principal-agent, 
international pressure angle and its capacity to affect local actors (Carr, 2006; 
Hanlon, 2004; and, Marong, 2002, among others); authors writing on anti-corruption 
cleanups (Mbaku, 1996; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; and, Taylor, 2006, among 
others); and, authors interested in the political will for engaging in reform 
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(Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba, 1999; Ruzindana, 1997; and, Kpundeh, 1998, among 
others). These five approaches, presented in the above order, show an increasing 
awareness of the role of agency and the importance of developing an encompassing 
model with the inclusion of key stakeholders. However, although taken as a group 
they provide favorable grounds from which to venture an answer for the question of 
anti-corruption reform, no individual approach has so far succeeded in putting 
together all the relevant analytical elements in a single model.  
Although the dissemination of anti-corruption discourse, instruments and 
financial and technical support is currently at an all-time high, political will as a 
precondition for effective reform has not attracted as much attention as one would 
expect, which is a particularly troublesome situation when considering the 
disappointing level of progress in much of the developing world. The principal-agent, 
top-down approach that is arguably the most prominent body of literature informing 
the work of think tanks and NGOs, takes for granted the presence of political will in 
domestic settings or at the very least ignores its crucial importance. Its two other 
versions, namely bottom-up and international pressure, do a better job in including 
political will as part of their discussion, but finally exhaust their efforts in placing the 
burden of reform in yet another stakeholder without deeply considering the conditions 
and power relations inherent in anti-corruption processes. While the development of 
strategies based on the roles of civil society and international actors recognize the 
usual difficulty in stimulating political will from domestic leaders, they again take the 
premise that there are in fact social forces available to push for reform, and that the 
problem keeps being one of technical and financial resources. Furthermore, instead of 
blending both approaches into coherent strategies based on the natural strengths and 
weaknesses of each stakeholder (including governmental actors), there is in fact 
scarce literature laying bridges between domestic and international actors, and the few 
that does skimp over necessary theoretical foundations. What motivates actors to 
behave the way they do? What lies behind efforts to reform the anti-corruption 
apparatus of the State? 
The literature on cleanups, in this sense, makes a better work reflecting the 
peculiarities of different stakeholders, but to dismiss of analytical constructs and 
exportable models. Being more embedded in historical analysis, the conclusions 
arrive to by this body of literature shed light on specific processes of corruption and 
anti-corruption reform, highlighting the supremacy of agency and putting political 
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will in the context of national dynamics. For cleanups, there are no premises 
regarding available resources or interests, only political and economic circumstances 
attached to specific settings. Thus, whilst authors from this approach avoid falling 
into the usual pits afflicting the principal-agent tradition, they do not provide much 
ground to continue the evolution towards an answer to the issue of anti-corruption 
reform. This weakness is finally corrected by the literature on political will, which 
takes its cue from the importance of national governments in the adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies without taking for granted their interest in 
fighting malfeasance. Thus, political will largely takes up where previous approaches 
failed, and suggests an analytical route to address the interests and role of domestic 
leadership.  
Does the above description mean that the political will approach holds the 
answer to the question of anti-corruption reform in Peru? Unfortunately, it does not. 
Although its worry for theoretical discipline and correct appreciation of political 
interests makes it more suitable for the task at hand than other approaches, it only 
provides a partial framework for the analysis of corruption and anti-corruption 
reform, and does not consider the basic elements underlying the state and stimulation 
of political will. For this reason, its conclusion invariably tend to fall back on 
recommendations that are not susceptible to policy interventions, or even worse, that 
implicitly consider the preexistence of some level of political will among the 
authorities. At the end, the core of the issue at hand is not only the role of political 
will and agency, or the possibilities for social stakeholders to engage national leaders 
in a successful way, but rather the reason why political systems are able and willing to 
resist changes even when falling under pressure. 
In conclusion, none of the above approaches effectively operationalizes the 
concept of political will for anti-corruption reform and implementation up to the point 
where it can produce applicable conclusions. In the best cases, they fall repeatedly in 
various forms of logical and empirical problems: by either assuming a priori the 
existence of political will from domestic leaders to adopt anti-corruption measures, or 
explicitly pointing to the existence of political agendas and hidden interests that 
usually work against policy reform, their conclusions normally suggest the application 
of strategies that inevitably end up assuming once more the preexistence of some kind 
of political will, the very same thing that should be critically considered before it is 
taken into account. When they do manage to get over assumptions regarding domestic 
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political will, on the other hand, they still fail to effectively draw together the various 
elements and actors that are relevant in a thorough analytical model; as a 
consequence, the field still lacks an integrative approach to the issue of anti-
corruption reform. 
 
Argument 
Corruption challenges traditional scholarship on policy implementation by 
putting forth an element usually not existent in other policy areas: while all 
governmental decisions imply the initial expenditure of different amounts of financial, 
technical, and political resources by one or more actors or organizations, and hence 
they can be analyzed and eventually acted upon by referring to benefits and costs of 
different actions in terms of their value in political capital, anti-corruption policies do 
not translate only in that currency. A leader faced with the option of engaging in the 
adoption and implementation of anti-corruption measures, will not think only of the 
traditional costs implied in that effort, but also in the potential loss of private assets 
for himself, his party and any other network as a consequence of putting in place 
structures that will make it harder for him and his subordinates to obtain benefits from 
corrupt activities. This situation, as grim as it may appear, is not only implicit at the 
core of most corruption-related topics, but is also the single main reason why the 
solution to the implementation of anti-corruption policies cannot be directly extracted 
from the general public policy literature. While in most cases policy makers can be 
approached and convinced to adopt certain measures in exchange for technical and 
financial aid, political support, reelection funds, and/or public backing of their greater 
agenda, anti-corruption policies may only be of interest to inherently non-corrupt 
leaders; otherwise, the incentives mentioned above may just not be enough to 
compensate them for the potential loss of a profitable activity.  
As central as this argument is for the study of corruption, it has nonetheless 
been widely ignored as a key element, staying in most cases only as part of the 
discussion background, much like the secrecy of a corrupt act. This condition has 
resulted in a plethora of work regarding the correct instruments to be adopted, but 
avoiding the discussion on how to actually come about their implementation in 
political terms.  
If we adopt the premise that domestic political actors could have an inherent 
interest in keeping the national anti-corruption standards as is, the traditional 
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argument moves to look at the principal-agent model, and suggests to focus on the 
strategies available to domestic non-governmental actors and the international 
community.  
In terms of financial and technical resources, the international community 
(once the inexistence of a government “principal” has been agreed upon) becomes the 
next best thing, albeit the natural constraints imposed by its existing outside the 
political system (and thus not having most of the prerogatives of a classic domestic 
leadership) effectively require proponents of such arrangement to think outside the 
box and develop new analytical frameworks. 
On the other hand, in terms of political resources, actors grounded in the 
domestic social, economic and/or political systems usually have the capacity to 
engage in activities as effective as those of their foreign counterparts. Opinion 
leaders, opposition parties, media outlets, and advocacy groups such as local NGOs, 
civic organizations, professional associations, and regional movements can all be 
crucial to changes in legislation and public policy, sometimes to even greater extent. 
Although usually engaged in a much less formal and institutionalized network of 
stakeholders, domestic actors are better positioned in the local setting than 
international actors. However, as it was mentioned, it is usually the latter that have the 
financial, technical and logistic resources needed for an enterprise such as anti-
corruption reform, especially in developing countries, where reform is needed the 
most but resources are scarce. 
An effective model to address the possibilities and the best strategies for anti-
corruption reform in scenarios where national governments cannot be expected to 
have much political will for such endeavor, then, requires giving proper consideration 
to the presence of both international and domestic non-governmental actors affecting 
the process and result. Additionally, it may also be expected that the presence and 
activities of one will affect the presence and activities of the other. The potential 
existence of different agendas and resources have been a cornerstone of debates 
surrounding the problem of implementation for decades (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973), and a similar issue emerges when questioning the reason for certain outcomes 
considering the existence of multiple actors spread over different levels of policy 
making. Synergy, assistance, subrogation, and substitution are some of the forms that 
may appear in different scenarios of their interaction as constitutive elements of an 
encompassing anti-corruption implementation model.  
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But the key aspect of the above argument is that it necessarily results in an 
antagonist relationship between the political system represented by domestic 
governments, and environmental actors such as NGOs and international 
organizations; and just as the latter have the potential for developing different 
functional arrangements and strategies, governments should also be found to have at 
their disposal a variety of mechanisms with which to reduce reform pressure while 
maintaining political control. This, in consequence, becomes the proposed answer to 
the earlier question regarding Peru’s limited adoption and implementation of anti-
corruption policies, and the core of the present study: the actions taken by domestic 
and international actors to press Peruvian authorities into fighting malfeasance have 
been unable to improve overall national anti-corruption standards in any significant 
way after the short period of the transitional government (2000-2001), due to the 
availability and timely employment by the Peruvian authorities of highly effective 
political strategies to mitigate demands and secure support without having to engage 
in real anti-corruption reforms. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The model used in this work, taking into account the argument just exposed, is 
a reinterpretation of David Easton’s famous Political Systems Model (Easton, 1965a, 
b). Although criticized as much as praised (Leslie, 1972; Sorzano, 1975, 1977; 
Stewart and Ayres, 2001), its core concepts have had a deep impact in the entire field 
of political science (Gunnell, 2013), and they open particularly promising possibilities 
for the study of corrupt systems.  
At its core, Easton’s model aims at providing an essential structure to 
understand the different forces that might create stress for a political system, and 
subsequently identify the coping mechanisms available to it to keep a minimum level 
of support flowing. Over this basis, the model incorporates multiple elements that are 
part of the dynamic processes embedded in the system; but at the end, all of them 
follow the author’s interest to address the survival of the political system, which 
Easton defines as “those interactions through which values are authoritatively 
allocated for a society” (1965b, p. 21). 
Of particular interest to the study of corruption is Easton’s own identification 
of clientelism as a type of output of the system which creates stress for itself: 
“Extended reliance on this kind of outputs as a source of specific support for political 
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objects may well prove more effective in stressing than in maintaining a system” 
(1965b, p. 361). This way of understanding public malfeasance represents an 
interesting (and surprisingly untapped) opportunity to see the effects of corrupt 
activities in the life of a country.  
By treating corruption as a type of output, Easton’s model forces us to go 
beyond the scope of his particular work and to analyze it as we would any other 
output generated by the system. The outcome proves to be deep and manifold. In light 
of the current progress of corruption studies, we can argue that corruption produces 
stress for the system following three different patterns or scenarios, which are here 
denominated: Corruption perception, characterized by public dissatisfaction as a 
consequence of what is usually referred to as scandals of corruption; economic 
inefficiencies, characterized by public dissatisfaction with the state of various 
economic variables partially affected by corruption and the way they impact their 
daily lives; and, corruption intolerance, characterized by public dissatisfaction with 
anti-corruption standards, regardless of the perceived level of actual corruption. 
What Easton’s work does is to allow us to address the phenomenon of 
corruption in his model’s terminology, producing as a result what will be dubbed here 
a Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform. This model, however, is 
only half of the equation needed to answer the questions about the circumstances 
under which anti-corruption policies are adopted or ignored; the other half depicts the 
analytical consequences of having three potential ways in which corruption stresses 
the system, and what that represents for its survival. 
As we said already, at the core of Easton’s work there are stress and coping 
mechanisms. Indeed, the survival of the system is what gives his work the shape it 
has, and when we talk about episodes in recent Peruvian history pertaining to one or 
more corruption scenarios, all the while keeping low levels of anti-corruption policy 
implementation, we are implicitly stating that the political system is able to survive 
without abandoning its anti-corruption standards. How can it do this?  
Just as Easton’s model describes several coping mechanisms that allows the 
system to deal with stress, a reinterpretation of it for the study of corruption, this time 
looking particularly at the possibilities for anti-corruption policy adoption and 
implementation, shows that there are a number of measures available to the 
authorities that reduce the pressure coming from both domestic and foreign actors, 
and provides the system with enough support to keep its anti-corruption standards. 
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These coping mechanisms will be in some cases common for the three stress-inducing 
corrupt scenarios, such as repression/coercion; and in some others specific to control 
the situation at hand, such as congressional investigative committees. At the same 
time, the selection of mechanisms to be activated will depend in the kind and source 
of pressure, with not all being possible at any given time (physical repression may be 
an effective way of controlling a public manifestation marching downtown, but will 
not prove feasible when addressing official admonitions from reputed international 
NGOs, or even worse, foreign leaders), or if possible, not potentially effective (a 
smokescreen may distract enough public attention as to get over accusations of 
malfeasance involving mid-level political actors, but will not prove as effective in 
keeping senior officials away from front pages). 
Finally, in order to make this model susceptible to empirical test, Easton’s 
concept of political system needs to be somehow qualified and adapted to the 
conditions of Peruvian democracy. What do we talk about when we talk about a 
political system? Throughout the present work, the concept of political system will be 
slightly differentiated from the term government, allowing the former to group all 
public agencies and structures, while the latter will be used as a reference to the 
incumbent party in all those agencies and structures, particularly the executive branch 
and the national parliament. The employment of the term executive branch, on the 
other hand, will make reference to that particular branch of government against other 
public bodies such as Congress. By carrying the discussion using these three different 
terms, the theoretical model will be able to adapt to the particularities of the political 
scenario under analysis: some cases, such as systemic corruption or State capture, will 
be better discussed by making reference to the ‘political system,’ as horizontal 
accountability will have been severely diminished and most public agencies will 
follow the same rationale. In other cases, however, coping mechanisms will reflect the 
efforts of only the members of the incumbent party in Congress and of senior public 
officials of different ministries, therefore inviting the employment of the term 
‘government’ to reflect their coordinated stance based on party loyalty without 
including the participation of constitutionally autonomous bodies. And still some 
other cases will show the ‘executive branch’ standing alone, particularly during 
periods of political crisis and/or cases of low party discipline, requiring the discussion 
to reflect the change in actors involved.  
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Methodology 
To test the tenets of the theoretical model and support the hypothesis, the 
present work focuses on the period 2000 – 2015 (from the second and illegal re-
election of President Fujimori to the present) and analyzes corruption-related news in 
Peru (through important newspapers like La República, Perú21, El Comercio, and 
others); international anti-corruption activities involving Peruvian participation or 
affairs (e.g. MESICIC, UNCAC); and country statistics (particularly those provided 
by the World Bank and consulting agency APOYO) regarding multiple economic, 
social and political variables, to look at particular cases of stress resulting from 
corruption. Additionally, a process of content analysis is performed over the front 
pages of newspaper La República spanning from July 29, 2000, to December 31, 
2014, in order to quantify the level of media coverage produced by each corruption 
event (and therefore the amount of indirect pressure exerted over the political system) 
over most of the period analyzed.  
The research then identifies the participation of foreign and domestic actors as 
sources of stress by reviewing official documentation such as proceeds and minutes of 
national anti-corruption offices from 2000 to 2014, international agreements of 
technical and financial cooperation (e.g. UNDP, USAID), public statements released 
in the media, and official reports from domestic and international organizations such 
as the UNODC, Transparency International, the Organization of American States, the 
Ministry of Justice of Peru, NGO Proética, and others.  
It further assesses information from thirty-two personal interviews (and 
additional communication) conducted between 2013 and 2014 with current and 
former public officials in charge of fighting corruption in Peru, and reviews the most 
relevant legal measures (legislation, regulations, administrative decisions) adopted by 
the State apparatus in the last fifteen years, in order to improve the detection of 
coping mechanisms and other political responses. Finally, it analyzes the outcomes in 
each case.  
The main methods that are satisfied with the collection of the above data are 
that of congruence and process-tracing, the satisfaction of which will depend on the 
specific case analyzed. For example, most (if not all) cases pertaining to that of 
corruption perception, or scandals, by their own nature are not susceptible to in-depth 
analysis short of conducting investigative journalism, and so they can only be 
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addressed here by relying on variations between social pressure and government 
activities. The congruence method supports this approach:  
 
“The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator 
begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict 
the outcome in a particular case. The theory posits a relation between variance 
in the independent variable and variance in the dependent variable; it can be 
deductive or take the form of an empirical generalization... If the outcome of 
the case is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the analyst can entertain the 
possibility that a causal relationship may exist” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
181).  
 
On the other hand, some cases in the present study will open the possibility for 
a more in-depth analysis thanks to a wider and more thorough availability of data; 
thus, for these instances a process-tracing method will be pushed in order to increase 
the validity of our conclusions. This approach relies on the possibility to assess not 
only the two main variables, social pressure and government response, but also the 
intervening mechanisms that connect them both: “The process-tracing method 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal 
mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). In other words, “[p]rocess 
tracing, to reiterate, is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences 
from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence 
of events or phenomena” (Collier, 2011, p. 824). 
The success of these methods will show that corruption cases effectively fit at 
least one of the three stress-inducing scenarios; that one or more coping mechanisms 
are activated in most situations; and that these mechanisms were effective in reducing 
stress before the system had to change (to a certain degree) its anti-corruption 
standards. 
 
The work is divided in the following way:  
Chapter II reviews the literature on anti-corruption reform, arranging it in five 
distinctive approaches: principal-agent, top-down; principal-agent, bottom-up; 
principal-agent, international pressure; cleanups; and, political will. Although each 
	   20	  
new approach discussed here represents a slight progress towards addressing the 
problems involved in improving national anti-corruption structures, the general 
conclusion of each individual approach, and of all them considered together, points to 
the absence of a comprehensive model for the analysis of corruption and anti-
corruption processes rooted in sound analytical grounds. 
Chapter III revisits the argument behind political will for anti-corruption 
reform, positing that the singularity of policies to fight malfeasance makes arguments 
based on political capital unsuitable to address the interest of national leaders. Then, it 
reviews David Easton’s Dynamic Response Model of a Political System, positing its 
untapped potential for the analysis of corruption and anti-corruption processes. As a 
result of considering the exchanges between the political system and environmental 
actors in terms of corruption outputs and anti-corruption pressure, a Systems Model of 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform is drawn, introducing four theoretical 
scenarios of stress affecting the system as a consequence of the stability of the 
national anti-corruption standards: (1) Corruption in processes; (2) corruption 
perception; (3) corruption intolerance; and, (4) prolonged stress.  
Chapter IV discusses the coping mechanisms potentially available to the 
government, and the strategies and activities usually undertaken by domestic non-
governmental and international actors. From the side of the government, four typical 
moments for the activation of strategies are: (1) Output concealment; (2) output 
perception attenuation; (3) negative input defuse; and, (4) stress amelioration. Each of 
these moments, called coping points, is addressed under each of the four stress 
scenarios identified in the previous chapter, and appropriate coping mechanisms are 
suggested for each point. From the side of environmental actors, strategies are divided 
between international and domestic pressure activities, and three general types are 
identified for each of those sources: (1) Direct pressure; (2) indirect pressure; and, (3) 
influence. As a result of laying down all potential strategies, this chapter makes an 
argument for the strength of the government’s position in comparison to the costly 
and scarce options available to reform actors. 
Chapters V to VIII comprise the analysis of the instances of stress-inducing 
corruption, together with the responses taken by the government, recounting the 
periods of the end of the Fujimori regime and the transitional government (2000-
2001), and the governments of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan García (2006-
2011) and Ollanta Humala (2011~). Each of these governments will reflect 
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peculiarities specific to the political conditions of the moment, beginning with the 
presence of a scenario of prolonged stress during the Fujimori-Paniagua transition 
(Chapter V), passing through the stabilization of the National Anti-Corruption 
Standards during the Toledo administration (Chapter VI) and its relative deterioration 
in the face of countermeasures during the García administration (Chapter VII), and 
finishing with the promising but ultimately feeble progress made during the 
government of President Humala (Chapter VIII), which also presents a case for the 
potential of political agency to upset the value of the National Anti-Corruption 
Standards. 
Chapter IX presents the summary of the empirical chapters and contrasts them 
with the theoretical model developed in Chapters Three and Four, finding that the 
Peruvian case provides enough ground to validate the tenets of the Systems Model of 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform. However, the comparison between the 
model and the data leaves certain theoretical cases without empirical confirmation. 
The stress scenarios, coping mechanisms and pressure activities that were not found 
in Peruvian national politics during the time period examined here are addressed by 
presenting brief examples of their existence in other administrative levels, time 
periods or countries. 
Finally, Chapter X presents the conclusions, offering possible ways to break 
the hegemony of the political leadership in regards to the defense of the National 
Anti-Corruption Standards. Although limited by available resources, the evidence 
presented in this work suggests that reform actors could exploit certain theoretical 
openings, particularly the impact of corruption tolerance for the overall levels of 
pressure and for the value of corruption profits vis-à-vis political capital. 
 
By the end, the role that Peruvian society and the international community 
have played in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies in Peru 
over the past fifteen years will become clear, highlighting the variety of measures 
national authorities have taken to resist the pressure. But, more importantly, a 
comprehensive analytic framework with potential application to developing 
democracies throughout the globe will have been tested, offering a framework to 
inform stakeholders of the inner workings of resisting political systems. 
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
 
As it was explained in the previous chapter, currently the field of corruption 
studies has a much better grasp of the causes and consequences of corruption that it 
ever did in the pre-1990s period, thanks to the development of measurement 
instruments by Transparency International and the World Bank. Globally, academia 
and international organizations have worked in tandem to arrive to a clear 
understanding of the pernicious effects of corruption, and to consolidate a single 
position on the issue: it is to be fought, deterred, and control. 
Resulting from an agreed position, literature on anti-corruption strategies 
quickly picked up the pace, and a body of instruments was developed and promoted, 
such as the IACAC, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, or United Nations’ Anti-Corruption 
Package, among several other examples. The International Anti-Corruption Academy, 
established in 2011, is a clear proof of the level of development of the international 
anti-corruption movement and its expertise in fighting malfeasance. However, how 
does this expertise translate into actual, real-life, domestic reform? 
This chapter reviews traditional and current scholarship on anti-corruption in 
order to understand how they address the issue of reform: the avenues and strategies 
to stimulate domestic adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policy 
proposals. Indeed, knowledge on reform can usually be found embedded in the more 
general literature of anti-corruption measures. But first, a brief overview of the 
international network of actors involved in fighting corruption will be presented in 
order to appreciate both the circumstances that have produced the literature on anti-
corruption, and the necessity to effectively address the issue of reform once and for 
all. 
 
1. The International Anti-Corruption Movement 
 
The significance of anti-corruption studies, which usually aim at supporting 
policy implementation (even if not exclusively those pertaining to applied research), 
is better appreciated in the light of the international network developed more or less in 
a consistent way to push the anti-corruption agenda across the globe. 
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As Guerzovich (2012) explains, although talking in regards to the Latin 
America experience, anti-corruption advocacy follows three consecutive stages 
starting from the 1990s. That decade, she elaborates, had the setting of anti-corruption 
standards as a main activity, represented by the normative work of Transparency 
International and others; the effort was directed at producing knowledge about good-
practices implemented in specific successful cases, and disseminate it across 
corruption-stricken regions, particularly Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America 
(not least of all in the form of international anti-corruption conventions or programs). 
The 2000s saw the shift of efforts towards the development of detailed and 
comprehensive diagnostics on the incidence, determinants, forms, actors involved, 
etc., of corruption as suffered in particular societies; this also included the 
introduction or improvement of indicators, assessment tools, international peer-review 
mechanisms, and other instruments to make an effective diagnostic possible. Finally, 
in the current phase of evolution of the anti-corruption regime/movement, we have 
seen an increasing emphasis (though still overall lukewarm) on the policy-making 
conditions for a successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms. 
The new stage of development is by no means accidental.  
When the literature talks about an international anti-corruption regime, it tries 
to describe a structure that can be more or less institutionalized and its norms more or 
less extended and legalized (depending on the author cited); but it invariably makes 
reference to the network of international organizations and donor agencies, the legal 
instruments produced in their forums such as international anti-corruption 
conventions, and the body of instruments and procedures built around the fight 
against corruption (Wolf and Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; 
Windsor and Getz, 2000). This regime can be said to make for most of the official 
anti-corruption activities being undertaken from an international perspective. 
However, just as important as multilateral cooperation and legally binding 
conventions, there is in reality also a variety of actors and activities that involve case-
by-case interactions, issue-specific oversight, national representation arrangements, 
research and training, and other forms of anti-corruption advocacy and support that by 
its nature is less institutionalized. For this reason, it is a better description of the 
international community to talk about of a movement rather than a regime in order to 
include the less formal elements of the global anti-corruption effort. 
	   24	  
The international anti-corruption movement, then, can be defined as the 
variety of international, domestic, public and private actors engaged in the 
development, adoption and implementation of the body of conventions, review 
mechanisms, policy recommendations, country rankings, scholarly production, 
measurement tools, indicators, statistics, training courses, and advocacy practices, all 
with the aim of fighting corruption in domestic contexts from a transnational 
perspective.  
This movement has seen a tremendous expansion of its activities and budget 
over the years. According to the OECD (OECD, 2015b), the official development 
assistance for supporting anti-corruption organizations and institutions in developing 
countries has risen from $36.3 millions in 2002, to $292.7 millions in 2012.9 An 
increase of over seven times the budget in only one decade! Turning to Transparency 
International, and international non-governmental organization whose projects funds 
are “raised largely from European governments and development agencies” 
(Sampson, 2005), we see their budget increasing from €6 million in 2005 to €24.5 
millions in 2014 (a growth of four times the amount) (TI, 2014/01/08).  
On the other hand, the amount of international conventions and fora has 
increased rapidly. Starting with the IACAC in 1996, it was quickly followed by the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption in 1999 and its counterpart convention on Civil Law the 
same year, the Southern African Development Community Protocol Against 
Corruption in 2001, the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the 
Fight Against Corruption in 2001, the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption in 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 
2003 (OECD, 2015a), and many others from there on.  
Fora such as the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 
(IAACA, 2011), the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption 
(GOPAC, 2015), the European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC, 2015), the Group 
of States Against Corruption (Council of Europe, 2014), the East African Association 
of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA, 2015), the Anti-Corruption and 
Transparency Task Force (ACT) of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum (APEC, 2015), the Open Government Partnership (OGP, 2015a), the Extractive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Amounts are provided for official development assistance from all donors for the sector of “Anti-
corruption organisations and institutions,” through all channels. 
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Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, 2015), and others, have also appeared in the 
anti-corruption landscape to support efforts and push for international and domestic 
actions to fight malfeasance in the public and private sectors. 
On the domestic side, most countries in the world have created at least one 
government office specialized in fighting corruption, either regarding its control, its 
prevention, or both. Some modern archetypal cases are Lithuania’s Special 
Investigation Service, Latvia’s Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, Spain’s 
Special Prosecutors Office for the Repression of Corruption-Related Economic 
Offences, Romania’s National Anti-Corruption Directorate, Croatia’s Office for the 
Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime, Belgium’s Central Office for the 
Repression of Corruption, France’s Central Service for Prevention of Corruption, 
Slovenia’s Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Albania’s Anti-Corruption 
Commission and Monitoring Group (OECD, 2008), and many others around the 
world. These cases feed the international anti-corruption movement by making it 
harder for other countries to continue without implementing similar offices of their 
own.  
With such level of financial support and pressure coming from the 
international movement (which keeps growing even if unsteadily) it is only natural to 
expect a concomitant improvement in the legal regimes of recipient countries in the 
form of implemented anti-corruption recommendations, and a subsequent decrease in 
the domestic levels of corruption; this, however, seems to be far from reality. 
Already by the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, some authors 
were pointing out and calling into attention the deep mismatch between expectations 
and reality: notwithstanding the amount of media attention, international donor 
involvement, technical expertise and governmental discourse that had been 
experienced in the previous years, anti-corruption projects and interventions in 
regions like Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America were mostly disappointing, 
showing a very low success rate (Klitgaard et al., 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2000; Heeks, 
2007). Most of them had failed to reach the targets set, and were soon to be 
discontinued or rolled back from lack of follow-up efforts by recipient countries. 
As part of an independent evaluation of World Bank support programs for 
public sector reform, focusing on data from nineteen country cases for the period 
1999-2006, Fjeldstad and Isaksen (2008, pp. 61-62) found that  
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“Even given the many uncertainties, a main overall conclusion is that 
there were not a great many successes in terms of reducing the problem of 
corruption.10 The Bank’s clear successes in corruption reduction have been 
much fewer than the failures. The overall result may, at best, be characterized 
as ‘moderately unsatisfactory.’” 
 
After adopting a new approach in 2007 called the Governance and 
Anticorruption (GAC) Strategy, the World Bank switched its focus from supporting 
actors and mechanisms on the demand-side of accountability, to formal institutions 
involved in public finance management (including supreme audit institutions). 
Migliorisi and Wescott (2011, pp. 48-49) report that 
 
“Although there is not necessarily a causal effect between the GAC strategy 
and these outcomes [regarding the changes in the achievement of 
accountability objectives], it is clear that the decline in support for the demand 
for good governance has been mirrored by a slight decline in the impact of 
Bank projects on civil society organizations. The increase in support for 
Supreme Audit institutions has been translated into an improved achievement 
of objectives relating to the external audit function, although starting rom a 
low base.  
... [However,] apart from the case of Ombudsmen, there have been more cases 
of deteriorating or stable effectiveness of domestic accountability institutions 
than improvements. Countries with World Bank projects for non-executive 
accountability institutions had an equal number of positive and negative 
changes.  
In sum, the analysis of country strategies and projects at the output level 
shows limited achievements. It seems logical to assume that, if accountability 
institutions are not strengthened, progress in accountability systems is unlikely 
to take place. 
 
The apparent failure of the international anti-corruption movement, 
particularly in its official and institutional form, to bring about effective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bold in original. 
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implementation and the reduction of corruption in recipient countries has given way 
to a small but incisive literature that highlights the issues surrounding that failure. 
Authors writing from this critical approach are usually skeptic, pessimist, and 
sometimes even distrustful and outright cynic of the global fight against malfeasance, 
raising arguments that questions the concepts, methodology, activities, discourse, 
politics and consequences developed by the international community (Kennedy, 1999; 
Brown and Cloke, 2004; Hanlon, 2004; Hindess, 2005; Sampson, 2005; Larmour, 
2005; Carr, 2006; Everett et al., 2006). Carr (2006), for example, not only discusses 
the problems behind the activities of international organizations, but explicitly 
questions the benefits of the rise of anti-corruption as described in the previous pages. 
The same description of the broad range of activities and instruments developed by 
domestic and international actors, is taken by Carr to be if not a sign of weakness, at 
least a significant obstacle to the pursued objective: “[T]he lack of a unified approach 
is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful way...” (2006, p. 
3) 
Hence, the relative failure of the international anti-corruption movement has 
had not only the effect of keeping corruption as a continuous scourge in the twenty-
first century, but it has raised questions about the relevance of the movement itself. 
Amidst the plethora of supporters and critics, of efforts and failures, one crucial 
question still remains: How can corruption be tackled? 
The weight of these questions naturally fall on the academic production 
dealing with anti-corruption, which has at its root the fundamental premise that the 
reduction of corruption levels requires some form of anti-corruption policies. 
Although this statement might come as a given, it nonetheless involves a crucial 
element that affects the way we disaggregate the problem.  
To say that anti-corruption policies are a pre-requisite to decrease the levels of 
corruption in a country involves isolating the issue of implementation from that of 
policy content. Indeed, although there is no intention to suggest that all policies are 
the same or that their specific content is irrelevant, implementation is clearly a topic 
all by itself, which merits attention aside and beyond the virtues or flaws of a specific 
piece of legislation. Needless to say, the content of a policy affects the possibilities 
and strategies behind implementation; but if we take as a given that a policy 
(regardless of what specific form it takes or if it is generic or country-specific) is 
	   28	  
necessary to prevent or control corruption, then we can divide our efforts between 
drafting the policy and coming up with a strategy to have it adopted and implemented.  
Taking this position as a first step, scholars researching anti-corruption need to 
take proper consideration to both policy products, and adoption and implementation 
strategies; both, however, are not susceptible to the same analyses, and history has 
shown that the issue of best practices or policies is a much easier subject to address 
than that of implementation, perhaps due to the technical nature of the former 
compared to the more political of the latter. To back this claim, we just need to look at 
the Guerzovich’s (2012) description of the phases of anti-corruption advocacy, or the 
United Nations’ Anti-Corruption Package, both of which were discussed in the 
previous chapter. Elaborating on what was said before, we currently do not just know 
much more about corruption than about how to defeat it, but we also know much 
more about how to defeat it than about how to convince domestic actors to actually 
try and do so. 
Additionally, the success of scholars dealing with anti-corruption policies in 
informing and orienting the activities and efforts of public national and international 
agencies can only be possible if the activities and efforts they recommend actually 
take place, namely in the form of actual adoption and implementation. Without 
having sound academic work implemented and tested in real settings, there is no point 
in disregarding policy recommendations for any number of flaws critics might want to 
point in them.  
Therefore, the adopted premise of the role of anti-corruption policies forces us 
to focus on the issue of anti-corruption adoption and implementation, without needing 
here to engage in the debate surrounding the wisdom behind specific policy 
recommendations produced by the international anti-corruption movement. Although 
such considerations are also crucial to ultimately defeating corruption, the current 
state of affairs requires us to address the separate issue of implementation as a matter 
of urgency. 
 
2. Anti-Corruption Reform: A Literature Review 
 
Although it has just been highlighted the importance of looking at anti-
corruption policies and their implementation separately, in reality the truth is that 
most of the literature concerned with fighting corruption does not make that 
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distinction so clear, and more often than not the focus on policies leaves little space 
for considerations over their implementation. This limitation is all the more profound 
when implementation is only glossed over implicitly rather than explicitly, leaving us 
with the job of identifying the proposed strategies to bridge the distance between 
policy advice and policy practice.  
Some cases surrender completely the matter of implementation, and address 
exclusively the technical content of anti-corruption tools available to political actors.  
Other publications, however, are produced aiming at balancing the weight 
between policy content and policy implementation, and focus on advocacy strategies 
and activities suggested to international donors, NGOs and social stakeholders. These 
could be said to work as the counterpart to the ones referred to in the previous 
paragraph: International Drivers of Corruption: A Tool for Analysis (OECD, 2012) 
and the Corruption Fighters’ Tool Kit: Civil society experiences and emerging 
strategies (Transparency International, 2002), among others, are some examples from 
this position. 
Although these two groups are prominent in their efforts to further specific 
agendas, be it of producing policy recommendations and/or supporting and engaging 
in policy advocacy, for the majority of academic publications the focus is not so 
clearly defined. At once they will analyze specific anti-corruption activities, and will 
move on to a conclusion or recommendation regarding its viability in technical and 
operative terms. All that can be stated without a doubt is that they are in one way or 
another concerned with the issue of fighting corruption. It is from this vast and 
heterogeneous body of anti-corruption publications that the state-of-the-art of anti-
corruption reform (i.e. adoption and implementation) actually arises, informing think 
tanks and practitioners. 
Looking at what the anti-corruption literature has to say about the issue of 
adoption and implementation, five different types of discussions can be identified: 
Principal-agent: top-down; principal-agent: bottom-up; principal-agent: 
international pressure; cleanups; and, political will. Each one of this will be briefly 
described in turn. 
 
Principal-Agent: Top-down. This approach is by far the most prominent and 
ubiquitous in both political science and economics (Persson et al., 2010). Its tenets are 
simple enough: it looks at corruption in society as an activity engaged in by a certain 
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group of actors, product of the asymmetry of information that allows them to abuse 
their delegated position for private benefits, and contrast them to another group of 
actors that entrusted the former with the performance of activities for the collective 
wellbeing. Thus, the interactions between both groups are dubbed a principal-agent 
model because it imagines a principal who has to control the performance of an agent 
that is inherently corruptible.  
The question of who these principal and agent are is somehow less 
straightforward. In most cases, the principal is found in the senior officials part of the 
ruling government, while the agents are naturally the bureaucracy in general; this is 
the top-down approach that will be discussed in this section. In other cases, however, 
the agents will be the ruling government itself while the principal is embodied by 
society at large; therefore, an inversion of the role of the government takes place and 
society is called on to perform control activities in a bottom-up fashion (which is the 
second approach discussed later). Finally, the principal may even be imagined in the 
form of international organizations (as the third approach will discuss). 
The literature on anti-corruption describing reform as a government activity 
aimed at controlling bureaucratic corruption was the first approach to lend itself to 
identification due to the considerable proportion of the international movement 
involved in its production. Such is the case of the United Nations’ so-called ‘anti-
corruption package’: The United Nations Handbook on Practical Anti-corruption 
Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators (UNODC, 2004b), the United Nations 
Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies (UNODC, 2003), the United Nations Anti-
Corruption Toolkit (UNODC, 2004a), and the Compendium of International Legal 
Instruments on Corruption (UNODC, 2005). Together with other publications such as 
the Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity (UNODC, 
2011) and Anticorruption Programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP, 
2012), these are but a few examples of the work developed under the principal-agent 
model with domestic governments as the envisaged principal. This type of documents, 
all elaborated by think tanks, are openly directed to practitioners; in other words, they 
engage and inform public officials and policy makers directly, in the same way the 
International Anti-Corruption Academy does. They work as compilations of fact 
sheets summarizing key anti-corruption tools available for implementation.  
But they are not the only, or even the most prominent, body of literature 
following this approach. The initial interest in developing policy recommendations to 
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deal with corruption comes in the form of normative research from the 1990s building 
on historical and anecdotic evidence. Some famous examples of this trend are the 
works by Robert Klitgaard (1988; Klitgaard et al., 2000), Transparency 
International’s Jeremy Pope (1999a; 1999b; Langseth et al., 1997, 1999), Daniel 
Kaufmann (1997; 1998; 1999), and Rose-Ackerman (1997; 1998). Furthermore, to 
some degree most corruption-related studies end up adopting this approach (at least 
when it comes to drawing conclusions and making recommendations) (Doig, 1995; 
Khan, 2006; Aron, 2007; Man, 2009; De Sousa, 2010; Vannucci, 2011).  
What all this production mentioned above has in common is a heavy reliance 
in the pre-existence of some level of political will already in place at the domestic 
leadership level. Although the settings are not always overlooked by the work of this 
approach, and the recommendations sporadically address contextual and 
environmental factors that need to be kept into consideration for a successful 
implementation, when it comes to the point of reforming national anti-corruption 
standards it consistently becomes intuitive as to how exactly those mechanisms are to 
be adopted, and by whom.  
Furthermore, it usually includes very limited reference to scientifically 
collected empirical data on implementation issues, basing its conclusions and 
recommendations on a logical process that builds on current knowledge on networks, 
organizations, and economic development. The point for this approach seems to be 
the exposition of policies in a logical and simple manner to provide a frame of 
reference for future adoption. As the discussion on the international anti-corruption 
movement has shown, at least in this sense it has proven to be quite effective.  
The convenience of its simplicity, however, is equally matched by the utter 
exclusion of the actual means to bring along policy adoption; or, to put it another way, 
its discourse makes the assumption that the problem of corruption control is one of 
knowledge, and not will. Examples of this implicit assumption abound, and, even 
though some authors are able to recognize the difficulties and paradoxes behind 
expecting corruption-stricken societies to just go ahead and implement anti-corruption 
policies (even if the specific policy recommendations were actually infallible), their 
arguments keep revolving around normative statements (good-practices) all the while 
taking for granted the necessary political will, or at least disregarding the issue.  
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Principal-Agent: Bottom-up. The second approach to the adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies derives logically from the previous one 
and its inability to secure effective reform. To clearly see the transition between the 
reliance of the top-down approach on government authorities, and the bottom-up 
discussion of policy advocacy by civil society, a paper by Susan Rose-Ackerman 
(1999) is discussed below. 
In her discussion of the link between electoral systems and corruption, Rose-
Ackerman (1999) attempts to go beyond the implicit assumption of automatic 
implementation and gives fair consideration to the issue of political will. Suggesting 
four ways in which a political system may break the connection between campaign 
financing and undue influence (restrictions on time and methods of campaigning; 
stronger disclosure rules; limits to individual donations; and, alternative sources of 
funds in the public sector), she then turns to the crucial subject of how to come about 
reform. She explicitly considers that “[r]eform will not occur unless powerful groups 
and individuals inside and outside government support it” (1999, p. 373), working 
with the premise that political leaders do not have an inherent interest in reform 
unless the benefits can somehow outweigh the costs. The solution to this problem, 
however, is hindered by the sheer weight of the issue at hand: “Democratic structures 
can promote reform under some, but not all, conditions” (p. 373). She states that 
“[r]eform ought to be more likely in governments with voting rules that limit the 
ability of politicians to benefit from patronage and in systems where power is 
balanced across political groupings” (p. 377), both aspects that are amenable to 
reform in the electoral system. But then we are confronted with a paradox: we need to 
reform in order to make reform possible. This paradox, although obvious enough, is 
largely ignored when she suggests that “[r]eform is possible and can become 
institutionalized and hard to reverse when it creates new supporters who resist efforts 
to undo past changes” (p. 378). If it is indeed the specificities of the electoral and 
party systems that can create support for anti-corruption reform, how exactly are they 
developed, and by whom? 
Although Rose-Ackerman does not give a clear answer beyond that of the 
historical particularities of United States and Britain, the argument finally switches to 
the importance of another group of actors in the political system: society. She states 
that “[i]n a democracy not everyone need support reform; it can be carried out if 
enough voters begin to see that it will be, on balance, beneficial” (1999, p. 377), and 
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that “[it] is much easier if the domestic and international business communities 
believe that they will benefit from a reduction in corruption and patronage and if 
ordinary citizens see gains as well” (p. 378). 
Having given up on the political will of the government to do anything more 
than just formally endorse the anti-corruption discourse, civil society becomes the 
preferred principal for anti-corruption control. This is the territory of vertical 
accountability (O’Donnell, 1998) and policy advocacy, of international and domestic 
NGOs like Transparency International and its national chapters, and the World 
Bank’s preferred approach before the adoption of the Governance and Anticorruption 
(GAC) Strategy in 2007.  
Certainly, the inclusion of civil society in projects supported by international 
donors and organizations has been a fundamental part of the mainstream literature 
from the top-down perspective. We need only look at the influential work by 
Langseth, Pope and Stapenhurst (1997; 1999) on their model National Integrity 
System, which includes as some of its pillars the media, the private sector, and the 
civil society, among government actors and agencies. However, other accounts of the 
importance of civil society to control the activities of the government focus solely (or 
at least primarily) on it, such as the work on Transparency International’s Advocacy 
and Legal Advice Centres (Elers et al., 2010; Giannakopoulos, 2011; Keller-Herzog, 
2009), publications aimed at providing guidance (such as the Anti-Corruption Ethics 
and Compliance Handbook for Business by OECD et al., 2013; the Anti-Corruption 
Kit, 15 Ideas for Young Activists by Transparency International, 2014; or the NGO 
Corruption Fighters’ Resource Book by Richard Holloway, 2011), and a growing 
number of academic publications (Kisubi, 1999; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Kpundeh, 
2005; Shelley, 2005; Németh et al., 2011; Trivunovic et al., 2013). 
Though it may seem that this position holds a better ground than the top-down 
approach (and this might be in fact true), as it is indeed more plausible that society, 
being the disadvantaged party in a corruption transaction (Spengler, 2010; Karklins, 
2005), will have an inherent will to fight malfeasance in the public sphere, it 
nonetheless continues working under the paradigm that there is an actor in the 
domestic system willing to take the role of the principal. Such a premise gives way to 
the problem of collective action. 
Bo Rothstein in particular has given much attention to this issue (2005, 2011). 
He describes this position as questioning “the underlying assumption [in the principal-
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agent theory] that every society holds at least one group of actors willing to act like 
‘principals’ and, as such, enforce such [monitoring and punishment] regimes” 
(Persson et al., 2010, p. 5). The collective action problem posits that, in societies 
ravaged by systemic corruption or simply in those were the issue of corruption does 
not stay restricted to the higher levels of government but can be found in everyday life 
(ubiquitous petty corruption), there may not be any actor willing to take the role of the 
principal, as it is always more profitable to partake in corruption rather than spend 
private resources to fight it (Del Castillo and Guerrero, 2003; Karklins, 2005; Uslaner, 
2008). It becomes the common formula ‘if everyone is corrupt, then nobody is.’ The 
perception of corruption becomes a force of society, and makes addressing anti-
corruption strategies from a principal-agent approach rather futile. 
Finally, even in societies where a maturing and growing organized civil 
society can be assumed, the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework reduces 
most of the literature in this bottom-up approach to being largely descriptive and 
anecdotic. There is no conceptualization of the nature of the various advocacy 
strategies, besides the point that they are pointed at the government; the possible 
responses of the government remains in total obscurity, beyond the fact that they may 
ignore, listen or embrace civil society; and the way certain advocacy activities and 
government responses interact to produce scenarios of success or failure of anti-
corruption reform is, so far, unknown.  
To sum up, although it introduces the issue of political will and the power of 
civil society to produce changes in the national anti-corruption standards, the 
principal-agent model as adapted by the bottom-up approach overestimates the 
willingness of civil society to fight corruption. It also ignores theoretical 
considerations to integrate its tenets into a comprehensive model of anti-corruption 
reform, and thus it remains as an adequate contraposition to the top-down approach 
without actually surpassing its inherent limitations. 
 
Principal-Agent: International pressure. When we cannot assume the 
existence of honest and willing senior officials, nor the presence of a strong civil 
society, there is only one more source of anti-corruption drive available: the 
international anti-corruption movement. As described earlier, this movement rises 
from the global interest in curbing corruption, and as such, it inherently has the 
positivist prerogative of addressing, facilitating, and ultimately producing changes in 
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domestic and international anti-corruption systems. The moral intentions and methods 
of this movement to engage in anti-corruption advocacy and support is beyond the 
point: they may very well have hidden political or economic agendas behind their 
anti-corruption efforts (Kennedy, 1999; Hindess, 2005), but the fact remains that 
certain anti-corruption activities become feasible thanks to the intervention of 
international actors.   
The emphasis on international actors is an extension of the classic principal-
agent model normally related to the work of the top-down approach, but it also tends 
to bottom-up positions. While the latter see an arrangement in which rulers or citizens 
(in other words, domestic actors) are respectively called to the role of principals in 
charge of controlling the behavior of agents, authors focusing on international 
pressure imagine international actors as potential principals too, especially in the 
absence of domestic actors willing or able to perform that role (as in cases of endemic 
corruption). In other words, in cases characterized by a collective action problem, 
where the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies is not being 
undertaken due to domestic political and economic barriers, the international 
community (particularly in the form of donor agencies) could fulfill the role of anti-
corruption champion.  
The body of literature that could be loosely described as focusing on 
international pressure for the implementation of anti-corruption reform, on the other 
hand, is quite a heterogeneous one, for the main point of intersection between the 
arguments of individual studies is that they all, somehow, address the role of the 
international community in supporting anti-corruption activities and producing 
changes in the anti-corruption standards. This role can be assumed indirectly, as 
when it takes the form of technical and/or financial support to domestic governments 
and/or bureaucracies (Maldonado and Berthin, 2004; Michael, 2004b; Charron, 2011), 
where this approach overlaps with the top-down position. It can also take the form of 
technical and/or financial support to local anti-corruption advocacy (Wang and 
Rosenau, 2001), where it overlaps with the bottom-up approach. Finally, the 
international community can also have a direct impact in anti-corruption reform, as 
when it generates international pressure through the release of corruption rankings or 
policy assessments, or when it calls for the subscription of anti-corruption agreements 
or declarations (Martin, 1999; Marong, 2002; Carr, 2006; Wouters et al., 2012).  
The international pressure approach is best recognized in the emergence of the 
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international anti-corruption regime, and in the past decade it has seen a spur of 
academic work, from the assessment of international instruments such as the OAS 
Convention or the work of Transparency International and their relevance and impact 
(Husted, 2002; Vincke, 1997; Hendrix, 2003; Guerzovich, 2012), to the historical 
review and subsequent proposal of strategies to increase the effectiveness of donor 
interventions (Hanlon, 2004; Petkoski et al., 2009; Michael and Kasemets, 2007; 
Mathisen, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2011).  
The growing and beneficial inclusion of the role of the international 
community in domestic anti-corruption reform, however, has in most cases produced 
an overestimation of its relevance, to the direct detriment of the role of domestic 
actors: the argument tends to revolve exclusively on the activities and strategies 
available to international actors, excluding the potential for a more synergic approach 
that would include all stakeholders. In this state, few are the studies that give both 
domestic and international actors their rightful weight; some exceptions are Abbott 
and Snidal (2002), Hanson (2003), Bukovansky (2006), and Hanlon (2004). This 
regular issue is a direct result of the normative approach that is usually employed, 
which ignores the adoption or development of clear models to describe the interaction 
between the different elements at play – i.e. international community, domestic civil 
society, and national governments. 
Having avoided the issue posed by the collective action problem, and in very 
few cases suggested theoretical models that include a more dynamic approach to the 
interactions between all stakeholders (Michael, 2004a; Guerzovich, 2012), the 
international pressure approach can be considered to be a step forward in the line of 
the principal-agent theory. However, where this approach does not shine, it keeps in 
utter obscurity. The initial and classic idea of government political will is not 
completely addressed, and it remains unresolved. The consequence of not deepening 
the discussion on the government side is that it limits the possibilities to further our 
understanding over successful and failed cases of international pressure for anti-
corruption reform. Can we say that, whenever anti-corruption policies are adopted and 
implemented at the domestic levels, it is due to the performance of international 
actors and civil society? Perhaps in some cases. Can we say that, whenever anti-
corruption policies fail to be adopted and implemented, it is due to inappropriate 
strategies from the international and social sides? It would definitely be considered a 
failure of the anti-corruption movement, and still there would very little to improve 
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without addressing the actions adopted by the national government to avoid reform. 
Again, this issue has been completely ignored in any effective way by the literature 
under the international pressure approach. 
 
Cleanups. In needing to address the unresolved issue of political will for anti-
corruption reform, the fourth approach reviewed here concerns the literature on anti-
corruption cleanups, which reflects a higher focus on domestic politics and the actual 
people that adopt and implement policies to control public malfeasance. 
Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruhlik, arguably the most relevant authors in this 
approach, define cleanups as “government-initiated and government-directed 
campaigns against corruption” (1988:60), and explain that the defining characteristic 
of these campaigns is that “[the] decisions to initiate them are political, as are their 
scope and initial targets” (1991:82). Following their argument, what cleanups are can 
be considered to be the implementation of one or more policy recommendations as 
proposed by the principal-agent, top-down approach, while the issue of how they are 
actually implemented is clearly far from what this classic view had in mind.  
The literature on cleanups does not assume the preexistence of political will, 
but undertake a critical review of historical processes (Cheung, 2007; Taylor, 2006; 
Kupatadze, 2012) in order to highlight the deeply political nature of anti-corruption 
reforms in the cases under study. The result is the case-by-case identification of an 
instrumental version of political will, one that mainly has private interests behind the 
adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. But the difference between 
the will for cleanups and the will for reform as described by the first approach does 
not only reside in the private interests that cleanups pursue (against the inherently 
social role of anti-corruption policies under normal circumstances): it is also usually 
highly temporal, limited by the term in office of the political leadership and the 
expected benefits it produces in terms of political capital and the concentration of 
power. 
Anti-corruption cleanups represent the effective political instrumentalization 
of the tenets of the international anti-corruption movement not only at the level of 
discourse, but particularly at the level of political competition and stability. 
Discussing the drive behind anti-corruption cleanup in Hong Kong during the 1970s 
(arguably the most famous example of successful anti-corruption efforts), Cheung 
(2007, p. 48) explains the purely political nature of that experience: 
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"By grasping an anti-corruption agenda, the reformist colonial administration 
under MacLehose was able to demonstrate its epistemocratic authority... 
Doing something about what everybody wanted to be eradicated, and doing it 
right the first time, was a sure way of winning support and legitimacy. As the 
ICAC scheme subsequently showed, the innovative way of combating 
corruption through a high-powered agency was able to underscore both the 
moral11 determination as well as the organizational12 effectiveness of the new 
administration to finally do something about corruption. The worth of 
government was thus proven." 
 
Cheung (2007, p. 64) emphasizes the role of political self-preservation behind 
the anti-corruption efforts in Hong-Kong: 
 
“During the post-1967 crisis of legitimacy in Hong Kong, by building up 
strong public expectations for combating corruption, and seizing the 
opportunity of an administration that was weakened by the crisis and thus 
internally less resistant to drastic reforms, MacLehose was able to accomplish 
what previously was thought almost impossible...” 
 
Most instances of cleanups, however, do not have a happy ending. Mbaku 
(1996, p. 108) describes the interests and motivations behind anti-corruption 
campaigns in Africa, which directly affect the quality of government: 
 
“The impetus to clean up corruption can be provided primarily by political 
exigency rather than by genuine interest in the efficient functioning of the 
nation’s political and economic institutions. In several countries, including 
those in Africa, postcoup commissions of inquiry are usually designed to 
discredit the ousted government and help incoming elites gain recognition and 
legitimacy. Incumbents also use cleanup programs to help them stay in power 
and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation and the allocation of 
resources.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cursive in original. 
12 Cursive in original. 
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The literature on cleanups clearly and directly addresses the issue behind the 
concept of political will, something that was always missing in the principal-agent 
approaches. However, although rich in historical insight, it often lacks a clear 
theoretical model or framework for the analysis of cases (Kupatadze, 2012; Manion, 
1998; Mbaku, 1996; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011), and thus its contribution to the 
study of corruption in general is limited as a result. Without a properly developed 
model that allows for the integration of insights from this approach into the progress 
already made by the previously reviewed positions (particularly that of the 
international pressure), there is not much the literature on cleanups can tell us about 
the rate of success and failure of anti-corruption policies in other countries.   
The main contribution of this approach to our understanding of anti-corruption 
reform comes between the lines, in the identification of those circumstances that 
allowed the adoption of anti-corruption actions (even as politicized and self-serving as 
by nature cleanups are): pressure (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1988), momentum of stress 
on the regime (Cheung, 2007), regime legitimacy (Kupatadze, 2012), political 
necessity (Mbaku, 1996), intra-party political competition (Balán, 2011), 
instrumentalization and self capacity-building initiatives (Adebanwi and Obadare, 
2011), etc. The focus on the identification and description of these scenarios is a key 
element missing from the principal-agent approaches, with their inherent interest in 
policy recommendation and advocacy strategies; however, for this same reason, the 
study of cleanups cannot cross the bridge towards a full model of anti-corruption 
reform, and it remains limited to a political analysis that leaves almost no room to real 
policy reform free from manipulation, self-service and sabotage. 
 
Political will. The literature on anti-corruption reform reviewed so far has left 
unanswered some crucial questions: What drives national leaders to support/tolerate 
the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies? How can this 
support/tolerance be measured? How can it be stimulated? 
 While the literature on cleanups adopts a realistic and even cynic attitude 
regarding the political will behind highly manipulated and instrumental reforms, the 
core concept of political will was left underdeveloped and unexploited. What exactly 
was understood by political will? The cleanups literature would suggest definitions in 
line with the specific circumstances in which it was expressed, differing from one 
case to another. For example, even though cleanup campaigns had initial similarities 
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in Zambia (2002~) and Kenya (2003~), because the former ultimately saw more 
progress and was pursued more effectively than the latter (Taylor, 2006) the cleanups 
approach would have to describe political will in those cases in terms of the 
singularities of one experience contrasted with the other. Taylor does exactly that, and 
although he does not explicitly employ the term ‘political will,’ he suggests that 
effective prosecution (anti-corruption cleanup) can be accomplished when there is 
“competitiveness of elections,” a strong governing coalition, “rapid initiations... of 
proceedings,” small “coterie of beneficiaries of corruption outside the state”13, and 
“international pressure” (2006, pp. 297-298). Obviously, there must be a common 
element linking these five circumstances, but this is never actually addressed. 
The issue of political will, just as this chapter has been suggesting from the 
beginning, is the single most important element when addressing anti-corruption 
activities. Kupatadze (2012, p. 28) states that 
 
“One of the key variables here is the political will of the committed leadership 
that is viewed as the key to the success of any anti-corruption campaign in the 
academic literature. As mentioned earlier [Georgia’s president from 2004 to 
2007] Saakashvili showed clear willingness to pursue [an] anti-corruption 
agenda. The most important question here is ‘what motivates elites and leaders 
to undertake or shy away from the tough anti-corruption reforms.’” 
 
To define and understand political will, and to trace its causes and processes, 
is to unveil the inner workings of anti-corruption activities in the making. 
Unfortunately, such concern has certainly driven less scholarly attention; but what has 
been produced, even if limited in number, is more embedded in theoretical worry.14  
Perhaps the most serious study of the concept of political will for anti-
corruption reform was the one produced by Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba (1999; and 
Brinkerhoff, 2000), who define it as “the commitment of [elected or appointed leaders 
and public agency senior officials] to undertake actions to achieve a set of 
objectives—in this case, anti-corruption policies and programs—and to sustain the 
costs of those actions over time” (1999, p. 3). Once it can be contemplated as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Italics in original. 
14 Particularly noteworthy is the work of Anna Persson (Persson et. al. 2010; Persson and Sjöstedt 
2012). 
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individual element, conceptually different from other with whom it interacts (such as 
stakeholders, advocacy strategies, specific policies, etc.) and even passive to further 
disaggregation, the gate is open for authors to describe it, develop indicators for 
identification and assessment, analyze different manifestations and levels, describe 
contexts and settings, and propose possible ways and means to stimulate (and even 
push) it (Kpundeh, 1998, 2000; Persson et. al., 2010; Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba, 1999; 
Persson and Sjöstedt, 2012; Ruzindana, 1997).  
In the words of Sahr J. Kpundeh, the study of political will for anti-corruption 
reform brings forth into the scholarly discussion the role of “the actors, their motives 
and the choices they make to promote and implement anti-corruption reforms” (1998, 
p.92). However, notwithstanding the obvious benefits of looking into the drivers of 
anti-corruption reform from a scientific perspective, literature production on this 
approach still falls short regarding the possible strategies to either stimulate support 
for reforms or come about them through other means. In other words, so far, the 
identification and assessment of political will have not suggested effective means for 
its manipulation. In their place, the study of political will has proposed scenarios that 
are not easily susceptible to intervention, or that rely again on political will, in a clear 
case of circular logic.  
To give two examples, Persson and Sjöstedt (2012, p. 626) find that the 
quality of the social contract determines the level of political will to fight corruption: 
 
“[T]he suggested analytical framework highlights the ways in which 
leadership behavior is to a significant extent conditioned by the character of 
underlying social contracts. Where a shared social contract is lacking, we 
should expect the incentive and opportunity structure of leaders to be geared 
towards moral hazard and adverse selection, making the existence of leaders 
demonstrating political will less likely.” 
 
Quite obviously, the social contract is not something easily malleable by any 
standard; it could even be said that corruption is a more simple issue than the quality 
of the social contract. So, to suggest the modification of the latter in order to solve the 
former is not just impractical, it is useless.  
On the other hand, Kpundeh (1998) proposes participatory governance as a 
way to foster political will. But to do so, he first requires the existence of public 
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pressure for reform (in the same way the principal-agent, bottom-up approach does); 
and more importantly, he suggests that such public pressure must be sustained and 
stimulated by specific policies: “Independent entities institutionalise (sic) political 
will, which is paramount to the success of any reform strategy.” (p. 105) Naturally, 
his argument puts as back at the beginning, as we are required to have at least some 
actors manifestly willing to support anti-corruption policies in order to begin fostering 
political will in the system at large. Although this brings attention to the historic 
importance of specific people in leadership positions, its does not suggest ways to 
stimulate political will other than to capitalize on any already existing. 
The result of the shortcomings described above is that, although the political 
will literature explicitly deepens our understanding, and secures the theoretical 
position, of a most important element to address the problems behind anti-corruption 
reform, it does not provides us with a clear model to solve the implementation issue. 
This is all the more eloquent when we consider that it does very little to address the 
issue of counter-reform, which effectively depicts not just a lack of political will for 
anti-corruption, but an active resistance to it.  
   
A better approach, then, needs to be comprehensive in nature and retain the 
strengths and scientific innovations of the five groups of work that have been briefly 
reviewed above. Although political will managed to focus on a persistent problem 
behind anti-corruption reforms, it lacks the empirical and down-to-earth approach of 
the work on cleanups, and so it is unable to provide any definite answer. On the other 
hand, although the arguments highlighting the relevance of international pressure to 
secure effective implementation allow for a richer and more comprehensive model of 
anti-corruption reform (building greatly on the work of normative authors regarding 
the principal-agent model), their general underestimation of domestic forces renders 
them insufficient to tackle the problem.  
The answer to how the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies is possible requires a more inclusive and productive model, acknowledging 
the importance of the three main groups of actors involved (international actors, civil 
society, and national governments) and describing them in terms of their objectives 
and strategies. The issue of political will in a multiple-actor arrangement, conversely, 
highlights the dangers of confusing the official adoption of international anti-
corruption standards with their necessary implementation in domestic settings: while 
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both adoption and implementation are obviously needed for reform, the former 
represents a formal (and often symbolic) political gesture that does not need to be 
reflected in succeeding measures, such as the provision of resources or even the 
enactment of regulations. Brinkerhoff (2000), for example, in identifying the five key 
characteristics of political will, explicitly differentiates between mobilization of 
support from continuity of effort, asking regarding the latter: “Does the reformer treat 
the effort as a one-shot endeavor and/or symbolic gesture, or are efforts clearly 
undertaken for the long term?” (p. 243) In other words, the level of technical expertise 
exhibited in the adoption of the most promising anti-corruption policy can, and must 
be, clearly differentiated from the actions taken to implement such policy in a way 
consistent with its technical, political and economic demands. Such position seems 
specially sensible when considering cases such as that of Peru and the Latin American 
region in general, where the adoption of international anti-corruption conventions has 
so far not been followed by adequate levels of national implementation, just as it was 
described in the previous chapter. In consequence, the evidence of formally adopted 
anti-corruption policies should not presume any later degree of implementation. 
Pushing the idea of lack of political will even further, it is possible to consider 
not just the resistance to implement international commitments and the resort to anti-
corruption practices that subvert their spirit, but even the adoption of counter-reform 
measures (from the enactment of regulations to constitutional reforms) that facilitate 
the practice of public malfeasance: censorship of the media (Peters, 2003; Dyczok, 
2006; Stanig, 2015), intervention of the judiciary and/or regulatory agencies 
(McMillan and Zoido, 2004; Sherman, 1980), increased legislative powers to the 
executive branch (Corrales and Penfold, 2007), spread of special procurement types 
(Schultz and Søreide, 2008), and deactivation of formal channels for the monitoring 
of public spending (Roberts, 2000; Coronel, 2006), among others. 
However, the distinction between accounts of political measures that weaken 
control structures and enable the capture of public resources for the benefit of private 
interests, on the one hand, and the five approaches to anti-corruption reform reviewed 
earlier, on the other, resides not in their policy-making nature (which they share), but 
in their relationship to the phenomenon of corruption: while the latter discuss the 
possibilities for engaging in the fight against public malfeasance, and at most their 
arguments might focus on the government’s neglect of this responsibility, the former 
focus on processes of active State-sponsored corruption. In other words, these 
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accounts deviate from an anti-corruption policy discussion, and enter the more 
general area of corruption literature, adding to its wealth of knowledge. Therefore, 
although they provide important insights regarding anti-corruption devolution that 
implicitly point at the existence of political opposition to reform in the terms 
proposed by international standards, they are also categorically different from the 
approaches considered at the core of this chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Theoretical Framework I:  
A Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform 
 
1. The Anti-Corruption Dilemma and the Nature of Government 
 
The critical review of the anti-corruption reform literature (engaged in the 
previous chapter) concluded that a central problem in the efforts to adopt and 
implement reforms was the issue of political will. Naturally, just as any other policy, 
anti-corruption requires the initiative of a senior official (or politician with 
prerogative) to address malfeasance by introducing a coherent group of actions aimed 
at reducing corruption in a certain part of the public and/or private spheres. As 
government activities are never free, the simple idea of performing an action against 
corruption requires us to consider the inherent costs of that action as a starting point. 
Already in the 1980s, Robert Klitgaard (1988) was considering the magnitude 
of implementation embedded in the anti-corruption idea, in an effort to provide a 
grounded advice to policy makers. Considering the variety of activities and 
instruments that could be adopted to fight corruption, each one of them with its 
specific cost to the organization, Klitgaard suggested that it would be inefficient to 
invest in all of them without considering the relative impact they potentially offered. 
As government, just like any other organization, does not have unlimited resources, it 
would be wise to invest in those activities that produced the highest margin of 
benefits in terms of anti-corruption success; however, this success in turn needs to be 
considered in terms of benefits for the whole system. Corruption is not an evil by 
itself, but only when considering its pernicious effects. Therefore, the cure for 
corruption should not be allowed to be more expensive to society (and not just in 
monetary terms) than corruption itself, and that is a real possibility when the marginal 
returns of anti-corruption activities are considered. Thus, Klitgaard (1988, p. 195) 
arrives to a crucial point: 
 
“It follows that policies to crack down on corruption have costs in terms of the 
organization’s effective performance of its primary mission. The wise 
policymaker will consider these costs as well as the benefits of reduced 
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corruption. The ideal level of anticorruption efforts will be short of the 
maximum; and the optimal level of corruption will not, in practice, be zero.” 
 
But the marginal returns of anti-corruption efforts are not the only (or even the 
most important) element in the calculations of real-life politics. To stop at that would 
be to adopt the premise that social benefits and collective wellbeing are the only 
concerns of the leadership, when realistically speaking they usually are not. The 
whole concept of corruption entails the idea that social considerations are put aside in 
favor of private benefits. If the leadership is already engaged in illegal acts, the anti-
corruption drive will not just stop short of the maximum, but it will most likely stop 
much earlier than that. Klitgaard evaluation of the appropriate length of an anti-
corruption campaign is perfectly reasonable when considering public administration 
from a normative perspective, but it becomes futile when the politics of corruption is 
considered.  
Before tackling the issue of efficiency in a scenario of corrupt leadership, let 
us consider an additional element to the equation. Taking a more realistic approach, it 
is usually considered that besides considerations of technical, financial, and political 
costs related to the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies, there is 
also the element of political capital. Anti-corruption, just as any other government 
activity, does not only translates into costs, but as it impacts in society (hopefully in a 
beneficial way) it also creates benefits for the government in the form of political 
capital. This capital, when we drop the assumption of a virtuous and devout 
leadership, explains in theory the reason why certain policies are adopted while others 
are ignored. Not surprisingly, political capital is especially important in democracies, 
where it has the ability to directly translate into votes and power. Therefore, 
Klitgaard’s idea of anti-corruption efforts being efficient just as long as social welfare 
is attained could be converted into a more realistic statement: anti-corruption efforts 
are pursued just as long as they are politically profitable for the leadership.  
Michael and Kasemets (2007, p. 6), following this logic, postulate that 
 
“Parliamentarians are, to some extent, vote maximisers working in these 
‘political markets.’ In political markets, parliamentarians would want to 
expose corruption because social welfare translates into votes. As the issue of 
anti-corruption becomes more popular, the probability of action turning into 
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votes increases. ... If anti-corruption increases returns, it can also decrease 
risks of being sacked and perhaps [Georgia’s second president] Eduard 
Shevardnadze’s support for anticorruption in Georgia serves as a testament to 
such a fear.” 
 
Although the above assertion is correct, anti-corruption policies are not just 
like other policies: they target the government itself (or at least the bureaucracy that 
supports it), contrary to most other policies that target in one way or another civil 
society. The contradiction or dilemma is obvious. Going back to the subject of 
efficiency in a scenario of corrupt leadership, there is a clear incompatibility between 
the objective pursued and the actors called on to address it. To give an analogy, it is 
equivalent to expecting a thief to arrest himself. Michael and Kasemets (2007, p. 6) 
understand this dilemma, and add 
 
“Yet, if serving minority interests and engaging in patronage earns more 
political capital, parliamentarians would be expected not to follow any type of 
donor training [regarding anti-corruption policies]. 
Simply put, parliamentarians, when considering anti-corruption action, will 
balance the probable increase in votes with the costs to special interests which 
support them politically.” 
 
It could be added that, to convince corrupt politicians to ignore anti-corruption 
recommendations, not only minority interests and patronage must provide higher 
political capital, but also political capital can be completely surrendered for higher 
rewards in the form of proceeds from corruption. We can take political capital 
completely out of the equation, and expect a political leadership to reject any anti-
corruption activity that might create obstacles to his network of corruption or even 
prosecute it. Certainly, the relative weight of political capital against illegal incomes 
will depend on the subjective preferences of the political actors, but when the latter 
are prioritized we could expect anti-corruption reforms to completely stagnate; and 
this is a major peculiarity of anti-corruption policies, for other types of policies do not 
introduce additional costs to their implementation beyond regular resources. Anti-
corruption policies effectively cost the organizational resources demanded to their 
adoption and implementation, and any surreptitious benefits the leadership may have 
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been perceiving from corruption and the national anti-corruption standards; all else 
being equal, they have a higher ratio of costs to political capital than most other types 
of policies. 
Thus, the peculiarity of anti-corruption introduces an additional level of 
complexity to the adoption of reforms (Maldonado and Berthin, 2004). 
On top of that, there may even be incentives for an honest politician to avoid 
supporting the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. Rose-
Ackerman (1999), reporting on work by Barbara Geddes, suggests the existence of a 
“politicians’ dilemma” (p. 373) where a single actor or group brings about anti-
corruption reform but voters are unable to perceive who is responsible for those 
improvements in the anti-corruption standards, and so political capital is distributed 
equally to all political actors. The politicians’ dilemma arises, then, when the 
spending of resources cannot produce an increase in political capital, thus devoiding 
the actor of enough reasons to invest. But the politicians’ dilemma also manifests in 
the opposite scenario. If voters are in fact able to identify the actor responsible for 
tackling corruption, the possibility of gaining office as a consequence of an electoral 
campaign driven on anti-corruption promises may make it more costly for the actor to 
hold on to a reformist agenda, as it will invariably bring a decrease in political 
patronage and its benefits for the party in office. 
One way or another, it seems costly for the political actor to invest resources 
in anti-corruption efforts. Evrenk (2011), employing a different logic to the one 
commented by Rose-Ackerman, supports this position and posits that “[a] clean 
politician... has incentives to not adopt the reform, because by (effectively) turning his 
corrupt rivals in future elections into clean candidates, the reform eliminates the clean 
politician’s competitive advantage in future elections” (p. 499). Here, the honest 
politician is not faced with the loss of political support from special interest groups, 
but fears that effective reform will make the anti-corruption campaign a one-time 
thing, benefitting him in the short run but taking away his competitive advantage in 
the long run. Therefore, for both Rose-Ackerman and Evrenk political systems are 
structured in such a way that there are no straightforward sources of stimulus for anti-
corruption activities, even in cases where leaders do not have a private interest in 
defending the status quo. 
Once we stop assuming that anti-corruption reform is of any interest or benefit 
to the political leadership, and that even the contrary might be true (corrupt politicians 
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stand to lose from reform), the implementation of campaign promises and 
international conventions become less likely, while counter-reform efforts become a 
real possibility. Just as Guerzovich (2012, p. 42) describes, “[i]n all societies, there 
are stakeholders with vested interests who stand to lose from [anti-corruption] 
reforms.” She then goes even further: “According to different Mexican anticorruption 
stakeholders, as no institutional anchor (or proactive advocacy tactics) made it 
mandatory or politically costly to roll back disclosure, executive officials have been 
willing and able to undo positive transformations” (p. 45). This situation highlights 
some qualities of the government as a reactive and creative system, one that not only 
adapts passively to the demands of its environment but that is able to develop new 
mechanisms in order to defend itself and even change its surroundings. The 
international anti-corruption movement has tended to see national governments as 
actors facing only two options, either adopt its recommendations regarding anti-
corruption reforms, or ignore them. In reality, however, national governments have 
two additional options: they can adopt policies that decrease the prevention and 
control of public malfeasance, effectively making it easy for political leaders to 
benefit from corruption without fearing detection and prosecution; and they can also 
undertake actions against the international anti-corruption movement, diminishing its 
strength, changing its focus towards other nations, or convincing it of the merits of 
their national anti-corruption standards. Each one of these options will naturally 
entail a different consequence, and will have a different degree of difficulty. 
Nonetheless, all four are perfectly possible alternatives, and to describe a government 
as been only able to execute the first two is an oversight that may very well explain 
why there has been so little progress in the academic field of anti-corruption reform. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that to acknowledge the existence of a 
leadership tolerant to corruption is to accept the possible existence of government 
actions that aim at defending (and even reinforcing) the existing anti-corruption 
standards, against any or all actions taken by international and local supporters of 
anti-corruption reform. Without making assumptions about the honest or corrupt 
nature of the political leadership, its description in the terms discussed above is both 
realistic and consequential. It is realistic based on what it is widely known regarding 
the level of high-level corruption in most developing countries around the globe, and 
of the level of adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies described in 
the introductory chapter. We may call the governments of these countries apathetic, 
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tolerant, or even corrupt; what matters is that we recognize the reality of the lack of 
incentives they have to adopt actions against malfeasance, just as this chapter has 
been discussing. It is consequential, because it opens the door to analyze government 
activities not just in terms of what they do to implement policy recommendations, but 
also in terms of what they do to resist implementation.  
The key to begin exploring the consequences of this reasoning will be, then, to 
explicitly adopt a description of the nature of national governments in relation to their 
interest in controlling corruption.  
Krastev and Ganev (2004, pp. 75-76) ask and respond exactly in line with the 
present discussion: 
 
“Why anticorruption programs are not getting support from ‘the top’ is the 
central question of this paper. It is not a study of anticorruption policies, it is a 
study of incentives. The ‘highest levels of the state’ do not support 
anticorruption efforts (1) because they have incentives to be involved in 
corruption, or (2) because they do not have incentives to initiate anti-
corruption campaigns even when they do not have incentives to be involved in 
corruption.” 
 
These hypotheses will be at the core of the theoretical framework to be 
developed in the rest of this chapter. For an honest government, anti-corruption 
policies should only be attractive in direct relation to the political capital they can 
generate for them; for a corrupt government, anti-corruption policies should be 
avoided in direct relation to the interests they threaten. Such is the initial hypothesis 
of this study to answer the question of what explains Peru’s limited adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies between 2000 and 2014. 
 
2. Dynamic Response Model of a Political System 
 
Taking into account all that it has been discussed so far regarding the 
particularities of anti-corruption reform, both generally and in Peru, a theoretical 
model for the assessment of the Peruvian experience since the turn of the century 
should consider the following: 
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§ There are three main groups of actors that are of importance: the 
government; local civil society; and international actors.15 
§ The government is pressured by local civil society and international actors 
to adopt and implement anti-corruption policies; however, the government 
may chose to reform or not. 
§ The government has an inherent interest in obtaining political capital; anti-
corruption actions may or may not provide it with political capital; and 
anti-corruption will only be chosen when it provides more political capital 
than the sum of the resources spent and any loss in corrupt profits. 
§ The adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies in Peru has 
fallen quite short of the target, and the national anti-corruption standards 
has been largely preserved for most of the period considered here. 
 
These four points put together describe a scenario where the Peruvian 
government defends (or at least allows) national anti-corruption standards to remain 
relatively underdeveloped, even against any pressure arising from public and 
international discontent, in a way that represents the most economical and convenient 
result for the leadership. Translating this description to a theoretical model, David 
Easton’s Dynamic Response Model of a Political System (Easton 1965a, b) is found to 
fit perfectly the tenets of the present study. 
At its core, Easton’s model aims at providing an essential structure to 
understand the different forces that might create stress for a political system, and 
subsequently identify the coping mechanisms available to it to keep a minimum level 
of support flowing. Over this basis, the model incorporates multiple elements that are 
part of the dynamic processes embedded in the system; but at the end, all of them 
follow the author’s interest to address the survival of the political system,16 which 
Easton defines as “those interactions through which values are authoritatively 
allocated for a society” (1965b, p. 21).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Although the local civil society and international actors may have hidden agendas and different 
interests, for the purpose of this model they must be considered to exert some type of pressure over the 
government towards anti-corruption actions. Therefore, their inclusion in the model will 
consequentially define them as inherently standing against domestic corruption. 
16 Easton’s work on his systems analysis is, even in its simplest form, a more complex model that this 
study can hope to portrait. For further details, hence, the reader can consult directly the literature 
referenced here. 
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Easton’s political system (conceived as the most generic, basic and 
fundamental shape forming the structure of any political system, from the simplest of 
nomad tribes to most complex of modern nations) is defined by the presence of two 
variables, which he dubs “essential” (1965a, p. 96): (1) “the making and execution of 
decisions for a society,” and (2) “their relative frequency of acceptance as 
authoritative or binding by the bulk of society” (pp. 96-97). They will describe any 
and every form of political system; without them, the system does not to exist. Putting 
it another way, once a political system ceases to make and execute decisions for a 
society, and/or those decision fail to attract compliance, the system itself ceases to 
exist. Therefore, the maintenance of those variables will become for Easton the most 
important task of the system, and the model itself is drawn in terms of its survival. 
Before translating the study of anti-corruption reforms to Eastonian terms, let 
us delve a little more over the ways the system has to secure its survival, which 
demands discussing the ways in which it can be threatened to begin with. 
The political system (which from here on will mean the national government, 
interchangeably, for the present purpose) works as a machine that converts inputs into 
outputs. The inputs will take the form of demands or support, both coming from civil 
society or international actors.17 In turn, the system produces outputs in the form of 
government actions aimed at affecting in one way or another civil society and the 
international scene (i.e. the system’s environment). These “exchanges” or 
“transactions” (Easton, 1965a, p. 109) between the government and the actors in the 
environment represent the life of the political system, the way a country is run. 
However, in order to work properly, demands and support need to be held constant 
lest the government begins to see its ability to perform its two essential variables 
threaten. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 To be precise, inputs can also originate inside the political system, and not just in its environment. 
Easton (1965b) describes this possibility under the label of withinputs (p. 55). He posits that 
“[d]emands such as these differ from the inputs we have been discussing in that the latter are shaped by 
such parameters as culture, economy, social structure, and the like, whereas withinputs are politically 
determined... Whereas the externally influenced demands must cross the boundary from parameters to 
political system—thereby creating an exchange between the social environment and the system—the 
internally shaped demands may just flow from one subsystem within a political system to another. 
Demands may move from a party subsystem to the legislative subsystem, as in the case of a party 
proposal to the legislature for an amendment to an electoral law. Boundaries need not be relevant for 
all purposes and consequently they may be ignored when the occasion requires it without impeding the 
analysis or creating any logical inconsistencies. For tracing out the effect of variations in demands on a 
political system, the fact that demands are determined by variables within the political system is quite 
irrelevant. Both inputs and withinputs press themselves in the same way upon members of the system 
as a possible agenda for discussion. Their implications for stress on the system are identical” (pp. 55-
56). 
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While Easton see both types of inputs as being crucial for the life of the 
system, the issue of survival is directly linked to the level of support. Although 
demands are the raw materials for government actions, as the leadership needs to 
create in response to specific necessities, without support the government is 
completely unable to perform any action. Therefore, the constant flow of support 
from society (or international actors) to the government is essential for the leadership 
to keep exerting its authority; without it, it would be hard to say it is still in power, 
especially when its subjects and its peers are unwilling to recognize it a commanding 
role. Support, in these terms, is indistinguishable from political capital. 
Demands tend to affect the government only in relation to the way they affect 
the level of support when left unattended. When demands increase, it usually reflects 
a situation that is unsatisfactory for society. If it is a reaction to previous government 
actions, such as the wrong monetary policy or corruption in defense procurement,18 
this will usually be joined by a decrease in the overall support for the political 
leadership. If, on the other hand, demands are raised as a reaction to the emergence of 
new circumstances, such as drought or the aggressive stance of a foreign nation, the 
level of support will depend on the government response to the challenge. This is the 
nature of demands, and by themselves do not seem to create what Easton calls stress 
to the political system. Demands are only stressful when the system fails to respond 
appropriately. 
This brings us to the issue of output failure, which describes “the failure of the 
authorities to produce adequate outputs” in response or anticipation of societal and/or 
international demands, and the consequent “decline in the input of support” (Easton, 
1965b, p. 230); in other words, output failure represents the scenario created by those 
government actions that are widely considered unsatisfactory, delegitimizing the 
leadership. Easton (1965b, pp. 230-231) says that such situation arises under three 
possible circumstances:  
 
“First, [output failure] it arises when the authorities fail to take any action to 
meet the demands of the relevant members of a system.... 
Second, even if members have put in no specific demands about a matter, 
output failure may still occur. This is the case when the authorities fail to take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Regarding corruption, Easton (1965b, p. 39) explicitly states as a way of example that “exposure of 
corruption in government may give rise to a demand for improved control over lobbying.” 
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action that anticipates conditions which may later arise and to which relevant 
members of the system might then object. It becomes output failure if the 
members blame the authorities for not having the foresight or wisdom to have 
prepared for such an eventuality. 
Third, the authorities may take action of an important nature that they interpret 
as a response to demands. But the outputs may in fact be considered by the 
affected members as quite inappropriate for the conditions or incompatible 
with their demands. In that event the failure has not been in the quantity but in 
the quality of the outputs. The probability is that the outputs would encounter 
more hostility than support and in that way add to any shortage of support.” 
 
As it has been explained, outputs can be understood in general terms as all 
activities of the government. However, in order to fully grasp their meaning and be 
able to translate it to the field of anti-corruption reform accordingly, it is necessary to 
go deeper and analyze the concept of outputs.  
By definition, outputs are generally directed at the system’s environment,19 
aiming at affecting in one way or another social and international actors and their 
level of support to the government. In order to be of any relevance, outputs are 
required to generate some kind of response, and this will come as a result of the way 
the system’s environment interpret the specific outputs under discussion. As we have 
seen, some outputs may generate support, while others might hinder them. It all 
comes down to the way society reacts to certain government actions. Based on this 
characteristic, Easton (1965b) classifies outputs as circumstantial or perceived. Their 
meaning is very intuitive. In the one hand, circumstantial outputs are those 
government activities that affect the material or objective conditions in which an 
individual live, indirectly stimulating his/her support in a positive or negative way. 
Perceived outputs, on the other hand, affect individuals in a subjective way; they are 
the way government actions are interpreted by the individual, notwithstanding the 
actual effects on real conditions. Logically, circumstances and perceptions may 
represent two dimensions of the same policy, as when economic reforms have a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 To be more specific, output need not only be directed at environmental actors, but may also take the 
form of intrasystem outputs (Easton, 1965b, p. 347): “[M]any outputs significant in the production of 
specific support are also directed to objects within the political system itself... The concept outputs 
does not suggest that the authoritative allocation must be related to something outside the system; it 
refers only to the notion that the allocation emanates from or comes out of the behavior of the 
authorities.” 
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positive overall impact on society but are unpopular for ideological reasons, or when 
a sound and potentially beneficial labor policy is inaccurately understood by workers. 
However, they can also describe different government activities: there is clearly an 
important difference between changes in the interest rate, which directly address the 
real conditions of domestic markets; and the presidential address delivered annually, 
which aims at improving citizen perceptions about the way government is handling 
relevant issues. 
Going back to the issue of output failures, they will take place when either 
social circumstances, perceptions, or both, are incongruent with public demands. 
When demands increase, and support decreases, the political system has difficulty in 
making decisions and having them accepted (the two essential variables) and so it is 
said to be undergoing stress. If left unattended for too long, stress may cause the 
authorities to be replaced, the regime to be modified, and even the political 
community to fall apart (1965b). Luckily, however, the political system has ways of 
securing the constant provision of at least a minimum level of support flowing, 
enough to keep the political system intact in order of priority: they are called the 
coping mechanisms, available to the system to deal with stress and keep the essential 
variables inside a normal range. They will explain how a political system manages to 
endure even after the government fails to tend to the demands of citizens and 
international actors. 
In Easton’s elaboration of his model, coping mechanisms are ubiquitous; they 
are mentioned sporadically, directly referring to specific mechanisms, and are not 
collected under a special title. Nonetheless, in explaining the fundamental categories 
of analysis employed in his work, Easton (1965b) estates that “we shall find that 
political systems accumulate large repertoires of mechanisms through which they may 
seek to cope with their environments. Through these they may regulate their own 
behavior, transform their internal structure, and even go so far as to remodel their 
fundamental goals” (p.19).  
 Coping mechanisms do not only (or even largely) aim internally at 
transforming the political system so as to adapt to public discontent, but they can also 
be directed externally at the sources of demands and support, i.e. the system’s 
environment. In this way, coping mechanisms are indistinguishable from outputs as 
they have been discussed earlier, with the only difference that the former describe the 
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system’s response to actual or potential stress. Easton (1965b, p. 441) supports this 
logic: 
 
“[I]f [authorities] are unresponsive as defined here, they will not seek to 
stimulate support by reacting so as to satisfy the feedback demands. Rather, 
they may devise ways to ignore them without unnecessarily endangering the 
input of support... Our primary task in this section of the analysis is to 
understand the way in which outputs are a coping mechanism for reducing the 
dangers from insufficient support for the political objects.” 
 
Therefore, we shall talk of coping mechanisms as those government actions 
that seek to secure support for the authorities without having to necessarily tend to 
the specific demands of civil society and/or international actors. In this manner, 
Easton’s model relates to the argument of this study regarding the ways in which the 
Peruvian government managed to avoid drastic changes in the national anti-corruption 
standards. 
To get a clear picture of the interactions between the political system and its 
environment, with the flow of demands and support and their conversion into 
circumstantial and perceived outputs, Figure 1 presents a simplified depiction of 
Easton’s model. 
 
 
 
 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL  
ACTORS 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
DEMAND 
SUPPORT 
DEMAND 
SUPPORT 
OUTPUT 
! Perceived corrupt outputs 
ESSENTIAL VARIABLES OF THE SYSTEM: 1- Allocated values 
2- Frequency of compliance with them 
! Circumstantial corrupt outputs 
Figure 1. Dynamic Response Model of a Political System 
Source: Easton (1965a, 1965b) (adapted). 	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Although Easton’s model might prove extensively theoretical, we just need to 
look at instances of social convulsion in any given country to see that behind a highly 
technical jargon, the Model of a Political System only describes reality in a series of 
concepts that become then available to proper analyses and comparison.  
To give an example, looking at the case of Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori and his illegal re-election in 2000, we see that the details of this historic 
episode reflect all the elements and relations described by Easton’s model.  
 Without going into excessive detail, it suffices to know that the Peruvian 
presidential elections of 2000 was marred by manipulation of the electoral apparatus 
in order to legitimize Fujimori’s candidacy, and allegations of further electoral fraud. 
As a result of public knowledge of the government’s efforts to remain in power 
through these means (i.e. output failure), and a growing perception of corruption 
affecting senior officials of Fujimori’s government (i.e. perceived output), opposition 
candidate Alejandro Toledo called for a multitudinous march across the capital city, 
Lima, to protest against the government on the days surrounding Fujimori’s taking of 
oath and the beginning of his third government.  
Called the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos (March of the Four Suyos20) by 
Toledo, it gathered people from different points of the country, with thousands 
gathering around Congress and the Presidential Palace (i.e. increased demands and 
decreased support from civil society). In addition to the domestic front, the 
international community had been closely following the details of the 2000 
presidential campaign, with an OAS Mission in the country supervising the 
transparency of the process but finding it severely flawed and irregular (BBC, 
2000/05/31), to the point where direct criticism was directed towards Fujimori’s 
governments for not addressing the allegations of electoral fraud (BBC, 2000/04/06). 
As a consequence, the social and political convulsion expressed in Toledo’s march of 
protest was being closely followed by international media (Relea, 2000) and other 
actors (LR, 2000/07/30a) concerned about the state of democracy and human rights in 
Peru (i.e. increased demands and decreased support from international actors).  
While Fujimori’s government was constricted in its options regarding the 
international front, and would not be able to effectively regularize the inflow of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A suyo was the traditional political division of the Inca Empire. The Inca territory was divided in 
fours suyos or regions, spawning from east of modern-day Colombia to north-west of modern-day 
Argentina. 
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support from institutional actors such as the Organization of American States without 
addressing at least some of the key issues they had raised, the domestic front, on the 
other hand, offered more possibilities. On July 28, the day Fujimori took oath, 
Toledo’s Marcha was confronted by more than 30,000 police officers (Noriega, 2000) 
(i.e. repression as a coping mechanism), leaving six persons dead, ninety-eight 
injured, more than a hundred arrested (LR, 2000/07/29), and the building of the 
National Bank burnt to the ground (which was later known to had been part of a 
secret operative by the National Intelligence Agency to delegitimize the protest). With 
that, the main threat to Fujimori’s political legitimacy was controlled, and even 
though the coping mechanism employed gave birth to new waves of demand and 
withdraw of support, these were relatively less threatening to the government than 
Alejandro Toledo’s call for civil disobedience and resistance, and the media agenda 
promptly moved to new issues.21 
 Although much more could be said regarding the particularities of the event 
just narrated, and a proper analysis would unveil hidden processes and mechanisms 
that produced this specific moment of Peruvian history, in its general composition it 
reflects the accommodation and survival of the political system (i.e. the government) 
against stress from its environment, just as suggested by Easton’s model. How would 
the model look not just for one event, but when we consider the stability of national 
anti-corruption standards across decades? What can Easton’s model reveal about the 
possibilities of reform when the government is better off leaving the problem of 
corruption alone? 
 
3. A Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform 
 
The Stability of the National Anti-Corruption Standards as an Essential 
Variable 
David Easton was not oblivious to the peculiarities of corruption as a form of 
(degraded) government activity. In fact, his model of a political system considered 
corruption (or clientelism, to be precise) one of the four types of outputs possible. 
These types were “authoritative statements” (1965b, 354), or government decisions; 
“authoritative performances” (p. 355), or the implementation of those decisions; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Fujimori’s government would fall within four months after the events of the Marcha de los Cuatro 
Suyos, but the reasons behind its collapse will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
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“associated statements” (p. 357), or the rationale behind them; and “associated 
performances” (p. 361), or clientelism.  
Easton says that “[b]ribery and corruption are classic illustrations of this kind 
of associated performance outputs” (p. 361), opening the door to understanding 
corruption as just another type of output from the system. Indeed, if we remember that 
outputs are nothing but government activities that impact society in objective and/or 
subjective ways, it becomes possible to see corrupt transactions as an attached 
element of whichever action was being officially carried out, such as cases of 
procurement corruption, favoritism in public contracting, embezzlement, nepotism, 
etc. All these activities represent the corrupt distortion of an official duty, and this is 
why multiple actors have consistently defined corruption as the misuse of public office 
for private gain.22 In the same line, Easton describes his fourth type of output, 
associated performances, as “performances which assume the form of tangible goods 
and intangible services associated with authoritative action and yet which do not 
themselves acquire any binding quality” (1965b, p. 360). The key element here is the 
‘binding quality,’ meaning that even though these outputs are related to official 
activities, they are not actually official themselves: 
 
“Typically, persons in positions of authority in all legal systems quickly 
become accustomed to fortifying support for themselves, with incidental 
consequences for the political objects, through performing numerous small 
and large services for individual or groups of members, services that are over 
and beyond the production of authoritative outputs.”23 (Easton, 1965b, p. 
360) 
 
 There can be no doubt, then, that corruption represents an unofficial output; 
but this is not all. Currently, most countries have included their legal systems 
provisions to criminalize at lease some (if not all) forms of corruption, making 
malfeasance in public life an illegal and criminal act. The identification of corruption 
as a problem of government sets it apart from other types of outputs. While the latter 
may increase of decrease support, depending on the quality of the output produced by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Naturally, it is also appropriate to talk about corruption in the private sector, but for the purposes of 
the present study the term corruption will deal specifically with corruption in the public sector. 
23 Bold by the author. 
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the system and the way it impacts the circumstances and perceptions of the citizens, 
corruption is widely and almost unanimously considered to be detrimental to society, 
and thus it always creates stress to the government by decreasing the level of support 
and raising demands. In the words of David Easton (1965b, p. 361), “[e]xtended 
reliance on this kind of outputs... may well prove more effective in stressing than in 
maintaining a system.” 
 The description of corruption as a specific type of output that is by nature 
stressful to the political system brings us back to the discussion about output failure, 
which was said to ‘represent the scenario created by those government actions that are 
widely considered unsatisfactory, delegitimizing the leaders.’ Connecting the dots, 
and employing the terminology developed in Easton’s work, we would then 
understand corruption as a kind of output that generates a scenario of output failure, 
which in turn creates stress for the system by giving rise to an increase in demands 
and a decrease in support; furthermore, if such situation remained unchecked, it 
could develop in the unsustainability of one or more of the political objects 
(authorities, regime, political community) and the consequent failure of the system to 
perform its essential variables (allocation of values and frequency of compliance with 
them). 
Therefore, corruption represents a threat to the normal life of a political 
system; this will be true in any system where public malfeasance is considered 
morally or legally wrong. Nonetheless, the stress produced by corruption may be 
specially damaging to a specific type of system, not because of the vulnerability of its 
nature but due to the way we define it. As Easton (1965a) defends, we should 
understand a system not necessarily as a natural object, but we may more fruitfully 
envisage systems as empirical constructs and define them in terms of our analytical 
interests and needs instead of all they materially include.24 Thus, the way we describe 
a specific system, the elements we decide to include in it, and the interactions we 
choose to focus on for academic reasons, will be scientifically appropriate as long as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Easton (1965a, pp. 27-30) posits: “We might maintain that it is pointless to try to distinguish so-
called natural from non-natural or nonexistent systems. In this interpretation any aggregate of 
interactions that we choose to identify may be said to form a system. It is solely a matter of conceptual 
or theoretical convenience... What commands our attention is the need to decide whether the set of 
activities is an interesting one, in the sense that it is relevant and helps us to understand some 
theoretical problems, or whether it is worthless or trivial from this point of view. Where the selected 
parts of political life are relevant, show some degree of interdependence, and seem to have a common 
fate, we can say that we have an interesting and useful system from the point of view of understanding 
the way in which political systems are likely to operate.” 
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it allows us the possibility to conduct relevant analyses. Considering corruption as a 
source of stress, the challenge it represents to the survival of the political system will 
depend directly on what we actually consider that survival to be. In Easton’s model, 
as its focus is any and every political system, survival depend on the maintenance of 
the two essential variables (decisions and compliance) and it can be ultimately 
measured by the persistence of the authorities, the regime, and the political 
community. For Easton there are degrees of survival, things that the system is willing 
to give up in order to secure the stability of its basic components. The ultimate object 
that will define the existence or disappearance of a political system is the political 
community, beyond which it could be said that the system has disappeared. 
Before the disappearance of the political system, or its metamorphosis into a 
new one, Easton considers that the authorities can be changed (as when a new 
government takes office after winning the elections) and the regime modified (as 
when a military government gives way to a democratically elected leadership), and 
the political system would be said to continue existing. How should we understand 
then the differences between a democratic regime and a dictatorship? To clarify this 
issue, and highlight the macro-level of analysis embodied by his model, Easton 
(1965a, p. 93) discusses the possibility of having essential variables for specific types 
of systems: 
 
“For democracies these might be conceived to be some vaguely defined degree 
of freedom of speech and association and popular participation in the political 
process. For a totalitarian system the essential variables might consist of some 
minimal degree of exclusion of popular participation, dominant power in the 
hands of a political elite, coercion of the individual, and controlled and highly 
restricted freedom of speech and association.” 
 
The existence of specific essential variables allows us to get closer to the 
ground and focus on how the stress over a totalitarian system may bring its 
replacement for a democratic one, and why the leadership of the new regime makes 
efforts to secure the survival of freedom of speech, association, and popular 
participation during periods of declining support for these figures. It is the specific 
system (in this case, a democracy) replacing an older and outdated one, and later 
trying to alleviate stress and guarantee support for the legal structure. All the 
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considerations made for the general political system described by the bulk of Easton’s 
work are directly applicable to particular systems, such as democracies, dictatorships, 
and any specific system that we choose to focus on, as long as we address the 
essential variables that will define the existence of that system. 
So, what type of system does Peru represent when considering its limited 
adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies between 2000 and 2014? 
Following Easton’s suggestion, we proceed to select the relevant elements in order to 
address a constructive system, one that is relevant and productive, and describe our 
analytical system as characterized in its basic form by the relative stability of the 
National Anti-Corruption Standards (NACS): the general but distinguishable level of 
adoption and implementation of anti-corruption principles, norms and policies in a 
national setting during a period of time.  Any element of the general Peruvian political 
system included in the chosen analytical system, then, will only be analyzed in 
relation to the way it serves to positively or negatively affect the stability of the 
NACS, which is the core issue of the present study. That way of defining the 
analytical system, furthermore, will also offer it the essential variable. 
What type of political system is especially vulnerable to stress generated by 
corruption? To answer this is to remember that stress represents a threat to the 
persistence of the specific political system we focus on. Although corruption is 
problematic for the stability of any government, the demands for anti-corruption 
actions directly attack one particular element: the NACS. As long as the authorities 
are willing to make appropriate corrections, corruption should not be a problem and 
the level of support should rapidly recover. In that process, however, the authorities 
prioritize their survival (and the survival of the form of government) over that of the 
NACS, and therefore the system cannot be conceived as including the persistence of 
the anti-corruption model as we have seen in Peru over the past fourteen years. Anti-
corruption demands are more threatening to a system identified by the stability of its 
NACS, simply because those demands are directed at destroying what gives that 
specific systems its principal characteristic (in the analytical terms presented here). 
Therefore, just as any political system strives to keep its essential variables in normal 
range, so does Peru have coped with domestic and foreign pressure to adopt and 
implement anti-corruption policies, and succeeded in limiting any transformation of 
the NACS. For this reason, it is completely rational to consider the stability of the 
NACS the best way of defining “the characteristic way in which the system operates” 
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(Easton, 1965a, p. 92) (i.e. the essential variable) for the objective of the present 
study. 
 
Corruption Outputs and Anti-Corruption Pressure: Four Scenarios of Stress 
Once the essential variable of the analytical system has been defined as the 
stability of the NACS, we need to consider any pressure aiming at modifying it as a 
source of stress for the government. Increased demands for anti-corruption actions, 
and a decrease in support as a consequence of ignoring those demands, will force the 
government to either revise its position towards the NACS, or to activate coping 
mechanisms to secure the flow of support. The former, as has been explained, 
jeopardizes the existence of the system as defined by the NACS, and so the 
government is forced to address the problem in was that do not include any effective 
change in the way it handles malfeasance in public life. 
Coping mechanisms, as mechanisms to deal with stress, are directly related to 
the specific form, degree and source of pressure. To understand the choices of the 
government regarding the actions it takes to control public dissatisfaction and make 
sure its decisions are respected, first we need to look at the specific type of stress 
involved. When talking about corruption, it is obvious that the source of stress has its 
antecedents in government activities; corruption, after all, is the misuse of public 
office for private gain, and thus it has its origin inside the government itself. Any type 
of pressure that may later arise as a consequence of corruption has its antecedents in a 
particular action taken (or not taken) by the government. 
Corruption is an output, and as it has been explained earlier, outputs impact 
social (and international) actors in two different ways: they can affect the objective 
conditions of the citizen, or they can affect the way he/she perceives them. The same 
two dimensions exist when we consider corruption. Let us consider briefly what is 
widely known about corruption: As the introductory chapter described, it damages the 
economy by reducing the total amount of foreign direct investment, diverts resources 
from productive to rent-seeking activities, increases transaction costs for private 
businesses, reallocates public budget from social services to less transparent and more 
profitable sectors, and in general is considered to be one of the mayor sources of 
economic stagnation and underdevelopment. These are all actual, material conditions 
affected by corruption that impact the lives of society at large, including the 
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international community.25 On the other hand, corruption is usually perceived through 
the media coverage of corruption scandals, which are for the most part the only way 
citizens can gain knowledge of the existence of malfeasance involving senior officials 
(Morris, 2008, p. 392; Németh et al., 2011, p. 61; Uslaner, 2008, p. 14; and Tverdova, 
2007, p. 3); media coverage, however, may or may not accurately report the case, and 
the so called ‘scandal’ may end up being a fabrication of political rivals. Allegations 
of corruption usually include as much noise as they involve proof, and it is very easy 
to manipulate news presentation so as to benefit or harm the allegedly corrupt actor.26 
Whereas both circumstantial and perceptual dimensions many times coincide 
in the same event, as when a case of political corruption becomes a damaging scandal 
to the government, they also create different possibilities that drive them apart. For 
example, although a social program may fail to raise the living standards of its target 
citizens, its failure might only partially be a consequence of corruption in one or more 
of its activities. Mismanagement, red tape, scarce human resources, lack of expertise, 
insufficient budget, conflicting objectives, lack of political will, mischaracterization 
of the problem, poor communicational strategies, inconsistency of efforts, competing 
services and offices, and many other circumstances may prevent a program to reach 
its objective.27 Corruption, in this case, stands as one of multiple factors that can be 
found responsible for the downfall of government efforts in addressing a public 
demand, and it might not even be perceived by the actors involved (except for those 
directly engaged in corruption transactions, of course). In this case, stakeholders 
might characterize the failure of the program as a generic problem of design and/or 
implementation, and move on; corruption, even being one of the elements that 
hindered the execution of the program, need not be identified at all. This scenario is 
more common than it might seem; we need only to keep in mind that, until news of 
corruption are presented by the media, corruption transactions are carried out without 
the knowledge of civil society, international actors, and many times even of senior 
officials of the government. Corruption is only indirectly felt by its impact on the 
living conditions of citizens, and as a result the demands that arise are not for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 One clear example is United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, and the 
American efforts to have it seconded by the OECD (Weiss, 2009). 
26 The government of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori was particularly keen to buying off media 
outlets to control the news, using them to attack political rivals and to prevent the dissemination of 
information regarding the government’s illicit activities (Conaghan, 2005). 
27 A classic study of the difficulties of policy implementation can be found in Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973). 
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adoption of anti-corruption actions, but for the addressing of the decline in living 
conditions. 
On the other hand, allegations of corruption involving the president and other 
senior officials are very common in Latin America, and although they rarely end in 
the prosecution of those actors directly and indirectly involved, they have a high 
impact on the general perception of corruption in the country and on the popular 
support for the leadership. It rarely matters if the allegations relate to actual instances 
of grand corruption, or if they are used as a political tactic to delegitimize a 
government unfriendly to certain interests such as the media or the private sector. The 
core of the corruption scandal is that it creates a wave of discontent among the public 
and a blow to the government’s international image. In this respect, corruption 
scandals are of a completely different nature to that of corruption activities as 
described previously: news of corruption affect the perception that people have about 
the government, while actual corruption affect their living circumstances.  
The perception of corruption stands as both the less objective and most 
relevant source of anti-corruption activities. Due to the secretive nature of corruption, 
it has been impossible for researchers to address its measurement in any direct way, 
and the closest they have come is to obtain self-reported accounts of petty bribery as 
offered by private individuals;28 regarding grand corruption transactions, these are 
obviously not amenable to academic or public scrutiny, and all we know comes from 
investigative journalism in a case-by-case fashion, which usually excludes hard proof 
of wrongdoing, and leaves a great degree of interpretation and probability. However, 
if not for media coverage, corruption would not even be an issue. Scandals open the 
opportunity for citizens and foreign actors to address the NACS and demand the 
effective adoption and implementation of sound policies, and the enforcement of the 
legal anti-corruption system. Even if corruption news only represent a limited and 
biased depiction of government activities and the incidence of malfeasance, this 
window of opportunity creates a source of stress and pressure over the government 
much higher than real but not perceived instances of corruption ever could. It is in the 
dimension of corruption perception that most demands for anti-corruption actions 
(and the consequential decline of support) have their origin. 
To give some clarity and order to the discussion of anti-corruption pressure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 We refer to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer. 
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from here on, we will dub corruption as a circumstantial output corruption in 
processes; while corruption as a perceived output will be dubbed corruption 
perception. These types of corruption, and the differentiated types of demand and 
stress they give origin to, represent the first two of four scenarios through which anti-
corruption pressure creates stress for the political system. 
The third scenario of stress produced by the NACS and its inadequacy to 
prevent and control public malfeasance depicts what Easton (1965b, p. 22) call 
“disturbances”: they are the “influences from the total environment of a system that 
act upon it so that it is different after the stimulus from what it was before.” 
Disturbances modify the settings under which the political system carries on its 
activities, producing new patterns of behavior of the actors outside government. 
Whenever a new way of understanding political life, public good, government 
responsibilities, social and economic rights, welfare and well-being, or any other 
relevant concept that stimulates a variation in the content of demands we can say that 
a disturbance has taken place. They can also take the form of natural events, such as 
floods, earthquakes, droughts, or any other disaster. International events such as the 
introduction of new technologies or processes, and armed conflicts, also represent 
disturbances in the environment. What all these situations have in common is that 
they redefine demands, and therefore the way outcomes are perceived and reacted to. 
Although this needs not necessarily produce stress for the political system, in the case 
of the NACS disturbances will represent the historical global transition from 
corruption as a matter of exclusively domestic politics and subject to cultural 
interpretations, to corruption as a target of the international anti-corruption 
movement. In short, the disturbance that is of importance to the NACS is the global 
decrease in corruption tolerance that begun in the 1990s (which was commented in 
the introductory chapter), and that threatens its stability and persistence. 
Corruption tolerance is defined as the citizens’ behavioral adherence to 
condone the corrupt behavior of the political leadership (Pozsgai Alvarez, 2013), and 
its study has inspired the production of a growing literature (Peters and Welch, 1980; 
Welch and Hibbing, 1997; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). 
A decrease in the domestic levels of this construct points to the transformation of the 
social awareness regarding the evils of malfeasance, which has been a mayor focus of 
the activities of the international anti-corruption movement. The whole principal-
agent, bottom-up approach that was reviewed in the previous chapter is implicitly 
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based on the utilization and malleability of the concept of corruption tolerance in 
domestic settings, while the approach dealing with international pressure embodies 
the decrease in tolerance at a global scale. Therefore, although not explicitly referred 
to as such, it can be said that the importance of corruption tolerance has been at the 
core of a big part of the literature dealing with anti-corruption reform ever since the 
field took off some twenty years ago. Both principal-agent approaches posited the 
possibility of civil society and international actors taking the post of principal, 
respectively, monitoring government performance and pushing for the adoption and 
implementation of effective anti-corruption policies. However, the literature on civil 
society accurately stresses the role of international actors in supporting financially and 
technically domestic efforts; after all, it is no mere coincidence that the anti-
corruption movement became global and started influencing domestic policies in 
almost every region on the planet only after the cold-war ended, Transparency 
International developed its Corruption Perception Index, and the United States drew 
the attention of the rest of the OECD countries to the necessity of criminalizing 
international bribery. The international anti-corruption movement, in many senses, 
has been crucial to the growth of anti-corruption activities by organized civil society, 
especially in developing countries like Peru. 
The decrease in the international tolerance towards corruption was a 
significant global disturbance that stressed the NACS of almost every country, 
including Peru. As a consequence of this disturbance, civil society (through increased 
awareness, media coverage, public discussion, and electoral response) and 
international actors (through international conventions, country rankings, aid 
conditionalities, and review mechanisms) increased their demands for anti-corruption 
reforms; and when these demands were not properly addressed, the level of support 
for impervious authorities decreased (at least in theory). 
Thus, the third scenario of stress will be dubbed here corruption intolerance. 
This scenario differs from the previous two in that the latter reflected the stress 
produced by the inability of the NACS to prevent corrupt activities, and the 
subsequent decline in support. Corruption intolerance, on the other hand, does not 
only reacts to the presence of corruption, but directly addresses the persistence of the 
NACS even when there are no corrupt outputs. This third scenario aims at reforming 
the political system both as to control and prevent corruption, and this quality will be 
of chief importance when looking at the specific way the government copes with 
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pressure. While corruption perception focuses on control, corruption intolerance will 
be stronger on prevention. What all three scenarios have in common, finally, is that 
they are the environmental response to output failures caused by the persistence of an 
inadequate NACS. 
Last, the fourth scenario of stress for the political system describes the 
prolonged exposure of the system to the stress produced by one or more of the 
previous three scenarios. This scenario does not have any peculiarity of its own, other 
than demanding an extended period of time and being a critical point where 
corruption in processes, corruption perception, and/or corruption intolerance threatens 
the persistence of not only the people in authority positions, but also the form of 
government and the political community. Easton (1965b, 231) explicitly supports this 
possibility: 
 
“Initially, the discontent might be directed toward the authorities. But if, 
where possible, these are changed and especially if this happens again and 
again, and still little improvement in outputs occur, it will be impossible to 
prevent the dissatisfaction from shifting toward the regime [i.e. the form of 
government] and even the political community.” 
 
What this possibility represents is the potential of any output failure to 
delegitimize more than just the people placed in authority positions. Prolonged 
dissatisfaction with government activities, particularly after a change in leadership, 
may disenfranchise society to the point where little regards are held to the form of 
government and even the unity of the nation. Latin American is well known for its 
history of swinging between military/authoritarian and civilian/democratic 
governments, with the tolerance and very often the support of civil society. Peruvian 
President Alberto Fujimori, for example, had no difficulties carrying on an ‘auto-
coup’ to dissolve Congress (which had an opposition majority) thanks to the general 
delegitimisation of traditional political parties after years of economic crisis and 
subversive insurgence. Fujimori’s auto-coup confronted almost no opposition from 
civil society, who felt the system had failed to improve the situation of the country, 
and so he proceeded to write a new constitution, permanently eliminating the senate, 
and calling to new congressional elections that gave his party an ample majority and 
control over legislation. 
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Generalized social and political convulsion has brought down many 
governments throughout history, revolutions have entirely changed the type of 
government, and international conflicts have destroyed and produced national 
communities. When the authorities are unable to produce a minimum level of support, 
they leave the door open for social and international actors to make the changes they 
deem appropriate. The survival of a leadership, as we have discussed, depends on the 
satisfaction of demands and the production of support, and the quality and timing of 
outputs is essential to secure the continuation of the political system. If outputs 
consistently fail to address demands, and support decreases to a critical point, the 
survival of the highest political object will dictate the path for the community. 
Naturally, it is much easier and productive to change the leadership than to change the 
form of government, and to change the latter is preferred than to change the 
composition of the community, dividing the nation. This is partly the strength of 
democracy as a form of government, in that it has inherent mechanisms for the relief 
of pressure and the addressing of social demands. 
The point has been made before regarding the expectation we can have about 
the political leadership. It was said that ‘anti-corruption will only be chosen when it 
provides more political capital than the sum of the resources spent and any loss in 
corrupt profits.’ If we consider the stakes at play in a scenario of prolonged output 
failure, it is possible to conclude that anti-corruption policies have the best chance of 
being adopted and implemented in this fourth scenario. As it describes a situation 
where leadership is unsustainable unless demands are satisfied, and even the fabric of 
the political system is at risk, it becomes obvious that no government resources and 
illegal profits can amount to more than the political capital desperately needed; or, to 
put it another way, activities directly aimed at producing support become the absolute 
priority, above and beyond considerations regarding government resources and the 
loss of illegal profits. When the NACS becomes the primary agent of destruction for 
the political system there can only be loss in ignoring demands for anti-corruption 
reform, and so the authorities have no option but to comply or step aside. This is the 
nature of the fourth scenario of anti-corruption pressure, which will be dubbed 
prolonged stress. 
To summarize the above discussion, the four scenarios of stress created by the 
stability of the NACS are: (1) corruption in processes; (2) corruption perception; (3) 
corruption intolerance; and, (4) prolonged stress. 
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The next step is to address the coping mechanisms available to the government 
to deal with each one of these scenarios. In doing so, it will be possible to see more 
clearly just how pressure is manifested from civil society and international actors, 
which will directly affect the options open to the authorities in specific conditions. 
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Chapter IV 
Theoretical Framework II:  
Coping Mechanisms and Types of Pressure 
 
1. Coping Mechanisms 
 
It was said earlier that it was possible to understand coping mechanisms as 
government actions that seek to secure support for the authorities without having to 
necessarily tend to the specific demands of civil society and/or international actors. 
For the case of anti-corruption pressure, coping mechanisms represent all available 
strategies that the government may decide to activate in order to prevent, control or 
diminish stress without affecting the NACS. Coping mechanisms may be designed to 
have an immediate impact, or may aim at being fully implemented in the mid to long 
term. Different strategies demand different resources, have different time frames, and 
stimulate support to different degrees. Their objective is common, however, in that 
they try to preserve the NACS in a certain form that is deemed useful to the political 
leadership. Because of the utility of the NACS, there are a couple of points the require 
clarification before fully engaging the review of coping mechanisms.  
First, although the NACS are the state of the anti-corruption normative and 
effective structure in a specific point in time, as long as its characteristics remain 
relatively consistent for an extended period of time we can talk of the NACS 
remaining stable. This shall not mean that it remains absolutely static, and that it has 
not suffered any changes. It will only suggest that the actions and policies adopted 
and implemented have not been prominent in terms of the current knowledge on good 
practices and successful reforms, and that the situation is in relative terms the same 
before and after those actions and policies, particularly as perceived by the political 
leadership. Some elements of the NACS can be sacrificed so that its core structure can 
remain, particularly in regards to the protection of senior officials: while some 
mechanisms can be implemented to control petty corruption, presidential 
accountability and monitoring of party funding can be expected to remain 
underdeveloped. 
This brings us to the second point. Because the NACS are relative and 
dependent on the interests of the political leadership, it is necessary to accept the 
presence of ‘agency’ in the specific behavior of different governments. Indeed, not all 
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politicians are perfect and rational utility maximizers. There are individuals more 
honest than others, and their personality will account for the type of coping 
mechanism activated and the degree of its execution. Furthermore, it will also account 
for their preferences and perceptions regarding what exactly the NACS are, and what 
changes can be made while still considering it stable. 
 Having set the above out of the way, let us look at what possibilities each 
stress scenario gives to the reaction of the government. Some mechanisms will be 
common to all scenarios, while others will be exclusive to the characteristic pressure 
of the specific output failure considered. Disregarding the specific scenario we wish 
to focus on, however, coping mechanisms are distributed throughout the model and its 
processes of output production/reaction, output effects (outcomes), and input 
production/reaction (demands and support), reflecting the entire cycle through which 
the systems interacts with the environment. Based on the moment of the cycle when 
coping mechanisms can be expected to be effective, these stages will be called coping 
points, and they are four: (1) Output concealment; (2) output perception attenuation; 
(3) negative input defuse; and, (4) stress amelioration. Figure 2 shows their position in 
the model.  
The coping point of output concealment covers the exit channels of the 
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political system, and allows for the activation of mechanisms that target precisely 
those channels through which corruption may be discovered, and preemptively 
disable or obstruct them. In other words, in this point actions are taken against certain 
anti-corruption enforcement efforts that deal with investigation and detection. As a 
consequence, coping mechanisms embedded in this stage are corruption-enablers to 
different degrees. 
The coping point of output perception attenuation covers the entry channels of 
social perception, and allows for the activation of mechanisms that address the way 
corrupt (or corruption tolerant) outputs generates increased demands and decreased 
support, by suppressing or altering the way citizens and international actors perceive 
information of public malfeasance. Their objective is to cut the link between 
corruption news and attitudinal change, preventing the generation of demands. 
The coping point of negative input defuse covers the entry channels of the 
political system, and allows for the activation of mechanisms that address the way 
demands are directed towards the system. They aim at cutting the link between 
popular dissatisfaction and the actual manifestation of demands, preventing their 
transfer into the system. This is the last coping point before the government can be 
said to come under stress. 
Lastly, the coping point of stress amelioration covers output failures after the 
system has come under stress, and allows for the activation of mechanisms that serve 
as compensatory measures. There are two different kinds of mechanisms in this point: 
Symbolic measures, which describe the production of outputs that aim at changing the 
perception social actors have of the way the government is handling the issue, without 
actually implementing them in any effective way; and genuine measures, which aims 
at generating support through the effective satisfaction of demands not related to the 
original source of stress. 
Coping mechanisms are discussed below in reference to their activation at one 
of the four coping points, for each of the four stress scenarios. 
 
Corruption in Processes. This is perhaps the easiest scenario for the 
government in terms of its possibilities for coping with anti-corruption pressure. The 
reason is simply that, as we mentioned before, due to the non-perceptual nature of the 
corrupt outputs being produced there is no reason to expect civil society or 
international actors to voice any anti-corruption demands at all. Certainly, all 
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government measures are expected to at least include a minimum level of anti-
corruption mechanisms (particularly of the kind addressing administrative corruption) 
in order to be able to control the execution of public budgets and monitor the 
performance of the bureaucracy; however, the rationale behind them relates to 
efficiency, and not necessarily clean government. These control mechanisms are so 
ubiquitous, that it is difficult to assert that they aim at preventing malfeasance at all: 
they are usually adopted and implemented to facilitate the execution of public policies 
and the attainment of specific results, and any impact on the likelihood of corruption 
is only indirect, and many times even involuntary. Instruments such as the annual 
plan of contracting and acquisitions and the institutional operative plan, and the 
spread of information and communication technologies (ICT) in government systems 
testify to the focus on results and efficiency, above and beyond concerns of 
corruption. 
Although some actors among civil society and the international community are 
usually able to identify the presence of corruption as at least one of the factors 
involved in unsatisfactory government activities, to do so usually imply the crossing 
over from this scenario to that of ‘corruption perception’ and its specific 
characteristics and coping mechanisms. To address the strategies available to the 
government to cope with the specific scenario of corruption in processes, we need to 
focus on those cases of corruption that are not perceived as such by the environment. 
They involve the generation of demands specific to the issue affecting the citizens, 
and even though they do not represent a direct threat to NACS, in order for it to 
remain stable the government needs to cope with social and international pressure in 
one way or another, lest the stress forces it to actually address the actual factors 
behind its failure in public management (one of which is the NACS). 
Indeed, coping mechanisms in this scenario still represent a way for the 
government to secure the stability of the NACS. But, as the threat is indirect, it gives 
the authorities the chance to isolate the material conditions that are producing stress 
on the system and to address them directly without considering anti-corruption actions 
per se.  
If the government do engages in anti-corruption under this scenario, however, 
it is logical to expect actions circumscribed to administrative processes, where they 
might have the most impact on effective and efficient public administration, and away 
from the spheres of high government. As the leadership is interested in obtaining as 
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much support as possible without taking actions that might proof costly, the decision 
between competing strategies should rest on the prioritized source of political capital. 
When the leadership depends on patronage jobs for specific support, government 
decisions will address material conditions without affecting the anti-corruption 
structure of bureaucracy. On the other hand, when the leadership receives direct 
support from civil society and has no party interests invested in lower echelons of the 
government, anti-corruption policies restricted to those ranks will be easier to come 
about if they have the potential to generate increased support. At the end it all comes 
down to the level of penetration of the incumbent party in the political system. 
 
I. Output concealment: This scenario does not possess coping 
mechanisms in this specific point, as it represents the objective impact 
of corruption on the real conditions of the environment, which are not 
amenable to concealment. 
II. Output perception attenuation: At this point, the government has the 
possibility to create smokescreens, which are fabricated events that 
gain wide public attention and news coverage, above and beyond that 
of the piece of information the government wants to keep unattended 
(Requejo Alemán, 2007). These events involve either superfluous or 
sensitive conditions stimulated by the political system, aimed at having 
the highest impact possible on public attention and perceptions. 
Superfluous events include pieces of information pertaining to show 
business, sports events, sensationalist media, and others. Sensitive 
events include politically, socially, culturally or economically relevant 
pieces of information other than the one the leadership wants ignored. 
III. Negative input defuse: Confronted with public dissatisfaction, the 
government can activate different mechanisms to repress the public 
expression of demands and guarantee the steady flow of support. The 
simplest of coping mechanisms is to turn to coercion or repression, 
effectively employing the police and military resources of the political 
system to force civil society and/or international actors to comply with 
government outputs.  
A milder version of this mechanism is the creation of obstacles 
to advocacy, which rely on legal structures to make it difficult for 
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public dissatisfaction to transform into actual demands entering the 
system. Complex procedures for the input of legislative proposals by 
non-governmental actors is one such mechanism; it effectively slows 
down the rate in which the environment may stress the system, and it 
can even work as a filter to keep at bay the most threatening demands, 
only letting in those that are perceived harmless to the leadership. 
Another way of obstructing the input of demands relies on 
exploiting or manipulating public priorities: by resorting to the 
personal or ideological legitimacy of the leadership, or the sense of 
common interests of the nation, the government may succeed in 
increasing the relative tolerance to corruption of the environment. The 
aim here is to stimulate public self-restrain and relative corruption 
tolerance with the excuse that there are other issues that supersede that 
of momentary social dissatisfaction. To resort to personal or 
ideological considerations is to remind the environmental actors of the 
qualities of the persons in charge in terms of their individual attributes 
and their political agenda; the idealization of a technocratic 
government invested in liberal reforms may be a powerful deterrent 
against complaints of specific government failures. Calling on national 
and common interests, on the other hand, consists in harnessing the 
support for the form of government and the political unity of the 
country, and to use it for the benefit of the leadership. Episodes of 
international conflict or tension, for example, or the emergence of 
subversive or extremist groups can be employed by the government as 
an excuse to pull support towards addressing those issues, turning 
away attention from government failures in the process. 
Descending into even more subtle ways of social control, the 
government may decide to invest in long-term mechanisms and turn to 
the stimulation of new cultural norms through education strategies and 
other elements of the socialization process. This is done with the 
objective of reinventing the meaning of political life, changing the 
array of topics and spheres that may be subject to government attention 
and intervention. If done correctly, social dissatisfaction over specific 
issues may not be something the environment feels that requires 
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authoritative outputs, and hence no demands would be produced. The 
recent history, for example, has seen the emergence of issues in the 
public agenda related to sexual orientation, conservation of natural 
resources, diet, and animal protection, all of which were previously 
considered to be exclusive matters of the private sphere. This implies 
the change of cultural norms regarding what society considers should 
be part of government activities. 
Finally, the government can take a minimalist approach 
regarding public demands, and cope with them by fostering the 
misallocation of responsibility. As it implies, this coping mechanism 
involves publicly holding actors away from the political leadership and 
even the system responsible for the output failure generating demands. 
Thus, the government (this is, the specific party in office) does not 
entirely aims at preventing the introduction of demands, but just 
manipulates the situation as to keep those demands away from 
affecting the people in office through the use of scapegoats.  
IV. Stress amelioration: The last coping point where the government has 
the possibility to activate one or more coping mechanisms is at the 
beginning of a second round of interactions between the political 
system and its environment. By way of symbolic measures, this 
scenario does not provide different type of options but only one, 
capable of adopting a wide array of characteristics. As corruption in 
processes imply the impact of corruption in any government activity, 
including economic or monetary decisions, budget allocation and 
execution, monitoring and control, tax collection, etc., it makes more 
sense to discuss symbolic measures in the most general terms capable 
of being adopted for any specific activity. Thus, the quintessential 
symbolic mechanism available to the authorities is the provision of 
public promises regarding the satisfaction of specific demands. These 
promises usually take the form of public speeches, media interviews, 
written or oral comments, and other ways of addressing civil society 
and international actors to convince them that actions are being carried 
out to solve the problem. Obviously, these promises need not be 
implemented in any way: as long as they succeed in reducing the 
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inflow of demand into the system and stabilize the provision of 
support, stress will have been avoided, which is after all the main 
interest of the leadership (theoretically speaking). 
Genuine measures, on the other hand, provide more options to 
handle stress. The government has the possibility to turn to clientelism 
and other forms of economic stimuli, which is a straightforward mean 
to ‘buy-off’ popular support by exchanging financial resources for 
political capital. Considering all the possibilities opened by this 
mechanism, the usage of money can be transformed into any form of 
scarce commodities commonly sought after by social actors, thus 
giving the option to the government of not just offering money, but any 
material condition considered to be more relevant than that which gave 
birth to the original demands. 
On the other side of the spectrum, social wants can also be 
translated to subjective conditions and valued concepts such as 
national pride and social justice. This is the realm of alternative 
populist gratifications, which seek to provide subjective satisfaction 
that may or may not linked to material resources. Policies aiming at 
providing additional job stability, for example, does not only affect the 
actual living conditions of the citizens, but it also addresses their 
perception regarding the role of the government in protecting the 
interests of workers, and therefore creates a sympathetic link between 
the two groups. 
Somehow similar to the concept of populist gratifications is the 
provision of political concessions, which usually target opposition 
actors and advocacy groups. Just as clientelism represents the buying-
off of demands, the government has the capacity to transfer the 
political agenda from one subject to another, and provide satisfaction 
of demands other than the ones stressing the system. In doing so, it 
balances out the stressful effects of the original demands with the surge 
of additional support related to another area, thus stabilizing the 
system. A common way to secure support for controversial policies, 
for example, is to offer ministry positions to opposition parties as a 
way of guaranteeing the inclusion of different opinions in the process 
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of government; this way, specific policy demands are balanced out of 
with activities involving inclusive governance. Political concessions, in 
short, involve the trade-off of political interests in a way the benefits 
the particular agenda of the leadership. 
Finally, the government can directly address demands and 
satisfy them without actually having to amend the issues related to 
corruption. As malfeasance may only be one among several factors 
involved in the output failure as perceived by the citizens, unfavorable 
conditions might be improved through general administrative reforms 
or measures. Thus, this coping mechanism does not aim at substituting 
the satisfaction of the original demands: it does not need to. The 
analytic existence of the scenario of corruption in processes depends 
on our focus on the stability of the NACS, and does not require the 
system to avoid any and all other forms of reform. As long as 
economic or administrative reforms do not affect the anti-corruption 
structure, and they manage to reduce stress, they will work as 
appropriate coping measures for the purpose of our essential variable 
(the stability of the NACS). Thus, demand-satisfactory measures aim 
at correcting economic, social, and political distortions; at developing 
or improving inefficient or underdeveloped 
systems/markets/institutions/procedures; at preventing contractions; or 
at other outcomes that directly or indirectly enable general economic 
growth and popular satisfaction, without having to necessarily engage 
in the fight against corruption.29  
 
 Corruption Perception. While the first scenario of stress as a consequence of 
the NACS provided only indirect pressure, and actually no explicit anti-corruption 
demands need take place on a regular basis, the second scenario is the most stressful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 As it was briefly discussed before, what the leadership considers to be acceptable for the stability of 
the NACS will heavily depend on the specific characteristics of the incumbent party. It is completely 
plausible to see the implementation of demand-satisfactory measures containing limited anti-corruption 
mechanisms if they enable enough support as to allow the general anti-corruption structure to continue 
functioning undisturbed. The control of petty corruption may even serve the objective of generating a 
more stable NACS for the higher ranks of government. Although we would see the NACS slightly 
changing in general terms, demand-satisfactory measures of this kind still represent coping 
mechanisms from the perspective of the political leadership. 
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for the NACS because corruption is directly perceived (or at least believed), and so 
specific actions for controlling and preventing it are directly demanded.  
The explicit and raw nature of stress as a consequence of corruption, however, 
gives this scenario certain qualities that makes it not only more stressful for the 
system, but it also provides it with more opportunities for coping with that stress, 
ironically. To understand this seeming incompatibility, we need to discuss the 
concepts of enforcement, prevention, and control.  
Anti-corruption policies can be said to fall into one of two general categories. 
The first one, prevention, includes actions such as the creation of specialized anti-
corruption bodies in charge of policy development, civil service reform, codes and 
standards of conduct, regulation of official discretion, reduction of procedural 
complexity (administrative simplification), transparency laws, internal reporting 
procedures, regulation of conflicts of interests, disclosure of assets, any many others 
(UNODC, 2004a). All of these measures address the event of corruption from a 
preventive perspective, putting in place structures and processes to deter the 
involvement of public officials in illegal activities. 
The second category of policies involve control measures, and although their 
existence also works as a deterrence, their main objective is to facilitate the 
monitoring of government activities; the investigation, correction, prosecution, and 
punishment of corrupt activities; and the recovery of stolen and generated assets. 
These measures include anti-corruption bodies specialized in prosecution, 
strengthening of judicial institutions, effective collaboration laws, improvement of 
financial investigations, integrity testing, electronic surveillance operations, 
whistleblowing protection, criminalization of different forms of corruption, 
international legal cooperation, and many others (UNODC, 2004a). 
Some specific measures may be said to stand in both prevention and control 
dimensions, such as laws of access to information; but most anti-corruption policies 
pertain only to one. Both prevention and control policies, nonetheless, are integral 
parts of any anti-corruption reform, and represent two sides of a coin when we 
consider their relative potential for stressing the stability of the NACS. 
Enforcement, on the other side, does not represent a policy per se, but rather 
the actual activation of implemented control policies. As it relates to compliance, 
enforcement addresses the degree to which norms regarding the prohibition of corrupt 
activities are followed by citizens and public officials; enforcement represents the 
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effective application of the law against different forms of malfeasance. Whether those 
norms are generally followed or not is a different matter. Enforcement is related to 
compliance only as far as both seek the legality of government activities, but the 
former comes into action after the latter fails. For this reason, enforcement only 
applies to control policies, and not to preventive ones. 
Preventive policies become effective as soon as they are implemented; in other 
words, when the structures, processes, tools and resources involved in a specific 
preventive policy are effectively in place and working, we can say that prevention has 
begun. Control policies, on the other hand, can be already implemented without 
actually being carried out. With the exception of measures related to the monitoring 
of government activities, all other policies pertaining to the control of corruption 
focus on the situation after corruption has taken place. Although structures, 
processes, tools and resources might be in place, they only begin to actually work 
after corruption has been detected. This differentiated point of activation makes 
control and enforcement linked to each other as much as enforcement and prevention 
are connected by their being anti-corruption policies. 
 So, what does this have to do with the possibilities of the government to cope 
with anti-corruption pressure? 
The presence of enforcement as the effective activation of control policies, and 
the markedly different nature of its activities to those of preventive measures, forces 
the model to consider not one round of transactions between the political system and 
the environment, but two. These rounds, although analytic in nature, will differ in 
nature due to the type of demands being voiced, with the first round of stress being 
created by demands of enforcement, and the second round reflecting demands 
regarding policy reform. On top of this, it is even possible to expect that the policy 
reforms demanded will be of the control type, as these are closer to enforcement.  
Due to the logic behind two differentiated rounds of stress, it is also necessary 
to reassess the specific point where we can say that the NACS are getting stressed. As 
the first analytical round focuses on enforcement, it does not need to represent stress 
for the stability of the NACS, but only as far as it gives way to a second round of 
demands explicitly targeting the adoption and/or implementation of preventive or 
control policies. The first round only represents stress for the political authorities, 
challenging their legitimacy and demanding the prosecution of corrupt actors. 
Therefore, even if the culprits are prosecuted, this single event does not imply that the 
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NACS have in any way been changed, or that a precedent has been made against 
which all (or at least most) future cases will be conducted. The complete satisfaction 
of demands of a single case of stress under this first round of enforcement pressure 
has no necessary impact on our analytical system. 
The second round of reform pressure, on the other hand, directly addresses the 
change of the NACS, and for the purpose of this study represents the source of stress 
under the scenario of corruption perception. If successful, the demands input here 
would destroy the stability of the analytic system and describe the change of the anti-
corruption structure. Coping mechanisms activated by the government, therefore, 
become the top priority of the leadership agenda. But this second round does not exist 
completely apart from the first one: it is drastically influenced by the outcomes of the 
previous round, and the type and strength of demands voiced here are partly a result 
of the way the political system was able and willing to handle the scandal. When 
enforcement proves efficient and effective, demands should be found to focus more 
on preventive policies; on the other hand, when enforcement fails and the actors 
involved are not effectively prosecuted, civil society and/or international actors will 
most likely prioritize the reform of control mechanisms. In conclusion, although both 
rounds must be coped with for their potential to stress the system, the second exerts 
its pressure directly and therefore must be prioritized, whereas the first round impacts 
the system only indirectly through its influence on the second. 
To put all this into perspective, let us imagine the case of a corrupt scandal 
regarding the involvement of a senior official of the Ministry of Defense in the 
irregular procurement of army boots. As the scandals breaks out, public demands for 
prompt investigation of the event, and the eventual prosecution and punishment of all 
actors involved, gain momentum, bringing down the general popularity of the 
president. The coping mechanisms selected by the government will directly reflect the 
demands for enforcement, as the alleged event involves a criminal act punishable by 
prison; the chosen mechanisms will likely address the need for clarifying the case and 
finding a culprit. This is the first round of stress under the scenario of corruption 
perception. 
The second round is the follow-up to the corruption scandal. Whatever 
mechanism the government choses to cope with the stress, at least some elements of 
civil society and/or the international community will want to address the core of the 
issue, i.e. the NACS. Evidently the corruption event involving the senior official in an 
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irregular procurement process can be traced to the inadequacy of the NACS to prevent 
such occurrence, either through insufficient monitoring, little participation of civil 
society, lack of transparency, or some other weakness. Regardless of how the 
government deals with this specific case, then, some pressure will be exerted towards 
improving the anti-corruption structure, so as to make sure that it does not happen 
again.  
In conclusion, the scenario of corruption perception involves two analytically 
different rounds of pressure, one pertaining to enforcement, the second pertaining to 
reform. And although both might coexist in the same moment in time, for theoretical 
concerns and their impact on government responses they must be analyzed separately.  
 
I. Output concealment (1st round): The first coping point introduces four 
different mechanisms available to the system to preemptively conceal 
the existence of corruption from members of the environment. 
The first concealment mechanism involves institutional 
imperviousness: It aims at securing the null or inefficient 
implementation of anti-corruption measures such as access to public 
information and financial transparency laws; it also includes the 
adoption and implementation of norms and actions that restrict access 
to public information and policy processes. While the former approach 
is more passive in nature, in that it does not directly deteriorate the 
control apparatus of the state, the latter actively reforms the relation 
between the government and its environment, cutting down complex 
ways of interaction in favor of a more hierarchical structure. Both, 
however, represent efforts by the political system to close its borders to 
the prying eyes of civil society and international actors, shunning away 
from popular overseeing, social control and participatory forms of 
government, all for the sake of keeping its activities (among which is 
corruption) under a veil of secrecy. 
The second mechanism is dubbed environmental repellence, 
and while it shares with the previous mechanism the government’s 
desire to reduce contact between civil society and the inner workings 
of the political system, it does so by addressing the capabilities of the 
environment instead of acting upon its own structures. Environmental 
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repellence consists of the adoption and implementation of norms and 
actions against freedom of press and other social, political and 
economic rights that may empower society to the detriment of 
government secrecy and impermeability. At the extreme, this 
mechanism includes the null or limited participation of the country on 
international and domestic anti-corruption fora. 
Third, the government has the option of adopting a strategy of 
risk management, through which it would seek to obtain the lawful 
political control of investigatory bodies and/or agencies of the state. By 
doing so, the leadership effectively becomes its own guardian, as when 
congressional commissions of audit and control of public affairs are 
chaired by a member of the incumbent party, or when supposedly 
autonomous agencies as the office of the comptroller general, the 
ombudsman, the attorney general, or even the judiciary are chaired by 
people close to (or appointed by) the government. By employing 
measures related to this mechanism, corrupt actors can avoid detection 
by official means, which usually represent the first and most powerful 
line of defense against public malfeasance; with this possibility out of 
commission, a corrupt leadership need only fear detection from civil 
society and international actors, both of which can in turn be 
suppressed by other mechanisms as the ones reviewed earlier. 
The fourth and last mechanism available at this point represents 
the effective application of counter-reform measures. Aimed not only 
at hampering the progress of anti-corruption efforts in regards to 
detection, but at dismantling any significant instrument that may have 
been adopted and implemented by a more honest leadership in the past, 
institutional devolution is an ever lurking danger for anti-corruption 
reforms. It involves the legal or practical disablement of institutional 
control mechanisms related to the detection of public malfeasance, and 
although it may include other areas of anti-corruption control such as 
investigation or prosecution, only at this point in the process of stress-
inducing pressure can we say that it acts as a coping mechanism. In any 
other instance, institutional devolution can be perfectly equated to 
actual corruption for the purpose of its stressful impact on the system, 
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as it protects public offenders and impairs effective enforcement even 
against social and/or international demands. For the purpose of output 
concealment, however, institutional devolution is only a corruption-
enabler, and as long as it is successful, it need not represent additional 
stress to the NACS other than the cost of its own execution. 
II. Output perception attenuation (1st round): At this point, the 
government has the possibility to create smokescreens. Another option 
is turn to the common tactic of argumentative defense, which aims at 
providing an additional source of information in the form of a counter 
position. This is the most natural and intuitive coping mechanism, and 
for that same reason the less sophisticated. By trying to compensate for 
the negative information with an official government position of a 
more positive nuance, argumentative defense aims at balancing out any 
potential demand that may be in process. Certainly, the effectiveness of 
this measure depends on the current level of support for the 
government, the extent of the corruption scandal, and the quality of the 
measure itself; as the point is to thrust one version against another, 
both the version and the person become variables attenuated by public 
perceptions. 
Connected to argumentative defense, authorities (directly or 
through a proxy) can also turn to plaintiff discredit, which represents 
an appropriate companion to the previous tactic: together with 
presenting a counter argument, the government can strengthen its 
position by calling into question the legitimacy of the original source, 
thus reducing the social impact of the corruption claims. The objective 
here is not so much to directly confront the veracity of the allegations, 
as to raise doubts regarding the quality of the person or group exposing 
the news of corruption. Thus, the political system addresses the issue 
indirectly in an approach widely known as ‘argumentum ad hominem.’ 
Considering long-term measures, the government can stimulate 
corruption tolerance in absolute terms through usually complex 
socialization processes, altering the social meaning of corrupt activities 
in a way that makes it difficult for social actors to recognize the 
illegality of the act and/or the responsibility of those involved. 
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Although it is not easy to theorize the specific measures that may be 
involved in this mechanism, corruption tolerance as a social and 
cultural reality is usually considered to be amenable to government 
outputs to some degree. Karklins (2005) and Uslaner (2008) agree that 
the level of popular acceptance of bribery behavior among citizens 
reacts to the way society perceives the performance of the leadership: 
when people at the top are seeing benefitting from illegal or unethical 
activities, it becomes less morally troublesome for regular citizens to 
do the same, and so society at large becomes more tolerant to 
corruption by condoning or even forgetting the pernicious 
consequences of malfeasance. Other cues from the government, 
particularly those aimed at changing popular perceptions regarding the 
boundaries between the public and private spheres and the role of 
private interests in political life could also help change the degree to 
which corruption generates social demands. 
III. Negative input defuse (1st round): At this point of the scenario of 
corruption perception, the government has the following mechanisms 
at its disposal: Repression/coercion; obstacles to advocacy; 
manipulation of public priorities; new cultural norms; and, 
misallocation of responsibility. 
IV. Stress amelioration (1st round): At the fourth and final coping point of 
the first cycle of anti-corruption pressure, the government has at its 
disposal additional symbolic and genuine measures to those available 
in the previous scenario. Besides public promises regarding the 
satisfaction of anti-corruption enforcement demands, which in this case 
might even take the form of public expressions of condemnation and/or 
enforcement support, two common mechanisms found here involved 
almost theatrical manifestations of government activity. 
First, there are non-independent, insufficiently funded, and/or 
mismanaged investigations/prosecutions aimed at giving the 
appearance of highly qualified and effective official display, but which 
is nonetheless conceived with inherent flaws. These flaws, as is the 
case with any other coping mechanism, are purposely included (or at 
least negligently allowed) in order to sabotage the performance of the 
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actors called on to carry the investigation of the corruption case and its 
eventual prosecution. However, as far as the official design and initial 
presentation is concerned, the execution of those anti-corruption 
activities needs to seem appropriate and provide enough ground as to 
dissuade popular opinion from any withdrawal of support. Therefore, 
this mechanism is usually denoted by a wide display of publicity 
through a constant stream of official statements and the stimulation of 
media coverage. Intense publicity of this coping mechanism exploits its 
symbolic nature, and provides it with power and legitimacy. 
A second symbolic measure, theoretically part of the one just 
discussed but deserving a specific mention of its own, is the setting of 
non-sanctioned parliamentary committees of investigations. These 
follow the same logic of defectiveness and publicity, but do so with 
arguably more expertise. Considering the natural power, political 
position and historic prestige of national parliaments, together with the 
popular representativeness it has by electoral process, they provide a 
particularly important setting for anti-corruption enforcement 
activities. Taken out of context from the formal arrangements of the 
legal system, however, those same qualities provide a significant 
opportunity for coping with anti-corruption pressure, giving unduly 
legitimacy and impact to a coping mechanism designed to be nothing 
more than an exercise in theatrics. Notwithstanding the actual 
intentions and performance of members of a parliamentary committee 
established to investigate a particular corruption scandal, the impact a 
committee has on judicial cases and their prosecution is usually 
limited: as their conclusions are not binding, it falls back onto the 
formal legal system to take the appropriate steps to see enforcement 
carried out. In the process, the parliamentary committee succeeds in 
relieving some pressure from the government, as it demonstrates that 
something is actually being done to address popular demands. 
Therefore, the benefits produced by the committee in terms of 
possibilities for enforcement, on the one hand, against the satisfaction 
of demands and production of support it represents, on the other, show 
the potential of parliamentary committees of investigation as a coping 
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mechanism of the symbolic type. 
Regarding genuine measures, the government can choose to 
activate clientelism and other forms of economic stimuli; alternative 
populist gratifications; political concessions; or demand-satisfactory 
measures. The last one, however, varies slightly from its form under 
the scenario of corruption in processes, and deserves some elaboration. 
As was explained earlier, the stability of the NACS does not 
require the system to avoid any and every form of reform. The same 
applies to the first round of a corruption scandal: while pressure 
concentrates on anti-corruption enforcement, it does not stress the 
system directly and so the authorities may be more willing to comply, 
particularly when the leadership is not compromised. To resort to 
scapegoat convictions of low to mid-level public officials represent an 
attractive option for senior officials, as they can satisfy popular 
demands, stimulate support, and have little to no cost for the incumbent 
party. Even when the case does not allow for the usage of scapegoats 
and the actual culprits must be brought to justice, as long as they 
represent a politically economic way of producing support and 
securing stability for the both the political leadership30 and the NACS, 
this coping mechanism will be an appropriate way of dealing with 
stress. 
A second type of demand-satisfactory measure particularly 
relevant at this point is the employment of exclusively non-partisan 
investigations/prosecutions, especially when the actors involved 
belong to the political opposition. While this mechanism share some 
common characteristics with the usage of scapegoats, the main 
difference between the two is that the latter deals with stress originated 
as a consequence of government malfeasance, while the former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Scapegoats may be useful, as noted here, for dealing with stress affecting both the authorities and the 
NACS. This is so because, even when a corruption scandal does not translate into reform pressure, the 
popularity of the leadership is bound to suffer, which represent an obvious problem for their 
legitimacy. Although this stress does not affect the analytic system dealt with in this study, it calls for 
the activation of a coping mechanism for the sake of the political interests of government actors. 
Scapegoats are one type of mechanism that can satisfy that requirement. However, for the purpose of 
our discussion on the stability of the NACS, we are interested in seeing these coping mechanisms in its 
role of reducing any type of influence that a corruption scandal may produce on the second round of 
this scenario, that is, on the demands for anti-corruption reforms. 
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represent a response to demands for enforcing anti-corruption measures 
against members of the opposition, or actors that are not part of the 
government party structure. These may even include key members of 
previous governments (as long as they are not partisans) such as former 
ministers, congressmembers, and others. Investigations and 
prosecutions of this kind represent highly beneficial and economical 
responses, and may even be used as means for the accumulation and 
storage of support (as we will discuss later). The literature on cleanups, 
as we have seen, largely describes the activation of this particular 
mechanism, suggesting its potential and popularity. 
I. Output concealment (2nd round): This round does not possess coping 
mechanisms at this specific point, as information regarding corruption 
has already left the political system in the first round and is no longer 
under sole control of the leadership. 
II. Output perception attenuation (2nd round): This round does not possess 
coping mechanisms at this specific point, as perception of corruption 
has already been effectively attained in the first round. 
III. Negative input defuse (2nd round): At this point, the government has 
the option to activate one or more of the following mechanisms: 
Repression/coercion; obstacles to advocacy; manipulation of public 
priorities; and, misallocation of responsibility. 
IV. Stress amelioration (2nd round): Finally, mechanisms similar to those 
found in the previous round, but modified to fit anti-corruption reform 
pressure instead of enforcement, are available as a last resort to cope 
with stress. As symbolic measures, the government can install 
inadequate anti-corruption policies/bodies/agencies that are by design 
unenforceable, generic, non-independent, insufficiently funded, 
mismanaged, redundant, and/or discriminating. Just as it was the case 
with mismanaged investigations/prosecutions, this particular 
mechanism benefits from high levels of publicity, which increases the 
social impact and exploits its symbolic nature. A second mechanism in 
this category represents the public expression of reform 
support/proposal; this is equivalent to public promises regarding the 
satisfaction of anti-corruption demands as we have seen in the scenario 
	   90	  
of corruption in processes and in the round of enforcement pressure. 
Regarding genuine measures, the following mechanisms are 
available: Clientelism and other forms of economic stimuli; alternative 
populist gratifications; and, political concessions. 
 
Corruption Intolerance. Parting from pressure directly or indirectly induced 
by the output of corruption, the third scenario explicitly deals with the stability of the 
NACS, exerting pressure over the political system with or without the actual presence 
of corruption outputs in any single moment.  
The difference in nature between this scenario and the previous two has 
important implications for the type of pressure imposed over the system. The most 
obvious consequence of directly targeting the NACS without requiring the prior 
presence of corruption is that the first two coping points become instantly disable, and 
so the government does not have the option to activate any preventive mechanism of 
concealment, nor can it turn to affect popular perceptions. Corruption intolerance 
takes place when popular dissatisfaction with the anti-corruption structure emerges; in 
that sense, this scenario is somehow similar to the second analytic round of corruption 
perception. Another point of comparison between the two scenarios is the explicit 
concern in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. However, 
where the second round of corruption perception was somehow influenced by the 
government’s performance regarding enforcement, the scenario of corruption 
intolerance is not amenable to satisfaction through specific cases of enforcement. This 
independency from other extraneous satisfactions represent a quality that gives the 
third scenario a particularly strong position to stress the system, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. 
Of the scenarios reviewed so far, corruption intolerance provides the least 
amount of possible coping mechanisms to the government. From this perspective, it is 
logical to expect that efforts undertaken under this scenario should prove more 
effective in threatening the stability of the NACS, all else being equal. However, an 
important variable in the capacity of the system to deal with stress has to do directly 
with the type and source of pressure, which is analytically independent from the array 
of mechanisms available to the system. Although this point will be taken up later, it is 
necessary to consider here that system stress is a consequence of the amount of 
pressure exerted by the environment and the way the government deals with it 
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through the activation of coping mechanisms. The relevance of the scenario of 
corruption intolerance for the fight against corruption, therefore, directly depends on 
the level of demands and support civil society and international actors are able to 
manipulate and channel. If few demands are voiced, the government may even forgo 
the activation of coping mechanisms and let the natural process of media agenda deal 
with the problem. In short, although theoretically this scenario should provide more 
opportunities for anti-corruption fighters, it may very well prove sterile for the 
creating of demands and the withdrawal of support. We will discuss these possibilities 
later. 
 
I. Output concealment: This scenario does not possess coping 
mechanisms at this specific point, as environmental pressure does not 
require the presence of corruption in any particular case. 
II. Output perception attenuation: This scenario does not possess coping 
mechanisms at this specific point, as environmental pressure does not 
require the perception of corruption in any particular case. 
III. Negative input defuse: At this point, the government has the option to 
activate one or more of the following mechanisms: 
Repression/coercion; obstacles to advocacy; manipulation of public 
priorities; argumentative defense; plaintiff discredit; 31  and, 
misallocation of responsibility for reform. 
IV. Stress amelioration: At the last point, the government has the option to 
adopt symbolic measures such as inadequate anti-corruption 
policies/bodies/agencies or public expressions of reform 
support/proposal. As genuine measures, on the other hand, the 
government can activate the following mechanisms: Clientelism and 
other forms of economic stimuli; alternative populist gratifications; 
and, political concessions. 
Prolonged Stress. Finally, the fourth scenario of stress represents the 
persistence of output failure under any of the three previous ones, i.e. corruption in 
processes, corruption perception, of corruption intolerance. When the government in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This mechanism is slightly adapted to this scenario from the description presented earlier, as in this 
case the plaintiff is not an actor or group producing allegations of corruption against the government, 
but producing demands for anti-corruption reform. 
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unable to reduce demands and increase support through the activation of one or more 
coping mechanisms, and support decreases beyond a minimum level, regular political 
life becomes impossible. In this case we would say that stress has become too great 
for the government to cope with, and thus the transformation of the political system 
becomes the only possible way for authorities to keep exerting power. For the case of 
our analytical system, this transformation implies the reform of the anti-corruption 
structure into a version that guarantees a minimum flow of support towards the 
political leadership, the form of government, and the community in general. 
Due to the nature of this fourth scenario, it rejects by definition the possible 
existence of any coping mechanism available to the authorities. Whatever coping 
point existed, it took place earlier; and whatever mechanisms were activated, the 
presence of the scenario of prolonged stress means that they failed as a group to 
alleviate the stress over the system. By this stage, government cannot maintain the 
two essential variables (decisions and their compliance) without addressing the 
stability of the NACS, and therefore no coping mechanisms are available. In order to 
stabilize the system and secure the survival of higher political objects, we would 
expect the government to reform the NACS through the effective adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies at least until enough support is produced 
and the authorities are again legitimized.  
 
2. Types of Environmental Pressure  
 
Coping mechanisms are essential for understanding the possible ways in 
which the authorities are able to maintain the stability of the NACS across years and 
even decades, getting past corruption scandals, periods of economic crisis, and the 
emergence of new global trends such as the international anti-corruption movement. 
Those mechanisms available to the political leadership, however, are only as effective 
as the amount of support they can stimulate and the types of demands they succeed in 
repressing. Information on the strength with which civil society and international 
actors pressure the political system is just as important in understanding why certain 
mechanisms are successful while others are not.  
Types of pressure and coping mechanisms are the two variables that decide 
the fate of the NACS. Certain events, such as corruption scandals, usually produce 
high amounts of demands on the system, and thus they require the activation of 
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equally effective coping mechanisms; other situations, like an international 
organization adopting new lending policies in line with international anti-corruption 
standards, may be better coped with a different, more subtle mechanism. ‘Better’ in 
this regard only implies a calculus of efficiency: the most simple and economical of 
two equally effective coping mechanisms can be considered the best. Whatever 
mechanism can produce the most support and the least demands for the least amount 
of government resources, will be expected to take the lead in a concerted strategy 
against environmental pressure. 
What can we say about the best type of anti-corruption pressure, on the other 
hand? Certainly, the most effective form of activism would be that which produces 
the highest amount of pressure over the government, to the point where the authorities 
do not have any other option but to comply with demands. However, just as it 
happens with the government, civil society and international actors also have limited 
resources and other concerns besides that of fighting malfeasance, thus considerations 
regarding viable strategies must necessarily include their relative costs and the 
amount of resources at their disposal. The ‘best’ strategy under any scenario would be 
considered that which produces the most pressure for the least resources; nonetheless, 
this may not be necessarily relevant for the case of environmental strategies. 
Civil society and international actors include a wide variety of formal 
organizations and informal groups that usually do not coordinate or harmonize their 
activities. At the same time as an international organization is negotiating the 
inclusion of anti-corruption mechanisms in a financial cooperation agreement, 
domestic NGOs may be pushing for the passing of a transparency and access to 
information bill, while popular attention is engaged in demanding the prosecution of 
senior officials over charges of embezzlement. Although all members of the 
environment are pushing for anti-corruption measures, each one of them is acting 
under a different scenario, and so their efforts can be frustrated by different coping 
mechanisms. Just like the figure of speech goes, ‘Jack of all trades, master of none,’ 
the environment may cover more topics than the ones it can possible impact. 
The lack of coordination between members of the environment takes special 
relevance when we consider the benefits and difficulties of each stress scenario for the 
reform of the NACS. The first scenario, corruption in processes, do not explicitly 
include any demands for dealing with malfeasance; the second, corruption perception, 
only addresses reforms in its second analytic round, and thus it could be said that 
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most of the efforts under this scenario are spent in dealing with enforcement, which 
threatens the NACS only indirectly if at all. The third scenario, corruption intolerance, 
undoubtedly represents the best theoretical chance for pressuring the system into 
reform, as the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies become here 
the sole targets of social and international action. The potential of corruption 
intolerance seems to be widely recognized, as it is indeed under this scenario that 
most of the activities engaged in by the international anti-corruption movement take 
place.  
However, the logic behind the stimulation of pressure under the third scenario 
drastically hinders the overall strength of the environment: as corruption intolerance 
implies a change in attitudes and behavior, it is first adopted by organized groups of 
civil society such as NGOs and professional bodies, and by international 
organizations and fora. It is through these groups that new perspectives on corruption 
influence the perception of members of society regarding what acceptable 
government activities are, and it is them who have the level of technical sophistication 
required to identify issues in the NACS and make appropriate suggestions and 
demands. When it comes to garner social attention and support for anti-corruption 
campaigns, corruption intolerance encourages public attention of corruption scandals 
but it does not succeed in harnessing that potential for specific policy reforms. To put 
it simply, the scenario of ‘corruption intolerance’ relies mostly on organized civil and 
international society for domestic anti-corruption reform, while the scenario of 
‘corruption perception’ keeps most of the public resources distracted on the 
investigation and prosecution of singular media cases. Thus, the most important 
source of pressure for anti-corruption activities is lost in a scenario that does not focus 
on reform. 
For this reason, the ‘best’ theoretical strategy for the environment becomes 
unviable due to the impossibility of coordinating and channeling all sources of 
demands and support in line with a single reformist agenda.  
But even when it is not feasible to make inferences regarding the best possible 
strategies available to the environment, we can describe the way pressure is channeled 
against the system, and the different forms it can take. As Figure 3 shows, there are 
three main routes through which civil society and international actors can implement 
their strategies/activities. First, civil society and international actors can exert a direct 
pressure over the political system, without any kind of coordination or cooperation 
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with each other. For example, negotiations of free trade agreements that include the 
implementation of specific anti-corruption mechanisms are usually conducted 
exclusively between official representatives of the state parties involved; the same can 
be said about any special attention given by a media outlet to a corruption scandal, 
which usually implies the mobilization of investigative journalist without any form of 
technical or financial support from international organizations. 
 Second, civil society and international actors can influence each other and thus 
exert pressure over the political system in an indirect way. This is the case of grants 
offered by international donor agencies to local NGOs on anti-corruption platforms, 
or the reproduction on local media outlets of information related to domestic 
corruption that has international news as a source. The influence can also work in the 
other direction: national NGOs can be given a role in the review mechanisms of 
international anti-corruption conventions, as it is the case of the MESICIC, where 
they present independent reports regarding the state of implementation and changes in 
the NACS.  
Third, civil society and international actors can combine efforts in a more 
coherent and consistent fashion, resulting in improved possibilities of stressing the 
system than either one of them had standing alone. For example, foreign governments 
 
Figure 3. Routes Available for Environmental Pressure 	  
EXTRA&SOCIETAL,
&,Individual,donor,agencies,
&,Intergovernmental,organiza=ons,
&,Interna=onal,advocacy,groups,
&,Others,
INTRA&SOCIETAL,
&,Media,
&,Local,advocacy,groups,
&,Social,movements,
&,Public,opinion,
&,Others,
POLITICAL,SYSTEM,
,
&,Execu=ve,branch,
&,Congress,
&,Others,
,
,
Dash&and&doHed,connectors,are,for,EXTRA&SOCIETAL,pressure,
DoHed,connectors,are,for,INTRA,SOCIETAL,pressure,
Full,connector,is,for,the,COMPOUNDED,pressure,from,the,environment,
Dashed,connectors,are,for,POLITICAL,SYSTEM’s,outputs,
	   96	  
can take position with local demands and make public declarations of criticism or 
condemnation over special cases of political corruption, or their media outlets may 
adopt local news and provide them with a global reach, thus affecting the 
international legitimacy of corrupt leaders. In the same way, international reports 
finding deficient anti-corruption structures in domestic settings are usually reproduced 
and instrumentalized by local media, forcing the government to deal with diplomatic 
and popular challenges regarding one common demand. 
Disregarding the route through which demands are channeled into the system, 
there are different ways in which these can manifest. Certainly, civil society and 
international actors do not exert pressure over the government in only way, but will be 
found to also have different strategies available to them depending on the intensity of 
the specific case, the scenario where it is embedded, and the resources available at 
that moment in time. Each strategy or activity, in turn, has a relative amount of 
effectiveness attached to it in terms of its potential to stress the system; what this 
amount is, however, is a matter of empirical analysis, but some intuitive categories 
can be laid down. 
 
I. Direct pressure: The first category of the available forms of impact to 
environmental actors includes those activities that are commonly 
considered to exert unmediated pressure over the government. For civil 
society, these are: Public exhortations; popular criticism; protests; 
advocacy/networking; and, legislative initiatives. 
Public exhortations describe speeches, addresses, interviews, 
press statements, and any other type of public address undertaken by an 
influential stakeholder against the government regarding specific 
corruption-related issues. 
Popular criticism, on the other hand, is the popular version of 
public exhortations. Relying on social networks, electronic media 
platforms, and other elements of the ICT that have democratized 
political participation and freedom of speech over the past decade, 
actors of the non-organized civil society are now capable of 
introducing demands and threatening their input of support to the 
political leadership. Older forms of popular criticism include citizen 
surveys of government/presidential support, and other tools reported by 
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domestic media that measure the level of support and the types of 
demands arising in society. 
Protests describe the physical manifestation of popular 
criticism, which may take on more pacifist or violent forms depending 
on the circumstances, but usually represent a more effective way of 
stressing the system due to its explicit and evident nature. 
Advocacy/networking changes the actors involved and reduces 
the distance between social stakeholders and public officials. Executed 
by members of the organized civil society such as NGOs and 
professional associations, advocacy represents a direct effort to 
influence policy making by approaching the official actors involved in 
the process of adoption and implementation of anti-corruption actions. 
This strategy can focus on mid-level public officials in charge of 
corruption awareness and control inside an agency, or can target senior 
officials and congressmembers with the intention of bringing specific 
issues into the political agenda. For these efforts to succeed, policy 
networks become an important resource: these can be defined as 
“(more or less) stable patterns of social relations between 
interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or 
policy programmes” (Kickert et al., 1997, p. 6). 
The last form of hard pressure usually employed by civil 
society and opposition political actors is the introduction of legislative 
initiatives, which include popular instruments as the calling to 
referendum. As this form of pressure is formal and technical in nature, 
having legal requirement that need to be fulfilled, it is possibly the 
most costly in relation to the previous ones. A legislative initiative 
usually requires the conformation of a network of stakeholders with 
enough resources to harness and mobilize public interest around the 
issue, making it more time consuming and logistically complex, which 
in turn leaves it open to attack by a variety of coping mechanisms. 
However, it also represents a more serious and concerted advance 
against the stability of the NACS, which might make it a more enticing 
option if the conditions are favorable. 
On the side of the international community, the activities 
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available under this category are: Public exhortations; international 
conventions; international agreements; and, aid conditionalities. 
International conventions are legally binding instruments that 
set minimum standards regarding the NACS and practice in national 
settings. As mentioned before, instruments of this kind are the IACAC, 
the UNCAC, and others. 
International agreements represent a more heterogeneous group 
of documents that may or may not be legally binding. Current free 
trade agreements, for example, usually include certain provisions 
regarding the control of corruption, particularly in the form of national 
legislation criminalizing transnational bribery. Other agreements, 
however, are less effective and binding, and sometimes represent mere 
statements of intentions regarding the position of domestic 
governments regarding the fight against corruption. Examples of these 
are the Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption (APEC, 2014), or 
the Andean Plan to Fight Against Corruption (Andean Community, 
2007). 
Aid conditionalities refer here to any form of linkage between 
the provision of financial support and the adoption and implementation 
of anti-corruption measures. These measures may be minimally aimed 
at controlling the execution of aid projects, or may be more 
overreaching and include the adoption and implementation of general 
anti-corruption policies; but they all respond to a trade-off with the 
providing agency, in which money is exchanged for compliance with 
the international anti-corruption movement in a similar but opposite 
way to the activation of clientelistic measures by the government. 
II. Indirect pressure: Diminishing in the their capacity to produce stress 
on the system, activities addressing the NACS in an indirect manner 
work more as instruments that stimulate pressure rather than exerting it 
themselves. Available to civil society, these activities are: Media 
coverage; technical corruption-related reports; and corruption 
awareness. 
Media coverage is perhaps the most common way of raising 
concerns about public management among regular citizens. As it was 
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mentioned before, civil society only becomes aware of corruption 
involving senior officials through its exposure to corruption news; in 
this way, media coverage represents a tool to bridge the distance 
between the political system and the environment, and it allows social 
and international actors to correct their opinions and attitudes 
regarding the leadership in line with the presence of corruption. Thus, 
the press becomes a force able to produce demands and reduce support 
for the government, giving cues for social mobilization that are 
normally outside the capacities of other social stakeholders such as 
NGOs and international organizations. Furthermore, media coverage 
helps in the communications between stakeholders, carrying relevant 
information across analytic borders that help the informal coordination 
of anti-corruption activities. 
The production of technical corruption-related reports by 
competent members of civil society represents a sophisticated and 
academic approach to domestic pressure. These reports stimulate social 
dissatisfaction and activism by bringing attention to the spread of 
corruption in national settings and the state of the NACS, which can be 
used as an objective rationale behind the production of demands and 
the withdrawal of support. 
Corruption awareness, too, aims at stimulating social 
perception of the state of affairs regarding the fight against corruption, 
but includes more general approaches than just the production of 
technical reports. Educational advertisement campaigns in radio and 
television, open conferences, training courses, and other forms of 
popular dissemination of anti-corruption standards and norms help 
decrease the general level of corruption tolerance in a society, and 
prepare the ground for the channeling of demands after specific 
objectives are identified.  
On the side of the international community, the activities 
available under this category are: Technical and financial assistance; 
international cooperation; and, technical corruption-related reports. 
Technical and financial assistance differ from aid 
conditionalities in that they do not come connected to a trade-off 
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strategy; they merely represent the foreign funding of domestically 
bred anti-corruption projects and the transfer of knowledge to facilitate 
the activities related to it. In this sense, technical and financial 
assistance do not aim at pushing the government towards compliance 
with international standards, but they provide the conditions to make it 
harder for the leadership to avoid implementing them. By reducing or 
completely eradicating the official costs involved in anti-corruption 
activities, international actors preemptively suppress the coping 
mechanism ‘argumentative defense’ as the government cannot turn to 
the excuse that it has no resources to undertake the socially demanded 
reforms. Therefore, they hinder government negligence and give 
grounds for the justified emergence of demands. 
International cooperation is an extension of the previous 
strategy, as it also aims at facilitating the adoption and implementation 
of anti-corruption policies in domestic settings, taking possible forms 
of ‘argumentative defense’ away from the government. 
Finally, technical corruption-related reports from international 
actors include such instruments as international corruption rankings of 
the like of Transparency International’s (2015a; 2015b) Corruption 
Perceptions Index and the Global Corruption Barometer; or reports of 
peer-reviewed mechanisms for the implementation of international 
conventions, such as the MESICIC (OAS, 2011b) or the UNCAC 
mechanism (UNODC, 2015). 
III. Influence: The third and final category of impact available to 
environmental actors is of the subtlest kind. While direct and indirect 
pressure can usually be traced for their effects (or the lack of them) on 
the stability of the NACS, to talk about influence is to focus on all 
those activities that have anti-corruption concerns at their core but that 
are so ubiquitous that their impact is not explicitly recognized, and 
thus can barely be said to even exist. Nonetheless, small traces of their 
existence can be found almost everywhere in the political system. For 
both civil society and international actors, these activities involve the 
general dissemination of corruption awareness and anti-corruption 
principles and information targeting not members of the environment, 
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but public officials. The objective of this influence is to affect the 
perceptions of the government itself in relation to the social, political, 
and economic costs of corruption.  
Much as the literature on the principal-agent, top-down 
approach did, influence as a form of impact on the stability of the 
NACS focuses on facilitating the knowledge required to adopt and 
implement effective policies to combat malfeasance if the political will 
of the leadership allows it. Indeed, even if the information is not 
actually employed, the extensive effort to influence policy agendas 
increases the costs of the government to secure the stability of the 
NACS. This is apparent when we consider that, below crucial positions 
at the top of the leadership, there exists a great degree of discretion 
available to junior officials in places of policy implementation that 
may be targeted for anti-corruption education. The potential impact of 
‘influence’ increases drastically when we consider the regular renewal 
of actors in positions of political power and decision. As not all 
political actors need be equally invested in the stability of the NACS, 
the early provision of information regarding the potential social and 
political benefits of fighting malfeasance may tip the balance in favor 
of reform. Academic conferences and publications, international and 
academic discourse, formation of professional networks, and similar 
activities support the dissemination of corruption awareness among all 
official actors of the political system. 
 
3. Final Considerations regarding Coping Mechanisms and Environmental 
Activities 
 
Corruption is a difficult phenomenon to study due to its secretive nature. The 
actors involved in it are invested in keeping their activities hidden from public 
perception, and so it is almost impossible to directly measure corruption, particularly 
of the high-level kind. The only information we have regarding events involving 
senior officials regards those accounts provided by investigative journalism, or the 
results from official investigations and prosecutions. In consequence, to talk about 
grand corruption is in reality to talk about the specific instances where it has actually 
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been detected or claimed. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
in part solves this problem, but it does creating a new one: To bypass the bias related 
our dependence on variables such as the media or the judiciary, it relies on popular 
perceptions, which is in itself another bias. Cases of petty corruption are easier to 
study due to the accessibility of regular citizens to such transactions, the ease with 
which they report them in surveys after anonymity is guaranteed, and the relatively 
small interests that are affected. Certainly, it is easier to uncover a petty bribe to 
obtain a drivel license, than a multimillion embezzlement of insurance funds. 
Coping mechanisms can be said to be even harder to detect and assess than 
corruption. While the latter relies on secret transactions and illegal networks of trust, 
the former is done completely in the open, at least in terms of the activities 
implemented. Because of the public nature of coping mechanisms, the official 
rationale behind them needs to be clearly established in every case, and this effort 
engulfs the actual reasons that inspired the activation of the mechanism in the first 
place. For obvious reasons, to publicly present a government measure as a way to 
cope with demands by not actually satisfying them would completely defeat its 
purpose. Coping mechanisms, after all, are also outputs like any other government 
decision, with the crucial difference that their motivation is purely instrumental for 
the interests of the political leadership. Therefore, it is not the official activity itself 
which identifies a coping mechanism, but the real and hidden rationale behind it. The 
political motivations and objectives behind the introduction of a legislative bill 
regarding augmented powers for anti-corruption prosecutors, for example, will 
ultimately reveal if the bill can be catalogued as a coping mechanism or as an actual 
anti-corruption measure aimed at modifying the NACS.  
But, how can the motivations behind coping mechanisms be assessed? 
Whereas corrupt activities, even if hidden, are ultimately instances of actual behavior 
involving one or more actors and usually a trail of money or other goods, motivations 
behind coping mechanisms never need to be stated on any material way and remain in 
the psyche of the political leaders, unknown to anybody but them. However, just as 
corruption can be implied from evidence of illicit enrichment, the presence of conflict 
of interests, the abuse of power and other forms of inappropriate behavior that may or 
may not be corrupt by themselves, coping mechanisms can also be identified by the 
presence of other events or activities that provide ample ground to state that a certain 
government action has effectively managed to reduce anti-corruption pressure from 
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the environment. Although it will remain impossible to posit with no margin of error 
that a certain activity indeed represents a coping mechanism, a methodic approach 
based on recurrent patterns of behavior and the cautious and alert identification of 
coincidental/accidental events will provide enough grounds for relevant inferences. 
The first challenge faced in the following chapters is to identify the instances 
of anti-corruption pressure following the presence of one or more environmental 
activities to that end, under any of the anti-corruption scenarios described in the 
previous chapter. If the theory proves correct, we should be able to find in most cases 
at least one coping mechanism activated by the political leadership in order to deal 
with the stress; this is the second challenge. Although not all cases of environmental 
pressure and coping mechanisms need to occur in response to each other, the 
clustering of these event will give strength to the predictive power of the theoretical 
framework, and explain how the Peruvian government has managed to keep the 
NACS relatively stable in the time period evaluated here. 
While the purely theoretical description of a systems model of corruption and 
anti-corruption reform suggests that coping mechanism are activated by the 
government upon the presence of corrupt activities or reform pressure, it is entirely 
feasible that proactive political leaders may find use for coping mechanisms besides 
their reactive nature, and choose to activate them preemptively in order to accumulate 
popular and international support. Just as promises of economic satisfaction may 
balance out and counteract demands for anti-corruption reforms, the latter can also be 
promised to assuage economic demands that are not in line with the ideological stand 
of the government party. In this case, therefore, coping mechanisms do not perform 
the job of protecting the NACS, and cannot be appropriately identified as such.  
On the other hand, they may also be proactively activated in direct relation to 
future corruption events, in the expectation that certain degree of support will be 
withdrawn. Although in these specific cases coping mechanisms would be found to 
comply with their role as described in the theoretical model, the identification 
problems described earlier will become usually unmanageable in any appropriate 
way. Without the presence and relevance of the context to provide support to claims 
regarding the identification of a coping mechanism, the latter cannot convincingly be 
differentiated from an honest anti-corruption output, or a coping mechanism serving 
unrelated political agendas. Therefore, although theoretically real, preemptive coping 
mechanisms will in most cases not be amenable to be identified as such. 
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 It also needs to be noted that the coping mechanisms and environmental 
activities listed here were not intended to provide an exhaustive list of all the possible 
instruments and measures available to the political system, and to the civil society and 
international actors. The only purpose of those described in this chapter was to 
provide an idea of the common and theoretical possibilities open to both groups of 
actors. It is evident enough that the number of mechanisms and activities theoretically 
available to social and political actors is only limited by human imagination and 
resources, which are constantly increasing and evolving. However, when considering 
their real world applicability, it is clear that their actual availability is connected to the 
type of country and political system we consider, with some settings being 
institutionally hostile or repressive towards certain environmental activities, in 
particular.  
While the theoretical model introduced in this chapter is envisioned as a 
proposed framework for the analysis of corruption and anti-corruption reform in most 
developing countries, beyond its core tenets the variety of coping mechanisms, 
stakeholders and pressure strategies will better describe political systems 
characterized by the stability of contested anti-corruption schemes, and that fit into 
the classification of liberal or electoral democracies (Diamond, 2002), and to some 
extent even delegative democracies (O’Donnell, 1994) or competitive authoritarian 
regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The reason for this qualification stems from the 
model’s focus on the political struggles around the presence of corruption, which has 
implicitly considered that political leaders, on the one hand, and domestic and 
international actors, on the other, are predominantly constrained by the availability of 
resources and predominance of interests in relation to the issue of public malfeasance, 
but otherwise in a level playing field in terms of formal political rights. This is, the 
model (as is) does not include forms of social and/or political control beyond those 
found in the above-mentioned types of regime and besides corruption-related coping 
mechanisms: non-governmental actors are considered to have at their disposal the 
widest array of legal channels and instruments, affected only when in direct 
connection to the control of anti-corruption pressure, such as the cases of 
repression/coercion and obstacles to advocacy. Thus, while an adapted version of the 
array of instruments presented here might be suitable for slightly more authoritarian 
regimes, extreme examples of systemic political repression such as autocratic or 
totalitarian regimes would require us to reevaluate the role of non-governmental 
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stakeholders as a source of support, and even the relevance of corruption as a source 
of stress entirely. 
Additionally, it is possible to see that a similar leeway is inherent to the model 
in regards to the behavior of the political system: even though the employment of any 
coping mechanism is dependent on the technical, political and financial capabilities of 
the administration at the specific moment of activation, the types of political systems 
cited above are considered to have a constant theoretical availability of all the 
mechanisms described by the model, which could be potentially employed provided 
that their technical, political and financial requirements are met. It is precisely under 
this premise regarding the maximum theoretical availability of pressure activities and 
coping mechanisms that the argument elaborated in the present chapter clearly points 
to the predominance of the latter over the former, which in turn has been proposed to 
explain Peru’s limited adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies over 
the last decade and a half. In other words, the hypothesis introduced in the 
introductory chapter finds theoretical support in the number and variety of strategies 
identified here as long as they are constantly available for potential activation (this is, 
despite the presence of temporary or circumstantial constraints). 
 
4. Real Anti-Corruption Activities and Reform 
 
Regardless of the rather pessimist approach that the Systems Model of 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform might represent at first glance, its core utility 
is to offer a realistic approximation to the dynamics of corruption in the presence of a 
political regime such as the Peruvian one,32 and does not inherently reject the 
possibilities for real anti-corruption activities, or even reform, being engaged by the 
government. The analysis described in this chapter emphasized the role of interacting 
forces behind the tensions caused by corruption, without predisposing the results of 
that tension to any given result. Rather, each individual process in real life will be 
brought to an end following the empirical values of the interacting forces, namely 
those of stress and government endurance; and although the model suggests a more 
powerful position from which the political system can secure the stability of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In the last three decades, Peru has moved from a delegative to an electoral democracy (or even to a 
liberal one—Diamond, 2002), only falling briefly to forms of competitive authoritarianism during the 
last years of the Fujimori administration (1990-2000). 
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NACS, the carrying out of activities to fight malfeasance have without a doubt 
become a part of regular public administration, providing an argument for the 
possibilities of change.  
The variety of coping points and mechanisms against the strategies available 
to environmental actors describes an uneven ground to push for anti-corruption 
activities, but does not doom reformist to failure; after all, the stability of the NACS 
are not a condition for the persistence of the political leadership per se, but rather a 
quality of the political system developed by a lack of effective opposition. In other 
words, the NACS have persevered and keep being defended because it pays off to do 
so in political and/or economic terms. As long as coping mechanisms are able to 
generate enough support to allow the political leadership to continue pursuing its own 
agenda, it will not be reasonable to expect any real change in the NACS. Thus, two 
natural conditions can be drawn from the tenets of the model that would allow the 
power relations in a country to be disturbed in specific cases: First, as agency plays a 
crucial role in the stability of the NACS, for its breaking point is defined by the value 
that corrupt profits have for a specific set of leaders, a honest government will find 
coping mechanisms more costly vis-à-vis the amount of support they generate. Taking 
the case of a political leadership that has (hypothetically) no economic or political 
interest in benefitting from corruption, its expected response should follow the most 
effective and efficient way of stimulating support from society and international 
actors, which in many cases will be to engage in real anti-corruption reform. Thus, by 
devaluing corrupt profits as a source of political interest, the model suggests an 
improved position from which to launch anti-corruption pressure. This condition, in 
fact, is what might account for most of the current progress in bureaucratic control 
mechanisms: as political parties have lost much of their appeal for stimulating 
partisanship, and most citizens in modern societies have become disengaged from 
membership into political groups, it was to be expected from the government to stop 
concentrating in handing out bureaucratic positions to its party ranks, and instead to 
allow the introduction of anti-corruption mechanisms specially targeting 
administrative processes as a form of stimulating public satisfaction and support. 
A second condition, when a more honest leadership cannot be attained, relates 
to the way resources are employed by each side of the confrontation. Although the 
model proposes the existence of a vast number of coping mechanisms available to the 
government, they all differ in the amount of support they can stimulate, and this 
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potential is even more relative depending on the specific corruption scenario affecting 
the political system. A perfect example of the subordinate value of coping 
mechanisms is the scenario of prolonged stress, where the failure to generate 
appropriate and timely responses allows the accumulation of sufficient stress as to 
render any newly activated coping mechanism useless. Thus, prolonged stress 
evidences a crucial characteristic of both pressure and coping strategies: their efficacy 
depends on particular conditions, and these must be addressed empirically rather than 
theoretically. For anti-corruption activities and reform to become possible, the model 
only suggests that the accumulated pressure must be higher than the support 
stimulated by coping mechanisms, with even the period of time over which these 
forces must be exerted being up to historical analysis. If this condition is met, there is 
no reason suggested by the model for which real anti-corruption activities should not 
be expected, given that other potential intervening variables are held constant. On the 
complete opposite side, this way of conceiving possibilities for reform also suggest 
that not every form of pressure will need to be met with the activation of a coping 
mechanism, for specifically defensive outputs might be more costly than the 
minimum deviation in support, and regular government outputs more efficient. 
To conclude, and to bring the above two conditions together, the theoretical 
model introduced in the present chapter allows for a flexible explanation of corruption 
and anti-corruption processes based on returns, which are valued by reference to 
particular political leaders and specific political circumstances. Thus, while for some 
leaders the NACS might not have any value by itself, others might prioritize its 
defense over the stimulation of support above the bare minimum; and while the 
former will probably concede to engage in anti-corruption reform after it becomes 
inefficient to keep deflecting the issue, the latter will only give in after corrupt rents 
have become unsustainable and political capital is all there is left. 
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Chapter V 
End of the Fujimori Regime and the Transitional Government 
 
From the discussion over a theoretical model with which to address the core 
question of this study (i.e. what explains Peru’s limited adoption and implementation 
of anti-corruption policies between 2000 and 2014?), we turn now to empirically 
testing its basic tenets, namely the existence and activation of coping mechanisms to 
deal with different forms of pressure from civil society and international actors. The 
time period covered includes (although not in their entirety) the governments of 
Alberto Fujimori, Valentín Paniagua, Alejandro Toledo, Alan García, and Ollanta 
Humala. The present chapter will focus on the last months of the Fujimori 
government and the brief term of interim President Paniagua. By reviewing the 
fluctuations in the input of demands and support, and the activation of certain coping 
mechanisms, the events leading to Fujimori’s demise and the recovery of democratic 
government will provide initial support to the strength of the theoretical formulations 
presented in the previous two chapter. 
 
1. Preface: Fraud in the 2000 Presidential Elections 
 
By now many studies have attended to different aspects of the Fujimori 
government, which went on from 1990 to 2000 (Degregori, 2001; Conaghan, 2005; 
Carrión, 2006; and, Murakami, 2007, to name but a few). Beyond the social, 
economic, and political aspects of his peculiar regime, one aspect that comes out in 
any account is the spread of systemic corruption that characterized the decade. As we 
know now, Fujimori’s government managed to seize control of most of the 
institutions of the country, from the military to the media, with the help of his main 
advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. But most of the information regarding the illicit 
dealings of the government leadership came only in the aftermath, after Fujimori’s 
third government had come to an abrupt end and he had fled the country. 
By the time of the electoral process of 2000, the biggest source of pressure 
from civil society and international actors had to do with the government’s blatant 
abuse of power the possibility of electoral fraud, which is also a type of grand 
corruption but with special and grave consequences to a democratic system. 
Fujimori’s efforts to stay in office for a third period included the control of Congress, 
	   109	  
the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Electoral Jury (JNE), and the National 
Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE); these institutions were crucial to secure a 
legally viable way of running for office for a third term, as the Constitution of 1993 
explicitly stated that the president could be re-elected only for one additional 
consecutive term. On top of this, the government was regularly employing public 
resources in support for Fujimori’s candidacy,33 openly acting against the principle of 
neutrality.  
Notwithstanding the abuse of authority showed by the leadership, presidential 
approval among citizens had been on the rise since February 1999, and by the same 
month of 2000 more than 50% of the population approved of Fujimori as president, 
and voting intentions were giving him an ample margin of success above that of the 
opposition candidates: more than 40% declared their intentions to vote for Fujimori, 
while none of the challengers reached even 20% (Carrión, 2000). 
To face the challenge, several institutional environmental actors mobilized to 
either stop Fujimori’s campaign or to make sure the process was carried out with a 
minimum level of fairness and transparency. Peruvian opposition and advocacy 
groups invested their efforts in stopping Fujimori’s candidacy through legal means by 
presenting motions of impugnation or resorting to public exhortations to the JNE34 
(Castro Hansen, 2002). International agencies and organizations such as the Carter 
Center, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI, 2015), the 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH, 2000), the International Center for 
Human Rights and Democratic Development, and the Organization of American 
States (OAS, 2000) sent observation missions to monitor the elections (Castro 
Hansen, 2002; Tanaka, 2006).  
However, the combined efforts from both environmental groups of actors were 
insufficient to keep the government at bay, and by the end of the second round of 
elections Alberto Fujimori won over opposition candidate Alejandro Toledo, who had 
informally resigned after the first round in an attempt to boycott the whole process. 
The reports from the observation missions were critical of the way the government 
had carried on the process, and their reports corroborated what was widely known by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Political magazine Caretas read: “Government registers thousands of people to Family Plots 
Program, less than 2 months to elections. [Fujimori’s party] Perú 2000 in campaign” (Escobar y 
Sullón, 2000; translated from Spanish). 
34 Peruvian NGO Transparencia demanded the update of the electoral register; and later it publicly 
requested to participate, in association with the OAS, in the quick count, but was confronted with 
government allegations to the OAS stating that the NGO was biased (Gonzales Arica, 2000a). 
	   110	  
domestic actors in Peru, and gave support to their positions against Fujimori’s 
campaign. The mission from the OAS (2000) concluded that: 
 
“After nearly three months of continuous work in Peru, the Electoral 
Observation Mission (EOM) of the Organization of American States issued its 
final assessment of the general elections, noting that ‘by international 
standards, the Peruvian election process falls far short of what could be called 
free and fair’... The overall assessment points to persistent inadequacies, 
irregularities, inconsistencies, and inequities, leading the Mission to qualify 
the entire electoral process as irregular, to use one of the categories listed in 
the Manual for the Organization of Electoral Observation Missions issued by 
the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.” 
 
 The conclusions from the Carter Center (NDI and Carter Center, 2000) had an 
even harsher tone: 
 
“The 2000 election process in Peru failed dramatically to meet minimum 
international standards for a genuine, democratic election. As a result, the 
people of Peru were denied the opportunity to exercise their right to 
democratic elections, and the government that emerged from the elections 
lacks a legitimate mandate based on the will of the electorate. Almost all of the 
groups observing the electoral process in Peru, including NDI/Carter Center, 
the OAS, the European Union, the Defensoría del Pueblo,35 Transparencia,36 
and Consejo por la Paz,37 decided not to observe the second round of voting 
on May 28, affirming their belief that the electoral process was neither 
legitimate nor credible. This broad consensus among various Peruvian and 
international observer groups that the election process did not meet 
international standards speaks to the extraordinary extent and severity of the 
irregularities that were documented throughout the process.” 
  
 The end of the electoral process did not equally end the waves of social unrest, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Peruvian Ombudsman. 
36 Peruvian NGO. 
37 Official forum created by Law No. 25237 on June 8, 1990. 
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but these rather gain strength over the following weeks. Under the leadership of 
Alejandro Toledo, the domestic front began a cycle of public speeches and 
manifestations of condemnation against the illegal re-election of President Fujimori, 
connecting with severe critics from the OAS’ Secretary General, César Gaviria. 
However, the international front was anything but cohesive in its position regarding 
Fujimori’s government, and while electoral missions had taken a critical approach, 
other influential actors in the hemisphere were more tolerant, and even supportive. 
Aided by several countries, particularly Brazil and Mexico (Basombrío, 2001; 
Pevehouse, 2005), Fujimori managed to avoid sanctions and regional isolation at the 
OAS level, and got away with the decision to create a Dialogue Table38 between 
members of the government and representatives from civil society and opposition 
groups to discuss actions for the democratization of the country.39  
On top of the diplomatic failure of the United States to get actions approved 
against the Peruvian government at the regional level (Jones, 2000), the Clinton 
administration showed a continuous inconsistency, going back and forth in its 
declarations regarding bilateral relations; finally, it bet for political stability and the 
eventual normalization of internal affairs, demonstrated by the presence of the U.S. 
ambassador at Fujimori’s inauguration on July 28, and the fact that none of the US$ 
125 million in aid allocated to this country for the year 2000 was suspended 
(McClintock, 2001).  
The issue of Vladimiro Montesinos followed a similar pattern. Although some 
actors of the American government saw with good eyes a third term of Fujimori, and 
drug czar Barry McCaffrey was considered to be very close to Montesinos concerning 
the American support for Peru’s war on drugs (McClintock, 2000), journalist sources 
reported on early July the apparent streamlining of positions between the United 
States Congress and the OAS (LP, 2000/07/24): some sectors had decided to push 
Fujimori for the immediate removal of his main advisor, particularly for his record of 
attacks against human rights, the media, and  a fair electoral process (Gonzales Arica, 
2000b). What was clear, however, was that the American senate had frozen in June a 
financial support of $42 millions aimed at fighting the production of drugs in Peru 
pending information on effective progress in the country’s democratic record, only to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Resolution No. 1753. 
39 This decision was considered lukewarm by the democratic forces of Peru. Nonetheless, the political 
opposition still saw it is as an opportunity to continue pressing the government (Paniagua Corazao, 
2002). 
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green light it again in early August (Páez, 2000a). This lukewarm employment of aid 
conditionalities40 with no real intention of backing their official discourse could not 
have meant much pressure for the Peruvian leadership, and indeed did not affect 
Fujimori’s position in any apparent way. 
 Under these circumstances of social convulsion but tepid international 
monitoring, opposition leader Alejandro Toledo called on all social and political 
forces of the country to gather together on the days prior to Independence Day (which 
was also they day Fujimori would take oath for his third term in office) on a massive 
social mobilization he dubbed the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos. In the meantime, 
President Fujimori and main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos were busy buying off a 
majority in Congress that the elections had not provided. 
 
2. Road to Change: July-September, 2000 
 
On July 28, 2000, the political system and its domestic environment collided 
in their efforts to bring stability or stress, respectively. As the days had closed to the 
beginning of Fujimori’s third term in office, his party Perú 2000 had managed to 
secure (through illegal means, as would later be revealed) an absolute majority in 
Congress, even though the elections had only given the party 52 out of 120 parliament 
seats. As newspaper La República recalls, “[i]n the year 2000, 18 congressmembers 
elected to other parties were added to Fujimori’s government party, in exchange for 
money”41 (Sánchez, 2011).  Fujimori’s strategy of risk management,42 aimed at 
lawfully controlling the legislative branch, had been activated as early as June, soon 
after the second round of the presidential elections had finalized. Caretas 
(2000/06/22) magazine reports in its issue of June 22 that at least eight 
congressmembers had become turncoat, with others probably following in a more low 
profile fashion. Thus, the government efforts to keep parliamentary functions such as 
audit and other forms of financial and political control under its power had paid off. 
The most immediate threat, however, was on the streets. 
Ever since the official ending of the electoral process, Alejandro Toledo had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
41 Translated from Spanish. 
42 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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begun to employ ever increasingly activities of public exhortation, 43  openly 
questioned the legality of Fujimori’s power, and had announced the formation of a 
movement of ‘pacific resistance,’ which would go indefinitely until the elections were 
considered void (Emol, 2000/05/30). On July 28, Independence Day and the official 
beginning of Fujimori’s third term, Toledo’s Marcha, which had congregated in 
downtown Lima over thirty thousand people (Tenorio, 2000) from all regions of the 
country, was violently repressed by the police, resulting in 207 people being arrested 
(Caretas, 2000/08/03) and 9 getting killed. This event can easily be identified, 
following our theoretical model, as the environment investing in protests44 against the 
government, and the latter activating one of the most common of coping mechanisms, 
repression. 45  However, the government activated almost immediately a second 
mechanism, plaintiff discredit: 46  Members of the National Intelligence Service 
infiltrated the Marcha (Páez and Aguirre, 2011) in order to vandalize the buildings of 
the Ministry of Education and the JNE, and to detonate a bomb in the building of the 
National Building (Loli, 2013), causing its complete destruction. Members of the 
government were fast to blame these actions on the poor and violent leadership of 
Alejandro Toledo. As newspaper La República (LR, 2000/07/30b) read in its front 
page, “Fujimori confirmed yesterday that from the Government side there is a 
hardline regarding the organizers of the pacific Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos: to 
accuse them of terrorism.”47 Thus, the social front of the opposition forces was all but 
delegitimized, and the immediate stress to the stability of the NACS was dealt with 
(Tanaka, 2000).  
The international front, on the other hand, was moving slowly.  
As previously noted, the presence of friendly governments (Brazil, Mexico) 
and tolerant powers (United States, OAS) had provided Fujimori’s new government 
with the necessary level of international recognition. Domestic media outlets, 
however, kept reproducing notes from a number of foreign actors that kept calling on 
Fujimori to revise his authoritarian style. This was the case of the ex-president of 
Argentina, Raúl Alfonsín, who visited Lima in the days prior to the Marcha de los 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
44 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
45 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of negative input defuse (1st 
round). 
46 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
47 Translated from Spanish. 
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Cuatro Suyos to show his support to the opposition forces, or the public 
exhortations 48  made by American presidential candidate George W. Bush (LR, 
2000/08/03), the Brazilian media (LR, 2000/08/04), the Wall Street Journal (LR, 
2000/08/05), the European Union and the OAS (LR, 2000/08/08). Notwithstanding 
the limited effects (if any at all) of these criticisms over the NACS, opposition groups 
in the country consistently kept using them as a way to keep public awareness and 
pressure. 
The most important strategy left for the environment, after popular 
mobilizations were delegitimized, was the OAS’ Dialogue Table which was meant to 
keep the discussion alive and represent an opportunity for opposition actors to keep 
exerting pressure over the government. The agenda prepared by the High Level 
Mission (created by OAS Resolution No. 1753) included the independence of the 
judiciary, freedom of speech, congressional checks and balances, accountability, and 
other important issues related to the quality of democracy (Soria Luján, 2010). 
Naturally, these items represented an attack against the stability of the NACS, not to 
mention the bigger picture of Fujimori’s personalistic and authoritarian rule. But the 
Dialogue Table itself represented also a superb opportunity for Fujimori’s 
government to cope with international and domestic pressure. From the beginning, the 
OAS decision to send a High Level Mission to intercede between the political forces 
of the country had fallen short of the show of international isolation that domestic 
actors had expected against Fujimori’s government, and it had meant the implicit 
acceptance and validation of the electoral results (Paniagua Corazao, 2002; Tanaka, 
2005). After getting its foot in the door, the government only faced the technical 
assistance49 imposed by the international community in the form of the Dialogue 
Table. Ironically, this intervention by the OAS offered an exceptional opportunity for 
the government to assuage demands and boost support by mimicking an interest in 
democratic reforms: by either providing some political concessions,50 or better yet, 
making a big display of symbolic reform support,51 the government could effectively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
49 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure; in this case, the assistance had 
a clear political nuance, but remained limited to being an indirect instrument, supplying the opposition 
with a forum through which to pressure the government for reforms that would impact the NACS. 
50 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (2nd 
round). 
51 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (2nd 
round). 
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cope with stress without having to actually give up its core instruments of power. 
Tanaka (2000, p. 13) is also of this opinion: 
 
“In sum, I believe that the Government has managed to surpass all obstacles 
that it faced in the short term. Fujimori is still head of state, although its 
legitimacy is being questioned, both in the domestic and the international 
fronts. Many sectors showed their disposition to exchange the provision of 
legitimacy to a government that was the result of fixed elections, for the 
promise of democratization within a reasonable period of time.”52 
 
The symbolism of the government’s participation in the Dialogue Table 
became evident very soon, and by the end of August opposition leaders were 
expressing their frustration at the dilatory maneuvers adopted by government 
representatives. The meetings supported by the OAS had so far failed to address the 
proposed agenda, and no relevant agreements had been made; in fact, the government 
was still insisting in discussing the conformation of specific commissions for 
attending to different topics, an attitude that was understood by the opposition as a 
mere exercise in futility and a strategy to wear them down. It was clear for them that 
Fujimori had no intentions of applying actual democratizing measures, 
notwithstanding the official discourse (Kadena, 2000). 
But while the Dialogue Table struggled, something unexpected was taking 
place. Although most authors writing on Fujimori’s government see September 14 as 
the day the collapse of the government officially began, there is a prior event that left 
the political system vulnerable to environmental pressure. On August 21, the same 
day that the Dialogue Table was installed, Fujimori and Montesinos (sitting beside the 
ministers of Defense and Interior, and the head of the National Intelligence Service) 
gave a press conference to inform of a successful intelligence operation to dismantle a 
criminal network of arms dealers in the jungle of Peru. The criminals, so they 
informed, that had been smuggling ammunition from Jordan and dropping it by plane 
on the territory of the Colombian FARC. Dubbed the ‘Operation Siberia,’ it was 
presented as an effort of almost two years directly commanded by Vladimiro 
Montesinos himself, without the knowledge of the Colombian authorities (Hinojosa, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Translated from Spanish. 
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2000a).  
Imagined in part as a smokescreen, 53  and in part as a preemptive 
argumentative defense,54 the news were quickly suspected for their content and 
timing. Ombudsman Jorge Santistevan was the first one to bring attention to the 
extreme coincidence in which the story of Operation Siberia broke, being on the same 
day that members of the opposition were sitting down with the government to discuss 
the terms of democratization (LR, 2000/08/22). Colombian authorities, on the other 
hand, were also quick to respond to Montesinos allegations and state that they had had 
knowledge of the existence of arms being smuggled into FARC territories for over a 
year, and that Montesinos statements had not been accurate. Finally, independent 
Peruvian media suspected that the press conference might have had the intention of 
showing the expertise of Fujimori’s government in military intelligence (Caretas, 
2000/08/24), in a manipulation of public priorities.55 However, the reality was much 
more obscene, as it would become known in the following days.  
Followed by heavy and critical media coverage,56 new pieces of information 
regarding Operation Siberia kept emerging daily as the event evolved, until the true 
nature of the arms trafficking came finally to light on August 25: authorities of Jordan 
refuted Fujimori’s description of the scandal, and declared that the weapons had been 
officially purchased by representatives of the Peruvian military (LR, 2000/08/25). 
There was no controlling popular perceptions now, as the event was arduously 
followed by the media, covering front pages day after day. Fujimori’s government 
tried to take attention away from the scandal by resorting to smokescreens,57 political 
concessions, 58  argumentative defense, 59  and environmental repellence such as 
radically changing its official position regarding a life sentence against infamous 
convicted terrorist Lori Berenson (Romero, 2000), giving explanations in person to 
Colombian president Andrés Pastrana (LR, 2000/09/01) (together with a written 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
54 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
55 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of negative input defuse (2nd 
round). 
56 As described under domestic pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
57 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
58 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
59 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
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report of Operation Siberia), agreeing on a fifteen-days deadline to settle various 
politically controversial cases60 with representatives of the opposition, and harassing 
opposition and independent media (Inés, 2000).  
Finally, media attention on the case began to dwindle after the first week of 
September, as Congress rejected the motions introduced by the opposition to 
officially investigate the connections between the government and the arms dealers. 
At the end, the whole event cost Fujimori a decline of 7% in popular approval, and a 
whooping 62% of Peruvians demanding new elections (LR, 2000/09/09), in a clear 
show of popular criticism.61 
The core of the issue, however, had been on the international front all along, 
and although public perceptions in Peru continued to slowly turn against Fujimori’s 
government, foreign actors represented the biggest source of threat for the leadership 
at this point. From the beginning, Colombia, Spain and Jordan, who had been 
included in the information regarding Operation Siberia and the route for arms 
smuggling into FARC territories, called into attention several elements of the report 
given by Fujimori and Montesinos that were not truthful. The American reaction, 
however, was initially positive. Richard Boucher, spokesperson for the U.S. 
Department of State, qualified in good terms the actions taken by the Peruvian 
authorities, highlighting the importance of having the whole region invested in 
controlling the Colombian conflict (Hinojosa, 2000b). It was not until after the 
involvement of government representatives in the arms purchase from Jordan was 
revealed, that the White House took a more critical position and demanded additional 
information to clarify the embarrassing affair (LR, 2000/08/29). The coping 
mechanisms activated by the government, which were mentioned earlier, mostly point 
at dealing with international pressure and not domestic. Even the radical change 
regarding the imprisonment of American citizen Lori Berenson for charges of 
terrorism was a political concession62 to the U.S., and not just a smokescreen.63 For 
opposition leader Alejandro Toledo, it was indeed both: “I have the clear impression 
that this is first a smokescreen and a political move to ameliorate the decision of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Especifically, the cases of Baruch Ivcher, the Constitutional Tribunal, the return to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the reform of the National Intelligence Service. 
61 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
62 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
63 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
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Department of State and the American government, who have requested from Jordan 
to explain the arms purchase”64 (LR, 2000/08/30a). 
The importance for this case of the international community as a source of 
stress for the stability of the Peruvian NACS became evident much later, after 
Fujimori’s government had collapsed. It has already been stated that the press 
conference of Operation Siberia was in part a smokescreen,65 and in part a preemptive 
argumentative defense. 66  Although the situation soon escaped the government’s 
hands, the motif behind it was to get ahead of a scandal that was unavoidable, and to 
control the news by choosing the way in which it would first be presented. According 
to Caretas magazine in an article from 2006, “the situation was that several 
intelligence agencies were following Montesinos tracks, and the press conference was 
a desperate attempt to escape the problem that was promptly arising”67 (Caycho, 
2006). Ugaz (2014, pp. 221-222) confirms this reading of the event: “Everything 
indicates that Montesinos, finding himself caught, convinced Fujimori of the 
necessity of getting ahead of the Americans [who already had knowledge of the 
participation of Peruvian officials in the smuggling of arms into FARC territory] and 
to give a press conference to inform the country of the alleged discovery...” 
 Thus, the activation of these and subsequent coping mechanisms were 
inspired by the government’s need to preemptively address a scenario of high stress, 
which had its origin in the activities of the international actors. The government 
reaction, however, did not succeed in keeping international demands away, and it 
injured the political system greatly. Only one week after the media attention of 
Operation Siberia began to decrease, the biggest scandal to hit Fujimori’s government 
would explode, finding the leadership unable to cope with stress any longer. 
 
3. The First Vladivideo and the Collapse of Fujimori’s Government 
 
Having barely come out of the arms smuggling debacle, the government was 
hit by yet another scandal that, unlike any other before, stripped the political 
corruption that had been rampaging for some time already. Pozsgai Alvarez (2013, p. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Translated from Spanish.  
65 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
66 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
67 Translated from Spanish.  
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1) briefly describes the events: 
 
“The day of September 14th, 2000, can be considered a turning point in 
Peruvian politics, one of those dramatic moments whose impact is still very 
much present throughout the years, affecting the whole political experience of 
an entire generation. That day, passed 6pm, congressmember Fernando 
Olivera, Luis Iberico, and Susana Higuchi from the political party Frente 
Independiente Moralizador (FIM), were in the middle of a press conference in 
the Bolívar Hotel, a few blocks away from the National Parliament. Both 
Olivera and the FIM had by then earned for themselves a name between the 
few references in Peruvian politics regarding active efforts to fight corruption 
in the higher levels of government, a pursue that had been ongoing since the 
decade of the 1980s, during the first administration of Alan García... 
The first cassette of what would be later dubbed the vladivideos, in reference 
to the president’s main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, was exhibited for the 
attentive eyes of all the press corps and the Nation at large, in a show that 
could easily be described as abominable: Montesinos himself was seen in a 
small office of the National Intelligence System, of which he was considered 
to be a powerful figure (if not the head), sitting down with turncoat 
Congressmember Alberto Kouri, negotiating in monetary terms the latter’s 
departure from Perú Posible and his recruitment in the ranks of the 
government’s party. In short, the video was showing the effective bribing of a 
congressman to change his political allegiance, conducted by the person who 
had been publicly acknowledged throughout the past decade to be Fujimori’s 
right hand.” 
 
The news of bribery involving Montesinos confirmed the suspicions that 
Fujimori’s party had not obtained his congress majority through honest means; 
furthermore, it exposed once and for all the true nature and role of the presidential 
advisor, whom for a decade had been exerting political power in the shadows. 
Needless to say, the political opposition and civil society at large used this 
opportunity to go all out and to stress not only the NACS, but most importantly the 
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continuation of Fujimori’s party in office. Unabating media coverage,68 universal 
public exhortations69 and condemnation, and continuous protests70 took place almost 
instantly: News of government corruption filled the front page of newspaper La 
República almost every single day for over two months; while representatives of the 
Catholic Church in Peru, the Ombudsman, associations of the private sector, 
opposition leaders, and even the U.S. Government demanded a swift investigation and 
the prompt capture and prosecution of Vladimiro Montesinos (LR, 2000/09/16a). The 
opposition and civil society even informed the OAS that their participation in future 
meetings of the Dialogue Table was conditional on the performance of the 
government regarding those enforcement activities (LR, 2000/09/16c). Opposition 
congressmembers took the same stance, and threatened with boycotting Congress 
sessions unless an investigatory commission was duly formed (Chirito, 2000). On the 
streets, citizens carried on mobilizations and protests in various parts of the country 
(LR, 2000/09/16b).  
Environmental pressure was reaching a point where the normal execution of 
government activities was being threatened, stressing the two essential variables of 
the political system as they have been described in Chapter II. In this scenario, the 
government had no choice but to activate several coping mechanisms one after 
another. Within one week of the vladivideo press conference, Congress had formed a 
committee of investigation71 to address the responsibility of turncoat Alberto Kouri, 
but had designated members of the incumbent party for two of the three available 
posts,72 thus activating a strategy of risk management73 in order to secure that the 
committee was under Fujimori’s control. When the opposition forced its 
recomposition, the officialist forces again managed to designate members of the 
government party for the majority of the committee.74 This way, after two weeks of 
environmental pressure, the government had managed (for better or worse) to 
postpone the creation of any committee of investigation (Caretas, 2000/09/28). 
A second approach taken by the government was the provision of political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 As described under domestic pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
69 As described under domestic and international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
70 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
71 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
72 Miriam Schenone Ordinola and Guzmán Aguirre Altamirano from Perú 2000. 
73 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
74 Mirianella Jesús Monsalve Aita and Pedro David Vilchez Malpica from Perú 2000.  
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concessions.75 Almost immediately after the video was released, and seeing that there 
would not be an easy way to alleviate the pressure this time, Fujimori announced that 
new elections would be held without his participation, and that his third government 
would be cut short by surrendering office at the end of its first year (Berntzen and 
Skinlo, 2010). The formal legislative project to make this possible was sent to 
Congress on September 19th by Prime Minister Federico Salas,76 but it was criticized 
by the opposition and the media for not considering the dismantling of the networking 
of government cronies that controlled the electoral apparatus (LR, 2000/09/19). In 
response to Fujimori’s proposal, the opposition in Congress introduced another 
legislative project proposing the almost immediate dismissal of the heads of the 
ONPE and the National Registry of Identification and Marital Status (RENIEC), and 
the replacement of the representative of the Board of Supreme Prosecutors to the 
JNE.77 The introductory words of this legislative initiative78 are very telling: 
 
“... [T]he President of the Republic has sent to Congress a project of 
constitutional reform with proposals that are not viable and extremely opposite 
to the proposals he has been taking and defending since the infamous Law of 
Authentic Interpretation of article 112 of the Political Constitutions was first 
put under debate. In other words, he has completely changed his position 
regarding the presidential re-election, which clearly represents a mockery of 
the Peruvian people and a great offense to the comprehension, intelligence and 
tolerance of the nation.”79 
 
However, by the time these projects were voted on, and the unified text was 
promulgated as Law No. 27365, only the government’s position remained. 
A third approach involved the mistaken abuse of risk management.80 In order 
to avoid any real enforcement, Montesinos turn to the services of First Public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
76 Law Project No. 428/2000.CR, received on September 19, 2000. 
77 Law Project No. 481/2000, received on September 27, 2000. 
78 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
79 Translated from Spanish. 
80 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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Prosecutor Blanca Nélida Colán, who had been under his payroll for years.81 While 
the government was offering limited information regarding the legal state of 
Montesinos, with some information stating that he had been taken under arrest by the 
National Intelligence Service, the presidential advisor went to give his statement to a 
provisional prosecutor who he knew would be easy to intimidate (Caretas, 
2000/09/22). Having officially surrendered to a formal investigation, the matter was 
promptly resolved by exerting pressure over the prosecution, who within a week 
decided to close the file and refrain from further investigating the bribery of 
Congressmember Kouri (Emol, 2000/09/26). But this only helped to aggravate the 
situation, and paired with the tolerant position of President Fujimori and his lukewarm 
responses when publicly confronted with the issue (he had only stated that the advisor 
may have made ‘some mistakes’) did nothing to provide a solution to the crisis. 
Congress had all but ceased to function (LR, 2000/09/22), popular protests continued 
(LR, 2000/09/21), 64% of the population expressed its demand for new elections 
without Fujimori (LR, 2000/09/20a), and a diaspora of congressmembers affiliated to 
the incumbent party Perú 2000 began. Congressmember Cecilia Martínez was the 
first to announce her departure (LR, 2000/09/20b), and was soon followed by four 
others before the end of September (Páez, 2000b). Still, Montesinos was not being 
officially dismissed from service. 
By the time the government agreed to separate the corrupt advisor, in an effort 
to show some demand-satisfactory measures82 to the opposition in front of the OAS 
Dialogue Table, it was too little, too late. Vladimiro Montesinos escaped to Panama, 
and with him a clear opportunity for the government to regain its legitimacy. 
Although the reasons behind Fujimori’s tolerance of his advisor go beyond the topic 
of this study, and involve much more than the protection of the leadership, it is clear 
that this point in time represents a fracture in the Peruvian government, as Montesinos 
kept exerting power in an effort to secure his continuation in the political system, and 
Fujimori trying to stimulate support even to the risk of abandoning the stability of the 
NACS.  
The fourth approach that we find during the following period is the isolation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Blanca Nélida Colán was later, in 2003, found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison for 
multiple crimes related to her misusing public office, which she had exploited to serve, protect and 
conceal presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and his network of corruption (services for which 
she was paid US$10,000 every month, according to witnesses) (Pariona Arana, 2012). 
82 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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of Montesinos’ influence, at least through the activation of public expressions of 
reform support83 and demand-satisfactory measures.84 On September 28, Congress 
unanimously approved the deactivation of the National Intelligence Service within 
fifteen days (Reyna, 2000); on October 2, the Council of Navy Admirals publicly 
expressed its support for the deactivation of Montesinos’ Intelligence Service and for 
early elections; on October 17, the Army confirmed that officials close to Montesinos 
would be purged from the institution by the end of the year; and on October 28, 
Fujimori announced several changes in the military leadership. However, these 
mechanisms were not implemented in a consistent and appropriate fashion, and the 
additional activation of risk management,85 through which the government party kept 
control of Congress (LR, 2000/10/13), produced even more stress over the political 
system.  
During this period Fujimori’s rate of disapproval among the citizens continued 
to plummet, reaching 77.7% (LR, 2000/10/07); and environmental actors increased 
their pressure over the government, not least of all due to the constant media coverage 
of ever emerging information about grand corruption. News of Fujimori requesting 
asylum for his fallen advisor surfaced in international media, together with warnings 
from Brazilian president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, stating that Montesinos would 
not be allowed to enter Brazilian territory (LP, 2000/09/23); Opposition 
Congressmember Jorge Chávez Sibina officially proposed the vacancy of President 
Fujimori for ‘moral incapacity’ (LR, 2000/09/27); U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright, publicly called on Fujimori to respect the agreements made in the OAS 
Dialogue Table and to implement democratic reforms (Hinojosa, 2000c); the OAS 
suspended the Dialogue Table after Congress decided to extend the current legislative 
term for two more weeks (which was against the agreement with the opposition 
forces) (Rojas, 2000); and popular demonstrations and mobilizations continued across 
the country. Thus, it is possible to see during this period the final emergence of a 
clearly stressful international scenario meeting the domestic opposition, reflected 
clearly in Fujimori’s visit to Washington at the end of September in search for 
political support and a way out of the crisis (Emol, 2000/09/29). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (2st 
round). 
84 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
85 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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But the most notorious form of protest took place after Vladimiro Montesinos 
returned to Peru. On October 29, Colonel Ollanta Humala led a military insurrection 
in the south of the country, specifically in the province of Tacna, demanding the 
resignation of President Alberto Fujimori, whom Ollanta and his troops considered to 
be an illegitimate ruler. Few days earlier, opposition leader Alejandro Toledo had 
(with a more pacific approach) expressed the same demands, publicly exhorting 
Fujimori to give up power immediately and give way to a transitional government 
(LR, 2000/10/25). The presence of Montesinos inside the country had stimulated 
additional stress over the system, and the situation was turning almost unmanageable 
for the government. 
Under these circumstances the political leadership activated the last round of 
mechanisms. This fifth and final government approach involved the late activation of 
five mechanisms in combined forms: smokescreens 86  and mismanaged 
investigations/prosecutions; 87  argumentative defense 88  and public expressions of 
condemnation; 89  and, mismanaged investigations/prosecutions 90  and risk 
management.91 Ironically, it is with the latter that a breakpoint is reached in the 
NACS, where its stability finally falls under the pressure of the environment and a 
new structure to fight malfeasance is born. 
Forced to deal with the presence of Montesinos in the country, President 
Fujimori tried to use the opportunity to create a show of personalistic rule, which in 
the previous decade had brought him a high level of popular approval and support. 
Mediatizing the police search of his ex advisor’s whereabouts, Fujimori took direct 
charge of the operation and was seen boarding a helicopter, going between military 
stations and different location were Montesinos might have been hiding (LR, 
2000/10/27). Needless to say, this symbolic gesture was aimed at distracting public 
attention from the wave of corruption scandals involving an ever-growing number of 
government actors, current and past. Just as Fujimori had been adept at getting his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
87 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
88 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
89 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
90 Ibid. 
91 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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picture taken while helping poor farmers in the Peruvian Andes furrow their land or 
harvest their crops, now the style was being redirected to stimulate support in his 
usual personalistic way to cope with the stress from civil society and international 
actors. 
A few day after the parade of presidential leadership, Fujimori gave a press 
conference to introduce the new public procurator hired by the government to lead the 
investigation against the ex advisor, but most importantly, Fujimori used the 
opportunity to reassure to the public his personal intentions of bringing Montesinos to 
justice. Furthermore, he claimed that he had had no knowledge whatsoever of the 
illicit dealings in which his advisor had been involved, and that the latter had abused 
the faculties he had given him (LR, 2000/11/04a). In sum, Fujimori was trying to 
show support for any enforcement measure against Montesinos, while taking any 
blame away from himself. The presence of the newly appointed public procurator for 
the Montesinos case, José Ugaz, was not coincidental, either. 
In his personal account of the event, Ugaz (2014, pp. 44-45) reads: 
 
“I was incredibly uncomfortable, as I felt that Fujimori was using a meeting 
that I had requested for another purpose: to present himself in front of the 
public opinion as the prime mover of the investigations against Montesinos. It 
was obvious that, without my knowledge, he had decided to give a press 
conference with me by his side to get some political capital from my 
appointment.” 
 
Just as expected from our theoretical model, Fujimori had seen the possibility 
of employing highly publicized symbolic measures as a way of boosting support for 
himself and his government. Channeling public attention to the Montesinos case, and 
putting in place actions apparently aimed at enforcing anti-corruption laws could 
insure a minimum level of stability for his leadership. The lack of financial support to 
Ugaz indeed shows that Fujimori did not expect to have him really succeed in his 
endeavor, or to even have him at all. Invited by minister of Justice Alberto 
Bustamante Belaunde to take charge of the Montesinos case on November 1, his 
appointment became official two days later with Supreme Resolution No. 240-2000-
JUS, and was further strengthened on November 4th after Ugaz and his team 
recognized the necessity to extend their faculties to include the investigation and 
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prosecution of not only Vladimiro Montesinos, but also any accomplice or accessory 
involved. While this might suggest the government’s intention to deal with 
Montesinos and his close network, the reality is that Ugaz’s capacity to execute his 
functions was at the same time being left adrift. With no budget officially provided, 
the procurator was forced to make use of the resources of his private law firm if he 
was to undertake any action at all. This included the recruitment of some of his 
colleagues and employees of the law firm, the use of their business offices, and the 
use of their own money to cover for any expense related to the public appointment as 
procurator. Ugaz requested the transfer of an institutional budget in four different 
opportunities, two to the minister of Justice, and other two directly to President 
Fujimori; but the resources were never transferred (Ugaz, 2014).  
Another aspect of Fujimori’s final strategy to cope with pressure, besides the 
activation of mismanaged investigations/prosecutions, is the intention to adopt a risk 
management approach. Ugaz (2014, p. 42) points to this fact in another section of his 
account, remembering the private conversation he had held with the president just 
before the press conference: 
 
“Fujimori responded that it was very important to capture Montesinos, who 
had betrayed his trust, because he was ‘blackmailing several of his ministers’ 
and he had in his possession film material that contained just about everything, 
from intimate scenes to grave acts of corruption. It was a material that, if it 
were to be published, it would shake the political class in the country with 
unsuspected consequences if it were to be used in the wrong way; so it was 
urgent to stop him in order to avoid a political crisis without precedents, which 
could plunge the country into chaos.” 
 
Fujimori’s description of the urgency of the situation, debriefing Ugaz on the 
existence of material proof of cases of grand corruption implicating members of the 
government, was not intended to help the public procurator in dealing with the fight 
against corruption but to convince him of the necessity to keep that information away 
from the public. By recruiting Ugaz, Fujimori expected to keep the issue under his 
control, preemptively addressing the flow of additional demands. Ugaz (2014) 
himself remembers to have been surprised by the ease with which Fujimori had talked 
about Prime Minister Federico Salas, who supposedly was very worried for the videos 
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Montesinos had of him receiving bribes. Clearly, without talking about himself, 
President Fujimori expected Ugaz to play along and to help stabilize the situation for 
the government. 
Another interesting aspect of this incident is that Fujimori seemed to be aware 
of the possibility of reaching a point of no return, a scenario with the qualities of 
prolonged stress where the system would be unable to perform its essential activities, 
and the only option would be to reform the NACS. In this case, the enforcement of 
anti-corruption laws would most likely affect the leadership at large, forcing a change 
in government. 
The intention of using Ugaz’s work as a coping mechanism became more 
evident only a few day later. On the same day President Fujimori had met with José 
Ugaz and used the opportunity to show his total support for the enforcement of anti-
corruption, the latter held a press conference of his own to counteract Fujimori’s 
intentions. That night, speaking to a room full of journalists, Ugaz assured that his 
mandate was wide enough to allow him to investigate every and any actor involved in 
Montesinos’ network of corruption, disregarding the power or office they may have, 
and that his intentions were to pursue the full enforcement of the law even if it 
reached President Fujimori himself (LR, 2000/11/04b). “Whoever may fall,” Ugaz’s 
(2014, p. 46) words, became from then on a catchphrase for the work of the Public 
Procurator’s Office and its drive to fight corruption to the last consequences. His 
insinuations were not well received by the president, who apparently threatened to 
remove him from his post. On November 11th, minister Bustamante informed Ugaz 
that Fujimori had expressed his desire to have him removed as procurator. Although 
Bustamante said he had responded to the president’s rage by expressing his intention 
to leave the Ministry if Ugaz was fired, thus defending the latter, his words of 
admonition to Ugaz were very eloquent: “I would expect from a lawyer that he did 
not put into question the honor of his client, even if later on it happened that that his 
client has been involved [in illegal activities] and that might cause him to quit and 
take distance from the client...” (Ugaz, 2014, p. 82) It was obvious that the 
government’s intentions were to have Ugaz represent Fujimori’s interests, and not 
those of the State (as was actually his official mandate), in order to benefit the 
leadership’s agenda beyond the actual prosecution or not of Montesinos. 
However, not only did these last coping mechanisms completely fail in their 
execution, but the environmental pressure could not be coped with any longer. The 
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Public Procurator’s Office conducted its work with bravery and independence from 
Fujimori’s pressure and negligence, and did not side with the government’s position. 
News of Montesinos corrupt activities were rapidly mounting, as bank accounts 
associated with him in foreign countries began to surface with millions of dollars 
(Teran Vega, 2000; LR, 2000/11/06) that had presumably resulted from dealings with 
Peruvian and Colombian drug dealers, embezzlement, and a large number of criminal 
activities. Blanca Nélida Colán, former Montesinos’ champion in the Public Ministry, 
was replaced in her post of First Public Prosecutor, and so was José Portillo 
Campbell, head of the ONPE. Vice-president Francisco Tudela gave up his post on 
October 23, and the president of Congress, Martha Hildebrandt, was dismissed on 
November 13. All the meanwhile Peruvian authorities are unable to locate and arrest 
Montesinos, who had by then fled the country again. 
The last and severely misguided coping mechanism activated by Fujimori 
himself was the illegal breaking into Montesinos’ apartment and seizure of dozens of 
boxes and suitcases containing jewelry and, more importantly, videocassettes 
recorded by Montesinos of all his dealings and negotiations made in his office of the 
National Intelligence Service (LR, 2000/11/10). Although this example of risk 
management was joined by a clever smokescreen through which the president 
successfully distracted media attention away from the location of Montesinos’ 
apartment and towards the north of the city (to the site of the Army’s recreation 
center) (Castillo, 2007), Fujimori’s apprehension led him to publicly inform of the 
event in a way that would show him in personal command of the manhunt. The 
corruption-enabling nature of all output concealment mechanisms make them 
particularly susceptible to failure as coping mechanisms, especially when combined 
with the publicity characteristic of mismanaged investigations/prosecutions. 
Therefore, by presenting himself in a press conference as the leader of the police 
operation, he effectively added more pressure to the already critical state of his 
leadership and the NACS.  
Finally, the last straw was Fujimori’s implication by a member of the 
Colombian drug cartels in Montesinos’ dealings with them. According to Roberto 
Escobar, brother of the infamous head of the Medellín cartel, Fujimori’s campaign of 
1990 had been partially funded with $1 million that Montesinos had received from 
Pablo Escobar (LR, 2000/11/12); Fujimori had allegedly even spoken to him on the 
phone to personally thank him for his contribution (Ugaz, 2014). The news 
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represented a final blow against Fujimori’s constant argumentative defense that he 
had known nothing of Montesinos’ corruption, and that everything had been done 
behind his back. 
There were no more mechanisms to activate that could cope with the pressure 
from civil society, political opposition and international actors. On November 13 
public procurator José Ugaz and his team presented a formal request of investigation 
to the Prosecutor’s Office against President Alberto Fujimori, while unbeknown to the 
country Fujimori was fleeing bound to Brunei and from there Japan. 
 
4. The New National Anti-Corruption Standards 
 
The end of the Fujimori government and the actions taken by the transitional 
government that followed describe a scenario that has been dubbed prolonged stress 
in Chapter III. Fujimori held on to the stability of the NACS while consistently 
producing corruption outputs (the extent of his criminal network is depicted in Figure 
4) and ignoring critical enforcement actions, accumulating mounting levels of 
environmental pressure from all external actors until the situation became 
unmanageable. By the end, the political system was not only confronted by the crisis 
of the NACS, but the stress had spread to the two essential variables of the system, 
the capacity to make authoritative decisions and to have them complied with. Under 
the control of the incumbent forces Congress had ceased to operate, and the monopoly 
of physical force was being contested. The system could not go any further without 
addressing the NACS. 
It is under these circumstances that Valentín Paniagua’s rise to office becomes 
not only helpful, but unavoidable. We need only to consider that the conservative 
leadership had left, one after the other, the control of the system in the hands of 
reformist actors. The vice-president had resigned, the president of Congress had been 
removed, and Fujimori left the country and abdicated via fax. The government was 
crumbling under the pressure. The power vacuum opened the opportunity for the 
political opposition to gain control of the government and begin implementing the 
reforms necessary to cope with the stress, but in order to do so the adoption and 
implementation of real anti-corruption reforms (and other crucial democratic 
measures) needed to be guaranteed. The functioning of the political system depended 
on the effective handling of the anti-corruption stress, and this could not be done by 
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activating additional coping mechanisms. Fujimori had all but tried them all, and they 
had been insufficient to improve popular and political support, or to keep demands to 
an appropriate limit. Thus, the selection of Valentín Paniagua to take charge of 
Congress, and soon afterwards the country, was not a simple gesture of goodwill to 
the country, but a requirement for the stabilization of the political system (Taylor, 
2005). 
Figure 4. Branches, Networks, and Links of Corruption, 1990-2000 
Source: Quiroz (2008, p. 377). 	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While Paniagua is universally described as the quintessential democratic 
figure in Peru, and his qualities were later praised without much refrain, it is crucial 
for us to note that his becoming the president of the transitional government was not a 
mere backing of his personal qualities by opposition forces, but more importantly a 
warranty for the necessary reforms. Of the ten political parties that obtain 
parliamentary representation in the 2000 elections, Paniagua’s party, Acción Popular 
(Popular Action), was second to last, with only three congressmembers out of 120. 
Alejandro Toledo’s party, on the other hand, had the second largest group in 
Congress, and had been the obvious leader of the opposition forces throughout the 
year. In these terms, it would be an obvious political choice for Toledo’s party to 
assume control of the Congress, and subsequently of the government after Fujimori’s 
resignation. However, it fell to the leader of one of the smallest parties in the country 
to lead the transition to democracy. 
The conditions for the recovery of a minimum level of support were evident to 
Ricardo Márquez, second Vice-president and person lawfully in charge of the 
government after Fujimori, who on November 20 decided to step aside and abdicate 
to his post, thus leaving the way free for the designation of Valentín Paniagua as new 
president of Peru. At that moment there were even rumors of a possible coup in the 
making by members of the military forces (Interview No. 23), which further 
highlights the strain of the political system and the urgency to stimulate support. 
 Under Paniagua’s transitional government the NACS suffered a dramatic 
change. This period saw the satisfaction of anti-corruption demands, both in terms of 
enforcement and reform, with almost no anti-corruption outputs to additionally stress 
the system. The government took charge of dealing with the scenario of prolonged 
stress, and invested an important amount of logistic and political resources in 
reforming the NACS without turning to coping mechanisms to generate support. 
International actors exerted pressure through technical and financial assistance92 and 
international cooperation, but as it was in line with the official political agenda it 
added to the government efforts and became supportive rather than stressing.  
Although officially the so-called Anti-Corruption Subsystem could be said to 
have officially started with the promulgation of Resolution of the Prosecutor’s Office 
No. 020-2000-MP-FN on November 10 (which appointed public attorneys to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
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exclusive attention of the Montesinos case), it is after the transitional government 
begins its rule that this subsystem really starts to take shape. To the resolution of the 
Prosecutor’s Office followed Law No. 27380 on December 20th, which made it 
officially possible for public prosecutors to be designated to exclusivity; 
Administrative Resolution No. 024-2001-CT-PJ of the judiciary on January 31, 2001, 
which created specialized anti-corruption courts for the Montesinos case; and 
Supreme Resolution No. 133-2001-JUS of the Ministry of Justice on March 23rd, 
which extended the competence of public procurator José Ugaz and his team to begin 
legal actions against fugitive President Alberto Fujimori. These three legal corners, 
supported by the Police Department Against Corruption created already under 
Toledo’s government on August 17th, 2001, were the pyramid over which the 
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the Fujimori-Montesinos corruption 
network stood. Eventually, over the next years, these agencies would have their 
mandate extended to include all cases of political or notorious corruption, and not 
only the Fujimori-Montesinos case, becoming a true system for the enforcement of 
anti-corruption law in the country. 
To support the job of the anti-corruption subsystem a body of anti-corruption 
legislation was approved, mostly written and requested by the Public Procurator’s 
Office (Ugaz, 2012; 2014). Among the most important were: 
 
- Law No. 27378 of December 20, 2000, which creates the figure of plea 
bargain. 
- Law No. 27379 of December 20, 2000, which give to judges the 
possibility of taking exceptional measures to limit the rights of those under 
investigation. 
- Law No. 27399 of January 12, 2001, which creates the possibility of 
limiting the freedom of those political actors under investigation that are 
given the right to a political pre-trial. 
- Supreme Decree No. 020-2001-JUS of July 6, 2001, which approves the 
rules for the protection of witnesses and collaborators. 
 
The above measures helped the government reach an impressive rate of 
success in the investigation, prosecution, and recovery of assets resulting from the 
Fujimori-Montesinos corrupt network. Ugaz (2014, pp. 256) remembers that, only 
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during 2001: 
 
“... [M]ore than 1,200 people [were processed] in approximately 200 criminal 
investigations. Of those, approximately 120 were sent to prison (about 10%), 
among whom were what at the Public Procurator’s Office we called the 
‘gallery of the remarkable convicts,’ a group of high level authorities or 
powerful political or economic actors that shows the great impact that this 
criminal network had in the Peruvian State. Among them were the First Public 
Prosecutor and other prosecutors of different denomination; the president of 
Congress and several congressmembers; the de facto president of the judiciary 
with several judges of the Supreme Court and of lower ranks; the president 
and two members of the electoral tribunal; mayors, businessmen and, perhaps 
the most impressive number due to what the military has traditionally 
represented in Peru, 14 Army and Police generals, including the Chief 
Commander of the Army, all without having shot a single bullet...”93 
 
On top of this, US$250 millions were located and frozen, and US$75 were 
promptly repatriated, in what represents an unusual example of haste, efficiency and 
international cooperation. The decisive support from President Paniagua, the media 
and civil society, together with the personal drive of the members of the Public 
Procurator’s Office, helped this office fight corruption in a way never before (or later) 
seen (Pariona Arana, 2012). 
In terms of preventive measures to fight corruption, the government also took 
important steps, although not as prominent as the ones taken to reform the area of 
anti-corruption control. The dismantling of the mechanism of institutional 
imperviousness94 was directly addressed by adopting measures of public transparency 
and access to public information. On December 7, 2000, the government created the 
Transparency Commission of the Ministry of Women and Human Development,95 
first of its kind at the national level.96 Its sectoral role was to elaborate a code of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Translated from Spanish. 
94 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
95 Ministerial Resolution No. 297-2000-PROMUDEH. 
96 The Metropolitan Municipality of Lima had, under the leadership of mayor Alberto Andrade 
Carmona, formally created the Metropolitan Commission Against Municipal Corruption with 
Ordinance No. 102-MML of February 5, 1997. 
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ethics, produce recommendations aimed at increasing transparency, support activities 
of internal control, and in general to facilitate the detection, investigations and 
punishment of corruption in the ministry.  
This initiative was soon followed by Supreme Decree No. 018-2001-PCM, 
which disposed that all agencies of the public sector should implement mechanisms 
for the public access to information under their possession; and Urgent Decree No. 
035-2001, which adopted measures for the transparency of public financial 
information. Both of these norms develop the area of transparency and access to 
information across agencies and levels of government for the first time in Peruvian 
history, and represent direct precedents to Law No. 27806 of 2002, which unifies the 
concepts and principles on the subject. Furthermore, decree 035-2001 describes a 
specific frame of mind that is completely consistent with has been posited before, 
regarding the role of the transitional government of President Paniagua as a mean to 
stabilize the political system through the satisfaction of demands and the reform of the 
NACS. In the second paragraph of its preamble, its states that “it is of vital 
importance that the next government administration begins its mandate under a 
framework of transparency that allows a better monitoring and evaluation of public 
policies by civil society, [which is an] essential element for democratic ruling...”97 
Clearly, the most important role of the transitional government was to rehabilitate the 
flow of support for the system and the leadership, thus solving the scenario of 
prolonged stress.  
Additionally, on July 14 the government decreed Law No. 27482,98 which 
regulates the publication of sworn statements of income of public officials. Less than 
a month later, on July 8, its guidelines (decreed by Supreme Decree No. 080-2001-
PCM) were published in the official newspaper El Peruano. These two legal 
instruments represented a big step forward from the outdated law on the matter given 
in 1988 under the previous Constitution of 1979, and elaborated on the more 
expansive measures contained in the Constitution of 1993. 
 On April 11, 2001, the government created the National Anti-Corruption 
Initiative99 (INA), an official forum for the discussion and proposal of anti-corruption 
policies that included actors from the public and private spheres, and civil society. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Translated from Spanish. 
98 The text of this law had first been presented in Congress on October 12, 2000, as project No. 
582/2000-CR by Paniagua’s party. 
99 Supreme Resolution No.160-2001-JUS. 
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Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the INA was set to formulate a thorough 
diagnosis on the phenomenon of corruption in the country, and produce a national 
dialogue upon which the basis for future NACS could be established. For the 
execution of these tasks, it was given only three months, the time left before the 
transitional government had to transfer power to the newly constitutionally elected 
leadership. Nonetheless, thanks to the political circumstances, the support of 
international actors and that of President Paniagua and his minister of Justice, Diego 
García-Sayán Larrabure (Interview No. 22), and the homogeneity of its members,100 
the INA not only succeeded in producing the first coherent and comprehensive set of 
recommendations regarding the effective reform of the Peruvian NACS (INA, 2001), 
but it also became the common point of reference for all other anti-corruption 
preventive bodies that were created (without much success) later.   
 The task given to the INA of developing a framework for future NACS (going 
beyond the transformation already underway) was described by minister of Justice 
García-Sayán from the beginning: 
 
“It is indispensable to make progress in the guidelines of a national plan 
against corruption. It is not a plan of the transitional government, which would 
greatly exceed its mandate, but [the purpose is] to develop guidelines that may 
be adopted by the State and the Peruvian society... This global project will be 
hand over to the authorities that will assume the leadership of the country next 
28th of July”101 (Zileri, 2001). 
  
 The INA additionally represented the natural companion to the efforts of 
reforming the NACS in terms of corruption control. The importance of preventive 
policies for the development of an improved NACS is explicitly stated by a senior 
official of the transitional government (Interview No. 23): 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The members of the INA were: Monsignor Miguel Irízar Campos (president of the commission and 
representative of the Catholic Church); Antonio Blanco Blasco (engineer); Cecilia Blondet Montero (of 
NGO Transparencia); Carlos Castro Rodríguez (of the exports association Adex); Pablo Checa 
Ledesma (member of the labor union); Margarita Giesecke Sara-Lafosse (historian); Baldo Kresalja 
Roselló (businessman); Humberto Lay Sun (representative of the national evangelistic groups); Alvaro 
Rey de Castro Iglesias (psychoanalyst); Mónica Sánchez Cuadros (actress); and, Jorge Santistevan de 
Noriega (former Ombudsman) (Zileri, 2001). 
101 Translated from Spanish. 
	   136	  
“The issue of public morality and corruption goes beyond a temporary 
situation, disregarding how grave this might be, and we saw it and discussed it 
a lot with Paniagua as a structural matter... We had to see a way of, besides 
adopting those measures to confront the corruption we faced, defining 
preventive anti-corruption policies that involve public policies, design of 
institutional strategies, inclusion of civil society, awareness and education 
campaigns, etc.”102 
 
Turning our attention to the international community, foreign institutional 
actors showed a particularly high level of international cooperation103 with Peruvian 
efforts to freeze and recover stolen assets. The most prominent of these was the role 
played by Swiss authorities, particularly Zurich’s district attorney, Cornelia Cova. 
Already at the beginning of November the authorities of that country had informed 
their Peruvian counterparts of the existence of a bank account under Montesinos’ 
name holding US$ 48 millions, money that had been deposited with false excuses 
(Ugaz, 2014). According to the minister of Justice, Alberto Bustamante, the Swiss 
government was inviting them “to try and do everything they could to investigate and 
provide them with information regarding what could be the existence of a case of 
money laundering...” 104  (Teran Vega, 2000). This show of initiative from the 
European country quickly continued with the report of additional US$22 millions in 
other bank accounts by the end of November, which were also quickly frozen to avoid 
their transference (LR, 2000/11/29). According to José Ugaz (2014), public 
procurator in charge of the Montesinos case and responsible for the recovery of stolen 
assets, it was Cornelia Cova herself who had provided the legal rationale to expedite 
the repatriation of the financial assets discovered in Switzerland. In her opinion, if 
there were enough elements to logically deduce the existence of a crime, even when a 
court of law had not yet ruled on the specific case of corruption, it would represent 
sufficient ground to warrant the immediate repatriation of the frozen money. Thanks 
to this interpretation, Ugaz states that over US$77 millions were recovered from 
Swiss accounts in only 21 months from the beginning of the investigations. 
A second source of international cooperation was the role played by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Ibid. 
103 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
104 Translated from Spanish. 
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American agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the district 
attorneys of various States. On December 4 Peruvian news reported that the FBI was 
carrying investigations on members of the Montesinos network (LR, 2000/12/04), 
both former public officials and private actors. Indeed, José Ugaz (2014, p. 133) 
informs that the American embassy in Peru had put him in contact with the regional 
office of the FBI ever since he had taken the post of public procurator; the FBI had 
expressed its intention to assist Peruvian authorities with anything related to the 
people or money involved in the Fujimori-Montesinos case. Soon afterwards, on 
January of 2001, Montesinos’ front man Víctor Venero Garrido was arrested in 
Miami.  
The district attorneys of New York and South Florida were also of great help. 
Besides informing the Peruvian government of any suspicious account belonging to 
people close to Fujimori or Montesinos, as was the finding of US$ 46 millions under 
different front men, they also helped the Public Procurator’s Office gain access to the 
information obtained by the American ‘Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.’ 
Ugaz (2014) also posits that the creation of the Special Fund of Administration 
of the Money Illegally Obtained (FEDADOI) was largely due to international 
pressure. The FEDADOI was created by the government of Alejandro Toledo with 
Urgent Decree No. 122-2001 of October 27, 2001, with the purpose of administering 
the vast amounts of stolen assets that were being recovered from local and 
international sources in relation to the Fujimori-Montesinos network. After being 
transferred to this fund, the money would then be channeled to compensate the 
victims of corruption perpetrated by the previous government; it would also be 
employed to pay for the expenses carried by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and for 
the construction of a maximum-security prison. In short, the FEDADOI had the 
purpose of insuring the efficient and thoughtful usage of the money recovered with 
the efforts of the Peruvian anti-corruption agencies and that of their foreign 
counterparts. José Ugaz (2014, pp. 242-243) describes the conditions that gave birth 
to the FEDADOI, which seem to be very similar to the case of aid conditionalities:105 
 
“As a result of the confiscations made by the American authorities, I entered 
in contact with Dan Clayman... who was in charge of the seizure and eventual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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destination of the money. From the beginning he expressed his concerns about 
the use that Peru would give to the money if it were repatriated. Attending to 
the important amounts of money... and in order to give confidence to the 
international community about the appropriate administration of those funds, 
the FEDADOI was created... In January of 2004, over the basis of a bilateral 
agreement of repatriation with the United States, and having finalized the 
administrative procedures of the American system, this country proceeded to 
give us back the confiscated money.”106 
 
 A close look at the bilateral agreement 107 mentioned by Ugaz provides 
additional support to his account of the FEDADOI. It stipulates the transfer of US$20 
millions in confiscated assets to the Peruvian government under rather stringent 
conditions: The authorities must give priority consideration to compensating the 
victims, and to financially support the efforts of the specialized anti-corruption courts, 
the anti-corruption prosecutors, the ad hoc Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Office 
of the Comptroller General, among others. Additionally, the Peruvian government 
agrees to hold a public debate regarding any proposal for the use of the transferred 
funds, and to inform of the latter to the government of the United States every six 
months, including the presentation of a final report once the funds had been totally 
employed. Clearly, as it was mentioned above, such conditions for the transfer of 
money is perfectly equivalent to the kind of pressure exerted through the 
implementation of aid conditionalities. Although we will discuss the effect this 
particular situation had on the stability of the NACS in the next chapter, it gives us a 
better idea of the involvement of foreign pressure in the creation of the Peruvian fund 
of administration. 
Another instance of pressure explicitly recognized by the government is found 
in Supreme Decree No. 018-2001-PCM, which was mentioned earlier. In it, the 
preamble considers that the adoption of measures to facilitate citizen access to public 
information rests on Principle No 3 of the Declaration of Chapultepec, among other 
international instruments. This Principle is literary quoted, saying that “[t]he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Translated from Spanish. 
107 “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the United 
States regarding the transfer of confiscated assets signed on June 12, 2004; approved by Legislative 
Resolution 28282, published on the official newspaper El Peruano on July 17; and ratified by Supreme 
Decree No. 055-2004-RE, published on September 2. 
	   139	  
authorities must be legally forced to put under the disposal of the citizens, in a timely 
and fair way, the information produced by the public sector.” In this case the 
influence is direct and concrete, as President Paniagua had signed the Declaration of 
Chapultepec only two weeks before the aforementioned supreme decree was enacted. 
For this reason, we can consider the Declaration to have worked exactly as an 
international agreement is supposed to; Paniagua’s government, dealing with a 
scenario of prolonged stress and engaged in generation support through the effective 
modification of the NACS, welcomed the event and used it for the stabilization of the 
political system. On February 13, 2001, the front page of newspaper La República 
exhibited a photograph of President Paniagua signing the Declaration; by his side 
were the prime minister, the president of the Inter American Press Association, and 
the director of the most important media group of Peru. Underneath it read: “Peru 
signs historical declaration of Chapultepec”108 (LR, 2001/02/13). 
 From a more benign but just as helpful approach, the international community 
also influenced the modification of the NACS through the availability of information 
on anti-corruption principles, measures and strategies.109 A senior public official of 
the Paniagua administration commented that, in order to write some of the laws 
(which were mentioned earlier) that were enacted to help prosecute the Fujimori-
Montesinos mafia, the government looked for information on the Italian and Spanish 
experiences (Interview No. 23) through the Internet. In this way, the availability of 
literature on different international cases and their circumstances helped the Peruvian 
authorities take appropriate and timely measures, just as our theoretical framework 
suggested. 
 The presence of anti-corruption information generated by international actors, 
and its employment for the implementation of domestic actions, is also evident in the 
INA. Among the documents stored as part of the commission’s inventory,110 several 
academic papers written by foreign scholars (and at least in one case explicitly to 
inform the Peruvian efforts) can be found: The Fight against Money Laundering, 
edited by the American embassy; The International Fight against Corruption: The 
Hong Kong Experience, by Anthony Milford; Corruption: Causes, Consequences and 
Cures, by Susan Rose-Ackerman; and, Combating Corruption for Development, by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Translated from Spanish.  
109 As described under international pressure activities, influence. 
110 Documents obtained as part of a formal request appealing to the access to information law. 
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Miguel Schloss. Although it is impossible to know to what degree each of these 
documents influenced the work of the INA commissioners, it is clear that they had 
been all informed by the academic production of the international anti-corruption 
movement. 
 International actors had additional involvement in the INA’s work through the 
provision of technical and financial assistance. 111  The most important activity 
undertaken in this aspect was the production of a survey report sponsored and 
prepared by the World Bank (2001), assessing the state and perception of corruption 
in Peru. According to some members of the INA, the report worked as a basis for the 
discussion and identification of specific measures to prevent and control corruption in 
the country. Their comments describe the World Bank’s report as having “the 
characteristic of precedent or of important previous information”112 (Interview No. 
01), and being “a very interesting element for discussion and from which everyone [in 
the INA] began to manifest their own viewpoints regarding the problem of 
corruption”113 (Interview No. 17). However, it is interesting to note that, while this 
report effectively helped and supported the work of the INA, for the Peruvian 
government at large the nature of the World Bank involvement was not so 
straightforward. As we have mentioned earlier, the administration of Valentín 
Paniagua indeed benefitted from the activities developed by the international 
community, as the nature of the former allowed it to assimilate the pressure over the 
NACS as a way to generate support for the bigger political system and the leadership. 
But other elements of the State were not as inclined towards Paniagua’s position. It is 
stated in the World Bank report that several government agencies refused to 
participate in the survey, among which were important actors such as the Supreme 
Court, the Superior Court, the Ministry of Health, the Office of the Comptroller 
General, the Public Ministry, the Congress, and the agencies that make up the 
electoral system (JNE, ONPE, RENIEC). 
This level of international involvement in the establishment of new NACS, 
which followed its late but crucial role in bringing Fujimori’s government to a much 
demanded end, would represent from then on the peak of international pressure over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
112 Translated from Spanish. 
113 Ibid. 
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the stability of the NACS in Peru, marked by a strong political quality. 114 
Nonetheless, in general all these activities helped the political system regain a healthy 
level of support, rather than stress it. According to Ford Deza (2004), during the year 
2000 about three hundred and fifty thousand college students participated in popular 
mobilizations against the regime, to which we should add a vast and homogeneous list 
of social groups, including labor unions, religious movements, regional associations, 
and many others. In only eight months, however, Valentín Paniagua was able to 
stabilize the political system (at least in term of support for the leadership), and was 
able to finish his presidency enjoying strong levels of support (Taylor, 2005), as it is 
possible to appreciate in Figure 5. By May, 69% of surveyed people supported 
Paniagua, and 42% even expressed their approval of Paniagua staying until 2005 if 
needed (LA, 2001/05/16). By the end of the transitional government, in July, as much 
as 83% of Peruvians supported the president (LR, 2001/07/21).  
 The scenario of prolonged stress had officially come to an end, for the 
political system in general, and the executive branch in particular, had managed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The strong involvement of foreign actors in the evolution of the Peruvian NACS was short-lived, 
however, as the attention of the regional champion, the United States, soon shifted away from Latin 
America and issues of democracy after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the onset of the “global 
war on terror From then on, the involvement of foreign actors in anti-corruption efforts will have 
exclusively technical characteristics (as opposed to political means of pressure), taking place under the 
umbrella of the international anti-corruption movement, as it will be reviewed in following chapters. 
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stabilize its capacity to make decisions and the level of popular compliance with 
them. In the process, the measures that were adopted and implemented by the 
Paniagua administration to address the spread of corruption in the country effectively 
gave rise to a new NACS: the emergence of an anti-corruption subsystem for the 
control of malfeasance; the adoption of legal norms to facilitate and empower the 
work of the subsystem; the early results in terms of asset recovery and dismantlement 
of the Fujimori-Montesinos network; and, the official launching of a national policy 
discussion on corruption prevention, represented a clear break with the previous 
treatment of corruption in the country, one that could not be reverted. Thus, 
notwithstanding small processes of weakening and strengthening brought by later 
administrations, the NACS introduced by the transitional government became the 
“new normal” in the fight against corruption in Peru for the next decade and a half. 
With a new set of rules in place, then, the change of government in 2001 
announced the time to resume the tension between the political system and the 
environment regarding the level and stability of the NACS. 
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Chapter VI 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006): 
Stabilization of the New National Anti-Corruption Standards 
 
The 2000 congressional and presidential elections saw the victory of 
Alejandro Toledo and his party Perú Posible, who only one year earlier had been 
prevented from office by Fujimori’s tactics of state capture and electoral fraud. 
Transitional president Valentín Paniagua, just as he had promised from the beginning, 
showed a transparent and efficient performance in the organization of the process, 
while at the same time implementing some important reforms that would serve as a 
basis for the new government to continue prosecuting the infamous Fujimori-
Montesinos mafia.  
Some of the key characteristics of Toledo’s government, at least in relation to 
its management of the NACS, can already be detected or explained by looking at the 
events taking place in the months immediately prior to his ascension to office. In 
particular, the existence of a vast prosecution project to be undertaken by the new 
elected government, and the success of Paniagua’s leadership, set up the scene for the 
2001-2006 government and the management of the NACS that will be described in 
this chapter. 
 
1. The Political System on July 28, 2001 
 
As we have discussed at length in the chapter regarding the theoretical model, 
the management of environmental pressure and the stability of both the NACS and the 
political system at large depend on the production of outputs that successfully address 
environmental demands and stimulate a healthy flow of support. This characteristic of 
the model is particularly evident in the scenario of ‘corruption perception,’ where 
government performance regarding enforcement measures takes a crucial role not 
only in preventing demands for reform, but also for securing the legitimacy of the 
political leadership. The early successes of the Public Procurator’s Office led by José 
Ugaz, for example, provided the government of Paniagua with enough support and 
legitimacy to adopt the measures it considered necessary to secure the stabilization of 
the whole political system. 
Toledo’s party understood from the beginning the importance of having a task 
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that were at once possible to accomplish, benign for the government, and which could 
provide them with a good and steady amount of support. Trying to associate his 
leadership with the prosecution of the Fujimori-Montesinos corrupt network (which 
offered the qualities just described of an ideal government task), Perú Posible began 
capitalizing on the political crisis before the first round of elections.  
Carlos Ferrero, president of Congress and first candidate in Toledo’s 
congressional list, publicly stated that there was a threat of Toledo being assassinated 
for what he represented for Montesinos’ mafia; according to him, Toledo was “the 
only candidate feared by Montesinos and the corrupt”115 (LR, 2001/03/29). Such 
declarations were conveniently being voiced less than two weeks before Election 
Day, clearly attempting to present Toledo as the anti-corruption champion that the 
country needed amidst the political turmoil. To give an even bigger impact to the 
candidate’s imagined figure, on March 5 (only three days before Election Day), 
Ferrero decided to order the playback in Congress of several videos recorded by 
Vladimiro Montesinos, which were still being processed as part of the voluminous 
evidence against the ex presidential advisor. In the videos, many high-ranking 
members of the military and the police could be seen presenting their allegiance to the 
military leadership, signing a Minutes Book to show their support for Fujimori’s self-
coup of 1992 and for the officers benefitted with the infamous Amnesty Law of 1995, 
in a ceremony that had taken place in secret in 1999 (Caretas, 2001/04/11a).  
Such actions by a leader of running party Perú Posible were interpreted (albeit 
timidly) by political magazine Caretas (2001/04/11b) in similar terms to ours: 
 
“It is still a mystery why the exhibition of those films were hurried (literally) 
72 hour before elections... And why it was done by Carlos Ferrero, none other 
than candidate number 1 in Alejandro Toledo’s list for Congress. Was it to 
create a wave of fear and therefore a compulsive need for order? In other 
words, the urgency of [electing] Toledo in first round? 
... There are some that speculate that the sudden show of the stored videos 
could be explained in the conspiracy climate that was ever-present in Toledo’s 
campaign over the last weeks. It should not be forgotten that it was Ferrero 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Translated from Spanish. 
	   145	  
who announced that some people wanted to assassinate Toledo.”116  
 
 The possibilities of Toledo playing the same card over the course of his 
government, however, got seriously impaired by Paniagua’s proactive approach and 
Ugaz’s rate of success. Furthermore, the most important element for exploiting an 
image of anti-corruption enforcer, which was the capture of Vladimiro Montesinos, 
was suddenly taken away by the transitional government barely a month before 
Toledo was to take office, thanks to the actions of the American FBI (Ugaz, 2014). 
With Montesinos behind bars, an important source of support for Toledo’s 
government disappeared, and even though plenty of other opportunities for activating 
non-partisan investigations/prosecutions117 were still available (Fujimori’s capture 
could be said to take a close second place), the power of this type of coping 
mechanisms was certainly diminishing quickly by the time Toledo assumed office on 
July 28. In these terms, it can be appropriately said that Paniagua harvested a 
significant amount of the resources that could have been used under Toledo’s 
government if only the former had not been so successful. The stimulation of support 
for the political system had not only exploited the modification of the NACS, but it 
had also used a good deal of demand-satisfactory measures that could have been 
activated by the following government in its efforts to stabilize the NACS without 
stressing the system. Barr (2003, p. 1171) presents a similar reading of the political 
impact for Toledo of the actions of the previous government: 
 
“Although Toledo had made the first stand against Fujimori, Paniagua was the 
first post-Fujimori president, thus presenting the most direct contrast to the 
despised former executive. Paniagua, moreover, could take credit for the 
capture of Montesinos in what was perhaps the symbolic equivalent of 
Fujimori’s 1992 capture of Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzman. After 
eight months of the Paniagua administration, the Fujimori regime no longer 
presented an acute crisis to resolve, but a residue to remove. Toledo has 
complained that the political honeymoon he should have enjoyed was 
exhausted by the interim administration. A March 2003 survey lends support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid. 
117 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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to his complaint: Paniagua’s approval rating was an exceptionally high 65.2%; 
quadruplet hat for Toledo. While the nefarious role and even persistence of the 
Fujimori-Montesinos mafia remain salient, as Toledo prefers, the new 
administration cannot take credit for solving the crisis. Instead, Toledo 
inherited the unglamorous, albeit tremendously important, work of cleaning up 
the political system.” 
 
 Toledo’s government would have indeed benefitted from cleaning after the 
meltdown of Fujimori’s regime; instead, it had to follow the highly esteemed 
leadership of Valentín Paniagua. This situation produced certain conditions for the 
new period: First, the work of the INA and the new norms on transparency and access 
to information had created the basis for efforts on corruption prevention; second, there 
was still a network of actors that would have to be prosecuted, but whose successful 
prosecution would not necessarily translate in increased support for the leadership; 
and third, the unity of the political leadership against Fujimori was quickly coming to 
an end, and opposition parties were ready to resume politics as usual.  
To those conditions we can add three more that, although not related to the 
transitional government, are important to understand the special circumstances under 
which the government of President Toledo had to operate: First, the fall of Fujimori 
had exposed the political system to unprecedented levels of public scrutiny, creating 
as a consequence higher levels of corruption awareness; second, the tight control over 
the State apparatus was suddenly replaced by a political party that was not 
institutionalized, nor disciplined, thus making it harder for the leadership to control 
the occurrence of scenarios of corruption perception; and third, the international anti-
corruption movement had finally made its first real impression on Peru, and foreign 
actors would only continue increasing their participation from then on. 
 In the rest of this chapter, the discussion will show how each of the above 
conditions affected the way the government performed towards the stabilization of the 
NACS. 
 
2. The National Commission to Fight Against Corruption (CNA) 
 
Aware of an increasing scenario of corruption intolerance, brought about by 
the domestic and international media coverage of the whole Fujimori-Montesinos 
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network and the approach taken by the transitional government, Alejandro Toledo 
was quick in addressing the pressure and to promise the appointment of a so-called 
‘anti-corruption czar’ (Valenzuela, 2001). The timing for such measure was also right: 
in the short span of four months, the 59% of popular approval enjoyed by Toledo 
when he took office in late July had eroded at an impressive rate, reaching 32% as 
early as November of that year (Tanaka, 2005). Under the circumstances, the 
government was in desperate need for new sources of legitimacy.  
With a tiny decree118 published on El Peruano on October 12, 2001, the 
government appointed Martín Belaunde Moreyra (who was at the time dean of the 
Association of Lawyers of Lima) as ‘High Level Advisor of the President of the 
Republic for the Fight Against Corruption and the Promotion of Ethics and 
Transparency in Public Management.’ Although the title was rather boastful, the 
decree itself did not include any information regarding the functions that would be 
performed by Belaunde Moreyra, nor any other information. A day earlier, however, 
President Toledo (together with Prime Minister Roberto Dañino Zapata) had given a 
press conference to publicly present his promised anti-corruption czar, where it was 
informed that he would have under his duties the prevention of irregular acts and the 
monitoring of activities that could turn into corruption. The latter task in particular 
was considered a rather delicate subject, due to the interests that it could clash with; 
already the Public Procurator’s Office was experiencing some level of “institutional 
jealousy” (Ugaz, 2014, pp. 66, 166) from the Prosecutor’s Office, which constantly 
complained that José Ugaz and his team were invading areas of competency that 
belonged exclusively to them. To supposedly dispel any misgivings that the 
appointment of a czar would interfere with other offices legally involved in 
investigations, Toledo assured that the duties of Belaunde Moreyra would not meddle 
in the activities of the judiciary, the Public Ministry, the Public Procurator’s Office, or 
the Congress, particularly in relation to the Fujimori-Montesinos case (LR, 
2001/10/12). 
Despite the public discourse behind the appointment of an anti-corruption czar 
and its later evolution into the National Commission to Fight Corruption (CNA from 
here on), these measures were actually consistent with the activation of inadequate 
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anti-corruption policies/bodies/agencies119 as described in our theoretical framework. 
To provide evidence of this assertion, we need to first discuss the circumstances under 
which Belaunde Moreyra was selected; these are narrated first by a staff member of 
the CNA (Interview No. 26) that worked with him:  
 
“When Martín Belaunde serves as dean of the Association of Lawyers of 
Lima, Toledo was on campaign. Back then, [Juan Paz, executive secretary of 
the CNA] was simply a secretary of secretaries, a person that carried 
documents around. Then what happens? This person goes and finds Toledo, 
who was a candidate, and tells him: ‘You can explain your party platform at 
the Association of Lawyers of Lima. I am going to make it happen.’ He was a 
political operator... He then goes and proposes [the event with Toledo] to the 
future anti-corruption czar... And they really have the presentation, obviously 
criticized by many politicians because [Toledo] was being given an important 
stage. But that was the purchase: ‘I am helping you, doctor Toledo, do not 
forget it, I am helping you.’ And it worked.”120  
 
The above account follows closely the description provided by a former senior 
official of the Association of Lawyers of Lima (Interview No. 18): 
 
“[Belaunde Moreyra] had a direct contact with Toledo because he had 
supported him during his campaign... He participated in the mobilizations 
organized by Toledo... and then in the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos... [Having 
been a member of the opposition against Fujimori, and then dean of the 
Association of Lawyers of Lima] gave him a relationship [with Toledo], even 
though he was formally neutral; but at the end he openly supported him... So 
he had a favorable position and was present in the inaugural ceremony of 
Toledo’s government as a friend, but of course a very well regarded friend. 
Soon afterwards he was appointed for a special commission on the reform of 
the military forces... and then (in the interim) he was appointed [to the position 
of anti-corruption czar]. At that moment he had a very good relationship with 
the prime minister; he knew Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who was minister of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 As described under the scenario of corruption intolerance, coping point of stress amelioration. 
120 Translated from Spanish. 
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Economy; in sum, he had friends... So, he was appointed thanks to a 
combination of all these factors.”121 
 
 Therefore, according to this information, it is clear that the appointment of 
Belaunde Moreyra was a political compensation for his help during the electoral 
campaign; but more importantly, it suggests the lack of independence of the position 
of the czar from the beginning. This problem is brought to light only a couple of 
months afterwards, when in January of 2002 Belaunde Moreyra is cited by local 
newspapers122 as avoiding the investigation of members of the government regarding 
allegations of corruption (LR, 2002/01/04), and even actively acting as their 
defendant (Cavero, 2002). A staff member of the CNA, indeed, considered that 
Belaunde Moreyra was prone to obstruct the work of the commissioners whenever 
issues affecting the government were brought forth (Interview No. 31). 
 To completely appreciate the real nature of the government initiative 
regarding preventive measures, we move on to look at the CNA proper. This 
commission, first of its class at the national level, was created by Supreme No. 120-
2001-PCM on November 17, 2001, roughly a month after Belaunde’s appointment. It 
was presided by a representative of the President of the Republic, conformed by 
members of the government and the civil society, and included the participation of the 
comptroller general and the Ombudsman (or their representatives). Among its 
function were the development of anti-corruption plans and recommendations, the 
promotion of ethics and transparency in the public sphere, the promotion of 
international cooperation, the carrying of periodical surveys, and other activities 
aiming at supporting the fight against corruption in both the government and society. 
These functions gave the CNA the leading place as the Peruvian anti-corruption body 
in charge of prevention. But the most remarkable attributions provided by its norm of 
creation were specifically three, involving not the prevention but rather the control of 
corruption: (1) To evaluate and denounce to the Public Ministry acts of corruption; (2) 
to inform of any sign of corruption involving public officials or private citizens; and 
(3) to conduct public hearings with the objective of analyzing cases of administrative 
corruption.  
 One of the key aspects that need to be pointed out regarding the creation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Translated from Spanish. 
122 For example, Caretas (2002/05/16). 
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CNA is its timing. According to a member of the anti-corruption commission, its 
creation was only decided by the government in the course of the first two weeks after 
Belaunde Moreyra had been appointed czar (Interview No. 19). Considering that most 
of the expectations regarding the tasks of the czar were actually embodied in the 
decree that created the CNA, it would be expected that they both were linked from the 
beginning, either by institutional design or by government decision; however, 
Belaunde Moreyra reports to have actually been the author of Supreme Decree No. 
120-2001-PCM, which suggests that the idea behind a preventive anti-corruption 
body had not necessarily been part of the original plan. Such an interpretation is 
supported by the presence of a competitive project. On October 9 (two days before the 
appointment of Belaunde Moreyra as czar), Congressmember Ana Elena Townsend 
Diez Canseco had introduced a legislative project123 proposing the creation of an 
‘Office Against Corruption’ with normative, technical, economic, financial, and 
administrative autonomy, and whose chair would be chosen by the Congress. Four 
days before the ruling on Townsend’s proposal, however, the government created the 
CNA. The sudden existence of a commission with similar duties as the one proposed 
by the Congressmember, albeit with clearly different real power, gave enough 
grounds for the national parliament to reject her proposal. Thus, the government was 
able to effectively avoid the creation of a politically independent anti-corruption 
body. Was the CNA so much different? This question brings us to a second aspect. As 
it was mentioned earlier, Supreme Decree No. 120-2001-PCM established that the 
CNA would be presided by the representative of the President of the Republic; to be 
precise, art. 7 of the decree reads: “The High Level Advisor of the President of the 
Republic for the Fight Against Corruption and the Promotion of Ethics and 
Transparency in Public Management is to be the President of the National 
Commission of Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Ethics and Transparency 
in Public Management.”124 In other words, ingrained in the norm was the presence of 
Martín Belaunde Moreyra as the CNA’s president. Under these circumstances, the 
CNA could only be as politically independent as the anti-corruption czar.  
The situation was not improved by Belaunde’s selection of close friends to fill 
some of the commissioners’ seats, particularly the ones that were crucial to the 
objective of the CNA. According to him, these were: Agustín Figueroa Benza, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Legislative Proposal No. 898/2001-CR. 
124 Translated from Spanish. 
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Francisco Diez-Canseco Távara, and Enrique Obando Arbulú, three of the four 
representatives from civil society.125 By the middle of 2001 Figueroa quit the CNA 
due to his critical posture126 to some of the activities carried on by Belaunde Moreyra 
and was replaced by Rafael Villegas Cerro, who was also brought by the czar; 
Guillermo Benavente Ercilla, representative of the Catholic Church, also quit for 
similar reasons. In August, Carlos Morelli Zavala, representative from the Ministry of 
Justice followed suit, and was replaced a month later by Alberto Ygor Martínez 
Llanos, former congressional candidate for the list of Perú Posible (President 
Toledo’s party) in 2000. 
  Other formal aspects of the CNA also evidence the government’s intentions to 
activate an inadequate anti-corruption body as a form of coping mechanism to 
address the scenario of corruption intolerance. While the capacity to monitor and 
almost investigate acts of malfeasance theoretically represented an important source 
of power to the CNA, in reality it was the seed of its own destruction. Disregarding 
Toledo’s initial discourse, other agencies quickly began harassing the work of the 
commission for what they perceived as being the unconstitutional invasion of their 
functions. The most hostile of them all was the Office of the Comptroller General 
(OCG), which, although it had been included by norm as an observer member, it 
refused to participate in any of its meetings. By early February, the comptroller 
general had sent an official communication to the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers (PCM) requesting the modification of the CNA in two key aspects: the 
removal of certain attributions from the commission, and the exclusion of the OCG as 
a member. 127  Soon afterwards, President Toledo and Prime Minister Dañino 
expressed to Belaunde Moreyra their opinion that the CNA should focus on 
prevention rather than control; thus, far from moving towards the institutionalization 
that the commissioners were seeking (in particular the granting of a higher legal 
status), the commission was being gently pushed to relinquish one of its main 
activities. Finally, on April 28, 2003, the norm that created the CNA was officially 
modified.128 With this change, the commission was effectively deactivated for all real 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Actually, if we discard the representative of the Catholic Church, there were only three spots for 
representatives of the civil society, all of which were designated by the president of the CNA. 
126 Benavente would even go as far as to contact the Office of the Comptroller General to request its 
intervention and the auditing of the CNA (as discussed in the proceedings of the fifteenth session of the 
commission, held on Octiber 2, 2001). 
127 The issue was discussed during the third meeting of the CNA, held on February 4, 2002. 
128 Supreme Decree No. 047-2003-PCM. 
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purposes, being stripped of its attributions regarding corruption control, its 
representation of the Peruvian country in international fora, and even of its capacity to 
hold any official meetings of its commissioners (this point will be elaborated on 
later).  
 The management audit carried out by the PCM (2006) describes the 
consequences and responsibilities behind the normativity of the CNA (pp. 10, 11 and 
14): 
“[T]he Office of the Comptroller General, through communication... dated 
January 22, 2002, makes some observations to the instrument of creation of 
the CNA and proposes the then prime minister, Doctor Roberto Dañino 
Zapata, the modification of Supreme Decree No. 120-2001-PCM... due to the 
fact that, in its analysis of the norm, it concludes that the various functions 
given with this instrument to the [CNA] interfere with the competency and 
duplicate the functions given to the Office of the Comptroller General by the 
Political Constitution... 
Afterwards, as a consequence of these apprehensions... five of the eight 
articles of Supreme Decree No. 120-2001-PCM are modified... 
Through communication dated October 05, 2006,129 [the technical secretariat 
of the CNA] reported that ‘between the most important consequences [of the 
modification of the norm in 2003], is the fact that the CNA lost the possibility 
of driving processes of investigation of presumed acts of corruption or lack of 
transparency in the different levels of government and especially in the high 
spheres of political power, as they were already taking place, in the first 
months of activity of the CNA...’130 
The facts presented show that the functions that were given to the [CNA] were 
not previously established in relation to other agencies that work against 
corruption.”131 
 
Regardless of the specific rationale behind the attributions given to the CNA 
(they could have been seeded on purpose to generate a hostile climate for the newborn 
agency, or simply included in an act of pure negligence by an inexperienced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 By this time the government had change, and President Alan García Pérez was in office. 
130 Italics in original. 
131 Translated from Spanish. 
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government), it is clear that the wrong elements were allowed to fall into place for the 
mismanagement of the emerging commission.   
 From the beginning, there had been more interest in creating the image of a 
great anti-corruption commission than to actually institutionalize the prevention of 
corruption at a national level. A member of the CNA remembers: “When [Belaunde 
Moreyra] got appointed they made a big circus out of it. They went all out: he went to 
Congress, and every day he appeared on the news”132 (Interview No. 19). He also 
approached different opposition leaders, such as Alan García Pérez from the 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party (APRA) and Lourdes Flores Nano 
from National Unity (Caretas, 2001/10/18), who had the second and third largest 
parties in parliament, respectively. Thus, the publicity of his appointment followed 
what we would expect from a properly activated coping mechanism at the point of 
‘stress amelioration.’  
When the CNA was created, it was obvious for some that Toledo’s approach 
for the prevention of corruption was markedly different to the one demanded. 
According to Peña-Mancillas (2011), NGO Proética criticized the creation of the 
CNA for not attending to the suggestions produced by the INA, which were clearly 
stated in its final report A Perú Without Corruption (INA, 2001). Among some of the 
key aspects recommended by its normative predecessor, the CNA was supposed to be 
closer to the anti-corruption body proposed by Congressmember Ana Elena 
Townsend: its chair should be appointed by the majority of parliament, and its 
political and administrative autonomy guaranteed. It was evident that, 
notwithstanding the amount of functions that were originally given to the CNA in 
relation to both prevention and control of corruption, its effectiveness could be greatly 
impaired if certain level of independence were not accomplished. As it has been 
described earlier, however, instead of empowering the CNA with the capacity to 
pursue any incidence of alleged corruption in the government, its existence was 
tightly linked to the political will of President Toledo. A member of the INA 
commented (Interview No. 01): “It is possible to assert that none of those 
governments [of presidents Toledo and García] implemented the suggestions of the 
INA.”133 
For the actors that had participated in Paniagua’s Initiative, it was apparent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Translated from Spanish. 
133 Ibid. 
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that the new government had no interest in creating an effective preventive body. One 
of them describes the situation (Interview No. 22): 
 
“The commission created did not follow that guidelines that we had 
developed. The recommendations contemplated [the inclusion of] people 
unaffiliated to the government; this is, not politicians or people linked to the 
government that in one way or another might not carry out their duties with 
objectivity but try to hide some incidents. [The original idea was to invite] 
some relevant and prestigious members of civil society that could guarantee 
the impartial execution of their duties. But what the government did, on the 
other had, was to appoint an anti-corruption czar (Martín Belaunde) and 
mainly representatives from different government agencies. Thus, when we 
saw this, we all said ‘this is not going to work’; and indeed, it did not 
work.”134 
 
This opinion regarding the appropriateness of having the CNA under the 
control of the executive branch is shared by most. Another member of the INA is 
even more vocal (Interview No. 16): 
 
“None of us agreed with the creation [of the CNA]... I have the impression 
that most of us were very skeptic about this idea of an anti-corruption czar. 
We thought it was a bad idea... I think it was an absolute disaster, in the sense 
that it was ineffective, first. Also, the work [of the commission] was 
imperceptible... My personal impression is that in the government of Toledo 
there was never a real interest in getting involved in the issue of anti-
corruption.”135 
 
The INA had not only left a clear roadmap for the evolution of the NACS, but 
had also made sure that the new government was aware of the academic resources 
available. Following the same approach taken by environmental actors, the members 
of the Initiative engaged in the direct dissemination of corruption awareness and anti-
corruption principles at least in one occasion during the electoral process of 2001. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Translated from Spanish. 
135 Ibid. 
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According to the accounts of the members of the INA, they met with the two 
candidates that had moved to the second round of the presidential elections, Alan 
García and Alejandro Toledo, in order to debrief them about the fight against 
corruption from the perspective of the INA’s work (Interview No. 01), which was 
predominantly normative in nature. Alan García, joined by four of his advisors, was 
reportedly already acquainted with the issue of anti-corruption activities. Toledo, on 
the other hand, was completely ignorant of the topic; on top of that, he had arrived an 
hour and a half late, and instead of bringing some members of his technical staff, he 
was joined by his nephew (Interview No. 16), Jorge ‘Coqui’ Toledo (who was in 
those days involved in allegations of money laundering—León, 2001).  
However the INA tried to leave its imprint on the new government, Toledo’s 
leadership failed to follow up on the efforts to prevent corruption from an institutional 
perspective. An anecdote told by a senior official of his government (Interview No. 
30) helps us grasp the lack of political will: 
 
“Almost nobody in the Ministry (of Justice) knew of the small booklet 
published by the INA. How was that possible, if it had been handed over? The 
printed edition came out sixty or ninety days after Toledo had taken office... 
Then, how was that possible? Where were [the booklets]? Didn’t public 
officials know [of their existence]? ... Orders were given to investigate and 
locate the documents. Much to the surprise [of the minister of Justice], they 
were found in boxes stored in a shut down bathroom. They had never been 
distributed.”136  
  
A public official appointed to support the activities of an anti-corruption 
working group created by Ministerial Resolution No. 245-2004-JUS of the Ministry 
of Justice, confirms the account of the tossed out booklets (Interview No. 02). Under 
these circumstances, it is very difficult to say that the government of President Toledo 
was invested in carrying on the type of reforms set on in the decree that created the 
CNA. 
Another important element underpinning our interpretation of the events was 
the provision (or rather absence) of material resources for the work of the anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Translated from Spanish. 
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corruption czar and the CNA. In this respect, it is by all accounts explicit that the 
government insufficiently funded the office directed by Belaunde Moreyra, who was 
not even provided with an office at the beginning of his appointment and had to 
perform his duties from the building of the Association of Lawyers of Lima. 
According to a senior official of the Association (Interview No. 18), Belaunde 
Moreyra had to stay there at the beginning due to the complete absence of budget; 
thus, he spent the first three months of his appointment working from his office in the 
Association of Lawyers, carrying any necessary duty with the help of the employees 
from the Association. It was only from December on that he could begin hiring a few 
people, but still had to fit them all in his office as the government had not yet 
provided a separate location for the anti-corruption activities. This situation continued 
until January 10, when Belaunde left the position of dean, and moved with his staff to 
a small office in the building of Petroperú. 
 According to the audit report (PCM, 2006), in 2002 the CNA was allocated S/. 
3 millions (roughly US$ 1 million), “amount that was insufficient for the execution of 
its activities.”137 The first part of this budget was only transferred after the middle of 
March, when Supreme Decree No. 048-2002-EF ordered the allocation of S/. 1 
million to the CNA. On top of that, it is mentioned in the fifth meeting of the 
commission, held on February 19, that Belaunde Moreyra himself was on a monthly 
contract basis, which highlights the informality with which the government was 
managing this agency. The commissioners, furthermore, were never allocated any 
budget for concept of allowances throughout the thirteen months they were appointed 
to the post, even though official requests were made to the prime minister to that end.  
These conditions reinforce our assertion that the CNA was in fact a coping 
mechanism set by the government to deal with the emerging scenario of corruption 
intolerance, one that seemingly proved effective: While the study sponsored by the 
World Bank (2001) during the Paniagua administration had found that 85% of 
respondents identified corruption as the second most important obstacle in the country 
(only outdone by ‘unemployment’), a national survey conducted by Proética (2002) 
and published in November of 2002 found that corruption had fallen to the third place 
with 63%, behind ‘economic crisis’ and ‘unemployment,’ and even to a fourth place 
(behind ‘crime’) when considering spontaneous answers. Furthermore, a study carried 	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out in February of 2002 had shown that 10% of respondents thought that the fight 
against corruption (independently from the prosecution of the Fujimori-Montesinos 
case) was being prioritized by the government above everything else (APOYO, 
2002b); and another one conducted in March showed that 46.1% of surveyed people 
were aware of the existence of the CNA, and that almost half of them trusted that it 
would accomplish its mission (University of Lima, 2002). While these results are not 
particularly impressive, they do point at a diminishing level of corruption-related 
stress caused, at least partly, by the presence of the national anti-corruption 
commission. 
Finally, the own personality developed by the CNA sped its ruin. Although all 
the characteristics described earlier made it particularly difficult for the commission 
to undertake any serious actions in execution of its official duties, in time certain 
confrontation with the political leadership became unavoidable. The commission 
became interested in gaining institutional legitimacy by following two different 
strategies: First, it pursued the improvement of its legal status by looking for support 
in Congress. The intention of the commissioners was to institutionalize the fight 
against corruption and to secure the persistence of the CNA by replacing the 
executive decree that created it, for a proper law emanated from Congress. The text of 
a legislative project was finalized by a subgroup of commissioners on October 4, 
2002. 
Second, the commissioners (including Belaunde Moreyra) saw the 
involvement of the CNA in investigations of corruption scandals as a way to attract 
popular attention, and therefore gaining political capital. This, however, represented 
the engagement in activities that have been described here as exerting pressure over 
the political system, and were obviously contrary to the interests of the government. 
This strategy started as early as February, with the request of information to the 
National Superintendent Agency for Tax Administration (SUNAT) regarding irregular 
procurements. The real friction, however, began with the critical position adopted 
during a small scandal involving First Lady Eliane Karp and her contractual relation 
with private bank Wiese Sudameris.  About this event, a member of the CNA 
(Interview No. 19) recalls: 
 
“Conflicts came with the President of the Republic, in particular due to his 
wife. [This was the case of] the famous Wiese Sudameris. [We sent her] a 
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questionnaire with seven questions asking ‘Please answer how much you have 
earned,’ ‘Please answer if you have paid taxes’... [We sent this questionnaire] 
to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and [as a result Prime Minister] 
Solari stopped talking to [Belaunde Moreyra]. On top of that, the czar leaked 
this document to the press... So, Solari got angry with him; Toledo did not say 
anything. Afterwards the whole thing appeared on the news, and [the czar] 
said on television ‘Ma’am, you need to leave your post [in Wiese 
Sudameris]’... This contributed to her losing that salary of US$ 10,000 per 
month. Toledo did not say anything, but they got angry and did not provide 
any [further] support [for the work of the CNA].”138 
 
Indeed, the media echoed the CNA’s position and highlighted its criticism of 
the whole affair. La República read (Núñez, 2002a): 
 
“The commission presided by Belaunde Moreyra considers that it is a mistake 
from the government to have adopted a lukewarm attitude regarding the 
subject and not having given explanations to clarify it. For them her 
resignation would not suffice. For all of this, the anti-corruption czar is 
believed to be evaluating the convenience of staying in his post after his 
recommendations were ignored. This, in particular, because it was the 
government itself who appointed him to take a stance in specific subjects.”139 
 
 Other accounts reinforce the idea that the government began to see the CNA 
as producing more stress over the system, just as any environmental actor, than to 
help cope with pressure as it had been designed for. Another member of the 
commission states that the relationship with the government was anything but friendly 
and supportive: “The commission became a sort of enemy, or an agency that should 
be feared”140 (Interview No. 08). This situation began to precipitate the beheading of 
the CNA. A staff member that participated in the activities of both the INA and the 
CNA (Interview No. 06) posits:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Translated from Spanish. 
139 Translated from Spanish. 
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“The National Commission to Fight Corruption, as any anti-corruption body in 
any country, needs to be joined by political will... in order to fulfill its 
objectives... And it also depends on the [government’s] purpose and intensity 
to fight against corruption... At some point the government itself started to 
withdraw the support that the CNA needed.”141 
 
The last straw was the interest of Czar Belaunde Moreyra in looking into the 
case of Minister of Internal Affairs Alberto Sanabria Ortiz, who after taking the post 
on January of 2003 had been immediately challenged by allegations of corruption and 
favoritism (Chávez, 2003). A member of the CNA describes this final episode 
(Interview No. 19): 
 
“There was a problem with Mr. Alberto Sanabria, who, as General Director of 
Internal Government, perceived an income equal to its nominal salary for 
looking over some raffles. It was not grand corruption, but we considered that 
it was not legal. Then [Belaunde Moreyra] did get removed [from the 
appointment of anti-corruption czar].”142 
 
The swift and sudden way in which the government handled the deactivation 
of the anti-corruption czar, and consequently the beheading of the CNA (which would 
be unable to continue holding meetings of its commissioners without the presence of 
the president, Belaunde Moreyra), supports both the CNA’s account and our 
discussion. The last official meeting of the CNA took place on February 6, 2003. 
Exactly one week later, Martín Belaunde Moreyra was appointed ambassador of Perú 
in Argentina,143 departing the country a day later. The rush was so great that his 
resignation was only made official two months later, on April 25, which meant that 
the ministerial resolution had to explicitly state that it had ‘retroactive efficacy.’ 
Finally, on April 30, the official newspaper El Peruano published Supreme Decree 
No. 047-2003-PCM, which modified the norm creating the CNA, rendering it 
harmless for the government and putting the blame on the complaints made by the 
OCG.  	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142 Translated from Spanish. 
143 Supreme Resolution No. 044-2003-RE of February 13, 2003. 
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The effective deactivation of the CNA (which formally kept existing, but its 
public image was all but dissolved) followed the logic of institutional devolution,144 a 
preemptive measure activated by the government to control the production of stress 
over the NACS and the political leadership. As mentioned before, this sort of coping 
mechanisms can be considered to be corruption-enablers, and so are susceptible to 
create other forms of pressure over the system. Aware of this fact, the government of 
President Toledo made sure to include a secondary mechanism to avoid that 
possibility. The public rationalization of its decision to separate Belaunde Moreyra 
from his anti-corruption role, and the involvement of an agency that was 
constitutionally autonomous, was clearly the government’s way of preemptively 
dealing with any stress caused by the beheading of the CNA. The use of the 
comptroller general was none other but an example of misallocation of 
responsibility,145 which diverts pressure from the government and towards secondary 
political objects. 
Following these measures, the CNA was further secured from political 
activism by the appointment of a political operator, Juan Paz Espinoza (Interview No. 
26), as the Executive Secretary of the commission on May 1. This position had been 
officially created by the amending norm (published on April 30) to supersede the 
administrative duties of the president. By doing so, the government managed to (1) 
avoid the appointment of a new president, (2) disable any official meeting of 
commissioners, (3) guarantee its control of the CNA’s activities, and (4) still keep the 
commission running (at least formally). For the next two years no meeting of 
commissioners would be organized, and most of the activities would revolve around 
anti-corruption training for public officials and civil society.  
When inquired about the fact that no representative of the President of the 
Republic was appointed after the ‘resignation’ of Belaunde Moreyra, Jaime Reyes 
Miranda, Secretary General of the PCM argued that (PCM, 2006, p. 9): 
 
“The appointment of the president of the [CNA] was a competence of other 
public officials different to the Secretary General of the PCM... When [I] 
assumed the post of Secretary General of the PCM, [I] could not unduly take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
145 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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the liberty of appointing or assuming the presidency of the commission, [but I] 
fulfilled my duty of warning the successive presidents of the Council of 
Ministers of the need to designate a new president, after the resignation of 
doctor Martín Belaunde Moreyra.”146 
 
On the same issue, Juan Paz Espinoza asserts that (PCM, 2006, p. 7): 
 
“Instances of coordination were carried out in important meetings with all the 
presidents of the Council of Ministers, although this is an issue that 
exclusively concerns the President of the Republic as in order to be appointed 
president of the [CNA] one needs first to be Presidential Advisor on Anti-
Corruption Affairs; nonetheless, the institutional operative plans were 
executed and accomplished as far as possible.”147 
 
Therefore, it is safe to say that the government was quite aware of the situation 
that the CNA was going through, and purposely kept it without leadership and 
excluded from the participation of other government agencies and civil society. In this 
respect, it is not true that the CNA, under the executive command of Juan Paz 
Espinoza, carried on all its duties as they were programmed. According to the audit 
report of 2006, of the fourteen activities that were officially programmed by the CNA 
between 2002 and 2004, the commission focused in only four of them: Promotion of 
public ethics; training sessions; media campaigns; and interinstitutional agreements. 
On top of that, the audit process found that on 2004 only 9.4% of the programmed 
activities could be accounted for, pointing to a serious deficit in management.  
Eventually, the CNA was revamped through Supreme Decree No. 035-2005-
PCM, signed on May 6, 2005. This second modification was brought by a number of 
reasons, the most important being three: (1) Toledo’s government was going through 
the second lowest level of popular approval of his entire term, caused by a series of 
corruption scandals throughout the second half of 2004; (2) the UNCAC had just been 
ratified by the Peruvian parliament on October 19, 2004; and (3) the funds described 
in the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the 
Government of the United States regarding the transfer of confiscated assets, signed 	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on June 12, 2004, had been recently transferred, which demanded the setting of 
institutional arrangements to comply with the requirements included in the 
Agreement. These three circumstances represented instances of domestic and 
international pressure, specifically regarding popular criticism 148  and media 
coverage;149 international conventions;150 and aid conditionalities.151 
Although the government response was to modify the CNA so as to allow the 
executive secretariat to hold official meetings of commissioners in the case of absence 
of the president, and certain preventive and control functions were improved, the 
political dependence of the commission was further secured. On January 13, 2005 
(less than three months before the modification of the CNA), the government had 
concluded the appointment of Juan Paz as executive secretary and put Alberto Ygor 
Martínez Llanos in his place,152 who until then had officially held the post of 
commissioner in representation of the Ministry of Justice. Martinez Llanos was 
another actor that the government knew could be counted on to keep the commission 
under control, same as Juan Paz; but in contrast to the latter (who had been first 
brought to the CNA by Belaunde Moreyra from the Association of Lawyers of Lima), 
the former was an official member of the incumbent party. According to a staff 
member of the CNA (Interview No. 26), “Juan Martínez Llanos is appointed... 
because he is another political operator. He actually was directly close to the 
president, and he actually belonged to [Toledo’s] party. So, it was a matter of ‘O.K., 
now it’s your turn.’”153 Indeed, the new executive secretary had unsuccessfully run 
for Toledo’s party Perú Posible on the congressional elections of 2000.154 
It is difficult to ignore at this point the persistence of the CNA as an 
inadequate anti-corruption body, a coping mechanism to somehow soothe the stress 
from the scenarios of corruption perception and intolerance. The events that followed 
the appointment of Martínez Llanos point unmistakably at the total 
instrumentalization of the commission and its preventive anti-corruption nature. On 
May 20 (exactly two weeks after the modification of the norm), the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
149 As described under domestic pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
150 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
151 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
152 Ministerial Resolution No. 006-2005-PCM. 
153 Translated from Spanish. 
154 Alberto Ygor Martínez Llanos occupied the place No 85 in the list of congressional candidates, as it 
is shown in Resolution No. 216-2000-JNE of the National Electoral Jury, published on El Peruano on 
February 19, 2000. 
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decreed155 that the CNA, together with the Ministry of Justice, would be the agency in 
charge of identifying the anti-corruption initiatives on which the funds transferred 
from the American government156 would be invested. On August 8, the first meeting 
of commissioners in two years and a half was finally held under the interim 
presidency of Martínez Llanos. During the next sessions, the task of identification of 
anti-corruption initiatives was properly discussed and reported, following government 
orders. The duties were distributed in the following way: the CNA would take care of 
the normative and technical aspects, while the Ministry of Justice (represented by its 
new vice minister, Jaime Reyes Miranda), would calculate their monetary costs. The 
presence of Reyes Miranda at this point is particularly telling of the consistent 
approach taken by the government: as it was mentioned before, he had been Secretary 
General of the PCM between 2002 and 2005–this is, throughout the two modifications 
suffered by the CNA. 
This process was officially completed with the approval of the projects by 
Ministerial Resolution No. 402-2005-JUS, on October 12. Then, two weeks later, on 
the 26th, the government gave Supreme Decree No. 082-2005-PCM, ordering the 
transfer of the CNA out of the sphere of the prime minister and assigning it to the 
Ministry of Justice. In its new sector, the CNA was put under the supervision of 
Reyes Miranda, who had been given the coordination of anti-corruption policies in the 
Ministry,157 and who became the commission’s new president in early 2006.158 
With that decision, the CNA was effectively demoted to a sectorial status, and 
even though its mandate remained having national reach, it is clear that in terms of 
institutional power the transfer left it even farther away from having any real impact 
on the NACS. A former senior official of the Ministry of Justice that was close to the 
work of the commission is of the same opinion (Interview No. 27): “I think it was a 
mistake to send [the CNA to the Ministry of Justice] and not keep it in the Presidency 
of the Council of Ministers, strengthening it in a different way.”159 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Supreme Decree No. 039-2005-PCM, published on May 24. 
156 These funds are the ones described in the bilateral Agreement that was commented earlier. 
157 This point is referred to at the 28th meeting of commissioners of the CNA, held on December 2, 
2005. 
158 The term commission is used here to avoid confusion. Actually, on January 16 of 2006 the CNA 
was reinvented by the Ministry of Justice as the National Anti-Corruption Council, which was given a 
slightly different structure (Supreme Decree No. 002-2006-JUS). 
159 Translated from Spanish. 
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3. The Anti-Corruption Subsystem 
 
It was explained earlier in this chapter that the success of Paniagua’s 
government in investigating and beginning the prosecution of the Fujimori-
Montesinos mafia effectively reduced the amount of spotlight that Toledo and his 
administration could obtain from activating mechanisms such as public expressions of 
enforcement support and non-partisan investigations/prosecutions. 160  As a 
consequence, the area of enforcement actions represented a less impressive source of 
support, at least in regards to the corruption of the previous government. The reason 
was simple: Due to the success of Paniagua’s government in the area, environmental 
pressure had considerably declined. With less demands to satisfy, less support to gain, 
and so the cases related to the previous decade began to fade in the political agenda. 
Let us take a look at the numbers first. Of the 246 days that Paniagua was in 
power (without counting the days he took and left office), newspaper La República 
included in its front page at least one piece of news related to corruption of members 
of opposition groups (which included almost exclusively the Fujimori-Montesinos 
network) on 179 occasions. Looking at the same length of time since the beginning of 
the Toledo administration, La República did a similar coverage of news on 102 
occasions. When we compare these two numbers, we get Figure 6: During Paniagua’s 
term in office, corruption cases involving members of the opposition are highlighted 
64% of the time, while this figure drastically decreases to 36% during Toledo’s 
government. Clearly, by the time Perú Posible arrives to office the saliency of the 
issue was already in decline; this trend is even more evident when we consider the 
general pattern in which news of the Fujimori-Montesinos are distributed throughout 
2001. From January to May, the coverage of corruption on newspapers is almost 
uninterrupted, except for a very brief period in April. The biggest two periods of 
corruption coverage during the second semester of the year take place during July and 
October; in other words, one still under Paniagua’s watch, and only the second under 
Toledo’s. 
The reduction of the government’s interest in pursuing the enforcement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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anti-corruption norms (this is, the activation of demand-satisfactory measures161) 
became evident almost immediately after Toledo took office. José Ugaz (2014, pp. 
169-171), then ad hoc procurator for the Fujimori-Montesinos case, describes the lack 
of presidential will, especially when compared to the transitional government: 
 
“Even though it is true that, in basic terms, the president kept supporting the 
Procurator’s Office, we were missing the fierce political will of Valentín 
Paniagua... 
It was not possible to understand... how a president that in the public discourse 
declared to be unambiguous in his fight against corruption without exceptions, 
was giving shelter in his political party to people... who were bitter enemies of 
the Procurator’s Office... 
[Some time later] I understood that the president could not hold back his 
Congressman [Jorge Mufarech, who was an open slanderer of the Procurator’s 
Office], and that we had to fight our battles without relying on the support of 
the Government... 
All these circumstances... contributed to my decision of putting an end to my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
64%	  
36%	  
Paniagua's Government 
Toledo's Government 
 
Figure 6. Days La República Reported Corruption Involving Opposition Groups–Paniagua/Toledo 	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post of Public Procurator.”162 
 
The passage of time and its effect on the popular interest, and in consequence 
on the government efforts, is also expressed by Ugaz (Peña-Mancillas, 2011, p. 6) by 
comparing Toledo’s administration to that of his successor, Alan García Pérez: 
 
“Toledo let [the Procurator’s Office] do its job. He did not support so 
decidedly as Paniagua, but he did not make much trouble either... During 
Toledo’s government what diminished was the political will, it became 
thinner, but he did not take apart [the anti-corruption subsystem] as this 
government [of Alan García] did. This government beheaded the Procurator’s 
Office and, definitely, today we have but a cartoon of what was, in its 
moment, the [anti-corruption] system.” 
 
The government support that Ugaz calls ‘political will’ here, is what we have 
identified as merely a type of coping mechanism to deal with social and international 
demands to fight corruption. As the time went by and the demands moved from 
prosecuting the Fujimori-Montesinos network to prosecuting members of the 
incumbent party, it was evident that the interest in a public procurator specialized in 
the Fujimori government would dwindle in direct relation to the media attention, and 
that the anti-corruption subsystem would become more threatening to the health of the 
regime than necessary for its sustainability.  
In the following lines we discuss the state and evolution of the relationship 
between the government and the subsystem by focusing on the hurdles of the Public 
Procurator’s Office, which is the only element that was under direct responsibility of 
the government: While the Public Ministry and the judiciary are constitutionally 
autonomous organizations, and are (at least formally) independent from the political 
leadership, procurators are officially ‘state lawyers’ hired by the government to 
represent its interests. The main function of public procurators is to pursue civil 
damages, and to different extends to support the work of investigation and the burden 
of proof (especially when the Public Ministry, through its body of public prosecutors, 
does not have the resources of expertise to do so), in name of the State apparatus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Translated from Spanish. 
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However, they can be legally appointed and dismissed at will by senior officials, 
which makes them particularly telling evidence of the real position of the government 
in terms of the fight against corruption. 
The new NACS, although originally designed to deal with the massive corrupt 
network of Alberto Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos, represented a new set of 
rules for all political actors, and not just for them. Still in its infancy, it had a great 
potential for affecting the members of the Toledo administration too. There were two 
aspects of the subsystem that could become particularly troublesome: First, there was 
always the possibility that the identified members of the network would eventually 
extend until it included actors close to the incumbent president, or at least to the 
higher ranks of his administration. Jorge Mufarech Nemy, of whom Ugaz (2014) 
complained for his opposition to the work of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and 
César Almeyda were two such examples. Second, as any administrative system, the 
anti-corruption structure could autonomously push for its own development, thus 
becoming a source of stress akin to any other actor in the environment. If left alone, 
there was no doubt that the NACS would not be stabilized, but rather they would 
continue evolving to more complex and challenging stages. We shall address each one 
of these two points in turn. 
Before becoming congressmember for Toledo’s party Perú Posible, Mufarech 
had been part of the Fujimori regime as minister of Labor for a very brief period of 
time at the beginning of 1999. Although his position was not in line with that of 
Fujimori’s, he had engaged in obscure affairs with infamous individuals such as Oscar 
López Meneses, Daniel Borobio (Trujillo, 2003), José Enrique Crousillat, and even 
Montesinos himself, all four of these imprisoned at one point or another for 
corruption involving the previous decade. In February of 2005, Mufarech was briefly 
prosecuted under charges of influence peddling in connection to Crousillat, whom he 
had allegedly helped in an administrative investigation during his appointment as 
minister in 1999 (LR, 2005/02/16). Although he successfully appealed the decision of 
the anti-corruption court to open a legal process against him (Véliz, 2005), the 
impetus of the subsystem could not be denied nor ignored. 
A year earlier, fragments of a conversation held between César Almeyda 
Tasayco, former chair of the National Council of Intelligence and Toledo’s private 
lawyer; and former Army General Oscar Villanueva, who had been considered to be 
one of Montesinos’ most important henchman, had evolved into a serious political 
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crisis, and had shown “to the citizens the existence of obscure connections between 
members of the Fujimori-Montesinos mafia and men very close to President Toledo” 
(Siles, 2004).  
There was no doubt that the combinations of bad elements in important 
government positions, on the one hand, and an anti-corruption subsystem especially 
designed to chase and punish acts of corruption linked to the previous decade, on the 
other, was a dangerous combination for the political (and legal) future of the 
leadership. The new NACS, thus, represented a threat to the stable inflow of support 
to the government with its improved capabilities to enforce anti-corruption law. A 
member of the Public Prosecutor’s Office supports these assertions (Interview No. 
02): 
 
“I believe that the subject [of fighting against corruption] is dropped for 
various reasons. First, because the daily affairs end up overwhelming [the 
capacity of] politicians, just as it happens in many of those reform efforts. I 
am sure that if you were to ask Alejandro Toledo ‘what is it going to be [your 
main concern]?’ [he would answer] ‘The fight against corruption.’ But then 
the scandals begin, the problems, your own people starts engaging in [illicit 
affairs], you get pressed to give up on the cases. There was a lot of resistance 
from [different] sectors, which were not involved in investigations yet, [and 
they wanted] to stop the anti-corruption efforts because everything was 
connected to the Fujimori-Montesinos process.... People very powerful got 
involved in these cases.”163 
 
Under these circumstances, the government first relaxed the investment in 
anti-corruption efforts, and then began to take steps towards institutional 
devolution.164  
 
Reallocating Resources Away from the Anti-Corruption Subsystem 
According to Public Procurator Luis Vargas Valdivia (2002-2004), by mid of 
2004 his office was confronting a series of challenges in terms of financial support: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Translated from Spanish. 
164 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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They had been waiting a transfer from the FEDADOI funds to pay for the appraisal of 
several public buildings erected during the previous decade; the OCG had failed to 
provide them with human resources to verify the accountability related to cases of 
illicit enrichment; it had been a year since they had requested without success the 
hiring of a law firm in the United States to take on a case brought against the foreign 
accounts of Vladimiro Montesinos, which as a result were in danger of being 
confiscated in benefit of private actors and entities; furthermore, their annual budget 
had been cut down from US$ 1.3 millions to US$ 0.8 millions. Regarding the last 
point, Vargas Valdivia had expressed: “The budget has gradually decreased even 
though we have kept the same level [of performance]”165 (LR, 2004/09/01).  
When we consider the assets that were repatriated during the Toledo 
administration, the budget cuts to the Public Procurator’s office become all the more 
striking. According to former procurator José Ugaz (2014), by the beginning of 2002 
US$ 75 million had been effectively recovered thanks to the quick actions of his 
office and the cooperation of international actors. By the end of 2006, the assets 
recovered summed more than US$ 170 million. In Figure 7 we see the evolution of 
the FEDADOI’s income.  
Urgent Decree No. 122-2001, published in the first three months of the Toledo 
administration, established in its article 10 that the funds administered by the 
FEDADOI would be employed to b) pay for services provided and other expenses 
required by the inherent activities of the Procurator’s Offices that take part in 
criminal proceedings [regarding illicit activities against the State], and of the anti-
corruption Procurator’s Offices of the Ministry of Justice. Additionally, the funds 
would also go to compensate the victims of human rights abuses, according to 
subsection d) of the same article. However, by mid 2005 the Ad Hoc Procurator’s 
Office in charge of the Fujimori-Montesinos case (the source of the FEDADOI funds) 
had only received 3% of the total money recovered, while the victims of crimes 
against human rights perpetrated during the previous decade had been allocated 3.3%. 
The rest of the money had found purposes other than those explicitly established in 
the norm creating the FEDADOI. 
Newspaper La República described the situation in time for President 
Toledo’s fourth and last State of the Nation address (Páez, 2005): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Translated from Spanish. 
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“More than three quarters (73.3%) of the total amount of money recovered has 
been spent, by strict orders from the Executive, in aiding to the budget of 
public universities (22%), in the purchase of uniforms and the payment of 
overdue vacations for officers of the National Police (22%), and in the 
compensation of [public] employees fired during the period of Fujimori 
(20%). 
The judiciary received US$ 11 million, but that amount was distributed in the 
following way: US$ 8.2 million went to solve the list of demands made by 
judicial employees and workers (69.6%), US$ 3.5 million (30.2%) to raising 
wages of the members of the Supreme Court, and only US$ 7,201 to paying 
the fees of judicial experts. And, how much did the anti-corruption courts 
receive? Zero.”166 
 
By Ministerial Resolution No. 377-2005-PCM, published on October 16, 
2005, the PCM authorized the transfer of US$ 1.1 million for the acquisition of goods 
and services and the equipment of three Superior Prosecutor’s Offices and two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Ibid. 
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Figure 7. Funds Transferred to the FEDADOI Per Year (in $US Millions) 
Source: Justicia Viva (Gamarra et al., 2007) with information from the Ministry of Justice of Peru. 
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Provincial Prosecutor’s Offices Specialized in Public Corruption. However, 
according to an official decree the Public Ministry, to which the Prosecutor’s Offices 
belonged, the resources allocated “do not cover the ordinary expenses of appointment 
of prosecutorial and administrative personnel; therefore, it is necessary that the 
Ministry of Economy and Finances allocates the resources to cover those ordinary 
expenses.”167 By way of contrast, two years earlier, in November of 2003, the 
FEDADOI had approved the transfer of US$ 10 million to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to pay for overdue vacations of its workers corresponding to the years 1995 
and 1996 (PCM, 2003). Such differentiated treatment to institutional anti-corruption 
activities, on the one hand, and the correction of trivial administrative issues, on the 
other, speaks very eloquently of the political will supporting the anti-corruption 
subsystem. 
Turning to the exact amount of resources allocated to the different components 
of the subsystem, including the Public Procurator’s Office under the management of 
the Ministry of Justice and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Offices in the Public 
Ministry, we find that 60% of the funds administered by the FEDADOI were 
ultimately employed in activities located outside the anti-corruption subsystem: while 
US$ 73.7 went to support the fight against public malfeasance, US$ 109.4 were used 
as discretionary ‘petty cash’ of the government (Gamarra et al., 2007). Figure 8 
presents the disaggregated information on the distribution of the money that was 
allocated to the subsystem, while Figure 9 shows the annual distribution of the 
amounts transferred. It is particularly telling the fact that the resources of the 
subsystem steadily declined during the first years of the Toledo administration, before 
picking up again in 2005 and 2006. As it will be discussed later, 2004 (the year 
showing the smallest amount of money allocated to the subsystem from the funds of 
the FEDADOI) was also the most stressful for the government as a consequence of 
multiple corruption scandals, and the year that the Public Procurator’s Office was 
effectively intervened by the political leadership. 
The result of the inconsistent and diminishing investment in anti-corruption 
enforcement efforts had as a consequence the stalling of criminal proceedings. By 
March of 2005, only twenty of the more than two hundred proceedings initiated 
against a population of corrupt actors of 1,492 accused had been finalized, while other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Resolution of the Board of Supreme Prosecutors No. 069-2005-MP-FN-JFS from October 20, 2005. 
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Figure 8. Resources Allocated to the Subsystem 2002-2006 (in US$ millions) 
Source: Justicia Viva (Gamarra et al., 2007) with information from the Ministry of Justice of Peru. 	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure 9. Annual Distribution of Funds to the Anti-Corruption Subsystem 2002-2006 (from Total 
Allocations from the FEDADOI) 
Source: Justicia Viva (Gamarra et al., 2007) with information from the Ministry of Justice of Peru.	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 twenty-four were being appealed in a higher court. On top of that, more than half of 
the sentences involved a maximum of four years in prison, the absolute minimum. 
This situation highlights the argument that we have been elaborating: With the 
decline in public interest and media attention to the cases of corruption of the 
previous decade, and the emergence of an entirely new scenario of corruption 
perception stressing the government, the coping mechanisms could not stay the same 
as during the transitional government of Valentín Paniagua. Simply, it just did not pay 
off to keep investing in demand-satisfactory measures168 anymore, especially when 
this could turn against the incumbent party just as easily. A member of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office during the first years of the Toledo administration expressed his 
view of the political scenario in the following terms (Interview No. 02): 
 
“As I see it, and this is absolutely my personal opinion, the political support 
dies out when it becomes costly for the government to fight for us. I believe 
that already by the third or fourth year in office Toledo does not have any 
more interest in this... Nobody cared anymore. It needs to be said also: the 
criminal proceedings were not giving the political capital that a politician 
wants. If they tell you that the trials will finish [somewhere around] the middle 
of the term of the next [government]...”169 
 
Harassment and Intervention against the Public Procurator’s Office 
After José Ugaz resigned to the appointment of Ad Hoc Public Procurator for 
the Fujimori-Montesinos case (February 1, 2002)170, Luis Vargas Valdivia took the 
post,171 which he held until December 21, 2004.172 During this period of almost three 
years, and notwithstanding the progress it was made in the prosecution of culprits and 
the recovery of stolen assets, the government’s position slowly but steadily switched 
from negligence to one of open harassment. The conditions for the work of the 
Procurator’s Office was already markedly different by early 2003, after some media 
sources close to the Fujimori government began a campaign of discredit against Ugaz, 
accusing him of having received irregular payments by Fujimori during the first days 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
169 Translated from Spanish. 
170 Supreme Resolution No. 013-2002-JUS. 
171 Supreme Resolution No. 016-2002-JUS. 
172 Supreme Resolution No. 266-2004-JUS. 
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of his appointment in 2000 (Pariona Ariana, 2012). Although by the time of the press 
attacks Ugaz had surrendered the office of procurator to Vargas Valdivia, this 
situation affected not only the work that had been done during the former’s 
leadership, but also affected the latter: Vargas Valdivia, after all, had worked with 
Ugaz in the same law firm before the Ad Hoc Procurator Office was created, and he 
had been part of Ugaz’s team from the very beginning. In fact, Toledo had appointed 
Vargas Valdivia following Ugaz’s recommendation. For the former procurator (Ugaz, 
2014, p. 93), the situation represented indeed an attack on the whole anti-corruption 
subsystem: 
 
“We did not imagine that, later, the irregular way in which this money was 
sent to the Procurator’s Office would be exploited by newspaper La Razón, 
spokesperson of Montesinos and his allies in Congress, to orchestrate a series 
of attacks against me, and in this way, to question the legitimacy of the anti-
corruption judges and prosecutors and ask for the resignation of the Public 
Procurator for the Fujimori-Montesinos case that came after me, Luis Vargas 
Valdivia.”173  
 
Disregarding the true source of the attacks, the situation was soon exploited 
further by members of Congress, particularly Jorge Mufarech, who went so far as to 
claim that Ugaz was “a key piece in the Fujimori-Montesinos mafia”174 (Bonilla and 
O’Brien, 2003). On April of 2003, congressmembers of the incumbent party voted in 
favor of recommending that the Public Ministry conducted an official investigation 
against Ugaz (LR, 2003/04/23). Although eventually the allegations against him 
would be contested and dropped, the whole affair created a bad precedent for the 
moral integrity of the Public Procurator’s Office. 
The attacks on the Public Procurator’s Office resumed in 2004, this time 
directly against procurator Luis Vargas Valdivia and his team, after a new scandal 
broke regarding the alleged forgery of signatures for the registration of Toledo’s party 
Perú Posible in the 2000 elections. Although Vargas Valdivia was quick to assure 
that no investigation was being carried out that included President Toledo in the 
scandal, he made clear that it was in the power of his office to investigate the affair, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Translated from Spanish. 
174 Ibid. 
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“it had allegedly taken place in 1998, during the government of the fugitive President 
Alberto Fujimori” 175  (Perú21, 2004/07/06). The clarification caused that some 
members of the incumbent party began publicly harassing the Procurator’s Office, 
expressing the animosity towards their work and even suggesting that Vargas 
Valdivia and his team were part of a network that was trying to get President Toledo 
overthrown (clearly, a combined instance of the coping mechanisms dubbed plaintiff 
discredit, smokescreen, and even manipulation of public priorities 176 ). Vargas 
Valdivia (LR, 2004/09/01) expressed on that occasion:  
 
“It is clear [that the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office does not have the 
political support of the government anymore] when the spokespersons from 
the government request that we be dismissed, and President Toledo himself 
does not say anything in relation to the fight against corruption on his State of 
the Nation address.”177  
 
Siles (2004, p. 22) summarized with great accuracy the situation that the 
procurator was confronting: “The Ad Hoc Procurator’s Office was caught in the 
middle of the storm because of its determination to investigate, with the efficiency 
and probity with which it has been carrying own its duty, all instances of corruption, 
including those that involved the present Government.” On December 20, 2004, 
Vargas Valdivia was replaced by Antonio Maldonado Paredes.178 Three days later, on 
the 23rd, Ronald Gamarra and Iván Meini, associate procurators since the time of José 
Ugaz, publicly resigned to the Public Procurator’s Office alleging differences with 
Antonio Maldonado, whom they described as being the government’s appointment to 
subjugate the fight against corruption. According to them, Maldonado had expressed 
his disconformity with the antagonism that had characterized their relationship with 
the government, and that they should not openly challenge official versions given by 
senior officials of the Toledo administration. Under those circumstances, the two 
procurators had decided to abandon their posts.  
The third and last associate procurator from Ugaz’s original team that had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Ibid. 
176 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round) and negative input defuse (1st round). 
177 Translated from Spanish. 
178 Supreme Resolution No. 267-2004-JUS. 
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continued in office was dismissed a month later, on January 25, 2005. The decision to 
do away with César Pantoja, who had pushed for the prosecution of Margarita Toledo 
(LR, 2005/01/26) (President Toledo’s sister), was automatically interpreted by the 
former members of the Procurator’s Office as “being evidence that the government is 
trying to dismember the institution” and that “it confirms that the government is 
trying to destabilize the Office”179 (Díaz, 2005).  
The situation described clearly points at the activation of risk management180 
on top of the extended presence of institutional devolution: In order to guarantee the 
control of the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office, the neglect of the resources needed 
and the open harassment by members of the incumbent party needed to be joined by 
the appointment of an actor with a more friendly, if not obsequious, disposition 
towards the government. With the appointment of Antonio Maldonado, who would 
coincidentally be dismissed only a month after President Alan García had assumed 
office, the issues between Perú Posible and the Procurator’s Office came to an end. 
 
Legal Evolution 
Taking a look at the normative evolution during the entire period of President 
Alejandro Toledo, it is possible to find that opposition parties in Congress had most of 
the political drive for anti-corruption legislative production, while the executive 
branch lagged far behind. Furthermore, of the seven important legal innovations 
produced by the government between 2001 and 2006, five of them took place within 
the first twelve months, supporting the assertion that the issue of corruption control 
declined at par with public interest in the Fujimori-Montesinos case, just as our 
theoretical model suggests: 
 
- On August 17, 2001, the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave Ministerial 
Resolution No. 1000-2001-IN/PNP, which created the Anti-Corruption 
Police Unit. This Unit became the “specialized office of the National 
Police of Peru in charge of providing the technical support required by the 
authorities of the judiciary and Public Ministry, who investigate corruption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Translated from Spanish. 
180 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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cases...”181 (Pariona Arana, 2012, p. 173). 
- On September 27, 2001, the Ministry of Justice gave Supreme Decree No. 
031-2001-JUS, which attended to the rules on extradition. It “specified the 
deadlines that are to be observed by public offices in the procedure of 
active extradition from the side of the Peruvian State, keeping in mind the 
fulfillment of international agreements.”182 
- On October 27, 2001, the Ministry of Justice gave Supreme Decree No. 
038-2001-JUS, through which Decentralized Anti-Corruption Public 
Procurator’s Offices were established. The rationale behind their creation 
was that “the management of judicial processes that are started... [in places 
other than the Capital City, Lima, is currently] dependent on the support 
provided by the lawyers of those branches, which hampers the proper 
exercise of the [procuratorial] function.”183 
- On April 10, 2002, the government signed Law No. 27697, which gave 
public prosecutors the capacity to execute surveillance operations and to 
seize private communications. Originally, the Executive branch had sent 
this legislative project to parliament on October 22, 2001.184 
- On June 21, 2002, the government signed Law No. 27770, which modified 
the Code of Penal Administration and increased the requirements for 
penitentiary benefits in cases of crimes against public administration (i.e. 
corruption). Originally, the Executive branch had sent this legislative 
project to parliament on May 10.185 
- On October 10, 2003, the government signed Law No. 28088, which 
modified Law No. 27378 and cuts back penitentiary benefits for senior 
officials (Siles et al., 2005). Originally, the Executive branch had sent this 
legislative project to parliament on January 3.186 
- On January 05, 2004, the government signed Law No. 28149, which 
allows citizen participation in the overseeing offices of the judiciary and 
the Public Ministry. Originally, the Executive branch had sent this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Translated from Spanish. 
182 Taken from the text of the norm; translated from Spanish. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Legislative project No. 1041/2001-CR. 
185 Legislative project No. 2816/2001-CR. 
186 Legislative project No. 5131/2002-CR. 
	   178	  
legislative project to parliament on August 01, 2003.187 
 
Regarding the above norms, some arguments can be made: First, most of them 
are aimed at improving the control of corruption in line with the prosecution of the 
Fujimori-Montesinos network. The creation of the Anti-Corruption Police Unit, for 
example, was expressly carried in order to reinforce and facilitate the work of the 
anti-corruption subsystem put in place by the transitional government of Valentín 
Paniagua. In fact, in article 3 of the norm, it states that the functions of the police 
officers appointed to this Unit would be determined by the anti-corruption prosecutors 
and judges. The improved rules on extradition were another instance of normativity 
being developed with specific political actors in mind; in this case, the interest was to 
fast-track the repatriation of members of the 1990s government. Similar 
considerations are behind Law No. 27770, which “restricts the granting of 
[penitentiary] benefits to the payment of civil damages beforehand” (Arbizu y Piedra 
León, 2012, p. 235), and Law No. 28088, which exclusively affects those former 
senior officials already in prison (and the Fujimori government had produced most, if 
not all, of them). 
Second, just as suggested in Chapter IV, scapegoat convictions188 of low to 
mid-level public officials represent an attractive option for senior officials to satisfy 
demands and stimulate support. As a consequence of this potential, it is easier to 
endorse the creation of Decentralized Anti-Corruption Public Procurator’s Offices 
without endangering the stability of the NACS, at least from the government’s 
perspective. The possibility of finding this kind of initiatives suggests that Toledo’s 
leadership might not have been particularly tied to the endorsement or tolerance of 
corruption at the regional level; however, there is not enough information to make 
concrete assertions in that respect. 
Third, a similar assessment can be made of Law No. 28149, as it only 
threatened the NACS in relation to the judiciary and the Public Ministry, both of them 
constitutionally autonomous organization with only coincidental and episodic 
connections to the incumbent party. Just as it happened with the case of decentralized 
procurators, it is easier to understand the rationale behind this norm: Following the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Legislative project No. 7711/2003-CR. 
188 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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argument presented in Chapter III, the government can choose anti-corruption actions 
when it provides more political capital than the sum of the resources spent and any 
loss in corrupt profits. The development of overseeing mechanisms in the work of 
autonomous bodies fit perfectly this scenario, representing an opportunity for the 
government to stimulate support without having to suffer the changes. 
Finally, the development of legislation addressing the seizure of private 
communications in order to more effectively fight corruption, brings attention to 
something that could have passed unnoticed among the evidence of political 
manipulation and instrumentalization of anti-corruption activities: There is always 
room for honest efforts to curb corruption, even if only sporadically and limited to 
certain issues and actors. The overseeing of the judiciary and Public Ministry was 
already evidence of the spaces that open up to introduce small modifications into the 
NACS, even if in general terms it remains quite stable. The same could be said of the 
Decentralized Anti-Corruption Public Procurator’s Offices, which somehow help the 
efforts of environmental actors to fight malfeasance in public live, even when these 
do not actually reach the members of the central government, where the biggest 
scandals usually occur. Law No. 27697, just as the ones just mentioned, may 
represent an instance of the personality of the leadership and the effect that this 
variable potentially has for the stability of the NACS. 
However, the tenets of the theoretical model seem to keep supporting the 
government’s interest in keeping the NACS under control. This is evident when we 
contrast the normative production of the Executive branch, with the significance of 
the norms decreed by constitutionally autonomous agencies or organizations, and 
opposition parties in Congress. The result shows the lukewarm interest of the 
Executive to introduce reforms for the control of corruption: 
 
- Law No. 27588 on prohibitions and incompatibilities of public officials 
(December 12, 2001). 
- Law No. 27693, which created the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF). 
- Resolution of the Prosecutor’s Office No. 988-2002-MP-FN, which 
elaborated on the faculties of the Provincial Prosecutor’s Offices 
Specialized in the Fujimori case (June 13, 2002). 
- Law No. 27765, which expanded for the first time the range of crimes that 
could constitute predicate offences for money laundering; previously, only 
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assets stemming from drug trafficking could give grounds to a criminal 
proceeding on money laundering (Reaño Peschiera, 2012) (June 26, 2002). 
- Resolution of the Prosecutor’s Office No. 182-2004-MP-FN, which 
extended the faculties of the prosecutor’s offices specialized in anti-
corruption so that they may be legally able to prosecute all instances of 
corruption, and not only those related to the Fujimori-Montesinos case. 
Later the same year the judiciary would produce a similar norm to join the 
position of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. These steps represent “the 
creation of a true subsystem specialized in crimes of public corruption” 
(Quispe Farfán and Delgado Tovar, 2012, p. 185), as from then on there 
would exist an institutional structure specialized in the prosecution of 
public malfeasance, a true network of anti-corruption agencies (January 
27, 2004). 
- Administrative Resolution No. 154-2004-CE-PJ from the judiciary, which 
decreed that the judges and courts of the anti-corruption subsystem be able 
to try members of the Toledo administration, in addition to the proceedings 
involving the Fujimori government that had previously been their 
exclusive competence (August 13, 2004). 
- Law No. 28355, which increases the punishment of illicit association, 
passive bribery, passive corruption of judicial workers, illicit enrichment, 
and others (Siles et al., 2005). 
- Resolution of the Prosecutor’s Office No. 774-2005-MP-FN, which 
regularized the list of crimes against public administration that anti-
corruption prosecutors are able to bring to court, in line with those defined 
by the judiciary and its anti-corruption courts through Administrative 
Resolution No. 154-2004-CE-PJ (April 08, 2005). 
- Law No. 28716, which strengthens the role of the Office of the 
Comptroller General in the internal control of public agencies (April 17, 
2006). 
 
Additionally, non-Executive organizations also produced a few landmarks in 
the area of corruption prevention: 
 
- Law No. 27806 on transparency and access to public information (August 
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02, 2002), soon modified and improved by Law No. 27927 (published on 
February 04, 2003). 
- Law No. 27815 on the Code of Ethics of the Public Service (August 12, 
2002). 
- Law No. 27865 on transparency in the origin of economic resources 
employed during regional and municipal elections (November 14, 2002). 
- Law No. 28024, which elaborates the conditions and procedures for 
lobbying (July 11, 2003). 
- Law No. 28083, which creates the Special Commission for the Integral 
Reform of the Justice Administration (CERIAJUS) (October 03, 2003). 
 
Although the above body of legislation produced by actors outside the 
executive branch, which we may consider as part of the government’s environment, 
was evidently more significant that the one produced by the government (even if not 
that much voluminous), it was still a long shot from reforming the NACS. The laws 
on lobbies, transparency and access to information, and code of ethics, for example, 
were largely ignored and did not have any important impact in the way the political 
system behaved in the following years. On the other hand, the evolution of the anti-
corruption subsystem carried on by the Public Ministry and the judiciary represented 
a very important step towards enforcement and control, but, as we have seen earlier, 
its effectiveness was seriously impaired by the lack of financial support from the 
government of President Alejandro Toledo, among issues internal to the 
administration of justice in Peru. Thus, although the legal structure had been 
somehow reformed, the NACS remained stable. 
Ronald Gamarra (2005), former associate procurator, supports the reading 
provided here regarding the government’s willingness to address corruption only 
when involving members of the previous governments; this is, what we have 
described as exclusive non-partisan investigations/prosecutions189 and norms that 
could facilitate the activation of this coping mechanism. He stated in 2005 (pp. 39-
40): 
 
“How should we describe the anti-corruption campaign started four years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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ago...? Insufficient... above all, because the official proposal [of reform] did 
not involve the creation of an anti-corruption ‘system.’ It only focused on 
repressing the activities of the past, but neglected the necessity to adopt 
preventive measures aiming at averting new acts of corruption, and our legal 
framework was not improved to deal with those public and private actors that, 
in democracy, expect to have their personal interests rule over those of the 
State.” 
 
4. Corruption Scandals 
 
The Toledo administration was confronted with multiple instances of 
corruption perception, one of the four stressful scenarios described in Chapter IV, 
throughout the five years Perú Posible stayed in power. Of the 1,825 days spanning 
between July 29, 2001, and July 27, 2006, newspaper La República reported on its 
front page the presence of corruption involving members of the incumbent party or 
public officials of the government in 410 opportunities, representing roughly 22% of 
the time.  
Due to the sheer amount and frequency of incidents, only three events are 
reviewed in this section. They represent a manageable sample amidst a plethora of 
small, medium and grand cases of corruption that have been identified for the period 
of 2001-2006, chosen in accordance not to their anecdotal nature or their potential 
impact on the political system, but for their qualitative value to assess the government 
reaction to corruption scandals. As a complete analysis of all scenarios found during 
the Toledo administration would greatly exceed the space provided here, and would 
require the production of an exclusive work altogether, the sample chosen will serve 
to demonstrate the regular presence of coping mechanisms under scenarios of 
corruption perception.  
Each scenario described here should not be understood as a case, which 
usually imply a comprehensive event with an established group of interrelated actors 
and the incidence of a specific type of corruption activity; instead, they represent the 
presence of one or more public cases of corruption, over an extended period of time, 
and which do not need to be related to each other. The cohesiveness of these events 
will be provided not by the network of actors, but by their coexistence and 
accumulating effects for the purpose of stressing the NACS. 
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The First Scandals 
The first such event that can be found during the government of President 
Toledo began on December 29, 2001, with the news of nepotism involving the 
minister of Promotion of Women and Human Development (PROMUDEH), Doris 
Sánchez Pinedo. According to a report from the Office of the Comptroller General, 
ever since Sánchez had taken office, six members of her family had been hired in 
different areas of the Ministry (Páez, 2001). The news, however, was immediately 
outdone the next day by coverage of a conflagration in a commercial area of 
downtown Lima, which reportedly had killed more than a hundred people; this 
disaster was heavily reported on until some days later, on January 03, 2002, the issue 
switched to its causes. According to First Public Prosecutor, Nelly Calderón, police 
officers in charge of security of the area had been receiving bribes in order to ignore a 
series of safety regulations regarding fireworks, which eventually had caused the fire. 
The government’s first reaction was to activate an argumentative defense, with 
minister of Internal Affairs Fernando Rospigliosi Capurro stating that “it is not 
possible to go ahead an provide opinion. It is not possible to find responsibilities and 
then carry out the investigation”190 (Véliz, 2002). He then explained that the police 
had been working overtime throughout the season, and that it was a fact of life that 
certain incidents just could not be avoided. However, prompt factual evidence of 
police negligence opened the door for opposition Congressmembers to express public 
exhortations 191  for the resignation of minister Rospigliosi; confronted with the 
pressure, Rospigliosi was quick to find in Police General Juan Mijichich a scapegoat, 
and relieved him a week later of his position as director of the General Office of 
Control of Services of Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives Safety for Civil Use 
(LR, 2002/01/12). Although the minister had complained about the comments of the 
First Public Prosecutor, describing them as premature, he had no problem in 
sacrificing Mijichich when the political pressure began to rise. With this action, the 
scandal drew to an end, and the time came for the government to address the issue of 
minister Doris Sánchez. According to sources of La República, the replacement of 
Sánchez had been decided in December, with plans to carrying it out on January 2; 
however, the conflagration in downtown Lima and the succeeding scandal had forced 
the government to wait for a more favorable opportunity (Rojas, 2002). Why? The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Translated from Spanish. 
191 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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dismissal of Doris Sánchez needed to be largely recognized for what it was: a 
political concession. In her place, President Toledo appointed an independent actor 
that was not part of the incumbent party, but rather a renown member of the anti-
corruption movement in Peru: Cecilia Blondet, former member of NGO 
Transparencia and founding member of Proética (which became later the national 
chapter of Transparency International), and who had also been part of the INA in 
2001. Thus, the appointment of Blondet in replacement of Doris Sánchez (who was 
part of Perú Posible) represented a clear sign of the government discourse regarding 
the fight against corruption, and it had required the correct opportunity for maximum 
impact. The popular response showed this decision to be right: according to a poll 
conducted in January, 45% of respondents expressed approval of Sánchez’s removal 
(APOYO, 2002a). 
During this event, there had been a peculiar situation that had benefitted the 
government, but which had been brought by a member of an opposition party: Right 
after the opposition began pressing the government for the dismissal of minister 
Rospigliosi, Congressmember José Barba Caballero of the political party National 
Unity, who had been appointed chair of the parliamentary committee of investigation 
for the conflagration case, posited that among the organizations involved in the 
corruption scheme that operated in the commercial area was the Municipality of 
Lima; in fact, he stated that bribes to this local administration was a regular, year-
round activity. On the other hand, concerning the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Barba expressed: “What I have asked to my parliamentary colleagues 
is that we do not put the responsibility beforehand on the minister of Interior, 
Fernando Rospigliosi”192 (LR, 2002/01/07). This was evidently a strange position to 
defend for a member of the opposition, and which could suggest the activation of 
misallocation of responsibility193 in benefit of the government: Indeed, the same poll 
conducted in January showed that 43% considered municipal authorities to be among 
those responsible for the tragedy, while 39% named the National Police, and only 
22% mentioned the national government (APOYO, 2002a). 
This interpretation is supported by two additional facts. First, after all the 
media attention pulled by Barba Caballero and his allegations of corruption against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Translated from Spanish. 
193 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of negative input defuse (1st 
round). 
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Lima’s mayor, Alberto Andrade Carmona, when the committee’s report was released 
there was no mention of the involvement of municipal officials in the corruption 
scheme that had ended in tragedy. It was certainly strange that, even though the 
committee’s chair had reported of the existence of a fund of US$ 100 thousand to 
bribe the authorities of the Municipality of Lima, the report did not include the names 
of any culprit belonging to this organization, but rather put the responsibility on the 
National Police, as it had been previously found by others. This situation supports the 
presence of not only misallocation of responsibility, but also of the characteristics 
associated with smokescreens. 
Second, Andrade Carmona was again publicly accused of corruption less than 
a month later, with almost identical consequences. On the first days of February, the 
APRA party brought attention to the lack of transparency with which the minister of 
Economy, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, had issued public bonds for US$ 1.5 billion. What 
followed was the intervention of the OCG announcing the beginning of formal 
investigations on the matter, and a congressional inquiry (Hidalgo, 2002). One day 
after Kuczynski’s presentation in Congress, however, Congressmembers Rafael Rey 
Rey and José Barba Caballero (of the National Unity party) gave a press conference 
to present alleged proves of a dummy company started by the mayor of Lima with the 
help of a front man; furthermore, the information indicated that the dummy company 
had been formed together with the sons of former Army General Víctor Malca, 
fugitive member of the Fujimori-Montesinos mafia (Caretas, 2002/02/21). The 
scandal switched public attention away from the government and towards the 
Municipality of Lima. However, one week later, the front man declared “not having 
presented any accusations of corruption against [Lima’s] mayor”194 (LR, 2002/02/20), 
but only informed the First Prosecutor’s Office of his participation in the dummy 
company. Whatever the actual truth behind the allegations were, it effectively buried 
the event concerning Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, and no legal charges were ever 
presented against Andrade Carmona regarding bribery or money laundering, or any 
other corruption activity. As far as Toledo’s government was concerned, the actions 
carried out by Barba Caballero proved as helpful and efficient as any other 
smokescreen. 
Overall, the stressful process recounted above shows to have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Translated from Spanish. 
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appropriately and timely handled by the government, and while between December 
29 and January 19 the presence of governmental corruption news on front pages 
surpassed the average of 22% to reach 54%, Toledo’s approval saw its first recovery 
since he had taken office, increasing 2% (APOYO, 2002a). 
  
The President’s Daughter 
The National Programme of Food Aid (PRONAA) had been under public and 
media scrutiny ever since the mother of Jorge Toledo (President Toledo’s nephew) 
was discovered in its payroll, in December of 2001. A month later, amidst the 
allegations of nepotism against Doris Sánchez, the government decided to dismiss the 
head of the PRONAA, Mauricio Diez Canseco Beggiato, and to rescind the contract 
of Jorge Toledo’s mother (LR, 2002/01/09). For Diez Canseco, this had meant his 
utilization as a scapegoat, as four months later he publicly declared that the cases of 
nepotism in the PRONAA had been of sole responsibility of minister Sánchez: “She 
paid political favors with job positions. She also hired family and friends. She wanted 
to use the PRONAA as if it was her own farm”195 (Palomino, 2002).  
The problems with this agency began anew in October of 2002, when 
Congressmen Wilmer Rengifo Ruiz, of the incumbent party Perú Posible, denounced 
the use of public funds in an event organized by the PRONAA in celebration of 
Father’s Day, which had included the presence of exotic dancers (Díaz, 2002a). 
Although four months had already passed, and the charges were not all that clear 
(particularly for the small amount of money involved, which added up to little more 
than US$ 3,000), President Toledo decided to immediately dismiss the head of the 
PRONAA, Modesto Julca Jara. Presumably in retaliation, Julca Jara declared in turn 
that Rengifo’s allegations were brought by a desire of revenge because the PRONAA 
had decided to stop purchasing goods (rice, specifically) from a congressmember’s 
business (Velarde, 2005). The media scandal kept taking front pages as the mutual 
accusations increased, with Rengifo insisting that Congressmembers of Perú Posible 
had been aware of irregularities in the PRONAA since 2001; but the core of the event 
would only take place a couple of days later, and nothing to do with this public 
agency. 
The news of the existence of President Toledo’s illegitimate child, Zaraí 	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Toledo Orozco, had first appeared during the electoral campaign of 2000, when 
Toledo was still a candidate; then, they had briefly resurfaced during the campaign for 
the 2001 elections (Mucha, 2001). The existent of the child was not problematic by 
itself, except for the fact that Alejandro Toledo had consistently refused for over a 
decade to legally recognize the child’s paternity, which was evidently seen as a lack 
of moral principles and a way of evading his legal responsibilities. The situation 
suddenly deteriorated into an open scandal of corruption when, on October 8, amidst 
the PRONAA affair, news of alleged benefits bestowed on the president of the Civil 
Courtroom of the Supreme Court, José Silva Vallejo, pointed to a case of abuse of 
power and influence peddling. 
Silva Vallejo, under whose presidency the Civil Courtroom had sentenced on 
April against the Zaraí case and decided that President Toledo had no obligation of 
taking a paternity test, coincidentally had filed a request to the General 
Administration of the Judiciary only a month later requesting the full payment of 
overdue income for the period he had been absent from the judiciary, amounting to 
US$ 100 thousand. This amount included not only the nominal salary he had been 
unable to receive during the illegal control of the institution by the Fujimori 
administration, but also such payments as gas allowances and productivity bonuses, 
which had been expressively excluded from payment by the Constitutional Tribunal 
(Caretas, 2002/10/17). With surprising celerity, his request was approved only weeks 
later, even though many similar cases were still pending since the previous year 
(Páez, 2002). 
The news produced a wave of popular criticism196 against President Toledo 
for his presume intervention in securing the irregular benefits for judge Silva Vallejo 
(LR, 2002/10/09). Meanwhile, the PRONAA case continued unfolding, with 
Congressmember Rengifo (Díaz, 2002b) and vice-president of Congress Jesús 
Alvarado Hidalgo (Zajec, 2002) publicly accepting to have recommended partisans of 
the incumbent party for different positions in the Food Aid agency; and three 
managers of the PRONAA confirming to have been pressed by Rengifo to contract 
with his company (Núñez, 2002b).  
In the middle of October, President Toledo’s situation concerning the Zaraí 
case took a turn for the worse, as medias sources reported of a private meeting held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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between Toledo and judge Silva Vallejo at the Government Palace in the beginning of 
September to discuss another file of the case that was still pending decision from 
Silva’s Civil Courtroom. The news generated a new wave of public exhortations,197 as 
the National Council of the Judiciary (CNM) opened a formal investigation against 
Silva Vallejo, the parliamentary Justice Commission requested his resignation, and 
even the Association of Lawyers of Lima demanded he be immediately relieved from 
his position (LR, 2002/10/15). The news was echoed by international media, which 
reported the declarations of members of the incumbent party as the government was 
trying to activate the immediate misallocation of responsibility and focus the blame 
on judge Silva. Thus, the Press Secretariat of the Government Palace issued an 
official statement declaring that the meeting had taken place by request of judge Silva 
Vallejo and not of President Toledo, and that the latter had thanked him for his 
concerns but that he would just wait for the legal proceedings to conclude with 
normality (LR, 2002/10/16b); and Enith Chuquival, spokesperson of Perú Posible, 
stated that “the judge must resign immediately for having incurred in an irregular act 
by visiting the house of one of the [litigating] parties”198 (Del Valle, 2002). The 
measure, however, did not prove effective, as 77% of people still believed that the 
meeting had had the purpose of negotiating a successful result for President Toledo, 
and that it had been over the president’s initiative that it had been held, not that of 
judge Silva. As a consequence, popular criticism improved, and Toledo’s approval 
descended from 17% to 14% (APOYO, 2002c). 
Second majority in Congress, the APRA party, was already suggesting to 
resort to a legislative initiative,199 with its leader, Alan García Pérez, stating (Caretas, 
2002/10/17): 
 
“The Zaraí case belongs to doctor Toledo and to his relation with the country 
and the public opinion. But when interference from the political power 
emerges, when it is revealed that a judge visits the president’s house, there is a 
legal problem that may provide grounds for a [constitutional] accusation.”200 
 
Another leader of the APRA, Congressmember Jorge Del Castillo Galvez, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
198 Translated from Spanish. 
199 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
200 Translated from Spanish. 
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went further and stated that “if it is proven that this judge was pressed by Toledo, or 
that he received certain benefits, then we would have to evaluate the possibility of 
requesting the [presidential] dismissal”201 (Caretas, 2002/10/17).  
The same day of Del Castillo’s declarations, October 16, the prime minister 
provided advanced opinion pointing to Toledo’s change of approach regarding the 
whole Zaraí affair. Clearly, the activation of simple coping mechanisms such as the 
misallocation of responsibility had not proven effective enough to control the level of 
pressure that was stressing the political system. The same day, the minister of 
PROMUDEH announced a thorough reorganization of the PRONAA, with newspaper 
La República explicitly pointing that the decision was “trying to bring to an end the 
scandal in which this institution has been involved”202 (LR, 2002/10/16a) This 
decision represented the movement from the first round of a ‘corruption perception’ 
scenario, which involves enforcement, into the second round focusing on reform 
through the activation of public expressions of reform support/proposal.203 
However, the main coping mechanism that finally brought to an end the 
stressful event surrounding the Zaraí case (which was still being pressed by heavy 
media coverage204) was President Toledo’s decision to finally recognize the paternity 
of his daughter, drop the necessity of a DNA test by own initiative, and financially 
compensate her with US$ 100 thousand (LR, 2002/10/19b). Two days after the 
comments made by members of the APRA regarding constitutional measures against 
the president, newspapers across the country covered their front pages with the news 
of Zaraí Toledo finally being legally recognized. This move corresponds to what we 
have described earlier as an alternative populist gratification:205 seeking to provide 
subjective satisfaction that are not linked to material resources, Toledo’s decision was 
followed for a whole week as mother and child arrived to Lima (LR, 2002/10/18), the 
details of their reconciliation with Alejandro Toledo were thoroughly reported (LR, 
2002/10/19a), bishop Luis Bambarén being quoted regarding his participation in the 
happy conclusion of the family affair (LR, 2002/10/20), Zaraí’s new birth certificate 
was issued (LR, 2002/10/23), and First Lady Eliane Karp publicly expressed her full 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Translated from Spanish. 
202 Ibid. 
203 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (2nd 
round). 
204 As described under domestic pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
205 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
	   190	  
support and satisfaction with the decision (LR, 2002/10/24).  
 President Toledo’s recognition of Zaraí as his lawful daughter worked exactly 
as the theoretical model suggested coping mechanisms do: Immediately after the 
event, one of the most important opinion polling companies in Peru, APOYO (2002c), 
reported that the popular approval of Toledo had increased from 14% to 20%, and that 
disapproval levels had dropped from 78% to 69%. According to Apoyo’s director, 
Alfredo Torres, Toledo’s decision “rescued [the government] from a crisis that could 
have been worse”206 (Emol, 2002/10/21). Indeed, up to 24% of citizens surveyed 
believed that the president had recognized Zaraí to boost his low popularity, and “it 
[was] probable that if he had not recognized her, the scandal of his meeting with 
judge Silva Vallejo would have finished to destroy his popularity, and it would have 
even put the stability of the regime at risk”207 (APOYO, 2002c, p. 1).  Thus, although 
the period of October 4~24 saw an increase in the rate of governmental corruption 
news to 52% (from an average of 22% for the 2001-2006 term), the executive branch 
managed to come on top and to change the tendency of support in its favor through 
the activation of effective coping mechanisms. 
 
 The Almeyda Factor 
 On April 10, 2003, Pedro Arbulú Seminario, former president of an important 
TV network and partner of fugitive Ernesto Schütz Landázuri (principal shareholder 
of the network and who during the presidential elections of 2000 had surreptitiously 
sold the editorial line to the Fujimori campaign) declared to a parliamentary 
Commission to have had as much as eight meetings with President Toledo in the past 
five months. In these, according to Arbulú, Toledo had expressed his desire to 
somehow acquire Panamericana Televisión, Schütz network, and to have its editorial 
line become ‘friendlier’ to the government. Additionally, Toledo allegedly had 
offered to help the Schütz administration with its legal problems; to this effect, César 
Almeyda Tasayco, head of the National Council of Intelligence (CNI) and person very 
close to the president, had told Arbulú that he would make sure that the legal 
proceedings were under control (Díaz, 2003a).  
 Notwithstanding the veracity of Arbulú’s allegations, the scandal required the 
prompt response of the government. Immediately, the Press Secretariat of the 	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Government Palace issued an statement to discredit the plaintiff:208 The true intention 
of this psychosocial maneuver was to impede the extradition of the fugitive Schütz 
Landázuri, the statement had posited, adding that Arbulú’s allegations were 
“tarnishing the honor and prestige of the executive branch and that of senior officials 
of the government”209 (LR, 2003/04/11). The note, however, was not enough to 
appease the misgivings generated by Arbulú’s story, and the opposition quickly 
moved to publicly exhort the government to address the issue by providing clear 
explanations, surrendering to an investigation (Velarde, 2003), or even removing 
Almeyda and others from office (LR, 2003/04/12). These exhortations included 
important actors such as Alan García (LR, 2003/04/13) and Valentín Paniagua (LR, 
2003/04/14), both of them former presidents and leaders of important parties. 
 Confronted with the circumstances, President Toledo decided to remain silent 
(Caretas, 2003/04/16); in his place, the government offered Rodolfo Pereira Terrones, 
head of the Press Secretariat, who publicly declared having resigned to his post, 
putting all blame on himself: “I feel that I have complicated the president’s 
surroundings. [This is why] I have presented my resignation to the president of the 
Republic so that he takes the appropriate decision”210 (Díaz, 2003b). To his sacrifice 
followed Toledo’s statement on April 16, which employed a natural combination of 
plaintiff discredit, and manipulation of public priorities.211 In it, Toledo denies having 
had any interest in buying the editorial line of Panamericana Televisión or any other 
network, and suggested that behind Arbulú’s declarations hid the Fujimori-
Montesinos mafia; the latter artifact, as it has been discussed before, was not new to 
Toledo and his party, Perú Posible, as it had been utilized during the electoral 
campaign of 2001. Toledo declared (LR, 2003/04/17): 
 
“This is an outrageous farce that the mafia has created, just as in Montesinos’ 
time... It is clear, then, that behind those maneuvers there is an interest in 
destabilizing [the government]... If they pretend to distract us with those 
outrageous farces, they will not succeed. They will not stop us. They will not 
stop us in our fight against the mafia. Corruption will not remain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output perception 
attenuation (1st round). 
209 Translated from Spanish. 
210 Ibid. 
211 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of negative input defuse (1st 
round). 
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unpunished.”212 
 
Toledo’s declarations represented an effort to reduce social and political 
demands without having to turn to more expensive coping mechanisms, such as 
another demand-satisfactory measure like the one used with the ‘resignation’ of 
Pereira Terrones. César Almeyda, who had also been implicated in the scandal, or 
Guillermo Gonzales Arica, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic, 
would be an even more expensive scapegoat to sacrifice for the stability of the 
leadership and the NACS. Indeed, Mirko Lauer, political analyst and columnist of La 
República, had written in an article published the same day of Toledo’s press 
conference that, after the departure of Pereira, Almeyda and Gonzáles Arica were 
probably being weighed to see which one would survive this event of ‘corruption 
perception’ (Lauer, 2003). 
The timely intervention of President Toledo in the media scene had helped the 
government to reduce demands, but the news of partisan control of job positions 
inside the CNI, Almeyda’s agency, once again pressured the political system, and the 
activation of another demand-satisfactory measure became inevitable. The Andean 
Plan, as it was dubbed, allegedly had been recently initiated under the direction of 
César Almeyda, and consisted in getting rid of current personnel serving in the 
Intelligence agency and replacing it with members of the incumbent party. The 
reports also indicated the presence of activities of espionage, such as the illegal 
seizure of private communications (LR, 2003/04/21). Thus, on April 25, amidst the 
scandals involving accusations from members of Perú Posible against former 
procurator José Ugaz (which has already been discussed in a previous section), 
President Toledo finally accepted Almeyda’s ‘resignation.’ According to the press 
note (Zajec, 2003): 
 
“[Almeyda] presented his resignation three weeks ago, after the scandal of the 
alleged pressure over Panamericana Televisión, in which once again he got 
involved by former director of that media outlet Pedro Arbulú. 
Back then his resignation was rejected by the president, who considered that 
the crisis could be solved. Although the polemic lost importance, the situation 	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of César Almeyda continued deteriorating, this time due to criticism from the 
opposition caused by revelations of wiretapping and partisan occupation of the 
CNI’s payroll.”213  
 
The above description of Almeyda’s resignation supports the tenets regarding 
the usage of scapegoats as demand-satisfactory measures. Although the tension over 
Perú Posible’s treatment of Ugaz would continue for a few more days, morphing into 
an issue of purely political conflict, the stressful event came effectively to an end with 
Almeyda’s departure. In its wake, the increase of corruption news hitting front covers 
to 56% of the period between April 11 and 26, paired with Toledo’s late and hesitant 
involvement, did little to stop the free fall in presidential approval, which fell from 
21% in March to 15% in April (Caretas, 2003/06/19). 
Almost a year later, in January of 2004, the former chair of the CNI would be 
again involved in a corruption scandal, this time regarding influence peddling for the 
sake of former Army General Oscar Villanueva, henchman of Vladimiro Montesinos. 
This event would quickly evolve into a great political crisis for the government, 
dragging down former minister of Justice and leader of the FIM party, Fernando 
Olivera Vega, who had been a political ally of Perú Posible since the beginning of the 
Toledo administration. Under these circumstances, Almeyda would finally be arrested 
and incarcerated. 
 
5. International Pressure Activities 
 
When Alejandro Toledo took office, in July of 2001, the international 
environment he found was completely different to that of the 1990s. Although Peru 
had been one of the first countries to ratify his commitment to the IACAC, the first 
anti-corruption convention of its kind, very little had been done in terms of the 
regional process of monitoring and the domestic implementation of its principles. The 
issue, however, was quickly changing by the time Toledo assumed office, as the OAS 
had approved and adopted the MESICIC in the first semester of 2001 (MESICIC, 
2006). Together with the regional process, the debacle of the Fujimori government in 
2000 had attracted a lot of international attention, and technical cooperation was ready 	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to be deployed. In this sense, international cooperation can be said to represent most 
of the important activities engaged in by foreign actors to push for the reform of the 
NACS during the period of 2001-2006. How these activities were carried out, and 
how they impacted the stability of the NACS, will be addressed in this section. 
From early 2002, the CNA had looked for the international scene as a source 
of information. On its second meeting of commissioners, on January 22, Belaunde 
informed that he had received orders from the prime minister and the minister of 
defense to take advantage of an invitation made by the American Congress, and to 
obtain current legislation on lobbies and transparency with the intention of using it as 
inspiration for two legislative projects on the subjects. Such interest evidences the 
potential influence of the general dissemination of anti-corruption information.214 
Indeed, on the 17th meeting of the CNA, on November 28, 2002, Belaunde Moreyra 
reported that the commission’s work (which had included the hiring of an expert in 
American legislation) had served as the basis for the project that was being debated in 
the PCM (CNA, 2002b). 
The most important impact on the work of the CNA, however, should have 
been the technical assistance 215  provided by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), which supported Peruvian anti-corruption bodies from early 
2002 until the end of the decade.  
Falling under the category of ‘funds administration agreement,’ the Ministry 
of Justice and the UNDP had signed the Agreement PER/02/003 ‘Anti-Corruption 
Procurator’s Offices,’ putting the international agency in charge of administering the 
funds transferred from the FEDADOI in support of the procuratorial work, with 
particular emphasis on its decentralized offices. The explicit purpose of the 
Agreement was to receive “technical and professional assistance in the execution of 
any required activities”216 from the UNDP.  
With this antecedent, the CNA commissioners suggested the possibility of 
entering in a similar agreement. The idea was first brought forth during their sixth 
meeting, held on February 28 (the same day as the decree approving PER/02/003 was 
being signed); in it, the commissioners had discussed the issue of their pending 
allowances, which still had not been approved by the PCM. Belaunde Moreyra, 	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talking of the bureaucratic problems that were obstructing the allocation of funds to 
pay the commissioners, informed them that, by law, the allowances they had 
internally agreed on in a previous meeting could not be possibly paid. The upper limit 
for that kind of expenditures, he explained, was merely S/. 545 (roughly US$ 180) per 
session. Under the circumstances, commissioners Benavente and Morelli came up 
with the idea of turning to international cooperation funds in order to obtain the 
desired allowances. The proceedings read (CNA, 2002a): 
 
“Commissioners Mr. Guillermo Benavente Ercilla and Carlos Morelli Zavala 
spoke on the subject, to request Dr. Martín Belaunde to search for the most 
suitable way to increase the amount already assigned for Allowances, and 
suggested that it might be done through the UNDP. 
In response, Dr. Belaunde pointed out that, in case the arrangement with the 
UNDP were successful, the commissioners would have to resigned to the 
allowances provided by the Commission...”217 
 
Thus, the basis for contacting the UNDP and requesting technical assistance 
were the private interests of the members of the CNA. Two additional statements 
corroborate this: First, during the seventh meeting, held on March 22, Belaunde 
Moreyra reported that a document had been sent to Kim Bolduc, representative of 
UNDP in Peru, regarding the interest of the CNA in signing an agreement of technical 
and financial cooperation with the international agency. He added that, if successful, 
the agreement could grant them a fund of US$ 50 thousand “for projects.”218 Second, 
according to one of the members of the CNA who was present throughout the process, 
the commissioners “had expectations of being paid. Deep down what [they] wanted 
was to receive the same amount that [the members of] the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission received, which was US$ 4 thousand”219 (Interview No. 19). 
Disregarding the initial motivations, the agreement was signed between the 
prime minister, Roberto Dañino Zapata, and the representative of the UNDP, Kim 
Bolduc, on May 14. It established that the UNDP would manage the funds transferred 
from PCM and other sources of cooperation, starting with an allocation of S/. 666 	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thousand (roughly US$ 220 thousand), for the “technical and professional assistance 
for the programming, execution and monitoring of the components of the ‘Prevention 
and Fight against Corruption Programme’”220 (PCM, 2002a, p. 2). The Agreement 
and its Programme were later designated as PER/02/021221 (eventually renamed 
PER/02/022), establishing as objectives the (1) reduction of corruption, (2) the 
promotion of transparency and public accountability, (3) the addressing of social, 
political and cultural enablers of corruption, and (4) the promotion of citizen 
participation, through a number of specific activities and targets (PCM, 2002b). 
Finally, in order to begin implementing the programme activities, the UNDP and the 
CNA created the Project PER/02/027, which had five immediate objectives: (1) 
Promotion of international cooperation; (2) incorporation in government policies of a 
National Plan regarding anti-corruption ethics and awareness; (3) promotion and 
strengthening of interinstitutional mechanisms of prevention, control and punishment; 
(4) development of public ethics, transparency and accountability through 
professionalization of the civil service and results-based management; and (5) support 
to social anti-corruption actors and networks (PCM, 2002c). 
The above description of the promised UNDP support and the activities 
identified point to a heavy presence of technical assistance222 aimed at stressing the 
stability of the NACS. However, severe flaws in the implementation and execution of 
the agreement can immediately be detected, suggesting that the intervention of the 
UNDP did not represent any real source of stress to the political system. 
In the official documents of Project PER/02/027 we find that, for the position 
of National Director, the UNDP hired Juan Paz Espinoza, who at the time was the 
CNA’s secretary. As it has been mentioned already, Paz Espinoza was not only a 
political operator, but he would be placed in charge of the Commission after Belaunde 
Moreyra is sent to Buenos Aires, thus creating a strange and irregular dynamic 
between the roles of monitoring (which had been entrusted to the UNDP) and 
execution (which was the CNA’s responsibility). Paz Espinoza would stay as National 
Director of the Programme PER/02/22 until his departure from the CNA, for a total 
length of two years and seven months (PCM, 2006).  
The unfortunate appointment of Paz Espinoza was partially responsible for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Ibid. 
221 Supreme Resolution No. 236-2002-PCM, signed on June 10, 2002. 
222 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
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UNDP supported programme failing to reach most of its objectives, leaving the CNA 
in a paltry state. According to the Management Audit of the CNA, most of the 
activities carried out focused on Objective 2, incorporation in government policies of 
a National Plan regarding anti-corruption ethics and awareness, with the execution 
of twenty regional seminars; the other fours objectives received null or negligible 
attention, with no relevant achievements. The report reads (PCM, 2006, pp. 33-34): 
 
“[T]he Auditing Commission has established that the National Anti-
Corruption Commission did not reach the expected goals during the period 
under study; this is, of the five objectives planned, some activities were carried 
out pursuing them, but these were insufficient... because the percentages of 
progress fluctuate between only 10% and 18%, which allows us to conclude 
that the total progress was about 18.5%...”223 
 
Regarding the reasons behind the failure of the CNA-PNUD agreement, the 
reports states that budgetary deficits was an important source of constraint (PCM, 
2006, p. 40), reflecting the government’s activation of the coping mechanism dubbed 
inadequate anti-corruption bodies:224 
 
“[I]n relation to the resources allocated to the CNA during the period 2002-
2004, for the execution of the Agreement signed with the UNDP... it is 
possible to see that these were fewer that expected, to the point where the 
transfers made to this agency only reached 33% of the amount agreed upon; 
this is, S/. 2,681,264 out of S/. 7.9 million.” 
 
However, the report turns to the figure of the technical secretary, Paz 
Espinoza, as partly responsible for the insufficient funding (PCM, 2006, p. 40): 
 
“No documents have been found addressed to the PCM, notifying them that 
the resources that were being allocated were not in line with the budget 
planned in the Programme, so that the PCM could take notice and adopt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Translated from Spanish. 
224 As described under the scenario of corruption intolerance, coping point of stress amelioration. 
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corrective measures as required... ”225 
 
Furthermore, the Audit Report found that the low success of the Programme 
PER/02/022 in reaching its planned goals was due to the lack of monitoring activities 
that were supposed to be carried out, which were responsibility of the Project Director 
and the Secretary General of the PCM; in other words, behind the failure of the 
UNDP technical assistance is possible to identify the appointment of Juan Paz 
Espinoza, and the negligence of Jaime Reyes Miranda (future president of the CNA 
after its transfer to the Ministry of Justice). Perhaps being aware of this, Paz Espinoza 
left the CNA amidst an irregular transfer of duties, without presenting any report to 
his successor of the activities carried out and the goals reached. 
It is difficult to suggest the reasons behind the appointment of Paz Espinoza, 
and even harder to explain his permanence in the position even after the CNA was 
surely perceived to be failing in its objectives. It is possible that the government had 
suggested and facilitated his employment, thus continuing the strategy of inadequate 
anti-corruption bodies. However, there is not enough information to clearly come 
with an answer. What is certain, however, is that the tolerance of the UNDP towards 
the management of the project made it impossible for it to challenge in any serious 
way the stability of the NACS, leaving this effort as a rather sterile one. If such an 
important international actor as the UNDP could have nothing but a negligible impact 
on the NACS, there is very little to suggest that other sources could be more 
successful unless they took a different approach. 
One such international action was the Agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Peru and the Government of the United States regarding the transfer 
of confiscated assets, signed on June 12, 2004, and which was commented earlier. 
This agreement, working as a form of aid conditionalities,226 actually forced the 
government to take actions for the financial support of anti-corruption activities, even 
though the activities funded may have ended corresponding to expenditures not 
related to fighting corruption. The misallocation of the FEDADOI funds, as we have 
discussed earlier, clearly hindered the efficient employment of anti-corruption 
financial resources in benefit of more superfluous and politically oriented objectives. 
However, at least until the point of allocation, the agreement required by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Translated from Spanish. 
226 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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American government had the potential to affect the NACS, and indeed was reflected 
in Supreme Decree No. 039-2005-PCM of May 24, 2005, disposing that the CNA and 
the Ministry of Justice identify the anti-corruption projects to be funded; and later in 
Ministerial Resolution No. 402-2005-JUS, which approved the projects, and caused 
the FEDADOI to transfer over US$ 12 million to the Ministry of Justice, Public 
Ministry, judiciary, INPE, UIF, and Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Notwithstanding the merit of the anti-corruption projects, it is important to 
also consider the timing of the funds being allocated: the transfer was finally made 
during the last semester of the Toledo administration, meaning that the projects could 
not possibly be implemented and enforced before the change of government. Such 
scenario could explain why the Agreement’s conditions were formally followed, and 
that no evident coping mechanism could be detected. Considering that the pressure 
activity could not actually affect the current government, it is perfectly feasible that it 
was seen more as an opportunity to stimulate support than as a source of pressure, just 
as it had been the norm during the transitional government of President Paniagua. 
Turning our attention to other international approaches, particularly 
international conventions and policy agreements,227 most (if not all) of them were still 
taking flight in regards to their potential to stress the NACS. 
Although the first round of the MESICIC had come to an end and a series of 
recommendations had been drawn to the Peruvian government, the next round of 
review would finish after a new government had taken office; for this reason, it did 
not need represent much of a challenge to the Perú Posible government. In a similar 
situation were APEC’s Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring 
Transparency, and its ACT; and the UNCAC. Both of these international instruments 
had only made their first appearance in the international anti-corruption movement, 
and it was too early to have them enforced. The Andean Plan to Fight Corruption was 
just being suggested by 2005, and would not take shape until well into the APRA 
government. Thus, these forms of international pressure are best analyzed in the next 
chapter, when we discuss the government of President Alan García Pérez. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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Chapter VII 
Alan García (2006-2011):  
Countermeasures and Coping Mechanisms 
 
After a campaign built around an agenda that contrasted deeply with the 
economic approach taken during his government of 1985-1990, and in opposition to 
the leftist and nationalist stance of candidate Ollanta Humala Tasso of the Peruvian 
Nationalist Party (PNP) (which was running in alliance with the Union for Peru—
UPP party), Alan García Pérez of the APRA party became president of Peru for a 
second time in 2006.  
By the time he assumed office, on July 28, the NACS had already been 
stabilized by the government of former president Alejandro Toledo (as reviewed in 
the previous chapter), with the CNA effectively reduced to a marginal office in the 
State apparatus, and the anti-corruption subsystem making more progress in its 
normative aspects than in real terms. The Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office for the 
Fujimori-Montesinos case had given signs of having fallen under complete political 
control, and the FEDADOI funds were all but exhausted, with Gamarra et al. (2007) 
informing that, of US$ 183.2 million there were only US$ 0.4 million left as of 
December 2006. Thus, the anti-corruption reform started by Valentín Paniagua had 
come to an abrupt end during the Toledo administration, and the scenario of domestic 
corruption intolerance could be said to have largely disappeared, at least in regards to 
the unorganized civil society.  
García also received a healthy economy, unlike his predecessor. Peru was in 
the middle of an impressive economic recovery, experiencing a constant growth in its 
annual gross domestic product (GDP), which reached 6.3% in 2005 and 7.5 in 2006. 
On the other hand, the scenario of corruption perception had become 
widespread during the previous government. According to Transparency 
International’s CPI, even though the overall level of corruption in the country had 
clearly diminished after the collapse of the Fujimori government and the steps taken 
to prosecute its corruption network, the popular perception of corruption had actually 
increased steadily year after year. It is possible to appreciate to severity of the change 
in Figure 10.  
Evidently, the falling ranking of Peru in the CPI corresponds to a series of 
environmental and systemic factors that changed during the transitional government 
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(2000-2001), and not the actual level of corruption in the country. However, what 
interests us is that, by the time García assumed office, there was a widespread 
perception of corruption affecting the country that went beyond any single case of 
corruption. A national poll conducted by Proética in 2006 partially showed a similar 
trend: Although corruption remained in the fourth place of spontaneous answers 
regarding the most important problem affecting the country, the report stated that “in 
general, comparing to previous editions [of this poll] (2002, 2003, 2004), there is a 
slightly lower mention of unemployment and poverty, while concerns about crime 
and corruption have notoriously increased” (Proética, 2007). Indeed, although the 
popular importance of corruption had initially decreased from 29% in 2002 to 25% in 
2003 (Proética, 2004), it had steadily risen since then. Additionally, the national poll 
found that corruption was considered to be the biggest obstacle for the public 
apparatus to achieve the country’s development (50%), almost doubling ‘lack of 
efficiency’ (26%) and five times higher than ‘lack of economic resources’ (10%) 
(Proética, 2007). 
 In addition to popular discontent, the García administration would also inherit 
a body of instruments and activities involving the international anti-corruption 
movement, representing a new scenario of corruption intolerance switching from the 
domestic to the supranational level. 
The analysis of all these elements will allow us to understand how the stability 
of the NACS was protected, and even reinforced, during the period of 2006-2011. 
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1. The National Anti-Corruption Office  
 
One of the first measures taken by the government of President García was to 
dismiss the CNA’s technical secretary (and partisan of Perú Posible) Martínez 
Llanos, and replace him with Juan Carlos Román Torero,228 who had only a month 
earlier been appointed president of the National Council of Notary of the Ministry of 
Justice. Regardless of Román’s personal qualities, during the period of 2006-2007 the 
CNA continued its steady decline, being little more than a shell, and office that could 
not work but that could not be entirely deactivated either. A staff member of the CNA 
that entered during the García administration remembers the state in which the office 
operated (Interview No. 24): 
 
“[During 2007, the CNA] had somehow little prominence. It had been largely 
neglected, so much that the council229 itself did not really function as such; 
who managed it and did the job was the Technical Secretary. From what I can 
remember, [the members of the council] met very few times (not to say almost 
never)... I did not see the council itself to have any real function, and my 
impression became objectively materialized when, a few months later, it 
disappears. That shows that it was indeed in real decay, with little support not 
only at the political level but also at the economic level. We were only six 
people working; there was no structure...”230 
 
 Regarding the specific activities engaged by the CNA, a senior official of the 
Ministry of Justice describes them, and technical secretary Román Torero, as focused 
solely on the promotion of corruption awareness without giving proper and equal 
consideration to other aspects under its mandate, such as the production of preventive 
policies and others stipulated by decree (Interview No. 10): 
 
“When I was appointed... the first thing that I noticed was that [some] people 
were participating in the [council] but were clueless of what they were 
supposed to do there. There was a technical secretary, Torero, who had as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Ministerial Resolution No. 448-2006-JUS, published on September 9, 2006. 
229 As mentioned earlier, after being transferred to the Ministry of Justice, the CNA’s name changed 
from that of Commission to Council. 
230 Translated from Spanish. 
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work plan the production of merchandising [and] stationery, and the 
promotion of anti-corruption mottos through labels [and] publicity. And in that 
way he believed that public servants would be changed and made better actors 
in the fight against corruption. In reality, he knew very little of public 
administration because he had come from the private sphere... So, public 
administration, and specifically the subjects of ethics, transparency, and the 
fight against corruption were completely foreign to him. So he thought that the 
fight against corruption was to produce brochures, do some publicity, produce 
some almanacs, some caps, etc.  
But there were also representatives from other sectors, and each one of them 
had a different perspective of what they were supposed to do. Thus, the [CNA] 
had no direction; this is, there was no management tool to provide them with 
direction. So, to sum it up, the anti-corruption policy under the CNA’s 
responsibility relied on the good mood, the interest, the will of the president of 
the [council].”231 
 
 By decree, the CNA’s presidency fell under the vice-minister of Justice, and 
so nothing could be done unless the government had real political will to do 
something for the sake of that preventive office.  
 On October 19, 2007, the official newspaper El Peruano published Supreme 
Decree No. 085-2007-PCM, by which the CNA was officially closed and replaced by 
the National Anti-Corruption Office (ONA) under the jurisdiction of the PCM, 
ordering the transference of all its resources and stipulating that, from then on, any 
normative reference to the CNA would be applicable to the ONA instead. The ONA, 
as we will see, was an entirely different office from the one created by President 
Toledo in 2001, born under different circumstances and with a different set of powers. 
 
 Circumstances Behind the Creation of the ONA 
The creation of the ONA can be explained by the presence of a scenario of 
corruption perception, and not to corruption intolerance as had been the case of the 
CNA. The same senior official of the Ministry of Justice commented: “Many events 
took place in the year 2007... that forced President García to make some decisions to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Translated from Spanish. 
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show that something was really being made in the fight against corruption”232 
(Interview No. 10). Indeed, the ONA represented an inadequate anti-corruption 
agency,233 publicly loud, powerful and effective to mitigate public demands and 
stimulate support amidst a dangerous period of corruption perception.  
The event that gave birth to the ONA began in early August of 2007, when an 
investigation carried out by several media organizations raised serious doubts about 
the procurement process of patrol cars in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The issue of 
patrol cars for the National Police had been followed particularly close since the 
previous minister, Pilar Mazzetti Soler, was removed from office for a similar case 
only six months earlier. With the new administration of minister Luis Alva Castro, a 
new process had been carried for the purchase of the 698 vehicles of Chinese 
manufacture, which was pointed out for not fulfilling the technical requirements, 
being overprized, and including only one bidder. Together with the Chinese goods, 
Alva Castro was also challenged for the procurement of different types of ammunition 
amounting US$ 3.2 million from a questionable provider (LR, 2007/08/14). 
Immediately, Congressmembers of the opposition demanded explanations from the 
minister, and expressed their intentions to formally interpellate him.  
On August 14, the day Alva Castro presented his explanations in Congress in 
front of severe criticisms from opposition members, General Víctor Gandolfo 
Monzón, inspector general of the National Police, was dismissed for his participation 
in the failed purchase of patrol cars. However, the procurement involving General 
Gandolfo was not the one being questioned by Congress at the moment, but rather the 
one that had brought down former minister Mazzetti. The ‘sudden’ measure, as the 
newspapers described it, point to the presence of scapegoating, particularly when 
considering that Gandolfo had not been directly responsible in the procurement 
process of which he was been accused (Aguirre, 2007). The maneuver was exploiting 
the similarities between the cases of Alva and Mazzetti: By activating a demand-
satisfactory measure regarding the earlier scandal, it could alleviate the pressure 
originated from the current event; Gandolfo’s dismissal could easily be confused with 
a quick response to the procurement of Chinese goods, when in fact both were 
completely unrelated. A second indication of the true coping nature of Gandolfo’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Ibid. 
233 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (2nd 
round). 
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dismissal is the fact that, right after the whole event was finally brought to an end, 
Gandolfo Monzón was appointed to the post of permanent secretary of the Human 
Rights Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with a supreme resolution 
signed by President García and minister Alva (Yovera, 2007). 
The procurement affair was suddenly dropped from public attention on August 
15, when an earthquake of eight degrees of magnitude stroke the south coast of the 
country, killing more over five hundred people. On August 23, minister Alva Castro 
decided to void the purchase of the patrol cars (LR, 2007/08/24); media coverage234 
insisted on pressing him over the issue, all the while problems with the procurements 
of ammunitions kept raising questions regarding the process and the responsibility of 
the minister. However, most of the attention was effectively switching towards the 
recovery efforts of the areas affected by the earthquake, and the evolution of the 
proceedings against fugitive President Alberto Fujimori, who had flown to Chile in 
late 2005 and was facing imminent extradition. These circumstances released some of 
the pressure from the executive branch, and voided the necessity of any additional 
coping mechanism. Although a poll conducted in mid-August (APOYO, 2007a) had 
found that 41% of people perceived corruption behind the irregular procurement of 
patrols cars (46% even considered that minister Alva Castro should resign), and a 
second poll conducted a month later revealed that 45% of respondents believed that 
the purchase had been canceled in order to protect the minister from accusations of 
corruption (APOYO, 2007b), by the middle of September President García’s popular 
approval had climbed from the 32% he had in July to a comfortable 44%, while that 
of the executive branch in general had increased from 28% to 38% (APOYO, 2007b), 
particularly as a consequence of their well-received management of the natural 
disaster. 
As the government enjoyed a moment of high popularity, opposition groups 
were busy moving towards a new wave of pressure over the Executive branch. On 
September 13, the legislative initiative235 of interpellation against Alva Castro was 
approved (LR, 2007/09/14). In addition to the issues affecting the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, members of the opposition denounced a series of irregularities in the 
managements of funds for the victims of the earthquake involving the National Health 
System (Camacho, 2007). The government had tried to prevent the issue from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 As described under domestic pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
235 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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producing a new wave of demands by dismissing the head of the Health agency, Julio 
Espinoza Jiménez, on August 30, but the opposition still charged against the minister 
of Health, Carlos Vallejos Sologuren. On September 20, Congress approved the 
formal investigation into the allegations against the National Health System. 
Amidst this growing scenario of corruption perception, the president 
announced an immediate increase in the minimum wage in order to ‘counteract the 
effect of the increase in prices’ (LR, 2007/09/19). The economic stimuli236proved to 
be very well timed, for one days later, on September 20, the news of Fujimori’s 
extradition grabbed all media attention. The next days all media sources of the 
country followed closely the details of the process, as the final sentence was read in 
Chile, and the fugitive president was brought to Peruvian justice. 
But the opposition in Congress could not be coped with like popular 
perception was, and on the last days of September legislative initiatives in the form of 
motion of no confidence and interpellation were presented against ministers Alva 
Castro and Vallejos Sologuren, respectively. The political leadership was being 
increasingly pressed. In an effort to defuse the explosive situation, minister Vallejos 
immediately met with First Public Prosecutor, Adelaida Bolívar, to request the prompt 
investigation and arrest of the people involved in the National Health System scandal. 
In declarations to the press, he publicly expressed condemnation and his support for 
enforcement:237 “[T]hey are a bunch of delinquents that have tried to involve me and 
tarnish my honor”238 (LR, 2007/09/29).  
On September 30, the Office of the Comptroller General entered the scene to 
announce that the Ministry of Economy would be audited in order to investigate its 
responsibility in authorizing the National Health Systems’ irregular expenditures, 
amounting over US$ 6 million (Mella, 2007b). With this, there were three ministries 
involved now in scenarios of corruption perception, and media coverage and 
legislative initiatives were proving hard to sway, disregarding the coping mechanisms 
activated by the government. It was becoming clear that, in order to get over the 
event, more complex and costly measures would have to be taken, particularly 
considering that it was unlikely that more episodes like the earthquake or Fujimori’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
237 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
238 Translated from Spanish. 
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extradition would naturally occur to distract public attention. The popular approval 
enjoyed by President García in the aftermath of the natural disaster was quickly being 
spent: by October 18, the popular approval of President García and the executive 
branch had fallen 14 points from the level they had in September (APOYO, 2007c), 
“mostly driven by the increase in food prices and the corruption scandals involving 
his administration”239 (IR, 2007/10/21). Indeed, 10% of surveyed people expressed 
that the scandals affecting the ministers of Internal Affairs and Health had been the 
biggest problem in the country in previous weeks, while 20% were of the opinion that 
this issue should be the government’s priority (Alva Castro and Vallejos were being 
pointed as the top two ministers that should be replaced) (APOYO, 2007c). If media 
coverage kept fueling popular criticism, and legislative initiatives of opposition 
groups kept gaining momentum, it would become increasingly hard for the 
government to ignore the need for anti-corruption reforms without seeing its 
legitimacy fall to dangerous levels. 
The government strategy to finally cope with the pressure and reduce stress to 
the NACS (not to mention the political leadership itself), involved the activation of 
three different coping mechanisms, all of which could be said to be more challenging 
than the ones activated in the previous two months, but for the same reason all the 
more effective. 
The first mechanism was a smokescreen targeting former president Alejandro 
Toledo, and executed by a member of an opposition party. On October 4, the country 
woke up to a rather strange news: Congressmember Gustavo Espinoza Soto, elected 
with the UPP party but later disenfranchised, had given a press conference the day 
before to accuse Toledo of raping a young woman. According to Espinoza, he had 
found a police statement against the former president: “Mr. Alejandro Toledo has 
raped, on September 19, a person, Diana Arévalo Sagástegui, after [having] an orgy, 
after [having consumed] alcohol and drugs”240 (Perú21, 2007/10/04), he expressed 
publicly. The reaction from members of Perú Posible was immediate. Besides 
accusing Espinoza of gross defamation against their leader, they claimed that the 
congressmember acted only as a pawn for the incumbent party. Their suspicion was 
further fueled by the fact that Espinoza had been seen meeting APRA 
congressmember Javier Velásquez Quesquén that morning. Reports on Espinoza’s 	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connection to the APRA would be repeated two years later, bringing attention to his 
constant support to incumbent’s projects in the national parliament (EC, 2009/11/18). 
The smokescreen, on the other hand, would only last for two weeks before the facts of 
the incident chattered Espinoza’s allegations, disproving any involvement of former 
president Toledo in the case; in the meantime, however, an opinion poll showed that 
82% of respondents were aware of the scandal, but that only 33% of them saw 
Espinoza’s allegations for what they were while 38% believed that Toledo had really 
been involved in the illicit affair after all (APOYO, 2007c), thus proving the 
effectiveness of this coping mechanism in the popular perception. 
The second mechanism involved a combination of scapegoating and public 
expressions of condemnation and enforcement support: On October 7, Alva Castro 
announced a thorough pruning in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the 
dismissal of more than twenty officials allegedly involved in the infamous 
procurement of the Chinese patrol cars. The minister declared (Mella and Faura, 
2007): 
 
“We have terminated the contracts of civil officials that were in charge of the 
purchases in the Ministry, and relieved the heads and members of the National 
Police that also participated in the acquisitions. In total they are more than 20. 
We have been selecting the new personnel since last week. We want 
specialized and competent people that behave with efficiency and 
transparency. ”241 
 
 The message was clear: although he had initially defended the procurement 
process of the patrol cars, after the scenario of corruption perception kept growing 
and becoming more stressful, the only way to get over the incident was to sacrifice 
mid-level bureaucrats that had no real impact in leadership structure. As newspaper 
La República read (Mella and Faura, 2007), the press seemed to have the same 
opinion, describing the government’s measure as “an effort to safe [minister Alva 
Castro’s] head only a few days before confronting a possible motion of no 
confidence,”242 and supporting the reading that “the purge inside the Ministry, even 
though it was designed to secure [Alva Castro’s] permanence in office, also 	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contradicts his own version [of the procurement process] provided until some days 
ago”243 (Caretas, 2007/10/11). However, just as expected from public expressions, the 
so-called ‘purge’ was more symbolic than genuine, and no immediate sanctions were 
taken: most officers relieved from their posts remained working in the Ministry in 
important positions, only dismissed from being involved in procurement processes 
(Aguirre and Camacho, 2007). 
 These two mechanisms were powerful enough to safe Alva Castro. On 
October 10, the opposition failed to get the motion of no confidence approved by 
Congress. Immediately afterwards, President García confirmed his support of Alva as 
minister of Internal Affairs, position that he would then occupy for one more year. 
Yet, public opinion did not welcome the rescue of the minister of Internal Affairs: 
78% of surveyed people in October disapproved of the fact that the motion of no 
confidence had failed, and the number of people that considered that Alva Castro 
should resign almost doubled to 83% from the 46% that were of that opinion in 
August. As a consequence, one in every six people considered that the government 
was coming out debilitated from this event (APOYO, 2007c). The message was clear: 
“If the president is to try and recover popular support through making changes in the 
ministries, ...the ministers of Internal Affairs and Health need to be removed. The 
scandals of corruption and incompetence that have taken place in their sectors have 
tried the citizens’ patience” 244  (p. 1). That measure, however, was what the 
government was trying to avoid through the activation of coping mechanisms. 
 Although Alva’s problem had been formally dealt with, minister Vallejos, on 
the other hand, was still in the middle of the storm. New evidence of massive 
corruption in the National Health System was spawning a new wave of criticism from 
all sectors. To control the situation, Vallejos announced the dismissal of as much as 
fifty public officials working in the corruption-filled agency with the alleged intention 
of bringing its reorganization (LR, 2007/10/16); such a large scapegoating effort 
suggests the crossing from the first round of this corruption perception scenario into 
the second round, and the additional activation of a public expression of reform 
support.245 The next day, October 16, the firsts arrests were being conducted by 
orders of the Public Ministry. With the public apprehension and prosecution of the 	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direct culprits of the scandal, the event quickly began losing steam. 
 The third and final mechanism was the creation of the ONA on October 18, 
and the appointment of judge Carolina Lizárraga Houghton as chief on the 20th. One 
week later, the scenario of corruption perception finally came to an end, and on 
October 30 Congress informed that they had found no criminal responsibility in the 
performance of minister Carlos Vallejos (Perú21, 2007/10/30). Overall, the stressful 
events that took place between August 14 and October 30 saw news of governmental 
corruption hitting the front pages of newspaper La República during 50% of the 
period, more than double the average of 24% for the 2006-2011 period.  With the 
scenario dealt with, the decline in the executive branch’s popular approval came to a 
halt, and although the scandals of corruption were mentioned among the reasons for 
García’s disapproval by 25% of respondents to a poll in November, by this time it had 
managed to change the trend and recover at least modestly (4%) (APOYO, 2007d).  
 
 Rise and Fall of the ONA 
 The ONA represented the government response to the scenarios of corruption 
perception described above, and the demands to not only prosecute the culprits but to 
reform the system. Thus, the powers vested in the new agency, and the person that 
was appointed to lead it, were all an effort to reduce stress on the stability of the 
NACS by creating an inadequate anti-corruption body 246  with a high level of 
publicity. In this sense, the ONA was an upgrade on what the CNA had meant for the 
government of Alejandro Toledo: the new agency took its place, strengthened its 
normativity, put it back under the PCM, and hired a new ‘czar’; at the same time, it 
suppressed the involvement of civil society,247 introduced elements that would create 
even more resistance than before, and cut its budget a short time after its creation, 
thus completely asphyxiating it.  
 The inspiration for a new preventive anti-corruption body could not have 
existed before the system fell under stress. By the end of August of 2007, less than 
two months before the ONA was created, the CNA was still conducting its functions 
as usual, signing interinstitutional agreements and planning a ‘mega event’ for the 
International Anti-Corruption Day to be celebrated on December 9 (CNA, 2007a). In 	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fact, according to the written proceedings of its tenth meeting, held on October 15 
(barely three days before its deactivation), none of the councilmembers seemed to be 
aware of the government plans. On that occasion, the representative of the PCM had 
only addressed the “declarations from the president, regarding the re-launching of the 
[CNA]”248 (CNA, 2007b), stating that the proposal was still under evaluation, and that 
he was of the opinion that a consultative council should be kept. The CNA’s president 
and vice-president of Justice, Erasmo Reyna, had further prompted the council to 
continue carrying their activities as usual, since according to him there did not seem 
to be any overlaying functions between them and the impending ONA. Three days 
later, however, the government signed Supreme Decree No. 085-2007-PCM 
deactivating the CNA, erasing completely the figure of the council, and replacing it 
with an executive agency under the leadership of anti-corruption judge Carolina 
Lizárraga. 
 The decision to have Lizárraga in charge of the ONA was by no means 
coincidental nor technical. The new czar had first attracted media attention in 2004, 
when she ordered the arrest of former head of the National Council of Intelligence, 
César Almeyda (Chávez, 2004), and then again in 2006 when she requested that 
Interpol located former First Lady Eliane Karp (LR, 2006/08/19). These actions, in 
addition to her previous participation in the proceedings against the Fujimori-
Montesinos network, had given her a level of legitimacy that was rather rare in 
Peruvian judiciary, and make her name be associated with the fight against corruption 
in the country.  
On the days before her appointment to the ONA, Lizárraga had even been 
responsible for the order of arrest against the public officials involved in the whole 
National Health System scandal, which helped the government finally get over the 
stress scenario. These circumstances evidently made her a perfect candidate for 
endowing the new government agency with the level of media attention, popularity 
and legitimacy needed to have it succeed in stimulating support and reducing 
demands. Political magazine Caretas noted: “[W]e have to acknowledge a certain 
spectacular side in the appointment of Lizárraga. As in a circle closing, it was her 
who, on Tuesday 16, in one of her last decisions as judge, ordered the arrest of those 
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involved in the overpriced purchases of the [National Health System]”249 (Caretas, 
2007/10/25). Indeed, Carolina Lizárraga’s own account of her designation confirms 
the president’s intention to use her designation as a way out of the stressful scenario 
(Prensaperu2009, 2009a):  
 
“[The president’s office summoned me] regarding something about an anti-
corruption czar. So I went and replied that I was yet not ready for [the 
appointment], that I was very happy in my position [as anti-corruption judge], 
but he told me that I had to help him and that we were at a dead end... He 
needed the support to do this anti-corruption crusade.”250 
 
The government strategy proved to be immediately successful among societal 
groups such as the media and civil society. Through an official statement, the 
executive director of anti-corruption NGO Proética (and former minister during the 
Toledo administration), Cecilia Blondet, expressed her complete support for the 
decision: “Lizárraga is a very good appointment, it is an incredibly appropriate 
decision. I think she is a well-prepared judge in academic terms, and at the same time 
she is very brave; and you need both elements to take over this kind of 
responsibility”251 (Proética, 2007/10/22). However, other actors of the opposition and 
the State apparatus, particularly those belonging to the anti-corruption subsystem, 
were quick to criticize not the person, but the institution. 
The contents of Supreme Decree No. 085-2007-PCM described an office 
“with technical and functional autonomy, with enough attributions for the 
development of State measures to prevent and fight corruption”; and, although its 
autonomy was actually impaired by the fact that the chief of the ONA was designated 
by the president himself, and that it depended on the budget allocated by the PCM, the 
powers granted to the new agency were unparalleled by even the first version of the 
CNA. Besides its expected preventive functions, the ONA was formally capable of 
opening investigations by own initiative, allowing it to take part of any case it saw fit 
(article 3, section c); of carrying out the analysis, processing and transmission of 
information regarding potential cases of money laundering, and of requesting 	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information to the UIF to that end (article 3, section k); and of notifying public 
procurators of any corruption case that may come to its attention (article 3, section l). 
In this way, the ONA was entrusted not only with preventive tasks, but also with 
control capabilities, which made it be perceived as intruding in the exclusive 
functions of constitutionally autonomous bodies such as the Office of the Comptroller 
General and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Such seed of destruction was of the same 
kind as the one originally included in the CNA, and which had allowed for the 
eventual misallocation of responsibility towards its modifications in 2003. Thus, once 
again, the main preventive anti-corruption body in the country was being designed 
with inherent structural flows stimulating environmental harassment from particular 
groups. President García’s behavior in the deployment of the ONA was not supportive 
of a friendly relation between this agency and other control institutions either: While 
presenting Lizárraga as the new anti-corruption czar, he used the opportunity to 
criticize the performance of the already existing apparatus (LR, 2007/10/21a):  
 
“This is a new point of attack against corruption. Until now the existing 
institutions has not been enough. I am not satisfied with their work; if I were, I 
would not be supporting [the creation of] a new agency to be like a stimulus to 
work on this subject.”252 
  
 The president of the Supreme Court, Francisco Távara, had already expressed 
his disapproval of the Executive creating the ONA, for what he saw as a duplicity of 
efforts, a waste of resources that could have been employed to strengthen the anti-
corruption subsystem (LR, 2007/10/21b). Evidently, García’s expressions were not 
happy ones, and could not help Lizárraga’s position. Shortly afterwards, the president 
charged directly against the comptroller general, Genaro Matute Mejía, whom he 
criticized for being vocal in the case of the ONA but having stayed quiet during the 
previous government and its scandals of corruption (Salazar, 2007). This conflict 
between Matute Mejía and the ONA would then continue until 2008, as the former 
held that Lizárraga’s agency had no legal right to conduct investigations, and the 
latter kept trying to establish an institutional space of its own. After a legal report 
produced by the OCG objecting to the ONA’s function was released in early January 	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of 2008, Lizárraga defended her office by stating:  
 
“This office was created to have an area of investigations and an area for the 
promotion of ethic and anti-corruption policies, and if an anti-corruption office 
is not allowed to know the reasons behind the corruption phenomenon, then it 
would not have any reason to exist.... [I]f we carry out an investigation is not 
only so that someone can be punished, but also to be able to exemplify what is 
going on, the reasons and the solutions.” 
 
 The truth, however, was that the ONA had been given a Trojan horse with 
those investigatory powers. In describing the interinstitutional relations between the 
anti-corruption office and non-Executive offices, a staff member of the ONA 
(Interview No. 05) said: 
 
“What happens is that the ONA created a lot of resistance at the beginning... 
As ironic as it may be, the National Anti-Corruption Office was devastated in 
terms of critics by the Office of the Comptroller General, and then the 
comptroller ended up leading something [very similar to what] he had 
criticized so much.253 The problems were solved later on, but the demolition 
work had been so great, what with Public Ministry, the OCG... Everyone saw 
that it was an interference, all the State [apparatus]. So, it gave me the 
impression that we had very little [political] backing. 
When the ONA is created, it is done with an investigatory unit. There were 
journalists, prominent lawyers; in other words, there were people that 
supposedly entered to push forwards all those denunciations [of corruption]. 
But I think it was the area that received most of the attacks, and due to which 
[the ONA] collapsed in political terms, as it represented the provision of 
competences [to an agency that was not entitled to them]. Everyone 
complained: ‘But why, if you already have public prosecutors, the Public 
Ministry, public procurators, the OCG...?’”254 
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 Regarding these attacks, the chief of the ONA remembers (Prensaperu2009, 
2009b): 
 
“I realized (and I got very disappointed) that nobody cared about corruption. 
This office was created and [all of a sudden] everyone became an anti-
corruption champion; [but then] the office came to an end and nobody ever 
talked anything about the subject anymore.... 
It was such an immediate attack! I did not even have an office yet and I was 
already being summoned by Congress at the end of November to explain 
about the post, about the money... I did not even have money! There was no 
support from other institutions; rather, there were attacks.”255 
 
But not only did the ONA’s official functions create severe tensions with the 
OCG and raised doubts regarding the actual institutional place the former had, but 
they were also overwhelming for the limited human and financial resources allocated. 
In other words, the ONA did not really have the material capacity to fulfill its 
controversial duties. The area of investigations, which Lizárraga defended so fiercely, 
included five consultants under the direction of Iván Meini Mendez. Meini, as it has 
been mentioned earlier, had previously worked as part of the procuratorial team on 
the Fujimori-Montesinos case lead first by José Ugaz and then Vargas Valdivia; his 
trajectory, therefore, provided this area with the same kind of legitimacy as the 
presence of Lizárraga in the chief position did to the whole agency. Meini, however, 
was not in Peru. According to some of the members of the area of investigations who 
had entered the ONA in January attracted by his reputation, Meini was away doing a 
postdoc in another country, and he did not get physically involved in the 
investigations until March or April (Interview No. 12; Interview No. 13); this is, until 
almost half a year had passed since the creation of the ONA.  
 The material situations in which the area of investigations had to work, 
additionally, did not match the alleged importance it had (Interview No. 12; Interview 
No. 13): 
 
“There were problems every month regarding us getting paid or not. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Translated from Spanish. 
	   216	  
administrator, Patricia Guillén, felt distressed because every month she 
received communication from the PCM stating that they did not know if we 
were going to get paid or not. And we did not have proper work conditions: 
We worked inside a basement that more than once got flooded.... 
The office was not well equipped. I remember Patricia always complaining 
about money. There was always a problem of money because (I think) there 
was no defined budget assigned to this project specifically, but rather we kept 
using the money from the CNA. So there were always problems about that.”256 
 
 Another staff member of the ONA indeed corroborated the budgetary 
challenges faced by the new agency, which continued throughout its period and 
eventually precipitated its dissolution (Interview No. 03): 
 
“When the CNA is closed and the ONA is created, the [UNDP project 
PER/02/027] continues carrying on. Even though they were two offices with 
different denominations, the project that oversaw the whole administrative 
part remained the same. [So the anti-corruption body] is transferred from the 
Ministry of Justice to the PCM with all its resources in order to implement it... 
[According to the UNDP project,] the ministry to which the office was 
ascribed was supposed to provide the resources for its sustainability and 
functioning. When the office joins the PCM, it does so with very few 
resources, and we had to request additional resources for the budget in order to 
increase it; but they did not do it. They stopped transferring funds.”257 
 
 When inquired about the lack of financial support from the government, 
Carolina Lizárraga confirmed that it had been a matter of political decision 
(Prensaperu2009, 2009a): 
 
“I worked at the ONA almost eight months, of which only five months and a 
half were of actual work... When I arrived, I had no office, no personnel, no 
budget; I had nothing... I put some [conditions] and [the president] said that 
everything was going to be fine and that we would have everything little by 	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little... I think that in one opportunity he tried to fulfilled [his promise]: he and 
Dr. Del Castillo signed at a Council of Ministers an urgent decree providing 
funds, but the minister of Economy said ‘No, this cannot be executed’... [So 
the ONA] was practically cancelled.”258 
 
 Finally, the lack of political will to support any success of the National Anti-
Corruption Office became painfully evident only six months after its creation. The 
ONA, after all, was nothing else than a symbolic coping mechanism, and was never 
supposed to affect the stability of the leadership or that of the NACS. It simply did not 
have the political backing to exert a power that had only been received to generate 
conflict with other public agencies. After Carolina Lizárraga tried to perform its 
formal functions of chief of an anti-corruption body and got caught unwisely giving 
advanced opinion on a matter affecting the prime minister, the time came to stop 
investing in a political measure that had already succeeded in relieving public 
pressure. 
 In April of 2008, when the ONA was still finding its rhythm, allegations of a 
possible conflict of interests and influence peddling appeared on the news involving 
prime minister Jorge del Castillo Gálvez and his son, Miguel, who was an advisor for 
a minor television network, RBC. According to a member of the opposition, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs had suddenly increased its allocation of publicity to RBC 
from S/. 0 in 2007 to S/. 283 thousand (roughly US$ 100 thousand) in only the first 
months of 2008, raising suspicions about the possible meddling of the prime minister 
in redirecting the resources for the benefit of his son’s employers. The scenario of 
corruption perception immediately took form, with Del Castillo and Alva Castro 
being summoned by the parliamentary Commission of Audit to present their 
depositions, and members of the incumbent party providing argumentative defenses259 
for the sake of the prime minister. The dissonant voice in the Executive, however, 
came from the chief of the ONA, who getting ahead of further details on the case 
expressed publicly that there could be evidence of an “ethical conflict, because the 
son of the prime minister works in [RBC], and the Council of Ministers work as an 
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association” 260  (Perú21, 2008/04/09a). By doing so, the ONA was effectively 
engaging in a public exhortation,261 generating pressure on the political system just as 
an environmental actor would. Lizárraga realized almost immediately the effect her 
words could have, and tried to show a more supportive stance by expressing the 
ONA’s “great consideration for the prime minister and belief in his version”262 
(Perú21, 2008/04/09b); but the pressure did not disappear. In order to avoid losing 
face, Lizárraga moved the focus of her intervention from the actions of the 
government to the legal structure, and suggested the introduction of formal guidelines 
regulating the matter of State publicity. Although such maneuver may have seemed 
like an appropriate deflection for the anti-corruption czar, in reality she was still 
pressing the system: her suggestion was just another form of public exhortation, 
effectively moving the scandal from the first round of corruption perception into the 
second, which directly involved the NACS. 
 The effect of Lizárraga’s public statements on the government’s backing is 
explicitly pointed out by a staff member of the ONA (Interview No. 03): 
 
“The Executive withdraws its support to the ONA because it gets affected by 
allegations against Del Castillo’s son, and of course, the media go and take Dr. 
Lizárraga’s statements; and she, being impartial, provides an opinion that 
apparently was not well received by the prime minister and the president, 
because from then on all support was really taken away.”263 
 
Of a similar reading was a senior official of the OCG (Interview No. 09), who 
pointed out that incident as the beginning of the end for the ONA: “[Carolina 
Lizárraga] provided opinion beforehand regarding Del Castillo, and in that moment 
she fell, as she depended on the PCM... [That statement about Del Castillo] killed 
her.”264 
Shortly afterwards, due to all the political and financial challenges the anti-
corruption office was facing, the personnel (including Lizárraga herself) began to 
present their resignations one by one. It was clear to all of them that the true nature of 	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262 Translated from Spanish. 
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the National Anti-Corruption Office created by initiative of President Alan García 
was nothing more than a symbolic gesture to assuage demands for anti-corruption 
actions. In the words of a staff member (Interview No. 05): 
 
“Actually, I think that the anti-corruption office was created with a decorative 
intention. I think there were very capable people, with good intentions of 
making it work, but I think that it did not work because [the government] 
never wanted it to work; that is, it was created so that it didn’t work.”265  
 
 Two consultants of the ONA agree with the above opinion, and are even more 
outspoken about the government’s intentions (Interview No. 12; Interview No. 13): 
 
“It was an office created so that it didn’t work. It was an office created with 
greater faculties than those of the CNA: faculties of investigation, formulation 
of public policies, creation of a national anti-corruption plan... [but] it was 
created so that it didn’t work... 
I think it was an office created to distract public attention saying ‘We 
investigate corruption,’ when in reality they did not do it. I think that the 
people that were there played the role (and I include myself) of useful idiots, 
and we realized it too late... 
There was absolutely no political support from the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers, led by Jorge del Castillo.”266 
 
 On August 15, 2008, barely ten months after the ONA had been created, the 
government announced its impeding dissolution. With only minimum media coverage 
and public exhortations, El Peruano published Supreme Decree No. 057-2008-PCM, 
formally deactivating the ONA and transferring its core preventive functions to the 
Secretariat of Public Management of the PCM; other functions would be transferred 
to the OCG in turn. Former anti-corruption procurator Ronald Gamarra expressed that 
“this deactivation confirms that the ONA was a trial and that, in reality, there never 
was any political will to help Carolina Lizárraga in her post, or to provide her the 
necessary resources.” In response, and to prevent other forms of criticism, Prime 	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Minister Jorge del Castillo stated that the decision had been taken in following the 
requests of the opposition, which had asked for the ONA’s deactivation (Perú21, 
2008/08/10). The resort to misallocation of responsibility, as can be remembered, had 
also been employed to behead the CNA in 2003. However effective this mechanism 
was to keep demands from entering the system, members of the opposition had finally 
seen the true nature of the ONA through its deactivation: “[This] demonstrates that 
the ONA was ghostly office, created as a façade to hide the acts of corruption 
committed by the government, such as the overvalue of food products after the 
earthquake in Ica... ”267 expressed Congressmember Isaac Mekler (LPR, 2008/07/31). 
And he was right. 
 
2. Petrogate 
 
While so far the discussion has focused on scenarios of corruption perception 
with average levels of pressure, to consider the government management of an event 
like the Petrogate scandal is to venture into a multifaceted and complex affair. 
Benefitting from the hindsight provided by the passage of time, certain obscure 
elements can be studied in light of the course they have taken, thus providing certain 
degree of comprehension regarding their true meaning and nature; others, however, 
are still covered by power structures that were never truly unmounted, and which 
hinder a completely sober and accurate recount of the details. The analysis, therefore, 
can suggest the general outline of the coping mechanisms activated; the political crisis 
they tried to control, on the other hand, was from the beginning evident for its 
significant proportions. 
The Petrogate event broke on October 5, 2008, when four audio recordings 
(taken in a surreptitious way) were presented at an important political TV program. In 
them, Alberto Químper Herrera, director of the Peruvian company for the promotion 
of investment in the hydrocarbons sector, Perupetro, could be heard discussing with 
former APRA minister Rómulo León Alegría the payment of bribes in order to award 
oil contracts in favor of Discover Petroleum, a Norwegian company (LR, 
2008/10/06). These contracts were being pursued by arranging the association of 
Discover with Petroperú, the Peruvian state-owned petroleum company, and having 	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Discover’s spokesperson, Ernesto Arias Schreiber, handle the delivery of payments 
for Químper and León. By the time the conversation was being broadcasted on 
national television, it was already a done deal: the contract had successfully been 
awarded on September 10.  
The government reaction was immediate: That same night, César Gutierrez, 
president of Petroperú, presented his resignation, which was publicly accepted by 
Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo. The minister of energy and mines, Juan Valdivia 
Romero, followed suit, while President Alan García forcefully requested the 
immediate arrest of Alberto Químper, whom he called a ‘rat.’ Thus, the official 
strategy from that early hour was to activate both symbolic and genuine measures to 
cope with the scandal: deal with the culprits, sacrifice the president of Petroperú, and 
publicly express the government’s support in seeing the whole issue dealt with swiftly 
and harshly.  
The next day combinations of symbolic and genuine responses were adopted, 
with President García accepting Valdivia’s resignation and expressing: “I accept his 
resignation making it clear that he is an honest man; but I accept his resignation until 
his honor, as he wants, can be duly proven”268 (Andina, 2008/10/06). With equal but 
opposite strength, the APRA party proceeded to expel Rómulo León from its ranks, 
stating: “The APRA is deeply sorry about the existence of unscrupulous people that 
take criminal advantage of the sacrifice of thousands of partisans” 269  (LR, 
2008/10/07a). Finally, President García moved to suspend the contracts awarded to 
Discover Petroleum, and ordered the removal of the Norwegian flag from the front 
side of the Petroperú building (Caretas, 2008/10/09). 
But new audio recordings followed, raising questions regarding the amount of 
information the government had actually had of the dealings before the story had 
broken out in the news. Additionally, three other members of the alleged network 
were being involved in the scandal: Fortunato Canaán, Dominican lobbyist and 
executive of Discover Petroleum; Jostein Kjerstad, president of the Norwegian 
company; and Daniel Saba, president of Perupetro. In Congress, legislative initiatives 
were being already prepared against the government: members of the opposition were 
working on an interpellation against the Council of Ministers and the setting of a 
committee of investigation, while the National Unity party was even requesting a 	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motion of no confidence be prepared.  
From the other side of the event, Perupetro released a statement presenting a 
thorough argumentative defense,270 through which the public enterprise was trying to 
clear its responsibility in any illegal dealings, defending the further legality of the 
contracts awarded to Discover Petroleum, and assuring the Alberto Químper, as 
representative from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, had never possessed the 
faculties to make administrative decisions that could have affected in any way the 
awarding process (LR, 2008/10/07b). A similar measure was taken by Petroperú the 
next day (LR, 2008/10/08). While these excuses were being offered, arrest warrants 
had been issued against Químper and León, as well as a warrant banning Arias 
Schreiber from leaving the country. 
All these activities from both the political system and the environment in a 
very short period of time set the tone of the event: a severe political crisis was taking 
shape, and very soon the time would be over for small and economical coping 
mechanisms. The possible adoption of a legislative initiative271 such as a motion of no 
confidence against the entire Council of Ministers; the mentioning in new recordings 
of the involvement of the prime minister; and, evidence of suspicious meetings with 
Minister of Health Hernán Garrido Lecca and even President García himself, raised 
the stakes. Under the circumstances, President García had no option but to make a 
political concession272 and accept the formal resignation of the Council of Ministers 
in its entirety (Chirinos, 2008), offering the position of prime minister to independent 
leader Yehude Simon Murano, who was already popular for his honesty and his 
commitment with transparency in the public sector. Regarding Simon’s appointment, 
political magazine Caretas (2008/10/16) expressed: 
 
“What does Simon’s appointment by Alan García mean? First, an important 
reduction in the presence of the APRA apparatus, which only keeps the 
portfolios of Jorge Villasante in [the Ministry of] Labor and Enrique Cornejo 
in [the Ministry of] Housing... With the previous prime minister the [APRA] 
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271 As described under domestic pressure activities, direct pressure. 
272 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
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party held an organic level of influence that today no longer exists. ”273 
 
 Futhermore, the designation of Simon involved the public expression of 
support for anti-corruption reforms:274 “The fight against corruption, just as President 
García outlined, will cover a big part of [Simon’s] agenda,”275 Caretas commented. 
With this, and the change of six of its ministers (the rest were individually ratified in 
their positions), the executive branch seemed to have not only saved the imminent 
political debacle, but even come out with more political support than it had when the 
event started: According to a poll conducted in October 22-24, its level of popular 
approval had remained stable in 16%, while that of President García had increased 
from 19% in September to 22% (even though disapproval due to high levels of 
corruption had also increased from 28% to 37%); more surprisingly, the support for 
former Prime Minister Del Castillo went up 4% despite the fact that 84% of 
respondents believed that he had been aware of the corrupt dealings prior to the 
release of the audio recordings (71% believed President García also had knowledge of 
this) (APOYO, 2008a). In the opinion of Alfredo Torres, director of APOYO, “[t]he 
impact of [Simon’s] designation over the image of the president has been moderate... 
but it is necessary to keep in mind that, if not for the change of ministers, the approval 
of the administration would have probably suffered a significant blow as a 
consequence of the ‘Petrogate’ scandal”276 (APOYO, 2008a, p. 1). 
The Petrogate scandal, however, kept thriving in regards to the direct actors 
involved. Media coverage had not left alone the corruption affair, exposing almost 
every day new details on illegal activities carried out by Romulo León, and the 
situation did not change with the prosecutor’s orders to initiate proceedings against 
fourteen members of the Petrogate network on October 21, 2008. The event was 
specially fueled now by the fact that León was a fugitive of justice, and that former 
ministers Del Castillo, Garrido Lecca and Juan Valdivia were being formally 
investigated for their possible involvement and responsibility (Romero, 2008). Soon 
the media began anew to question the specific participation of former senior officials 
of the government in the Petrogate affair, as information surfaced regarding meetings 	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that the Dominican lobbyist Fortunato Canaán had had with former ministers of 
Health, Justice, and Internal Affairs (Núñez, 2008). Congress, too, continued its 
investigation, and former ministers and other officials close to President García were 
summoned for enquiry. These incidents caused popular approval for President García 
and the executive branch to fall 3% and 1% by the middle of November, respectively, 
with 42% of surveyed people expressing disapproval due to the high degree of 
corruption affecting the government (compared to 37% the previous month). The 
domestic environment expressed skepticism regarding García’s discourse in relation 
to the fight against corruption: 56% believed that the administration had done nothing 
to address this issue since it took office in 2006, and 38% considered that the reward 
of S/. 100 thousand (roughly US$ 30 thousand) offered for León’s capture on 
November 5 was a mere smokescreen deployed by the government (APOYO, 2008b). 
Amidst this enduring pressure (reflected, and partly represented, by news of 
corruption appearing in the front page of La República for 78% of the time—much 
higher than the average of 24%), however, the whole event was finally brought to an 
end by a combination of events and measures: First, on November 13, Romulo León 
gave himself up and was immediately arrested; with it, a large degree of sensationalist 
coverage grew rapidly silent, moving on to a new story. Albeit not enough 
information is available, it is possible to suggest that León had effectively been used 
as a scapegoat: Even though President García had publicly called him a criminal, and 
his capture had effectively helped end the scandal, on July of 2009 Rómulo León was 
released from prison and put under house arrest. He was soon arrested again for not 
paying bail, and would remain in prison until December of 2011, when he was put 
again under house arrest. Arriving home, León gave some statements to the press 
insisting in his innocence, but adding: “The APRA never dies”277 (EC, 2011/12/02). 
Half a year later, in July of 2012, his status was further changed and he was granted 
parole. By 2015, there was still no conviction against León, notwithstanding his 
central position in the crisis that had meant the fall of Primer Minister Del Castillo’s 
council almost seven years earlier. In September of that year, finally, the judiciary 
sentenced that the audio recordings were ‘illicit evidence’ due to the way they had 
been acquired (Barboza Quiroz, 2015), thus effectively bringing to a close the 
Petrogate case. 	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Second, in order to control pressure already moving into a reformist second 
round of the corruption perception scenario, new Prime Minister Yehude Simon 
presented on November 14 a project of National Anti-Corruption Plan for public 
discussion, based on the work that had already been advanced by the Toledo 
administration in 2006. This measure helped stimulate political support towards his 
person and that of President García, with Simon’s popular approval increasing 2% 
between November and December and disapproval of García’s administration due to 
corruption falling back to 34% (APOYO, 2008c). Beyond its political role, however, 
it is clear that the Plan was not intended to be anything more than a coping 
mechanism: although presented in the prominent forum of the National Agreement 
(Andina, 2008/11/14) and having attracted praises from members of the organized 
civil society (Proética, 2008/12/24), it would never be officially approved by the 
government, reinforcing the reading that it was meant to be an ‘inadequate anti-
corruption policy.’278 
Third, from November 18 the media turned to the coverage of the APEC 
Summit held in Lima, which filled most front pages until the 24th. The publicly 
acclaimed handling of the summit helped President García and the executive branch 
to swiftly recover from the costs of the Petrogate scandal, climbing back to 25% and 
21% of popular approval by the middle of December, respectively. When asked about 
the reasons for their political support for the García administration, 38% of poll 
respondents mentioned García’s performance during the APEC meeting (APOYO, 
2008c). Thus, for all practical purposes, the APEC summit worked just as a 
smokescreen in benefit of the government.  
 
3. The International Anti-Corruption Movement 
 
Although beginning in the late part of the government of President Toledo, the 
international anti-corruption movement can be said to really have shown its full range 
of activities in Peru during the government of President Alan García. His is the period 
of expansion of international anti-corruption agreements and internationally funded 
projects, which spread from institution to institution with varied degrees of 
implementation and results. In the following subsections, the wide arrange of 	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activities are briefly described in order to get a clear picture of the level of 
international involvement in the efforts to reform the Peruvian NACS and bring down 
public malfeasance. Although their empirical results are often difficult to assess due 
to confidentiality measures imposed on their evaluation reports, the employment of 
personal interviews and the review of specific products will make it possible to 
provide some conclusions regarding the impact of international activities on the 
stability of the NACS. 
 
MESICIC 
As it has been described in Chapter IV, international conventions279 represent 
direct forms of pressure over a political system to push for the reform of domestic 
anti-corruption structures. The IACAC adopted by the Organization of American 
States on March 29, 1996, was the first such instrument to come into existence, back 
when the international movement was still taking shape. This type of activities, 
however, represent little more than normative commitments if they are not joined by 
procedures through which monitor compliance; thus, the need for a review 
mechanism for the IACAC became apparent soon afterwards, and so the MESICIC 
was adopted on 2001 to bring attention to the level of domestic implementation in 
each one of the signatory countries. The First Round of review took place between 
2003 and 2006, after selecting the specific provisions that would be subject to 
assessment.280 The task was carried out by waves, starting with the country report on 
Argentina (adopted in February of 2003), and concluding with the country reports on 
Guyana, Grenada, Suriname, Brazil, and Belize (adopted in March of 2006). The 
MESICIC’s committee of experts adopted Peru’s country report in July of 2004 
(MESICIC, 2006), after having considered information on the national anti-corruption 
structure up to March 8, 2004. 
The country report on Peru identified a series of deficiencies in the 
implementation of most of the provisions evaluated, and showed a striking absence of 
information regarding the results of the legal framework and/or other measures 
(MESICIC, 2004), which was consistently missing in the Peruvian answer to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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MESICIC questionnaire expressing reasons such as the ‘newness’ of the adopted 
legislation, the on-going execution of related activities, the lack of implementation or 
final approval of norms, and others. For the MESICIC (2004, p. 21), such conditions 
impaired its capacity to “offer a comprehensive and objective appraisal of the results 
obtained.” Considering the Peruvian measures adopted to implement the IACAC, the 
country report offered 51 recommendations aiming at improving the NACS, most of 
which pertained to norms of conduct and compliance mechanisms (24), sworn 
statements of income (7), and participation of civil society (14). These 
recommendations were to be adopted and implemented by the government, and again 
reported during the Second Round of review that would be carried out in 2007 and 
consider information provided until November 10 of 2006. 
As the Second Round actually was set to take place during the 2006-2011 
government, the Toledo administration had no real incentive to implement the 
MESICIC recommendations, as the successor party would be the one to fall under 
pressure. Although the critical assessment from the MESICIC would point to a lack of 
commitment of the Perú Posible government to take on its recommendations in the 
two years it had between the First Round’s country report and the transference of 
power from Alejandro Toledo to Alan García, the news of international criticism 
would break again under the APRA’s watch, and would generate more stress to the 
actors in office than to those in the opposition. On the other hand, whatever measures 
that were to be adopted during Toledo’s government, they would be recognized only 
after he had left office, and so the political credits would likely be reaped by the 
APRA, and not by Perú Posible. Thus, in terms of political support and demands, 
there was nothing to lose from ignoring the MESICIC recommendations, and it could 
actually prove to be a feasible way of stressing the system lead by Alan García. 
As expected, the country report on Peru for the Second Round found that, of 
the 51 recommendations made by the Committee of Experts of the MESICIC, 49 
were still pending information or requiring additional attention; this is, 96% of the 
recommendations had been partially or completely ignored. Additionally, the Second 
Round involved the review of a new set of provisions included in the IACAC.281 This 
time, 26 recommendations were offered. 	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In light of the bleak level of implementation of the MESICIC 
recommendations, the technical secretariat of the follow-up mechanism decided to 
activate an additional pressure strategy to stimulate reform (OAS, 2011a): 
 
“[The technical secretariat] created a technical assistance program to support 
States Parties in the creation of a national Plan of Action to implement the 
recommendations formulated by the Committee of Experts.  The Plan of 
Action, which is created with the full participation of the public sector and 
civil society, identifies the necessary activities to implement the 
recommendations, the agencies responsible for implementation, estimated 
time-frame and cost to do so, and indicators to measure the advances in 
implementation.” 
 
 According to the OAS, the project of technical assistance282 was to be 
financed through a contribution made by Canada, the United States and Spain. In 
October of 2007, project consultant Franz Chevarría Montesinos (who was also 
member of the ONA in the area of preventive anti-corruption policies) presented a 
draft project denominated Action Plan for the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Committee of Experts of the Mechanism for Follow-Up on 
the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Ministerio 
de Justicia, 2007), addressing the specific measures and responsibilities to be taken by 
the State in order to satisfy the recommendations made by MESICIC in the first two 
rounds of review. On the basis of this document, a national workshop was held in 
Lima between February 14 and 15, 2008, with the participation of domestic actors 
such as NGOs, civic and professional associations, constitutionally autonomous 
organizations, and public officials in general. The idea was to elaborate and improve 
on the project developed by Chevarría, providing it with popular legitimacy in the 
process, and to have it officially adopted by the government later on. Thus, the Action 
Plan financially backed by the OAS was meant to become the foundation, if not the 
embodiment itself, of a National Anti-Corruption Plan in Peru, as it would be the case 
in other countries of the region, such as Uruguay (CM, 2010/06/23). However, when 
the government finally produced an official (but not legally decreed) Plan in 	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December of 2008, members of civil society were quick to point that it had not taken 
into consideration the measures elaborated in the Action Plan. In fact, there was no 
mention at all of the document. The report of the civil society (Arias, 2010b) sent to 
the MESICIC as part of the Fourth Round of review stated: 
 
“It is significant that [the Action Plan] was not included in the National Anti-
Corruption Plan (in no part of the latter is the Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
mentioned), which could be demonstrating that those who were in charge of 
relaunching the National Anti-Corruption Plan at the end of 2008... were in 
fact unaware of the existence of this other document. And, what is more 
troublesome, this omission constitutes the demonstration of the lack of 
continuity in a subject as important as that of the anti-corruption policy in 
Peru.”283 
 
 So, the Action Plan produced under the sponsorship of the OAS was pushed 
into oblivion by the government’s National Anti-Corruption Plan, which would not be 
legally recognized by decree and would only be introduced as part of a coping 
mechanism in the whole Petrogate affair, as it will be described later. 
 Returning to the MESICIC rounds, in 2009 the Third Round of review took 
place, assessing the provisions included in Article III, paragraphs 7 (laws denying 
favorable tax treatment for corruption-related activities) and 10 (accounting 
measures); and, Articles VIII (on transnational bribery), IX (on illicit enrichment), X 
(on notification of criminalization of the preceding activities) and XIII (on 
extradition) (MESICIC, 2011). Peru’s country report found that compliance with 
recommendations made in the First Round had increased from 4% to 16%; and that 
19% of recommendations made during the Second Round had been satisfactorily 
considered (Arias, 2010a). This increase in the compliance with MESICIC suggests 
that international pressure may have been more effective in forcing the 
implementation of the IACAC due to fact that both the Second and Third Rounds of 
review took place during one single presidential period, thus providing enough time 
and incentives to the government to engage in anti-corruption activities. Although the 
level of implementation remains very low, it contrasts dramatically with the almost 	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inexistent attention to the MESICIC’s recommendations in the last two years of the 
Toledo administration. This may very well point to a degree of effectiveness of 
international conventions as a source of stress given the right temporal conditions.  
Additionally, of the provisions reviewed in the Third Round, the MESICIC 
offered only 16 recommendations, an amount that also reflected the difference 
between engaging in prevention and engaging in corruption control.  
 However, in the Fourth Round of review, which considered information until 
September of 2012, the level of compliance with the recommendations made during 
the First Round of review was found to have another increased, reaching 30%. By this 
time, the APRA government was not longer in power but had given way to the 
administration of President Ollanta Humala Tasso. Why, then, had the government of 
President García kept investing in implementing the IACAC when the country report 
would not be produced until well into the next presidential period?  
Although this situation may seem to reject the argument made earlier 
regarding Toledo’s lack of incentives to engage in implementation, a closer look at 
the activities that were found satisfactory can provide an answer: Of all of the 
measures identified by the MESICIC, only one of them was carried out by the 
Executive branch: Supreme Decree No. 184-2008-EF, published on the first day of 
2009, which provides guidelines for the new law on public contracting; all the other 
measures were adopted either by constitutionally autonomous agencies, such as the 
OCG and the First Prosecutor’s Office, or already in the government of President 
Humala. Furthermore, the provision of rules for public contracting finds its reason not 
in the MESICIC recommendations either, but rather in the presence of an 
international financial crisis that makes it a preemptive demand-satisfactory measure 
for the scenario of ‘corruption in processes,’ and not a measure to satisfy international 
pressure. Thus, although the country report for the Fourth Round of the MESICIC 
shows different results than the one expected given the change in government, they 
are not to be attributed to the political will of the government. 
 
Other International Conventions and Agreements 
During the government of Alan García the political system was also pressed 
by other forms of international activism in the area of anti-corruption efforts, although 
none as institutionally active as the MESICIC.  
On November of 2004, the members of the APEC forum (including Peru) 
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endorsed the Santiago Commitment to Fight Corruption and Ensure Transparency, 
agreeing to promote regional cooperation on extradition, implement punitive and 
preventive policies, and engage in other forms of cooperation towards improving 
public transparency and honesty. Additionally, and in more specific terms, the forum 
leaders endorsed the APEC Course of Action On Fighting Corruption And Ensuring 
Transparency, which consisted of seven points: (1) the ratification and 
implementation of the UNCAC; (2) the strengthening of measure to prevent and fight 
corruption; (3) the denial of safe haven to corrupt officials; (4) the fight against both 
public and private corruption; (5) the promotion of public-private partnerships; (6) the 
cooperation among member economies; and finally, (7) the creation of an Experts’ 
Task Force to assist government senior officials in the implementation of the Santiago 
Commitment and the Course of Action. In 2007, these statements and actions were 
joined by the Conduct Principles for Public Officials; Complementary Anti-
Corruption Principles for the Public and Private Sectors; and the Statement on 
Actions for Fighting Corruption through Improved International Legal Cooperation. 
Then, in 2009, the APEC ministers endorsed the Singapore Declaration on 
Combating Corruption, Strengthening Governance and Enhancing Institutional 
Integrity, and the APEC Guidelines on Enhancing Governance and Anti-Corruption. 
However, disregarding the profuse production of official declarations, to this date 
there has been almost no incidence of the APEC’s anti-corruption discourse on the 
Peruvian NACS. According to a consultant working with the APEC’s Anti-
Corruption and Transparency Experts’ Task Force (Interview No. 11): 
 
“It would be difficult to evaluate [the impact of the APEC on domestic anti-
corruption implementation]. There are no national committees, or permanent 
committee. The [management of the] issue is divided because the Ministry of 
Production is the one seemingly in charge of representing [the country, but] 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles the other part. So it is complicated... 
There is no awareness here yet.”284 
 
 Thus, it would seem that, although the APEC’s activities can be nominally 
described as engaging in the kind of pressure activities dubbed here international 	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agreements, in reality they do not have any more impact than that of influencing 
national public officials through the general dissemination of corruption awareness 
and anti-corruption principles and information,285 an activity that does not normally 
justifies the employment of coping mechanisms from the government. 
 Turning to the UNCAC, which represents a more thorough and universal 
approach, it was ratified by the Peruvian government on October 20, 2004. Steps 
towards a peer-review mechanism followed shortly afterwards, and in December of 
2006 the Conference of State Parties agreed on the establishment of a Pilot Review 
Programme as a way of testing possible means for a more comprehensive review 
mechanism. Sixteen countries, including Peru, expressed their willingness to 
participate in the Pilot in a voluntary way; these countries were later on joined by 
other thirteen in 2008, amounting to the twenty-nine participant countries (UNODC, 
2009). 
 Peru submitted its self-assessment checklist on August 15, 2007, and the on-
site review took place between the 16th and 18th of January 2008, conducted by 
Argentina and Norway. The scope of review was as follows (UNODC, 2008, p. 2): 
 
“Articles 5 (preventive anti-corruption policies and practices); 15 (bribery of 
national public officials); 16 (bribery of foreign public officials and officials 
of public international organizations); 17 (embezzlement, misappropriation or 
other diversion of property by a public official); 25 (obstruction of justice); 46 
(mutual legal assistance), particularly paragraphs 13 and 9; 52 (prevention and 
detection of transfers of proceeds of crime); and 53 (measures for direct 
recovery of property).” 
 
 While this Pilot Review might be seen as an effort to press the government 
into engaging more actively on anti-corruption reform, and thus a source of stress for 
the NACS, the conclusions of the review process were of more help for its stability 
than a threat. Regarding the Peruvian legislative and regulatory framework, and its 
correlation with the UNCAC provisions under consideration, the review concluded 
that “Peru’s legislative framework has largely implemented the requirements in 
accordance with the eight Articles under the scope of the Pilot Review Programme” 	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(UNODC, 2008, p. 3). Furthermore, regarding the level of implementation, the 
document states (p. 4): 
 
“Peru has implemented the requirements of Article 5 regarding preventive 
activities through a wide-ranging system of preventive measures and bodies... 
[Its] implementation of the requirements of Article 15 to criminalize bribery 
has also been good, with many prosecutions of bribery cases... [It] has fully 
implemented Article 17 of the Convention, and has prosecuted many 
embezzlement and misappropriation cases... Overall, Peru’s implementation of 
the prevention, detection, and reporting requirements of Article 52 has also 
been good... [It] also has a good history of implementing measures for direct 
recovery of property as required by Article 53 of the Convention...” 
 
 The review process only seemed to find important problems with the 
implementation of Articles 16 and 25, with all other reviewed provisions being 
critically commented only in an ancillary way, after describing Peru’s NACS as 
mostly in line with the tenets of the UNCAC. Thus, it is improbable that the Pilot 
Review had been seen as a real threat for the provision of support into the political 
system; most likely, Peruvian authorities saw the country’s voluntary participation in 
the Programme as an opportunity to express their support for anti-corruption 
reform286 in response to the UNCAC, and the positive evaluation as a way of 
preemptively addressing future criticisms regarding the NACS. An introductory 
remark contained in the document supports these assertions (UNODC, 2008, p. 7): 
 
“It must be indicated also that the recently appointed president of the Council 
of Ministers has been mandated by the President of the Republic to place the 
fight against corruption as a central axis of the general government policies, 
with explicit reference to the international obligations undertaken by Peru as 
State party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption.”  
 
 Clearly, this kind of description cannot count as pressure activity in any sense 
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of the term, as it works more for the benefit of the García administration than for its 
stress. Under these circumstances, it is completely understandable why the 
government expressed its interest in voluntarily yielding to a pilot review process. 
 From the lessons learned in the Pilot Review Programme, in 2009 the 
Conference established a proper Review Mechanism comprising two five-years 
cycles. The review process consisted of information provided by the government 
through the Comprehensive Self-Assessment Checklist created by the UNODC, and 
an on-site visit by representatives from two other State Parties, which for the case of 
Peru were Ecuador and Bolivia. The on-site visit to Peru took place in April of 2012, 
already during the government of Ollanta Humala; from it, a report was finally 
presented in Vienna on May 27, 2013.  
From the review of Peru’s implementation of the UNCAC, only the executive 
summary became available. However, it was enough to observe that, this time, the 
Peruvian NACS was described in a less positive light, highlighting from the 
beginning the deficiencies in the domestic legal framework, the level and quality of 
implementation, and other issues related to the UNCAC provisions (UNODC, 2013). 
The government of President García, knowing that the UNCAC review would finish 
during the next presidential period, need not worry about adopting measures to either 
satisfy the demands for anti-corruption reform, or about coping with the potentially 
incoming stress: those would be problems for the Humala administration to handle, as 
the scenario of corruption intolerance (however much its degree of pressure) would 
only be fully developed in 2013.  
 Disregarding the problems of bringing pressure over a certain political 
leadership by carrying out activities that take a long period of time to come to 
fruition, it is possible to state that the level of pressure represented by technical 
reports is still significantly lower than other considerations, such as economic 
interests and political legitimacy. The United National, in general, is not a 
traditionally relevant actor recognized by Peruvian society; and the UNCAC, in 
particular, is largely unknown even for many civil servants and some senior officials. 
A member of the CNA, who was later involved in the activities of the Conference of 
State Parties, comments (Interview No. 08): 
 
“The UNCAC is not even known here [in the country]. I talk about it 
sometimes. [This one time] there were two prosecutors who asked me ‘What 
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is that convention of United Nations...?’ So I told them that there was a 
delegate of theirs that used to travel with me to Vienna, Pablo Sánchez, who 
worked with me... [And they replied:] ‘Oh, that’s what Pablo was doing in 
Vienna?’”287 
 
 On the other hand, an international instrument like the United States-Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement (usually called free trade agreement—FTA) has shown 
to be more effective in bringing along changes in the anti-corruption legal framework, 
even if only to a degree limited by the nature of the agreement itself. After its 
subscription on April 12, 2006, the government of President García invested 
significant efforts in carrying out the implementation of the measures included in the 
FTA, which was set to enter into force in February of 2009. These measures included, 
among many others, the provision on active bribery of foreign officials, contained 
under Section B, Anti-Corruption, of Chapter Nineteen, Transparency. Thus, in 
following the text of the FTA, Peru was expected to pass legislation making it a 
criminal offense for a person to engage in active transnational bribery in any way that 
may affect international trade or investment. This obligation was fulfilled on January 
14, when Law No. 29316 that Modifies, Incorporates and Regulates Several 
Measures in Order to Implement the Trade Promotion Agreement Subscribed between 
Peru and the United States of America was published, creating the crime of ‘active 
transnational bribery.’ This law, it should be added, was approved with surprising 
haste, taking barely five days to go through Congress; this was possible thanks to the 
decision to exempt it from discussion and ruling in the appropriate parliamentary 
commission, and instead was prioritized for direct and immediate vote in plenary 
session.  
 The text of the legislative project of Law No. 29316,288 presented by the 
Executive branch, is particularly revealing in terms of the relative weight of 
agreements such as the IACAC and the UNCAC compared to an FTA: 
 
“The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption... establish the acts of international corruption 
committed against foreign public officials or officials of international public 	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288 Law Project No. 2959/2008.PE, presented on January 8, 2009. 
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agencies. 
Likewise, article 19.9.1(c) of Chapter 19 (Transparency) of the Trade 
Promotion Agreement with the U.S.A. disposes that the Parties will adopt 
legislative measures to impose criminal sanctions [in cases of active 
international bribery]... 
Notwithstanding having acquired these international obligations, and although 
there exist recommendations in the sense that Peru should categorize such 
criminal form in its domestic framework, they have not been adopted until this 
day. In this sense, and in order to comply with the Conventions mentioned 
above and article 19.9.1(c) of the TPA, it becomes necessary to introduce an 
additional [clause] to article 397 of the Criminal Code, categorizing 
International Bribery.”289  
 
 The point raised by the government was clear: Even though the Pilot Review 
of the UNCAC had explicitly found that “Peru has not criminalized either the active 
or the passive bribery of foreign and international public officials” (UNODC, 2008, p. 
17), the project presented by the Executive limited to consider only that aspect which 
had been included in the FTA, this is, active transnational bribery. In fact, Law No. 
29316 explicitly framed the crime within international economic or commercial 
activities, a limitation that was not considered in the UNCAC and which was 
criticized in the report produced by the Review Mechanism in 2013. However, that 
limitation was perfectly in line with the text of the FTA, which had stated its 
requirement in matters affecting international trade or investment. Additionally, Law 
No. 29316 had purposely excluded any reference to passive transnational bribery, a 
figure that also needed implementation in line with the requirements of the UNCAC; 
this deficit would only be amended in June of 2011 with Law No. 29703, by proposal 
of the judiciary.  
Under this body of evidence, it is clear that, even though the legislative project 
of Law No. 29316 had cited the IACAC and the UNCAC as reasons to criminalize 
active international bribery, the only legal instrument that had exerted actual pressure 
on the NACS was the FTA with the United States of America. The government, in 
turn, satisfied the demands of the FTA to its absolute minimum, while calmly 	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ignoring the recommendations from the UNODC. 
After considering the above cases, it is no surprise that the Andean Anti-
Corruption Plan endorsed on June 13, 2007, could have been all but forgotten, 
considering the irrelevance that the Andean Community had exhibited in most other 
aspects.290 Already by February of 2011, the Andean Parliament was officially calling 
for the reactivation of the Executive Committee in charge of managing the 
implementation of the Plan, which had met only in two occasions, and for the 
resuming of regional efforts to fight corruption (Andean Community, 2011). Needless 
to say, the calls came to no fruition, and it is unknown if the Andean Anti-Corruption 
Plan is still considered an international commitment by members of the government, 
and much less if it represents any form of pressure. 
 
Failures of the UNDP and the USAID 
When the ONA was dissolved in mid-2008, it did not only mean the extinction 
of an anti-corruption body in charge of driving the development of preventive policies 
in the country, but it also meant the end of the UNDP project that had been providing 
technical assistance since 2002. A UNDP program official involved in the activities of 
the CNA (and later the ONA) indicates that the problem of political support had been 
a recurrent issue from the very beginning (Interview No. 28): 
 
“I am talking about a whole period... Even though I was responsible for 
supporting the anti-corruption initiatives, the great problem that I can describe 
is that, [although] there were very good ideas, very good mid-level 
professionals, good consultants, and teams that could have been built in an 
appropriate way, the leadership (and the support of the incumbent government 
to that leadership) was the great problem that existed... The CNA became the 
ONA, then this became another commission,291 and it was like going from 
office to office to see what happens; [but] it was not a matter of organizational 
structure, it was a matter of empowering the leadership. [The government] 
talked about an anti-corruption czar; but what czar could there be without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 According to a poll conducted in February of 2006, 61% of respondents in Peru had never heard of 
the Andean Community (APOYO, 2006) even though it had been on the works since 1969 and Peru 
had joined its free trade zone in 1997. 
291 The Anti-Corruption High-Level Commission, created during the APRA government, but which 
will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
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power? It was pure title... We could see that [the project] goals were not being 
reached because of the institutional weakness [of the national agency] and the 
lack of commitment from the highest spheres of the government. ”292 
 
The UNDP official also comments about the position of the international 
agency during the final period of the CNA, and the demolition of this to create the 
ONA: 
 
[The transfer of the CNA to the Ministry of Justice was seen] negatively, 
because we could perceive a lack of compass, but we had to keep the 
commitment, otherwise it was going to be even worse, and the little 
institutionality there was would disappear. So we forced many of our internal 
procedures regarding agreements and projects. We unloaded the project from 
one sector to another. And later [the anti-corruption office] went back! It was 
moved from the PCM to the Ministry of Justice, and from the Ministry of 
Justice returned to the PCM! So, you can imagine those forced procedures, 
because inside a project you [should] have a responsible person who remains 
during the whole life of the project; but we had to close the project, move the 
remaining resources into the new project. So, we really pushed it, we had to 
juggle it. I had to present waivers to my agency explaining the situation, the 
circumstances of the country, etc.”293 
 
When the ONA was created in October of 2007, it was seen with great 
expectations by the UNDP. The new office, as it was mentioned before, represented a 
great refurbishing of an anti-corruption body that had been dragging for years, 
without ever really taking off, which had obviously impacted in the reputation of 
those international actors involved in its support. The ONA, however, was short-lived. 
The problems with it became evident to the UNDP soon after its creation (Interview 
No. 28): 
 
“The creation of the ONA embraced many of the proposals that we had 
extended; and I remember there was a lot of expectations for it. But sadly, 	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these expectations disappeared quickly with the widespread attacks made 
against the ONA’s responsible, who even ended up with health issues. I had a 
lot of contact with [Carolina Lizárraga], who was Project Director, and sadly 
she had to leave because of serious health issues... Even the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs complained that the ONA had been given faculties that 
belonged to the former!294 Truly, that was stingy... UNDP is an institution that 
[can only provide] support; the government was free to say ‘We follow a 
certain strategy’ or ‘We coordinate with other institutions to make this strategy 
work.’ But I can tell you, there was not much intention of carrying out any 
coordination.”295 
 
However, even though the persistence of the project and the technical activism 
of the UNDP had the purpose of keeping with a strategy of assistance as a form of 
indirect pressure, its effectiveness in stressing the political leadership and the NACS 
was meager compared to the coping mechanisms employed by the government (as 
they have been described earlier). Confronted with the harsh reality, the international 
agency could do nothing but to see its strategy fail: 
 
“[We, at the UNDP project, saw it as something] very bad. We were not 
communicated at the appropriate time (being us strategic partners in the 
subject); it was a unilateral decision from the government. And what is more, 
it was a political decision more than a technical one, even though we had 
highlighted the technical aspect of the office because if you make it a political 
issue then you discredit it. So, we took it badly... It was not coordinated with 
us; it was a very political subject. We were simply informed...”296 
 
The treatment received by the government seemed to go hand in hand with the 
type of pressure activity employed by the UNDP: 
 
“We as UNDP do not engage in political pressure. What UNDP does is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 The activity challenged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the representation of the State in 
international anti-corruption fora such as the Committee of Experts of the MESICIC, the Conference of 
State Parties to the UNCAC, the APEC’s Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts’ Task Force, and 
others. 
295 Translated from Spanish. 
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show the government the necessity of having certain norms, protocols, or 
conventions implemented, because it is a ‘government commitment,’ [or] ‘a 
mandate of United Nations and Peru is a member’... But no political pressure; 
United Nations does not engage in political pressure. 
[From the other side,] I do not think the Peruvian government feels pressured 
[by the UNDP]. United Nations, in general, has the mechanism of Special 
Rapporteurs, like the ones on adequate housing, health, indigenous peoples, 
etc., who many times have criticized government affairs, and the government 
has received them but has not felt pressured.”297  
 
Thus, it is possible to see that, notwithstanding the employment of technical 
assistance, the avoidance of direct forms of pressure hindered the capacity of the 
UNDP to effectively support the performance and existence of a national anti-
corruption body, and through it to secure reforms in the area of prevention or control.  
Disregarding its own irrelevance, however, the UNDP had succeeded in 
leaving behind the seed for another, more aggressive, example of assistance, this time 
of a financial nature. Adopted by USAID, it would represent the main international 
activity for the stress of the NACS in terms of its sheer financial resources.  
In 2008 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
launched the Anti-Corruption Threshold Program (ATP) in Peru, under the 
framework of the Millennium Challenge Corporation298 (MCC), set to work with the 
judiciary, the National Police, the Office of the Ombudsman, the OCG, and civil 
society organizations. 
The interest of the Peruvian government in applying for the ATP can be found 
not only in the financial resources that would be poured into the system (some of 
which had benefits outside the scope of the NACS), but in what it represented: “The 	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298  The MCC, as described by Curt Tarnoff (2015), “provides economic assistance through a 
competitive selection process to developing nations that demonstrate positive performance in three 
areas: ruling justly, investing in people, and fostering economic freedom” (summary page). In order for 
a country to be considered a candidate for economic assistance under the framework of the MCC, it 
needs to fall “under the threshold for the World Bank’s classification for upper-middle income 
countries” (Tarnoff, 2015, p. 2); this is, it needs to belong to the lower-income or lower-middle income 
group. Two types of economic assistance programs are available from the MCC: Compacts, spamming 
five-year terms and awarding budgets raging in the hundreds of millions of US dollars; and thresholds, 
spamming two to three years, and involving fewer resources. Threshold programs are “designed to 
assist promising candidate countries to become compact-eligible” (Tarnoff, 2015, p. 17), and usually 
focus on corruption issues. 
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MCC made control of corruption a ‘hard’ (read: mandatory) indicator for compact 
status. These Threshold programs were designed specifically to help the recipient 
countries address identified weaknesses in their control of corruption.” (USAID, 
2014) The Compact programs, which could be granted for low-income countries with 
compact status, involved the financial assistance with hundreds of millions of US 
dollars for a wide variety of activities impacting on poverty and economic growth; but 
they could only be accessed by improving the country’s NACS, or at least the 
measurement of this by international indicators. Thus, by assuming the role of an anti-
corruption involved government, it was possible to gain access to a much-desired 
source of international funds. A USAID official who was directly involved in the 
activities of the ATP is of this opinion (Interview No. 25): 
 
“The MCC has these Threshold Programs as a stimulus to be able to access 
bigger funds (the Compacts)... So, that was the incentive for the Peruvian 
government to take on the project. But what happened in the process [of 
implementation] is that Peru moved on to become a middle-income country, 
and thus it lost the opportunity to access the Compact. So, the whole launch 
pad strategy that the ATP represented became discouraged. That was 
somehow a disincentive for public agencies in Peru (that were involved in the 
program) to carry out the tasks as we would have wanted them to.”299 
 
The logic behind the government’s interest in the ATP falls perfectly in the 
tenets of the theoretical model: As it was proposed before, anti-corruption will only 
be chosen when it provides more political capital than the sum of the resources spent 
and any loss in corrupt profits. Considering that the original run of the ATP was 
scheduled to go between 2008 and 2010, finishing just in time for the electoral 
campaign; that the granting of compact status would impact positively on the APRA’s 
image and political capital; that it provided resources that in reality could be 
employed in the satisfaction of more than anti-corruption activities; and that the 
implementation of specific measures could improve the overall rating of the country 
without actually affecting the NACS from the perspective of the political leadership, 
it is clear that the incentives for undertaking anti-corruption actions were indeed 	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present when the government engaged USAID. When economic growth closed the 
door to the Compact Program, the government lost the principal incentive for 
successfully implementing the measures contained in the ATP, and so the problems 
that will be described below arose. 
The ATP project had been initially proposed, in all its measures, by the 
government through the leadership of the PCM and a process of consultations with 
the public agencies directly involved in the future implementation. Then, the project 
was analyzed and negotiated in Washington. The result was the grating of US$ 24 
million, including US$ 1 million to Proética (TI’s national chapter) for activities 
involving civil society. In order to monitor the execution of activities carried out by 
public agencies, an Executive Board was installed chaired by a representative of the 
prime minister, which had to regularly inform USAID of the progress made. Thus, it 
is fair to say that the ability of the international agency to affect the stability of the 
NACS was fairly limited by the presence and control of the government, which had 
from the beginning the capacity to impose its own interests in the matter.  
Due to the impossibility of gaining direct access to the official report of the 
project, which is confidential in nature, the results of the ATP are described here in 
detail by copying excerpts from an interview taken with an USAID official (Interview 
No. 25): 
 
“The final [evaluation] report is very critical, as the expectations that the 
American government had of that project were not reached because the 
Peruvian government, in almost every aspect, did not fit the bill. There were 
important problems in terms of lack of commitment for implementing 
products that were delivered (and expensive), such as information systems. 
Everyone requested information systems, and there appeared a problem that 
began from the formulation of the project, with USAID and the American 
government accepting all those requests without a previously screening them 
to see if the [Peruvian] government had the capacity to manage them, or if 
they were actually needed...” 
 
The problems with the implementation and impact of the ATP are then 
described by turning to each public agency involved in the specific product. First, the 
judiciary: 
	   243	  
 
“For example, the technology of Business Process Management, which is used 
to manage information systems for the follow-up of files in the Office of 
Control of the Judiciary: the system was implemented, delivered, and after 
some time the judiciary stopped using it, and threw it away. And the 
development of that system was the reason for an extension of the project; in 
other words, in order to fulfill [its commitment], USAID extended the 
deadline of the project (the Assistance Agreement between Peru and the 
United States), to provide the contractor with more time to deliver the 
product... [These issues] represent a waste of money, first of all; and in terms 
of reaching the goals, [they mean that] we were unable to consolidate a 
mechanism of transparency and efficiency in the production of disciplinary 
investigations in the judiciary... [Additionally,] the development of the system 
was linked to the purchase of equipment: two cutting edge servers with all the 
conditions so that the system could run, computers, building of a data center, 
etc. So, a lot of money for infrastructure, besides the software. More than a 
US$ 1 million were spent in equipment, and US$ 0.5 million more in the 
software. So, more than US$ 1.5 million were invested... and from that they 
kept the equipment, and threw away the informatics solution... We also gave 
them the Business Intelligence [tool]... and they say that it has never been 
used, that they never implemented it.”300 
 
The activities carried out by USAID in assisting the work of the Office of the 
Comptroller General were affected by the same problems: 
 
“With the OCG something similar happened. We bought them computers, 
servers; we hired IBM to do a consultancy regarding a system for the follow-
up of citizen denunciations (which was part of the OCG’s mandate)... When 
we had already made progress with all those requirements that had been 
included in the [ATP] contract from the beginning, a change in the legislation 
took place and the SINAD (National System for the Servicing of Denounces) 
was created. This somehow changed their logic regarding workflows, but what 	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we had been developing for them [under the ATP contract], the flow of those 
processes for servicing denunciations, was based in the previous system... 
They ended up coming out and saying: ‘As there are new guidelines, a new 
organizational structure, a new map of processes, because this is a new unit... 
all of this that has been made, no longer works.’ So, the system that was 
developed for them was never used either. For that consultancy USAID paid 
to a partner of IBM US$ 300~400 thousand. Wasted money. And they went 
back to their old system .net.”301 
 
 Finally, the measures involving informatics components carried out for the 
National Police followed the same patter as the judiciary and the OCG before: 
 
“Not only the OCG and the judiciary threw away the systems (for different 
reasons, but the result was the same, they never used them), but also the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, specifically the Inspectorate of the National 
Police. We hired engineers to work in-house, we bought computers, servers, 
internet repeater antennas... Either way, we also built the system they wanted... 
[but] at the end they also changed their legislation. [The system] could have 
been adapted because the changes were not dramatic, but at then end they 
decided no to use it because the system could not be replicated in all the 
regions were they had investigatory offices due to technological requirements 
that were already their responsibility to implement. The project could not do 
all of it because there were not enough resources, and because that was already 
responsibility of the government. If you are getting already 70% of the 
infrastructure, the other 30% has to come out from your pocket. But they did 
not put that 30% from their pockets, and at the end the users decided to go 
back to their old system, and [the product] was thrown away. [This failed 
activity represented] other US$ 1 million.”302  
 
 Notwithstanding the serious deficits in the implementation of the activities, 
which had been selected and requested by the government itself, and that the PCM 
(specifically the Executive Board) had been properly informed of the issues by 	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USAID, nothing changed. The execution of the ATP kept dragging, the project 
contract had to be extended until 2012, and a month after the APRA left office the 
Executive Board was dissolved by the PCM, and USAID lost its primary contact 
point. All further coordination had to be done directly with the representatives of the 
public agencies, one by one, with all the difficulties entailed.  
 As the USAID official expresses, the interest of the international agency had 
been to somehow pressure the government into adopting anti-corruption measures by 
offering financial assistance, 303  which was expected to work better than the 
exclusively technical approach taken by the UNDP: 
 
“The purpose was somehow to [press the government]. We are not talking 
about mere cents; we are talking about more than US$ 20 million that come 
from the American taxpayers so that improvements in the workflow can be 
achieved, so that anti-corruption control can be improved. Obviously there 
was a commitment that the government had to effectively fulfill, but which it 
didn’t at the end.”304 
 
However, we can consider USAID’s original strategy not only as financial 
assistance, which ultimately failed to make any real impact in the NACS, but as a 
form of aid conditionality:305 The ATP was supposed to be only a launch pad towards 
obtaining the ‘compact status,’ and in that way force the government to undertake 
anti-corruption reforms (at least to a minimum degree) with the promise of aid funds.  
But as the Compact Program became unreachable, the ATP lost most of its leverage, 
and so it failed. Although it is impossible to defend that, had the compact status been 
kept as a possibility, the ATP would have reached a higher level of success, the cases 
of the FTA and the UNDP suggest that environmental actors have more to win from 
implementing strategies that rely in direct forms of pressure, particularly those 
involving financial resources, than from classic assistance activities.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 As described under international pressure activities, indirect pressure. 
304 Ibid. 
305 As described under international pressure activities, direct pressure. 
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4. The End of the Anti-Corruption Subsystem 
 
Several measures taken during the government of President García affected 
the formal structure of the anti-corruption subsystem, as well as its effective capacity. 
In general, the period of 2006-2011 represents the collapse of the Ad Hoc Public 
Procurator’s Office, and the dismantling of the subsystem in regards to the role of the 
judiciary. To address the details and implications of these changes, the Procurator’s 
Office will be discussed first, after which the study will turn to the constitutionally 
autonomous agencies of the subsystem. 
 As it can be remembered, by the end of the government of Alejandro Toledo 
the main Executive office in charge of corruption control was the Ad Hoc Public 
Procurator’s Office led by Antonio Maldonado, which followed the cases of the 
Fujimori-Montesinos network. However, with the change of government, leaders of 
the incumbent party, APRA, began pushing for the creation of an additional ad hoc 
office charged with investigating and denouncing all the cases of corruption involving 
the Toledo administration (LR, 2006/08/15), in what can only be considered an 
example of anti-corruption cleanup aimed at stimulating support. For this task of 
exclusively non-partisan investigations/prosecutions, 306  the government appointed 
Gino Ríos Patio on August 29, 2006.307 Procurator Ríos showed promptly to be a 
fervent critic of the previous administration, and one month after his designation the 
scandal broke when he publicly stated that Toledo was a ‘more corrupt political 
animal than the fugitive former president Alberto Fujimori himself’ (Perú21, 
2006/10/08). Naturally, his outburst was immediately criticized by members of the 
opposition, particularly those of Perú Posible, and even the government expressed 
some distance from Ríos opinion. However, the procurator’s words were in line with 
the government position of harassing the former president, as a few days earlier, on 
September 28, Congressmembers of the APRA had supported (and succeeded in) the 
creation of a parliamentary committee of investigation308 against Alejandro Toledo 
and his wife (LR, 2006/09/29). The parliamentary measure was yet another form of 
non-partisan investigation, only this time of symbolic nature. Together with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
307 Supreme Resolution No. 143-2006-JUS, published on Augusto 30, 2006. 
308 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of stress amelioration (1st 
round). 
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appointment of Ríos Patio, it served a specific agenda aimed at stimulating support 
for the new government, and so did the statements made by the public procurator.  
Meanwhile, a few days before Gino Ríos was appointed, ad hoc procurator 
Antonio Maldonado had presented his letter of resignation due to family reasons (LR, 
2006/08/26). Although the government had previously stated its desire to keep 
Maldonado in charge of the Fujimori-Montesinos cases, it had no option but to accept 
his resignation309 and to look for a new procurator. The search concluded with the 
designation of Carlos Briceño Puente,310 but with him a series of disapproving 
comments followed from different media sources, which pointed out his faulty 
performance during his time as associate procurator in charge of extraditions, office 
that he had been forced to leave in November of 2005 after Maldonado had requested 
his resignation (Salazar, 2006). His appointment as new leader of the ad hoc office 
was seen not only seen as a clear negligence of the government by members of the 
press, but also by the team of associate procurators. Less than a week after Briceño’s 
designation, Iván Montoya Vivanco, new head of the area of extraditions, announced 
his departure, stating (Salazar García, 2006):  
 
“I hope to be mistaken about Mr. Briceño, but three weeks ago I expressed in 
advance that the government administration required bigger gestures in order 
to provide more support to the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office in the fight 
against corruption... It is necessary to show a bigger commitment in the 
process of extradition of former president Alberto Fujimori. The extradition is 
a State policy, and not only [a policy] of the judiciary. It is a requirement from 
the Executive branch that makes it its [responsibility]; therefore, a minimum 
of non-partisan political commitment is necessary. These are gestures that I 
have not seen.”311 
 
 The government decision represented in practical terms a form of institutional 
devolution, one that had clear-cut consequences for the functioning and results of the 
Ad Hoc office over the next year as it will discuss shortly, but whose rationale is not 
easy to identify. According to former procurator Antonio Maldonado, behind the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Supreme Resolution No. 145-2006-JUS, published on September 1, 2006. 
310 Supreme Resolution No. 156-2006-JUS, published on September 23, 2006. 
311 Translated from Spanish. 
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intended dislocation of the ad hoc procuratorial office was an interest in protecting the 
government’s relations with the pro-Fujimori forces in Congress and society (Godoy, 
2009); such allegations of a secret political instrumentalization of the Fujimori-
Montesinos cases by the incumbent party would be repeated several times throughout 
the period 2006-2011 (Mella, 2007a). In any case, the designation of Briceño 
continued the pattern started by the Toledo administration of neglecting the treatment 
and follow-up of the Fujimori-Montesinos case, but now switching in nature from a 
coping mechanism to a full-fledged countermeasure. 
In Addition to the above measures, in September of 2006 the government 
appointed Moises Tambini del Valle as new president of the Council of Judicial 
Defense of the State (CJDS). Tambini was an old partisan of the APRA, and had been 
congressmember of that party for the period 1985-1990, during the first government 
of President Alan García (Zambrano and More, 2007); now, as head of the CJDS, 
Tambini was effectively in control of all procuratorial offices, including those related 
to corruption cases. From that unfortunate position of political power over anti-
corruption efforts, the boycott of the procuratorial office promptly began (Godoy, 
2009): 
 
“The lack of support [for the activities of the ad hoc Procurator’s Office] 
became manifest again during a meeting summoned by Tambini in his office, 
located in the Ministry of Justice itself, the last week of September. According 
to a source from the Procurator’s Office that prefers to remain anonymous for 
the moment, during the meeting the newly appointed procurator Carlos 
Briceño was informed of the decision to reduce, in the next months, the 
number of lawyers allocated to his office, besides the rescindment of the 
contracts of associate procurator Janeth Briones (who chose to resign after the 
announcement) and of the lawyer in charge of the financial investigation 
against [vice-president] Luis Giampietri...”312 
 
Tambini was also quoted expressing his criticism of legal actions taken by the 
Public Procurator’s Office regarding judicial decision to close cases following the 
statute of limitations: “In a criminal case in which the statute of limitations has been 	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invoked, why would they file appeals? If the statute of limitations has to be followed 
then there is nothing else to do.”313 For this performance, Moises Tambini was 
appointed ambassador to Costa Rica in early 2009, after leaving the CJDS (EC, 
2009/02/14). 
Thus, from the beginning the APRA government managed to secure and 
exploit the activities of the procuratorial offices in charge of combating corruption, 
either by using them as a way of stimulating support, by effectively impairing their 
appropriate management, or by capturing them. Tambini’s appointment was the third 
coping mechanism activated in the first two months of government, which took the 
form of risk management.314 With these measures in place, the real output of the 
Executive branch in terms of corruption control began a dramatic decline. 
According to different sources, of the US$ 185 million recovered between 
2000 and 2011 by the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office for the Fujimori-Montesinos 
case, only 3% correspond to the years of the García administration; in other words, 
between 2006 and 2010 only US$ 2.2 million were recovered, with the amount 
dropping to zero in 2011 (Ramírez Varela, 2012). This amount contrasts with the 
actual existence of frozen funds in foreign accounts: US$ 12.6 million in Switzerland, 
US$ 8.4 million in Luxemburg, and US$ 1.6 in Mexico (Arbizu and Piedra León, 
2012). Therefore, it is not possible to say that the poor performance of the 
procuratorial office in recovering assets was a reflection of the exhaustion of stolen 
assets to repatriate, but rather the management of the office itself, which had fallen 
under deliberate negligence by the APRA government. 
The reason for such dramatic decline was connected to the management of 
human resources, as the personnel of the ad hoc procuratorial office were reduced 
from a team of fifty-four people to only thirteen lawyers and one accountant during 
the government of President García (Pariona Arana, 2012). Ten of them were 
dismissed by a single decision on November of 2009, representing a real cutback of 
almost 50% of the personnel at the time. According to the chief procurator, Pedro 
Gamarra, the reduction had been carried out by the government following an already 
decided agenda by which his office would be merged with the newly created Public 
Procurator Specialized in Crimes of Corruption (Romero, 2009). The merger of both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Excerpt from Perú21, quoted in Ramírez Varela (2012, p. 16). 
314 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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procuratorial offices, however, was not implemented until two years later, already 
during the Humala administration. 
The situation of the Decentralized Public Procurator’s Offices was no better: 
 
“The decentralized procurators were working mostly in offices occupied 
thanks to interinstitutional agreements, which were in basements, parking lots 
or attics of the headquarters of different public agencies. The logistic resources 
available to them were precarious and did not follow any criteria of 
requirement, because no previous study had been carried out to establish a 
standard of minimum requirements for their work.  
On the other hand, due to the fact that the national scheme of the 
Decentralized Public Procurator’s Offices follows the model of judicial 
districts, each procurator had to travel to the provinces under his or her 
jurisdiction (which were eight on average for each decentralized office), 
having to take on 800 cases in total. If we consider that, in the majority of 
cases, a decentralized office had only one procurator, [it becomes clear that] 
the coverage of all proceedings in any effective way was an impossible 
enterprise.” (Arbizu and Piedra León, 2012, p. 234) 
 
Alongside the steep deceleration of most procuratorial offices, other important 
measures were taken by the government during the next years, starting with the 
granting of additional faculties to the office of procurator Gino Ríos on September 03, 
2007. Amidst the news of corruption in the National Health System, and the severe 
scenario of corruption perception it spawned (which was described in detail earlier in 
this chapter), the government gave Supreme Resolution No. 149-2007-JUS granting 
faculties to the office of Gino Ríos to investigate cases of corruption involving 
members of the incumbent government, and not only those of the Toledo 
administration. According to the decree,  
 
“[It] is a State policy and primary objective of the government to fight 
corruption head-on, in order to contribute to the full validity, respect and 
promotion of the fundamental rights of the people... [and] that objective must 
be accomplished in a forceful and effective way in regards to the events taking 
place during the period of the current government...” 
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The provision of those faculties were, as the decree reads, directly connected 
to the corruption events already affecting the García administration, and the specific 
timing suggests that it had the purpose of helping in the prosecution of scapegoat 
actors connected to the National Health System scandals. A member of the Gino 
Ríos’ procuratorial office comments (Interview No. 29): 
 
“In exercising the broaden faculties, we denounced and requested the taking 
into custody of the person in charge of the National Health System... who was 
an important leader of the APRA party, and he ended up in prison.”315  
 
However, the most important aspect of the newly delegated powers was to 
work in practical terms as an inadequate anti-corruption agency,316 a symbolic coping 
mechanism activated to create the fiction that the government was really committed to 
purging corrupt elements from within its ranks. While that was true for specific 
scapegoat cases, it was not meant to reach the political leadership; in fact, not even 
scapegoating would be carried out to its full extent, as the head of the National Health 
System, Julio Espinoza, would be granted a presidential pardon on June 14, 2008, 
after being in prison for only eight months of the fifteen years that legally 
corresponded to his crimes (LR, 2011/07/04). Supreme Resolution No. 149-2007-JUS 
represented the first time that a procuratorial office was being given faculties to look 
into any new corruption case it saw fit; but the fact that such faculties had to be 
exercised by an office that did not have the material resources to pursue such task, 
that had been created as part of a political strategy, and that was already stretched 
going after the previous government, reveals that behind the government measure hid 
the true intention of stimulating support and soothing demands without actually 
reforming the NACS. Members of the opposition, particularly those from Perú 
Posible, adopted the same reading and openly criticized the measure as another 
political maneuver. Former Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero Costa publicly stated (LPR, 
2007/09/05): 
 
“[Gino Ríos] is no guarantee, for being an obsequious official of this 	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government; he is a member of the APRA without a membership ID, and for 
this reason there is no sense in appointing him to control the expenditures of 
the current administration... Everything indicates that this is a play to the 
gallery performed by Alan García, but everyone with a minimum of common 
sense will realize that a person whose main responsibility is to go after former 
president Toledo cannot be impartial enough to analyze the accounts of the 
current government.” 
 
To pursue the additional task of controlling corruption in the García 
administration, the office of Gino Ríos was not awarded any significant increase in its 
budget, and only saw its human resources go eventually from eight lawyers to twelve. 
Everything else remained the same, except for the monumental competency it now 
had. Thus, the ad hoc office remained mostly focused on chasing after cases involving 
the Toledo administration, which had been its original purpose, and of 362 cases 
presented to the Public Ministry, less than 30% involved the APRA period: “Because 
it was our principal objective, so to speak; that is what we were appointed for,”317 a 
member of Gino Ríos’ office commented (Interview No. 29). The set of mind 
regarding the task assigned and how this was supposed to affect the level of 
corruption in the incumbent government is clearly depicted in further comments: 
 
“Even though the wok done, in my opinion, was thorough and done with a lot 
of effort, my most important conclusion is that it is not possible to beat 
corruption from the Procurator’s Office. It is impossible... ”318 
 
The coping mechanism was later modified, amidst the impending emergence 
of the Petrogate crisis, by preemptively securing the political control of the 
procuratorial work, and appointing an actor whose performance would later show a 
complete negligence of his duties. Stretching the legislative powers granted by 
Congress for the implementation of the FTA with the United States, the government 
established by law319 the Judicial Defense System of the State (JDSS), creating for the 
first time the figure of the Public Procurator Specialized in Crimes of Corruption as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Translated from Spanish. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Legislative Decree No. 1068, published on June 28, 2008. 
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permanent office of the Ministry of Justice. Although the measure represented an 
improvement over the ad hoc and case-by-case nature of the anti-corruption 
procuratorial offices up to that point, it also meant the concentration of faculties in an 
office that was from then on solidly rooted in the Executive branch and thus kept 
secured under political control.320 Unsurprisingly, and showing the inadequacy of this 
anti-corruption scheme, Gino Ríos was dismissed in the middle of the Petrogate 
scandal, on October 31, 2008, and in his place the government appointed José Caldas 
Malpica, who immediately stated that his office would not pursue any investigation 
into the Petrogate affair (LR, 2008/11/05); he did, however, get involved in the BTR 
case that ensued shortly afterwards against those responsible for the audio tapping. 
Soon afterwards, Caldas Malpica got appointed to lead the newly created anti-
corruption Procurator’s Office,321 with government orders that all corruption cases 
being managed by other public procurators were immediately transferred to him.  
Finally, Caldas left the symbolically important anti-corruption office on November of 
2010, after news of a romantic relationship between him and an important witness in 
the Petrogate (Castillo, 2010) case forced him to present his resignation.322 
Behind them, Gino Ríos and Caldas Malpica left a depressing record: between 
2007 and 2009, the Procurator’s Office collected only S/. 700 (roughly US$ 250) in 
civil damages (Arbizu and Piedra León, 2012; Mujica et al., 2012), a really 
shockingly poor amount when we consider that this activity is one of the most 
important functions of a public procurator, and that according to Legislative Decree 
No. 1068 (which created the Public Procurator Specialized in Crimes of Corruption) 
50% of all funds collected under this activity would be awarded to the Ministry of 
Justice. The general institutional deterioration of the procuratorial work during this 
period is also worth mentioning: 
 
“[T]he creation of [a permanent anti-corruption procurator’s office] opens a 
period in which the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office for the Fujimori-
Montesinos cases, and the Public Procurator Specialized in Crimes of 
Corruption, coexist, albeit with different courses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 In fact, the guidelines of the JDSS (Supreme Decree 017-2008-JUS, art. 58) established that “public 
statements in the media without authorization from the Council” would be considered grounds for 
dismissal of public procurators, thus controlling their exercise of pressure over the political leadership 
and the NACS. 
321 Supreme Resolution No. 026-2009-JUS of January 31, 2009. 
322 Supreme Resolution No. 217-2010-JUS, published on November 11, 2010. 
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During the initial period of this coexistence, an evident and ever increasing 
deterioration of the operative capacity of the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s 
Office for the Fujimori-Montesinos cases took place (expressed in the 
progressive reduction of specialized personnel and economic and logistic 
resources), together with the neglect of the fundamental activity of the State’s 
judicial defense (the recovery of assets and collection of damages) by the 
Public Procurator Specialized in Crimes of Corruption. 
On the other hand, it has been evident in the last years the lack of prominence 
that has characterized procurators, relegating their participation to the level of 
a mere companion in proceedings, leaving behind the original impetus of the 
Ad Hoc Procurator’s Office...” (Arbizu and Piedra León, 2012, p. 229) 
 
The coup de grace to the procuratorial scheme created by the transitional 
government of Valentín Paniagua came with the deactivation of the Ad Hoc Public 
Procurator’s Office for the Fujimori-Montesinos case on October 3, 2011,323 under the 
government of Ollanta Humala, ordering the transfer of all its files and resources to 
the office of the Public Procurator Specialized in Crimes of Corruption.  
The final unification of the procuratorial offices had taken place within a 
general trend in the anti-corruption subsystem, which had extended the government’s 
approach into the judiciary and its associated measures. After years of expansion and 
evolution, on April 23, 2009, the Executive Council of the Judiciary approved the 
deactivation of two anti-corruption courtrooms, alleging the low workload they had in 
comparison to their counterparts in other areas, and reallocating their resources to 
general cases.324 The measure was immediately seen for what it was: the effective 
disassembling of the specialized anti-corruption subsystem that had taken years to 
consolidate, and that was already seeing corruption cases pertaining not only the 
Fujimori-Montesinos case but also others that had spawned during the following 
governments (Perú21, 2009/05/15; Silva del Carpio, 2009). In other words, the 
movement of the judiciary’s position in the fight against corruption represented 
another countermeasure, this time involving not only specific political interests but 
affecting the stability of the NACS in a counter-reformist way. The counter-reform, 
however, would not stop there. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Supreme Resolution No. 186-2011-JUS, published on October 4, 2011. 
324 Administrative Resolution No. 130-2009-CE-PJ, published on May 14, 2009. 
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On May 20, 2010, the Executive Council of the Judiciary established the 
Special National Criminal Court325for the prosecution of cases involving corruption 
affecting national, regional, or provincial public agencies, which aimed at becoming 
the highest courtroom on the subject. The anti-corruption courtrooms of the 
subsystem had been exercising their functions with relative independence for almost a 
decade under the jurisdiction of the Higher Court of Lima, and the transfer of these 
functions to a newly created chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice was a delicate 
matter, to say the least (Andrade Navarro and Ramírez Varela, 2012). Its creation 
meant that the deactivation of other anti-corruption courtrooms was a matter of time, 
and in the meantime there was no saying what would actually become of the Special 
National Criminal Court just created, which had to be implemented by a working 
commission chaired by Robinson Gonzáles Campos, judge that had been criticized in 
several occasions for his suspicious rulings in benefit of prosecuted members of the 
Fujimori-Montesinos network; in fact, judge Gonzáles had been a trusted appointee of 
First Prosecutor Blanca Nélida Colán during the Fujimori government (Caretas, 
2005/08/04). Additionally, the Special National Criminal Court required the early 
coming into force of the new Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) in Lima for crimes of 
corruption. The latter measure was particularly problematic as it represented an 
important procedural reform for the speeding of criminal proceedings, but which also 
challenged the logistics and material resources of the judicial agencies and that could 
severely affect the prosecution of complex cases. If implemented with lukewarm 
efficiency, it could impair the capacity of public prosecutors to pursue criminal 
charges in new corruption cases most likely involving members of the APRA 
administration, considering the impending change of government. Thus, when an 
urgent legislative projected presented by the government was approved in Congress as 
Law No. 29574,326 mandating the immediate application of the CPC for cases of 
corruption barely six months before the change of administration, it was heavily 
criticized from different sectors of society (Gálvez Rivas, 2011). The former ad hoc 
public procurator Luis Vargas Valdivia described the risks perceived at the time 
(IDEHPUCP, 2010, pp. 9-10): 
 
“Just as the First Prosecutor’s Office and several experts in the subject have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Administrative Resolution No. 177-2010-CE-PJ, published on June 3, 2010. 
326 Published on September 17, 2010. It was set to come into force on January 15, 2011. 
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pointed out, there is a serious problem of infrastructure and organization, but 
there is also a problem from a legislative perspective. Law No. 29574 pushes 
the early coming into force of the CPC for crimes against public 
administration (extortion, embezzlement, misappropriation, etc.) to January of 
2011... However, just as the First Prosecutor’s Office expressed, neither the 
Ministry of Economy and Finances, nor the Executive branch, have made the 
necessary transfers to logistically implement this norm... 
Although it is true that this law was encouraged, allegedly, to guarantee the 
celerity in the proceedings regarding crimes against public administration, the 
truth is that, due to its improvised character and the problems mentioned 
above, it will most likely end up producing results contrary to those expected. 
Only talking about in respect to deadlines, we would already be facing a 
serious risk that investigation files could be closed without even having 
presented charges.” 
 
 Notwithstanding Law No. 29574, and for unknown reasons, the Special 
National Criminal Court was never implemented. However, the normative 
introduction of this structure managed to open the door for the official disassembling 
of the anti-corruption subsystem (Ramírez Varela, 2010). After President Ollanta 
Humala assumed office, it was employed as a precedent for the delimitation of 
functions of another courtroom with similar hierarchy, the National Criminal Court, 
which on July 9, 2012, was granted competence over most (but not all) corruption 
crimes that had been previously planned for the Special court.327 With these, the 
National Criminal Court was from then on competent to take charge of complex 
criminal cases involving terrorism, human rights, money laundering, drugs 
trafficking, criminal organizations, social unrest, press freedom, and of course, 
corruption. To these, three months later the Executive Council of the Judiciary would 
include crimes against means of transportation, media outlets and other public 
services.328 In other words, corruption proceedings stopped being a specialized branch 
of the judiciary, and were piled together with almost every other type of crime of 
social importance. For Andrade Navarro and Ramírez Varela (2012, p. 86): 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Administrative Resolution No. 136-2012-CE-PJ. 
328 Administrative Resolution No. 194-2012-CE-PJ, published on October 13, 2012. 
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“[T]he intentions behind the [Special National Criminal Court] became a 
reality with the last decision of the Executive Council of the Judiciary to 
assign the crimes against public administration as a competence of the 
National Criminal Court. This measure is the one that causes the real process 
of disappearance of the anti-corruption subsystem, which does not have anti-
corruption courtrooms now, but liquidating courtrooms, as if the only cases 
under their competence were those of the Fujimori-Montesinos mafia and not 
other cases linked to corruption in later governments, which was the original 
idea when these courts were made permanent.”  
 
Thus, the countermeasures adopted by the government in regards to the 
prosecution of the Fujimori-Montesinos affair were finally joined by those of the 
judiciary, with an even greater impact on the evolution of the NACS in the latter case. 
By pulling complex cases of corruption with national impact together with cases as 
mundane as riots and roadblocks, the specialization of the anti-corruption network in 
the judiciary was lost, and the NACS was slightly devolved. 
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Chapter VIII 
Ollanta Humala (2011~): 
Frail Recovery of the National Anti-Corruption Standards 
 
The last government elected during the time period analyzed here is that of 
Ollanta Humala Tasso of the PNP, who had finished in a very close second place in 
the 2006 electoral process. Departing from his initial leftists position and moving 
closer to the center-left, Humala defeated Keiko Fujimori, daughter of convicted 
former president Alberto Fujimori, and made way for a period that would see some 
diffident progress in terms of the fight against corruption. In particular, from 2011 on 
it is possible to perceive a significant recovery in the management of the anti-
corruption procurator’s office, as well as the institutionalization of the national anti-
corruption body in charge of policy reform. Some international links are also 
introduced that challenged the stability of the NACS; however, their progress was still 
hindered by the same patterns identified in previous governments.  
In a way, the government of President Humala departs from the rigid 
protection of the NACS that characterized the Toledo and García administration, 
which points to a significant role of individuals in the political leadership. As it was 
already suggested in Chapter III, ‘anti-corruption will only be chosen when it 
provides more political capital than the sum of the resources spent and any loss in 
corrupt profits’; in other words, specific partisan interests in keeping anti-corruption 
measures at bay are located at the core of the NACS stability, and a relatively more 
honest set of leaders would, therefore, show less inherent resistance to change. This 
seems to be the case for the government of President Humala, which not only 
represented an institutional improvement from the overall negligence of the APRA 
administration, but was also less affected by corruption scandals in comparison to 
previous governments. However, although Humala’s leadership represented a 
different attitude to the fight against corruption, it was not enough to effectively 
create a new point of reference through which make anti-corruption reform a political 
priority. The little political appeal in actively investing in anti-corruption reforms, and 
a more complex political scenario in later years, discouraged a real change in the 
NACS beyond the regularization of preventive and control anti-corruption agencies of 
the Executive branch, which had suffered the adoption of counter-reform measures 
during the previous administration.  
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In sum, while the PNP government did improve the general conditions of the 
NACS, it did not deviate enough to conclude that a new structure has emerged, but 
rather that it has recovered on average to the level it previously had. This will be 
particularly evident when we consider the improvement of the procuratorial work, 
while observing that other public agencies and offices have instead fortified the 
changes made during the government of President García. 
 
1. The Anti-Corruption High Level Commission 
 
On September 4, 2009, the official newspaper El Peruano published 
Ministerial Resolution No. 394-2009-PCM, by which the government of President 
Alan García designated former comptroller general Genaro Matute as person in 
charge of carrying out the necessary arrangements to create an Anti-Corruption High 
Level Commission (CAN); the decree stated that, after the commission was created, 
Matute would be appointed as its General Coordinator.  
According to the government decree, the interest in creating the CAN was to 
continue with the anti-corruption measures that the Executive had been adopting, and 
that such efforts required a mechanism to articulate them with other public and civil 
actors, such as constitutionally autonomous organizations, regional and local 
governments, organizations of civil society, and others. At its core, however, was the 
necessity to have a national body to represent the fight against corruption, which was 
a measure considered in the UNCAC and the IACAC, as well as in most other 
international commitments on the subject. After the deactivation of the ONA, there 
was no single agency that could be called out as the responsible office to represent the 
country in international fora. The Secretariat of Public Management of the PCM 
(SPM-PCM) had been taking care of the task, but not only was it far from being a 
specialized office on the subject of corruption, the personnel appointed to it were only 
two people that had remained from the ONA, Franz Chevarría Montesinos (author of 
the MESICIC’s Action Plan) and Patricia Guillén Nolasco (former manager of the 
UNDP project). For these reasons, there was a pressing need to create a new national 
anti-corruption body. 
The appointment of Matute for the task is very telling of the government’s 
perspective. As it can be remembered, the former comptroller general had been 
throughout the decade a vocal critic of the CNA, first, and of the ONA, later, due to 
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the faculties granted for their participation in corruption cases. Such posture had 
caused more than once that Matute entered in public disagreements with the 
government, particularly during the early years of the García administration. In 
October of 2007, when the ONA was created, newspaper La República reported: 
“[President García] said that Matute remained quiet during the Toledo administration 
regarding the ‘exorbitant, crude, terrible expenditures’ of the Government Palace, but 
that nonetheless, now ‘that mister’ does raise doubts over his government” 329 
(Salazar, 2007). Thus, even for Matute himself, it was indeed strange that he had been 
called upon to coordinate the creation of a new anti-corruption office in the Executive 
branch (RPP, 2009/08/25). However, it is clear that the government’s intention was 
twofold: First, by having the former comptroller general behind the project, it would 
be automatically provided with the social and political legitimacy needed to generate 
support for the government, just as the appointment of anti-corruption judge Carolina 
Lizárraga had meant in 2007. A public official of the SPM-PCM was of this opinion 
(Interview No. 04): “I think that the government wanted a well-known person, one of 
prestige, who had worked on these topics so that he could be the government’s poster 
child for the fight against corruption. ”330 
Second, Matute’s well-known approach to the role of the Executive in the 
fight against corruption guaranteed that the future CAN would be limited to 
interinstitutional coordination and policy proposal, while staying away from scenarios 
of corruption perception and other forms of political meddling in criminal cases. This 
way, the CAN was set from the beginning to be an inadequate anti-corruption 
body,331 in the sense that it would represent little more than a forum, while taking the 
formal position of main anti-corruption office in the country for the purpose of 
international representation. Such approach was the complete opposite from the one 
taken in the case of the ONA, but that difference responded to the presence of a 
different scenario: while the ONA needed to look powerful (and in that power to have 
its demise) to confront a scenario of corruption perception, the CAN needed to be 
functionally weak and basic (thus securing its persistence) and only fulfill the 
requirements of the international anti-corruption movement and its corruption 
intolerance. A former public official of the CAN expressed (Interview No. 32): 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Translated from Spanish. 
330 Translated from Spanish. 
331 As described under the scenario of corruption intolerance, coping point of stress amelioration. 
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“[Velásquez Quesquén is appointed as prime minister] and says: ‘I need to do 
something that proves to be important in this subject,’ so Matute tells him that 
the most important thing that they could do was to have a body in which all 
institutions of the State could be involved, and develop not investigations, but 
policies. Thus, [the CAN] would not enter and say ‘we will investigate this 
and that,’ because [it] does not have the resources; the resources are in the 
institutions...  
[The government] originally told Matute to be the president [of the CAN], but 
he refused, because if we are talking about institutions, branches of 
government, he cannot be president of, say, the president of the judiciary. He 
is the Coordinator, technical coordinator at that level. That is more 
appropriate.”332 
 
 In fact, when the CAN was officially created333 on January 27, 2010, no 
specific functions were prescribed. The decree only stated: “The functions of the 
Anti-Corruption High Level Commission will be established by the members that 
make it up, observing their attributions y competencies stated in the Political 
Constitution of the State, the current normativity, and considering the International 
Agreements and Conventions in the subject of the fight against corruption...”334 In this 
way, the CAN started out as a technical forum for the interinstitutional coordination 
of anti-corruption preventive and control measures, involving the participation of a 
diverse group of actors through their official leaders: the presidents of the judiciary, 
the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council of the Judiciary, the PCM, and the 
National Confederation of Private Business Institutions; the First Public Prosecutor 
and the Ombudsman; the Mayor of Lima, the minister of Justice, the Coordinator of 
the National Assembly of Regional Governments, the Executive Director of Proética, 
and the Secretary of the National Agreement Forum. 
The neglect in the provision of specific faculties meant that it was left for the 
member institutions to decide, which would not take kindly to the idea of providing 
an Executive office with faculties beyond the bare minimum; but it also meant that an 
area of dispute was effectively opened between the technical coordination of the CAN 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Translated from Spanish. 
333 Supreme Decree No. 016-2010-PCM, published on January 28. 
334 Supreme Decree No. 016-2010-PCM, art. 2. Translated from Spanish. 
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and the SPM-PCM, as the latter officially kept its jurisdiction in the areas of public 
ethics, transparency and access to public information, and citizen watch, which had 
been transferred after the deactivation of the ONA. A member of the SPM-PCM 
commented on this issue (Interview No. 04): 
 
“I felt a lot of duplicity in functions... Even though the promotion of 
transparency and access to information is a crosscutting subject in public 
management, these are subjects that are also included in any plan to fight 
corruption... Nonetheless, [the two offices] were completely divorced, because 
although there was this commission that had little resources and no personnel, 
there was [the SPM-PCM] as governing entity that carried out activities linked 
to those that had to be done by the CAN. [The CAN] had initiatives that were 
later sent to us for technical opinion, but they were stopped because SPM-
PCM was already working on similar issues and there was duplicity. So, I 
think that the political appointment of the Coordinator of the CAN did not 
match with the technical faculties.”335 
 
 A former public official of the CAN indeed corroborated the lack of both 
financial and human resources afflicting the work of the Technical Coordination, 
while pointing out the approval of President García with its work (Interview No. 32): 
 
“Apparently, Alan García was happy with the role of the CAN. He had a 
positive evaluation of the things we were doing, [mostly] because they were 
not investigations and people very close to him were present, like Erasmo 
[Reyna] who is now his lawyer and that kept him directly informed of our 
activities. ”336 
 
 When considering the existence of the CAN as a symbolic coping mechanism, 
it is reasonable that President García would support a poorly funded anti-corruption 
body with no clear functions but with a high profile Coordinator. 
 With the change in government, the Humala administration immediately made 
the CAN its own, changing everything but its legal structure, which would later be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Translated from Spanish. 
336 Translated from Spanish. 
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also modified by Congress. The first measure taken was the removal of Genaro 
Matute as Coordinator, whose resignation was forced only two months into the new 
government. A former public official of the CAN recounts the event (Interview No. 
32): 
 
“When the change [in government] took place, [Genaro Matute] immediately 
sent a communication congratulating them, and requesting a meeting to define 
the next steps that had to be taken in the CAN. There was no reply. We went 
to talk with the president’s secretary once, and still there was no reply. The 
prime minister did not receive us... We sent three or four requests, but when 
not even these were answered, Matute presented his letter of resignation... We 
had so little support that [there was no] money to pay anybody’s salary... It 
just did not work anymore, so we had to quit. ”337 
 
 The reason for the government’s decision to do without Genaro Mature was 
directly connected to the idea they had of the CAN: as it was mentioned before, 
Matute’s appointment was perceived by many as a political gesture, and so his work 
as Coordinator was perceived to belong with the previous administration, not with the 
new one. A senior official of the CAN expressed this idea by describing the position 
of Coordinator as a “position of trust,” one which is constructed from a relationship 
between the political leadership and the person appointed to that office (Interview No. 
14). Thus, for the government of President Humala, Matute was a member of the 
APRA administration, and so he could not be kept in charge of the anti-corruption 
body. In fact, according to the same senior official,338 the new administration had a 
completely different idea of its own: 
 
“The government considered appointing a person that could take the role of 
anti-corruption czar, and completely change the existence or configuration of 
the CAN. But that did not happen, they could not find the right profile; the 
person they had had in mind apparently was not willing to have the kind of 
position they were suggesting. So, in that moment they decided to continue 
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investing in the Anti-Corruption High Level Commission...”339  
 
 The suggested deactivation of the CAN in favor of a revamped commission 
under the leadership of an anti-corruption czar responded to a clear identification by 
the government of the potential political benefits of such coping mechanism. 
President Humala’s idea, in that way, was no different from Toledo’s when he created 
the CNA, and García’s in the case of the ONA: there was an interest in obtaining the 
political support that came with the creation of a new anti-corruption agency, 
disregarding its actual utility. Proética had already began to express public 
exhortations340 for augmented powers and functions for the ONA only a month after 
Humala had taken office (Andina, 2011/08/31), showing the persistence of a scenario 
of corruption intolerance not only in the international environment, but also in the 
domestic one. For this purpose, the person they had had in mind was Avelino Guillén 
Jáuregui (Hernández, 2011), former prosecutor and member of the commission of 
transfer for the PNP party; however, just as the above account mentioned, soon after 
the Humala took office, public disagreements begin to appear between the two of 
them regarding the president’s commitment to the fight against corruption. Avelino 
Guillén stated (LR, 2012/01/20):  
 
“Initially, in the Commission of Transfer of this government, I pointed out that 
a great Anti-Corruption General Procurator’s Office needs to be created; but in 
general terms, from the government of García to the government of Mr. 
Humala what is taking place is the great continuation in the subject of anti-
corruption.”341 
 
 This statement was made in January of 2012. Genaro Matute’s resignation had 
been officially accepted on September 29, 2011,342 and it was not until November 18 
that the government appointed Susana Silva Hasembank as new coordinator of the 
CAN.343 During this period of two months, the commission was completely paralyzed 
while the government tried to figure out what to do with it; it was in this process that, 	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341 Translated from Spanish. 
342 Supreme Resolution No. 282-2011-PCM. 
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according to the accounts, Avelino Guillén was approached to take on the task of 
creating a new anti-corruption agency that could improve the popular support for the 
new administration. Guillén, clearly, was not willing to play the role of useful fool.  
 After Susana Silva’s appointment, the CAN saw an improvement in its 
functional relation with the SPM-PCM, its financial resources, and even its legal 
status. According to a public official of the SPM-PCM who was involved in its anti-
corruption activities during this period (Interview No. 07), both offices began 
coordinating actions regarding different initiatives, like the implementation of an 
online registry of visits to senior officials, the transfer of responsibilities for the 
MESICIC report in favor of the CAN, the new guidelines for the law on transparency 
and access to information, and others. This process of coordination and informal 
definition of functions resulted in an empowerment of the CAN in topics related to 
international fora, as well as in its institutional position and role vis-à-vis that of the 
SPM-PCM. The latter, on the other hand, underwent a change in its paradigm, 
focusing its resources on the subject of Open Government (which will be reviewed in 
detail in the next section). The best example of this distribution of activities became 
evident in 2012 with the development of the Action Plan for Open Government 2012-
2013 and the National Anti-Corruption Plan 2012-2016, which were efforts headed by 
the SPM-PCM and the CAN, respectively, and that shared many of the same 
activities. Thus, in order to avoid duplicity of functions, both offices had to find their 
own institutional space to efficiently focus their resources in specific areas of 
expertise. 
In financial terms, the CAN also gained a relatively more comfortable position 
when its budget was more than doubled by orders of Prime Minister Juan Jiménez 
Mayor, passing from S/. 491,473 (approximately US$ 175,000) in 2012 to S/. 
1,149,984 in 2013 (approximately US$ 410,000); however, this budget remained 
clearly insufficient to cover the increasing amount of tasks entrusted to the CAN’s 
Coordination, with most of its activities still funded with the support of international 
cooperation agencies through financial assistance344 programs.  
 Finally, on January 3, 2013, the government signed the bill granting the CAN 
status of Law.345 The importance of this measure for the continuity of the CAN was 
succinctly pointed out by a public official from the anti-corruption commission 	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345 Law No. 29976, published on January 4, 2013. 
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(Interview No. 21): “The Law impacted us in a positive way as it provided us with a 
new status, and it secured our persistence in time. Even though a law can be modified 
or repealed, this would still require a process; thus, it gives us institutionality. ”346 
 What does the new stage in the evolution of the CAN mean for the stability of 
the NACS? At first sight, it would seem that the government of President Humala 
shows a reduced interest in weakening the general condition of the NACS, and that it 
provides as a consequence some range of action for active reformers to successfully 
push for reforms. Although such reading is indeed partially true, the management of 
the CAN as primary anti-corruption body of the country does not support it. Several 
points indicate that, in fact, the granting of the status of law to the CAN represents the 
institutionalization of the coping mechanism initially adopted by the government of 
President García, i.e. the CAN as an inadequate anti-corruption body.  
First, the effective dismissal of Genaro Matute and the possibility of an anti-
corruption czar show that the government perceived (correctly) the office as a 
political instrument that could be employed for the production of political support.  
Second, even though the budget has been somehow raised, there is still an 
overwhelming amount of activities that could not be possibly carried out without the 
active involvement of international cooperation agencies; this lack of financial 
support for anti-corruption activities does not reflect the economic growth 
experienced by the country over the past decade and a half, or the increasing level of 
international reserves that by September of 2015 amount to US$ 58.6 billion, 
according to the IMF (2015/09/16).  
Third, the existence of a Law providing the CAN with a higher legal status, 
and therefore a higher institutional stability, secures its role as mainly an 
interinstitutional forum, which prevents attacks against it by keeping it away from a 
more relevant position in the fight against corruption; thus, it is possible to say that 
the CAN’s institutional strength is its being operatively dependent on other agencies. 
This limitation is recognized by a senior official of the CAN itself (Interview No. 14): 
“Actually, for me, the institutionality of an anti-corruption body needs to be much 
higher; it cannot have only the functions that the CAN has. ”347 
Fourth, the role of the CAN as an interinstitutional forum makes it particularly 
susceptible to issues concerning quorum and the disposition of the person holding the 	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presidency. For example, while eight meetings were held between February of 2010 
and January of 2011, there was no other meeting during the next six months due to the 
electoral process; and even after the change of government, the meetings were not 
resumed until January of 2012. Thus, during 2011, only two meetings were held, 
meaning that the most important role of the CAN could not be performed; this 
problem was again repeated in 2014, with only two meetings held that year (one on 
June and one in December). A public official of the CAN summarized the problems 
created by these circumstances (Interview No. 15): 
 
“Without meetings there are no agreements, and without agreements there are 
no activities for us to implement. The CAN kept working following 
agreements that had been previously adopted and that required longer 
processes of implementation; but still, if the CAN is a space for coordination, 
it is a weakness to not hold meetings. Indeed, we had difficulties to carry out 
certain activities.”348 
 
Fifth, as most of the activities discussed in the CAN are actually implemented 
by its individual members, it largely depends on the specific leadership of each one of 
those institutions. In some cases, that structure provides a voice for more involved, 
active, and reformist actors, such as Proética, which is usually seen pushing for more 
concrete actions from all the participating agencies and is able to keep watch over the 
functioning of the meetings and commitment from its members. However, for most 
other actors, the CAN became a forum on which publicize their anti-corruption 
activities regardless of the appropriateness or success of the measures. This is evident 
throughout the written proceedings of meetings, with different agencies taking turns 
to describe the actions carried out by their own initiative (CAN, 2015).  
And sixth, the persistent role of the SPM-PCM in preventive anti-corruption 
areas has proven to debilitate the institutional preeminence of the CAN, and the 
designation of the former as pro tempore Coordinator between February and July of 
2015,349 after the resignation of Susana Silva, did not help the issue. The distribution 
of roles and institutional space in favor of the SPM-PCM after the deactivation of the 
ONA in 2008 should have been resolved with the creation of the CAN in 2010; 	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however, even with the latter’s new legal status, the SPM-PCM keeps being an 
important actor in preventive anti-corruption policy making (sometimes to the 
detriment of reform activities, like the creation of an Autonomous Authority on 
Transparency), and there has been major points of conflict between the two offices, 
which naturally diminishes the effectiveness of both. This point will be taken up again 
in the next section when the Open Government Partnership is discussed. 
Thus, although the CAN does represent an important forum for the exchange 
of experiences and the coordination of activities, it has taken away a position that 
should have been filled by a more autonomous, well-funded and powerful agency in 
charge of preventing corruption in public life. Its persistence as a coping mechanism 
against a scenario of international corruption intolerance is all the more eloquent 
when we consider the treatment given by the government to the proposed 
Autonomous Authority on Transparency, which was part of the new Action Plan for 
Open Government and that has been sternly resisted by the government for the past 
few years. Clearly, while the CAN is favored for its weakness, the possibility of a 
powerful and autonomous institution represents a challenge to the stability of the 
NACS, and so the government position reflects their very different nature. 
 
2. The Open Government Partnership 
 
The participation of Peru in the Open Government Partnership (OGP) is 
certainly one that begins with a mixture of international pressure and government 
tolerance for anti-corruption actions. The OGP, as its webpage reads, “was launched 
in 2011 to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to 
making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens” (OGP, 
2015a); furthermore, it “aims to secure concrete commitments from governments... In 
the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, OGP is overseen by a Steering 
Committee including representatives of governments and civil society organizations” 
(OGP, 2015c). In this way, the OGP seems to represent a more proactive approach to 
anti-corruption networking from a governmental side, standing securely on a strategy 
of combined and coherent efforts from both international and domestic actors: In 
order for a country to join, its government must endorse a high-level declaration of 
commitment, develop a national action plan with the participation of civil society, and 
agree to an independent reporting mechanism. These conditions directly fall under the 
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activities denominated here as international agreement,350 advocacy/networking,351 
and technical corruption-related reports;352 therefore, the OGP could be said to be a 
potentially powerful source of pressure in a scenario of corruption intolerance that has 
not usually shown to affect the stability of the NACS. So, how did Peru join such 
organization, and why? The story is briefly narrated first by a former public official of 
the SPM-PCM (Interview No. 07): 
 
“That story starts in the year 2011, when Humala goes to a meeting of 
presidents and the subject is brought up to him. What is decided there is that 
the Peruvian chancellery (particularly the Peruvian embassy in Washington) 
presented a Letter of Intent to United Nations in order to join the Open 
Government Partnership. Once the letter had been submitted, Humala ratifies 
the commitment of Peru to join the Partnership at the 66th [session of the 
General] Assembly of the United Nations, and in that way the Letter of Intent 
is somehow formalized. What happens later is that the chancellery receives 
communication that, in order for Peru to be accepted into the Partnership, it 
has to elaborate an Action Plan of Open Government and that, furthermore, 
this Plan had to be developed by consensus with civil society. ”353 
 
It is indeed feasible that the government of President Humala was not 
completely aware of the responsibilities implied by the OGP membership when it first 
expressed its intention to join the international group. The Letter of Intent, after all, 
was sent on September 15, 2011, less than two months after the beginning of the new 
administration and only five days before the OGP was officially launched on the 
margins of the 66th General Assembly of the United Nations. In its final paragraph, 
the Peruvian communication read: “We are pleased to join the OGP co-chairs and 
Steering Committee governments in setting a new standard for governance in the 21st 
century” (OGP, 2015b) In any case, the intention of joining the OGP in this effort 
responded to the recognized possibility of gaining international reputation, just as the 
governments of Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo had done with the prompt 
adoption of the IACAC and the UNCAC, respectively. The difference with previous 	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353 Translated from Spanish. 
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cases, however, was that the Humala administration was not particularly opposed (at 
least yet) to carrying out anti-corruption activities in the country, as long as they 
generated political support for the government. That is why soon after the 
requirements to join the Partnership were communicated, the country initiated a 
process of coordination between different public agencies and civil organizations for 
the development of an Action Plan in consensus, which had to be ready by April of 
2012.  
The process of drafting the Action Plan would eventually prove to be 
successful, at least in terms of the identification of priorities. However, it also 
evidenced certain organizational issues afflicting the network of anti-corruption 
policy management in the State apparatus, particularly those involving the roles of the 
SPM-PCM and the CAN. The above account proceeds (Interview No. 07): 
 
“At first the chancellery summons civil society and the Office of the 
Ombudsman to a meeting to introduce the subject, but they do not invite the 
SPM-PCM. Later, obviously, the chancellery is told that the SPM-PCM, 
which is the governing agency in transparency and citizen watch, should be 
present, and that is how we are just invited from the second meeting on and 
the working group is created. ”354 
 
From then on, the SPM-PCM would be put in charge of setting up a 
multisectoral group composed of government agencies and organizations from civil 
society. However, the CAN was not included in this group. The account continues:355 
 
“The CAN enters the scene later on. At first, the members of the Executive 
Committee were only the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the 
Comptroller General, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the SPM-PCM; 
these were the four representatives from the State apparatus. And, from the 
part of the civil society were Proética, Ciudadanos al Día, the Council of 
Peruvian Press, and the National Association of Centres. The inclusion of the 
CAN took place later on... Once the draft was produced, we held meetings 
with other agencies: first, there were meeting with all sectors, and then other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Translated from Spanish. 
355 Ibid. 
	   271	  
meetings where the different offices of the PCM were also included. It was at 
that moment that the CAN was finally informed of what was being done, and 
that it begins having a more active participation.” 
 
Once the draft was completed, its was publicly presented for discussion during 
March of 2012. In order to improve the popular legitimacy of the initiative, the PCM 
published the document on its website, inviting comments through this channel and 
through open social networks, and held several meetings with representatives from 
different public agencies of the State, just as mentioned above; meanwhile, Proética 
held two informational workshops in Lima, and the German Corporation for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) supported the process by providing professional 
consulting services (OGP, 2013). Finally, by Ministerial Resolution No. 085-2012-
PCM, the revised version with all contributions was formally adopted on April 9. 
From a first glance, the process seemed to have been a success, and perhaps it 
was in terms of the participation of civil society. But, what ever happened to the 
CAN, which was supposed to be the leading government office in all things anti-
corruption? This part of the story is narrated by a former senior official of the CAN 
(Interview No. 14): 
 
“Susana Silva arrives to the CAN on November 19, 2011, and the first 
meeting of the Open Government was somewhere between the 22nd and the 
25th of November. The SPM-PCM, the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
CAN are summoned, but Silva could not go because she was in the process of 
assuming her post... So later, when she tried to join, the SPM-PCM told her 
‘No, this is a matter exclusively involving transparency; it is not connected to 
the fight against corruption.’ So they kicked us out...”356 
 
Thus, while the process of drafting the Plan brought together public and civil 
actors, it also evidenced a clear problem regarding the definition of functions between 
the two leading offices in anti-corruption policy proposal (both of which existing 
under the same institutional structure of the PCM), and the presence of an institutional 
rivalry that could affect the implementation of the OGP Action Plan. The government, 	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however, did not take any measures to solve the problem. On January 5, 2013, the 
Humala administration gave Supreme Decree No. 003-2013-PCM, creating a 
permanent multisectoral commission for the follow-up of the OGP Plan and putting 
the SPM-PCM in charge of its technical secretariat. The CAN, which had just been 
granted status of Law, was not included among the members of the new 
commission.357  
The decision to put the SPM-PCM in charge of Open Government, while 
ignoring the relevance of the CAN in the subject, points to an effort to disengage the 
whole OGP process from an explicit anti-corruption discourse, and to sabotage the 
effective implementation of the activities identified in the Action Plan. The SPM-
PCM, after all, lacked not only the human resources needed to achieve additional 
tasks, but most of its duties regarding the reception of government reports had already 
been transferred to the CAN. Therefore, the rationale for Supreme Decree No. 003-
2013-PCM could not be compatible with a real anti-corruption reformist agenda, nor 
with the fulfillment of international commitments to the Open Government 
Partnership. The first report from the Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) 
(Casas, 2014) supports the criticism: Only 3 of 47 activities were completed, while 25 
had a limited level of completion or had not even started. Additionally, the report 
repeatedly cites the lack of coordination and cooperation as a source of weakness for 
both the CAN and the carrying out of activities contained in the Action Plan. Finally, 
it quotes something that has been at the core of the present study from the beginning:  
 
“[There is a] recurring concern expressed by the specialists who were 
consulted: That the Plan receives political support only to the extent that it 
does not try to  change the status quo.358 The IRM researcher considers this 
theory valid as long as the government does not create an entity with sufficient 
autonomy, authority, and jurisdiction to align the entire state behind a standard 
of open government.” 
 
As the report suggested, the political will of the Humala administration was 
indeed tested during the process of elaboration of a new Action Plan (this time for the 	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358 Italics in original. 
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period 2014-2015) and the creation of an Autonomous Authority on Transparency 
(AAT), but this time it failed to show the same level of commitment to anti-corruption 
reform that had been present in its earlier discourse. Although the SPM-PCM 
performed it duties to the level expected, and fulfilled its leading role in the 
elaboration of a new Action Plan by consensus with civil society, the government did 
not endorse the document. In October of 2014, NGO Proética began its public 
exhortations359 for what it considered to be an unfortunate change in the government 
agenda, being four months and half since the draft had been finished, and yet no 
measure had been taken by the political leadership (Proética, 2014/10/31). On 
November 27, the Steering Committee of the OGP adopted a similar position and sent 
an official communication to the Secretary General of the PCM, exhorting the 
Peruvian government to fulfill its commitments. It read (Proética, 2014/12/04):  
 
“Countries more than four months late in submitting their National Action 
Plan (NAP) will be considered acting contrary to the OGP process for that 
action plan cycle. The Government of Peru has not submitted its second NAP 
as of November 2014, four months after the deadline of July 1, 2014. This 
letter is therefore to inform you that the Government of Peru has acted 
contrary to the OGP process for this cycle of action plan development... 
In order to avoid a future review by the Criteria and Standards Subcommittee, 
we recommend that the Government of Peru publishes its second NAP before 
January 1, 2015, implements the commitments in the NAP, and publishes all 
future self-assessment reports and NAPs on time.” 
 
 However strong the communication from the OGP Steering Committee was, 
the deadline came and went, and the government of President Humala did not 
respond. According to Proética, the political problem hid in the instability of the 
prime minister appointment, which saw three different changes only during 2014, and 
the challenge represented by the creation of the AAT, which was an activity included 
in the draft for the new Action Plan (Proética, 2014/10/31). Indeed, the relative 
weight for the Humala administration of political capital vis-à-vis the stability of the 
NACS had changed over the previous years, and while at the beginning was 	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considered a good investment to enroll in the OGP in exchange for domestic and 
international support and the control of corruption intolerant demands, by 2014 the 
situation had changed, and the government was willing to sacrifice certain level of 
support in order to forsake anti-corruption reforms.  
When finally the government presented the second OGP Action Plan, it was 
already July of 2015, and so it had modified its 2014-2015 target for 2015-2016; thus, 
2014 was a lost year for open government. Furthermore, the document approved by 
the Executive had made several modifications to the original draft without the 
participation of civil society and the respect for the procedure established in the 
country’s commitment to the OGP. Of particular importance was the exclusion of the 
AAT as a target activity, which meant that no significant change in the NACS would 
be made in the foreseeable future, at least in terms of government structure. Through 
an official communication to the Executive, Proética (2015/07/24) expressed: “[T]he 
published plan does not follow the deadlines nor the conditions in which it had to be 
formally approved, which voids it for the [Open Government Partnership].”360 
It can be added that the issue generated by the proposal of an AAT had been 
controversial from the beginning, not so much for its value as an instrument to fight 
corruption, but for its disruptive potential for the NACS. As it has been discussed 
before, the time of existence of both the CNA and the ONA had been inversely 
related to the degree of power and functions they held; thus, it was no surprise that the 
most powerful agency somehow related to anti-corruption activities should find 
obstacles from before its inception. It was, after all, an entity that could not easily be 
created as another coping mechanism, for it was to be autonomous if it was to be at 
all. The government was quite aware of this, and while several independent voices 
inside and outside the CAN were supportive of its creation, the political leadership 
was not willing to see such a project become a reality. The first obstacle to the AAT 
had come, naturally, from the SPM-PCM. A senior official of the CAN stated 
(Interview No. 14): 
 
“I do not believe there were constitutional problems [behind the AAT]... I 
agree a 100% with [the creation of] an AAT. We have been trying to push it 
forward for a long time, but well, things are not coming along as we wished. 	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SPM-PCM, indeed, released a technical report saying that the AAT was not 
viable, that [the proposal] was a badly produced document. So a whole 
problem arose because the Office of the Ombudsman had sent the legislative 
project to the PCM in the framework of a meeting of the CAN, and the 
Secretary General had forwarded it to us and to the SPM-PCM... [After that, 
the CAN] had begun coordinating, working, holding several meetings with 
[the SPM-PCM], and [one day] all of a sudden we are informed that the SPM-
PCM had already elaborated a negative report... The subject was discussed at 
the highest level, and they said it was going to be reformulated. There was a 
lot of pressure from civil society because they knew there was a negative 
position from the SPM-PCM, so the latter fell back and offered to elaborate a 
new legislative project... The new proposal is almost the same, except that it 
establishes that the AAT will not be an autonomous agency, and that it will 
not take away functions from the SPM-PCM. ”361 
 
 It is symptomatic that, when the Ombudsman first proposed the creation of an 
AAT, back in April of 2012, vice-president Marisol Espinoza had expressed the 
commitment of the Humala administration in supporting such effort (Andina, 
2012/04/25). However, according to political analyst Carlos Basombrío (Castillo, 
2015), by the end of 2014 the progress of counter-reformist forces and the weakness 
of the Humala administration in political terms pointed to a complete stagnation of 
structural anti-corruption activities, which was in fact evidenced by the exclusion of 
the AAT from the second OGP Action Plan.  
To summarize, through the treatment given to the Open Government 
Partnership, and in particular to the national Action Plan and the possibility of 
creating an Autonomous Authority on Transparency, it is possible to see how the 
Humala administration went from a position of willingness towards anti-corruption 
actions in exchange for political support, to one of open defense of the NACS. In the 
process, an honest anti-corruption activity was transformed into an inadequate anti-
corruption policy;362 all it took was three years in office. 
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362 As described under the scenario of corruption intolerance, coping point of stress amelioration. 
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3. Recovery of the Anti-Corruption Procurator’s Office 
 
One of the first positions adopted by the government of President Humala in 
relation to the NACS was to correct some of the countermeasures that had been 
implemented during the previous administration, specifically in regards to the state of 
the anti-corruption procuratorial work. Thus, in the last days of September of 2011 the 
minister of Justice, Francisco Eguiguren Praeli, announced the impending creation of 
a procurator’s office specialized in cases of corruption involving senior officials. In 
the words of Eguiguren, the new administration had found “an anti-corruption 
apparatus completely dismantled, without incentives,”363 and so it was coordinating 
measures for a more powerful office that could even fall under the jurisdiction of the 
PCM, with rumors suggesting Avelino Guillén as the probable appointment to the 
post (Gutiérrez, 2011). The creation of such office had first been promised by Prime 
Minister Salomón Lerner Ghitis on August 25, during the official presentation of the 
Council of Ministers in Congress. During the event, Lerner Ghitis talked about the 
government projects for the frontal attack against corruption, among which stood 
out: “Through Supreme Decree, a General Procurator’s Office will be created for 
cases of corruption and criminality involving senior officials of the State...”364 
(Caretas, 2011/08/25). The measures presented by the prime minister were well 
received by environmental actors, with Transparency International expressing their 
congratulations to “the government of Ollanta Humala for having this intention and 
that will, and expressing them publicly”365  (Andina, 2011/09/08). However, the 
General Procurator’s Office soon gave signs of being just a symbolic measure, a 
public expression of reform proposal366 to address the dire state of the anti-corruption 
procuratorial offices and its stress potential under a scenario of corruption intolerance. 
As quoted earlier, already by January of 2012 Avelino Guillén would express his 
disappointment with the government and its yet unfulfilled promise of a procurator’s 
office for senior officials.  
In December of 2011, vice-minister of Justice Juan Jiménez Mayor, who had 
allegedly been put in charge of overseeing the implementation and organization of the 
proposed General Procurator’s Office, was appointed minister; and in July of 2012, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Translated from Spanish. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 As described under the scenario of corruption intolerance, coping point of stress amelioration. 
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was further promoted to prime minister. Jiménez’s presentation in Congress, one 
month after his appointment, was criticized by Justicia Viva for avoiding the fact that, 
of the seven anti-corruption measures proposed one year earlier, only one had been 
advanced, namely the revamping of the office of the Public Procurator Specialized in 
Crimes of Corruption (JV, 2012/08/23), while the General Procurator’s Office had 
been completely forgotten. Three days later, at the 13th session of the CAN, the office 
of the prime minister was selected as new president of the commission. After the 
meeting, and addressing the press, Jiménez used the opportunity to announce the 
creation of a General Procurator’s Office of the Republic (LR, 2012/08/24), this time 
carefully excluding the mentioning of any specialized anti-corruption function. 
However, up to 2015, neither this office, nor the previous proposal of a procurator 
specialized in cases of senior officials, would ever come to fruition. 
The relaunch of the anti-corruption procuratorial office created during the 
APRA administration was indeed the only real and effective anti-corruption measure 
adopted and implemented by the new government, beginning with the dismissal of 
César Roca Fernández and the appointment of Julio Arbizu González as new anti-
corruption procurator on October 3, 2011. 367  Together with this measure, the 
government also proceeded with the deactivation of the ad-hoc procurator’s office for 
the Fujimori-Montesinos case that had been planned during the previous government, 
in favor of restructuring the whole representation of the State in corruption cases and 
empowering the Arbizu office. Disregarding the wisdom of that particular decision 
for the fight against corruption, the government strategy was soon found to be 
successful at least in regards to the work of Arbizu and his team. After his resignation 
in January of 2014, Justicia Viva would remember: “With pain, and no surprise, we 
saw how during the government of Alan García the Procurator’s Office lost 
importance and power, ending up being almost disabled for five years. It was the 
administration of Julio Arbizu the one that relaunched this office” 368  (Mujica 
Coronado, 2014). Of a similar opinion was José Ugaz, former ad hoc procurator and 
current president of Transparency International (Núñez, 2014):  
 
“I would say that towards the end of Toledo’s government and the beginning 
of García’s government it was evident that the intention was to keep a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Supreme Resolution No. 184-2011-JUS, published on October 4, 2011. 
368 Translated from Spanish. 
	   278	  
Procurator’s Office without voice, without resources, and probably without the 
personnel required. I think there was a dismantling that ends, precisely, when 
the impetus returns with the new government and procurator Arbizu is 
appointed.”369 
 
 The government’s decision to relaunch the anti-corruption procurator’s office 
responded to a very real problem: according to information released by the ad hoc 
office for the Fujimori-Montesinos case in September of 2011 (one month before its 
deactivation), 145 people charged for their involvement in acts of corruption had been 
benefitted with the application of the statute of limitations since 2010 (AP, 
2011/09/06), reflecting the deep deterioration of punishment structures in the country. 
Prime Minister Juan Jiménez Mayor (2012, p. 408) described the situation in the 
following terms: 
 
“What did we find, then? A procurator’s office deeply weakened and, in 
general, disorientation in the area of action of the Public Ministry and the 
judiciary. What we found then was that we had a procurator’s office inside the 
Ministry of Justice that was basically a litigations unit, this is, an office that 
was devoted to trials, an office that was devoted to presenting appeals, to 
present denunciations every now and then, to follow proceedings and 
sometimes without even going to the hearings, there were many procurator 
that did not go to hearings. 
We considered, then, how to confront this. We could not have a procurator’s 
office only as a litigations unit. The design that was proposed, the design that 
is working today, goes beyond a litigations unit: [there is] an intelligence unit, 
an executive committee, a financial analysis unit, [and] an observatory 
through which we have been able to systematize information.”370 
 
 The results followed short afterwards. In the first half of 2012, the office led 
by Arbizu (2012) won fifty criminal cases, and during its first two years presented 
more than five hundred charges against members of the previous two governments, 
authorities of regional and local governments, and even against two brothers of 	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current President Ollanta Humala (Alexis and Antauro) (RPP, 2013/09/29). Arbizu’s 
work was continued by Christian Salas Beteta371 in 2014, and by October of that year 
it was reported that the procuratorial office had recovered S/. 9 million (roughly US$ 
3.3 million) in civil damages since 2011 (Velarde, 2014), with other S/. 16 million 
(roughly US$ 5.7 million) more being announced shortly after from a historical legal 
victory against corruption (RPP, 2014/10/20). On the other hand, the government 
allocated over S/. 20 million (roughly US$ 7.1 million) to the anti-corruption 
procurator’s office between 2011 and 2014. 
 Notwithstanding the evident success of this anti-corruption area from the part 
of the Executive, by the end of 2014 the government began giving signs of a wavering 
political support, starting with Christian Salas’ departure after only ten months of 
having been appointed.372 In an interview, Salas would explain the reasons for his 
resignation (Muñoz, 2014): 
 
“One cannot work uncomfortable, and much less knowing that the 
appointment is one of political trust... More than disagreements with the 
executive branch, there was (from my perspective) a discomfort in the 
Ministry of Justice in relation to some public statements I made about some 
cases under my competency... It was not a matter of content, of legal issues, 
but rather due to the political consequences of my statements.” 
 
 The statements mentioned by Salas had been reported on the news only days 
before the government accepted his resignation, and had to do with the corruption 
scandal involving Martín Belaunde Lossio, businessman and close supporter of 
Humala’s candidacy in the past. Salas had publicly indicated that Belaunde Lossio 
would not be able to enter in a plea bargain due to the latter’s center participation in 
the criminal event; the statements, however, had caused unrest in the government, and 
the minister of Justice quickly moved to disavow Salas, stating that the procurator’s 
only function was to “defend the interests of the State in order to obtain compensation 
for damages caused to it”373 (Gestión, 2014/11/26), and that Belaunde Lossio had the 
right to request a plea bargain. Less than a week later, Christian Salas left the anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Supreme Resolution No. 002-2014-JUS, published on January 10, 2014. 
372 Supreme Resolution No. 207-2014-JUS, published on November 29, 2014. 
373 Translated from Spanish. 
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corruption procurator’s office.  
On December 5, 2014, the government appointed associate procurator Joel 
Segura Alania in replacement of Salas.374 The same day, associate procurator Yeni 
Vilcatoma de la Cruz was sending a direct communication to President Humala 
informing him of the irregularities that had been taking place around the case of 
Belaunde Lossio, and requesting the immediate dismissal of minister of Justice Daniel 
Figallo Rivadeneyra (Correo, 2014/12/06). In reply, the government decreed two days 
later the dismissal of Vilcatoma,375 while procurator Joel Segura publicly distanced 
himself from her allegations. 
Similar measures were later taken against the Public Procurator’s Office 
Against Money Laundering for its insistence in investigating the First Lady, Nadine 
Heredia. Throughout the year 2015, a series of popular and political demands 
regarding Heredia’s finances struck the general approval of President Humala and his 
wife, bringing them down from 27% and 34% in October of 2014 (EC, 2014/11/04), 
respectively, to a mere 15% and 11% in November of 2015 (LR, 2015/11/15). The 
events had multiple angles, from Heredia’s connections with Belaunde Lossio’s 
irregular deals (EC, 2015/04/13), to the sources and employment of the PNP’s 
campaign funds in 2006 and 2011 (Libón and Valle, 2015; EC, 2015/06/22), from her 
unusually high and frivolous expenses using a friend’s credit card (Perú21, 
2015/05/31; 2015/06/08), to the leakage of her private agendas with details of 
suspicious payments (Belaunde, 2015). These issues produced a hectic battle in the 
Peruvian criminal system, beginning with the Public Prosecutor’s decision to open an 
investigation against Heredia for money laundering (in connection to the campaign 
funds) in February, only to be annulled by the Superior Court of Justice of Lima in 
August; this in turn was responded with a formal appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal 
in September, which sentenced in October that the investigations against the First 
Lady could be resumed. President Humala, on the other hand, was legally spared, and 
in September the Prosecutor’s Office decided to close the case against him 
notwithstanding the fact that he, and not his wife, had been the president of the PNP 
during the 2006 campaign. In reaction to the prosecutor’s decision, the public 
procurator against money laundering, Julia Príncipe, formally complained that “it 
[was] incongruous with the position that [the Prosecutor’s Office] has been taking 	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375 Supreme Resolution No. 221-2014-JUS, published on December 8, 2014. 
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regarding the defendant Nadine Heredia” (LR, 2015/09/22).  
In early June, Príncipe had requested the Public Ministry to include in their 
investigations the brother and cousin of the First Lady; in response, the CJDS opened 
a disciplinary process against Príncipe for making public statements without 
permission (Uceda, 2015). This, however, did not stop her from further pursuing the 
procuratorial work against the presidential couple: on August 19, her office presented 
to the Prosecutor’s Office on Money Laundering the case of Heredia’s alleged 
agendas, requiring that the First Lady go through a handwriting analysis to confirm 
the ownership of the documents. On October 20, two days before confronting a vote 
of no confidence in Congress, the minister of justice presented his resignation, but not 
before having formally dismissed Príncipe from her post as public procurator376 
(Godoy 2015; Caretas, 2015/10/15). With this, the executive branch removed an 
element that had become threatening to the Humala family; but in activating a 
preemptive strategy of risk management377 already amidst a scenario of corruption 
perception, it remains uncertain how much stability could it be gained after including 
in the political calculus the amount of media and political criticism that this measure 
generated in return: According to a poll conducted in November, 45% of respondents 
who disapproved of Humala’s administration did so due to the persistent presence of 
corruption in the Executive (APOYO, 2015). 
In conclusion, from the above events regarding both offices against corruption 
and money laundering, and according to different sources like Lilia Ramírez Varela 
(2015) of Justicia Viva and former anti-corruption procurator Julio Arbizu (Ideele, 
2015/07/07), it is possible to conclude that the latest period in the public procuratorial 
work contrasts the efforts of its members with the rapidly diminishing support from 
the government, and the apparent weakening of functional autonomy against the 
increasing intervention of political interests of the leadership through the Ministry of 
Justice. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Ministerial Resolution No. 192-2015-JUS. 
377 As described under the scenario of corruption perception, coping point of output concealment (1st 
round). 
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Chapter IX 
Reflections on the Theoretical Model 
 
In the preceding four chapters, the study has strived to present a thorough but 
accessible picture of the most important anti-corruption processes in Peru in the last 
fifteen years, putting particular emphasis on institutionally relevant episodes such as 
the evolution and decay of anti-corruption bodies, but also reviewing telling examples 
of anti-corruption pressure that were met by other equally effective coping 
mechanisms, which in one way or another managed to diffuse the stressful events 
without pushing the political system into a status upgrade.  
Although in each case the events reviewed were found to follow the tenets of 
the Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform introduced in Chapters 
III and IV, no individual event could possibly embody the totality of the theoretical 
model, for the body of stressful scenarios, coping points and mechanisms, and 
environmental strategies is too large for a single process to reflect it. Thus, after 
everything is said and done, a few questions remain: How did the theoretical model 
fare against the data presented throughout chapters five to eight? Could the data be 
explained by reference to the model? Can we surmise that the model was indeed 
supported by the data? And if so, to what extent? 
 
Explaining the Data 
Certainly, not every single coping mechanism activated by the government 
managed to completely reduce stress and stimulate support by itself, nor did they need 
to. For example, during the scandal reviewed under the title “The President’s 
Daughter” (Chapter VI), one of the first coping mechanisms found was the 
misallocation of responsibility through which the government blamed judge Silva 
Vallejo for having approached President Toledo and addressed the issue of his 
illegitimate daughter; the mechanism, however, soon proved to be ineffective to 
deescalate the scandal, and the scenario kept running its course. Notwithstanding the 
evident failure of the mechanism to address the issue at hand, however, its activation 
supports the tenets of the theoretical model in that the government made an effort to 
reduce stress through the reliance on an output that did not intend to address the 
presence of corruption in the system, but only to stimulate support without 
jeopardizing the stability of the NACS. In that sense, therefore, the presence of the 
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‘misallocation of responsibility’ gives grounds to support model, however effective 
that particular mechanism might have been to protect the system. As already 
described, the government did eventually manage to defuse the pressure and stabilize 
the system through a combination of coping mechanisms, some more effective than 
others. It is this overall result that supports the initial hypothesis: the actions taken by 
domestic and international actors to press Peruvian authorities into fighting 
malfeasance were unable to improve the NACS in any significant way after the short 
period of the transitional government (2000-2001), due to the availability and timely 
employment by the Peruvian authorities of highly effective political strategies to 
mitigate demands and secure support without having to engage in real anti-
corruption reforms.  
In other words, the model did not make a point for the individual power of 
each coping mechanism against that of each environmental strategy; instead, it 
suggested their existence and the rationale behind them, positing that the NACS have 
managed to survive thanks to the availability and effectiveness of coping mechanisms 
against that of environmental strategies. The relative success of the Peruvian 
government to protect the NACS in each case is evidence of that. Is the ‘misallocation 
of responsibility’ individually more successful than, say, legislative initiatives are for 
domestic environmental reformers? The model did not venture an answer in this 
respect, for the answer could only be found in a case-by-case basis. The analysis of 
the Peruvian cases did that, and found that, in general, the misallocation of 
responsibility is too simple a coping mechanism to deflect pressure in important 
corruption scandals. It, however, was simple enough as to be activated regularly, in 
contrast to other more expensive mechanisms such as repression or obstacles to 
advocacy, and so it represented a valid strategical element during the specific coping 
point of ‘negative input defuse.’ 
The above argument can be replicated for every coping mechanism identified 
in the data, and it defends the validity not only of these mechanisms but also of their 
distribution following differentiated coping points. The analytical existence of the 
latter, as can be remembered, was suggested to explain the order that different coping 
mechanisms were usually activated as part of a government’s defense strategy. These 
points follow the theoretical cycle of an anti-corruption pressure event, from the 
initial output of corruption to the final production of symbolic or genuine measures 
and the stabilization of the NACS. The fact that inadequate bodies or agencies were 
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created following long and stressful corruption events, for example, supports the 
theoretical division of the cycle by both points and rounds, particularly during 
scenarios of ‘corruption perception.’ The cases of the CNA and the ONA were telling 
in this regard: the CNA was created following the real adoption and implementation 
by the Paniagua administration of control measures to deal with the Fujimori-
Montesinos network; the ONA was created in the very last days of a large corruption 
event involving the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Health System, 
following the exhaustion of coping mechanisms under the first round of ‘corruption 
perception.’ Such order in the activation of coping mechanisms responds to their 
potential for engaging stress in different moments of the cycle, and suggests that 
failure is indeed very much part of the equation, just as it was evidenced in the 
example of ‘misallocation of responsibility.’ 
On the other hand, the domestic and international pressure activities identified 
throughout the years of 2000 to 2014 in Peru, and the effects they had on the political 
system and the stability of the NACS, were found to follow the basic tenets of the 
Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform: Corruption affects the 
political system by increasing demands and decreasing support, and this is done in 
different ways or scenarios of stress.  
The emergence of the Anti-Corruption Subsystem in the country, spearheaded 
by the work of José Ugaz in the Ad Hoc Prosecutor’s Office (and even the ascension 
to office of the man behind the whole anti-corruption effort, Valentín Paniagua), was 
explained by reference to the collapse of the 1990s government and the unveiling of 
the massive political corruption institutionalized by the Fujimori-Montesinos network, 
just as the scenario of ‘prolonged stress’ had suggested. The subsequent creation of 
the CNA by the government of President Toledo, on the other hand, was explained by 
“the domestic and international media coverage of the whole Fujimori-Montesinos 
network and the approach taken by the transitional government” (p. 144), fitting the 
increasing environmental pressure activities comfortably in the scenario of 
‘corruption intolerance’ and shining light on the decision to activate a preventive 
measure such as an inadequate anti-corruption body so early into the new period. 
From there on, the vast majority of pressure activities stressing the political system 
would be found under this scenario or that of ‘corruption perception,’ which 
accounted for some declining levels of popular approval and the activation of a 
variety of coping mechanisms appropriate to the specific circumstances. 
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Notwithstanding their ubiquity, however, most forms of domestic and international 
pressure failed to bring about real anti-corruption measures, an issue that was not 
surprising given that the model had already suggested the existence of only a handful 
of strategies of direct pressure available to environmental actors, finding all others to 
be forms of indirect pressure or mere influence. 
The only period analyzed in this study that seemed to challenge the 
applicability of the theoretical model was the beginning of the Humala administration, 
where, notwithstanding the relative absence of pressure activities, the government 
was fast to move straight for the adoption of anti-corruption measures: Support for the 
CAN increased and a law was passed granting it an upgraded status; Peru joined the 
Open Government Partnership and a National Anti-corruption Plan was drafted an 
approved; and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office was recovered from the 
morass of political subversion and institutional atrophy. Why did the Humala 
administration seem to somehow relinquish the stability of the NACS during the first 
couple of years?  
The position adopted by the government of President Ollanta Humala at the 
beginning of this period can be better understood not by comparing it to the position 
of previous governments, but by going back to the roots of the theoretical model. 
Before Easton’s Dynamic Response Model of a Political System was even discussed 
in Chapter III, an argument was introduced to consider political will for anti-
corruption activities a special case that needed to be independently addressed. As a 
result, it was proposed that “for an honest government, anti-corruption policies should 
only be attractive in direct relation to the political capital they can generate for them; 
for a corrupt government, anti-corruption policies should be avoided in direct relation 
to the interests they threaten” (p. 49). What did this mean for the later development of 
the Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform? Simply put, it meant 
that although most Peruvian leaders have shown an interest in preserving the NACS, 
this interest is the origin of the model and not its consequence: the essential variable 
of this particular political system (Peru). Furthermore, it meant that the value of the 
NACS is not only defined by reference to structural considerations, but to those 
regarding individual leaders. The role of agency in the stability of the NACS takes a 
center point here: just as it was stated above, for some leaders the NACS will be as 
valuable as its weight in political capital; for others, it will be worth much more. After 
the value has been set, however, corruption and anti-corruption processes are 
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expected to follow the usual course established in the theoretical model until the value 
of the NACS is revised. 
In conclusion, the data on Humala’s first years does not pose a challenge to 
the theoretical model proposed here; instead, it sheds light on the importance of 
considering specific political leaders individually and the value they give to political 
capital378 and corruption profits, as these will in turn describe the conditions under 
which real anti-corruption measures will be adopted and implemented instead of 
activating coping mechanisms.  
 
Supporting the Model 
Once it has been established that the Peruvian experience with corruption and 
anti-corruption processes reflects the tenets of the theoretical model, it is necessary to 
turn the discussion around and see how much of the Systems Model of Corruption 
and Anti-Corruption Reform was actually supported by the data. In general, it is 
possible to conclude that the existence of different scenarios of stress was confirmed 
by comparing the events that culminated with the collapse of the Fujimori 
government in the second semester of 2000 and the creation of the Anti-Corruption 
Subsystem, to smaller but equally telling events like the creation of the short-lived 
National Anti-Corruption Office—ONA in 2008, or the appointment of an anti-
corruption czar with no real political independence in 2001. These schemes, as the 
previous chapters described, came as a response to very different scenarios of anti-
corruption pressure: While Paniagua reacted to a ‘prolonged stress’ that had been 
affecting the political system, the ONA was a consequence of the evolution of a 
corruption scandal moving into the second round of what has been called ‘corruption 
perception’; the appointment of Martín Belaunde Moreyra and the creation of the 
CNA, on the other hand, was an appropriate response to the wave of ‘corruption 
intolerance’ in the wake of the Fujimori-Montesinos network. Beyond these brief 
examples, the previous chapters showed that the rise and fall of corruption scenarios, 
matched with the particular value assigned to the stability of the NACS, were 
responsible for the oscillations in the government’s seeming interest in anti-corruption 
activities. Thus, the suggested interpretation of political will for anti-corruption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 In here it is considered that the capacity to stimulate support by means of anti-corruption activities 
remains stable and that political leaders are aware of it. In practical circumstances, however, the value 
given to political capital will vary alongside citizen perceptual trends. 
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activities, the adoption of NACS stability as an essential variable, and the modeling of 
different corruption scenarios and coping mechanisms found support in the data 
presented. 
Some theoretical cases introduced in Chapter IV as examples of coping 
mechanisms and pressure activities, however, could not be reflected in any of the 
historical events reviewed. This situation does not suggest their lack of validity, but 
forces us to look for them in other empirical cases that may not have found place in 
the present study either because they did not significantly added new evidence to the 
argument, their political range was limited to local spheres instead of the national 
scene, or simply because they stood outside the fifteen-year period considered.  
The first coping mechanism theorized in the model that failed to be supported 
anywhere in previous chapters is that of obstacles to advocacy, presented under the 
coping point of negative input defuse. This mechanism, which aims at silencing 
public dissatisfaction through legal means, can be found in the political maneuver 
executed by the government of President Fujimori, in 1997, to take control of the 
editorial line of one of the major TV networks in the country: After television station 
Canal 2 began airing investigative reports on the obscure activities of presidential 
advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, the government moved to revoke the Peruvian 
citizenship of its principal owner, the Israeli-born Baruch Ivcher, and to place its 
administration in the hands of minority shareholders Samuel and Mendel Winter, who 
surreptitiously proceeded to sell the editorial line. This way, the government was able 
to stop the hurtful media campaign and to silence an important source of pressure 
against the NACS. 
A second coping mechanism is that of new cultural norms, a highly difficult 
strategy to implement and even more to identify. As described in Chapter IV, this 
mechanism has the objective of changing the array of topics that may be subject to 
government attention and intervention, thus reducing the number of stressful issues 
that the environment feels require authoritative outputs. An example of this strategy 
can be found in the position adopted by the influential journalist Rosa María Palacios 
in defense of the First Lady, Nadine Heredia Alarcón de Humala: Following almost 
half a year of constant pressure against the government for corruption scandals 
involving Heredia Alarcón, Palacios (2015) (who by then was widely known as an 
important voice in support of the legality of all alleged accusations) released in her 
personal webpage a note stating:  
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“The campaign funds of [Humala’s] National Party and all other parties in 
Peru are subject to scrutiny and audit from the ONPE. There are legal 
prohibitions, but there is no real punishment. Much less acts that may be 
qualified as ‘criminal’... To steal campaign funds is not a crime. It may be a 
disappointment for contributors, but it is not a crime. In any case, they should 
demand party leaders or treasurer to know how their money was spent.”379 
 
Thus, it is evident that, for Rosa María Palacios, although being morally 
wrong, the final destination of party funds should not be a matter of criminal 
investigation, specially not one regarding money laundering. Such discourse reflects 
an effort from informal government spokespersons to downplay corruption allegations 
and even push them away from the political system per se. 
A third mechanism not clearly found in the empirical cases reviewed is that of 
clientelism. Although economic stimuli was at least once identified (p. 202), it is 
possible to see a more fleshed out example in the employment of the National Fund of 
Compensation and Social Development (FONCODES) by the Fujimori 
administration. According to Schady’s (2000) study, FONCODES was used for pork 
barreling under the Fujimori administration, providing the government with a truly 
discretionary source of financing to stimulate support before the national elections of 
1995. Furthermore, Schady found that FONCODES pre-electoral spending followed 
an evident clientelistic logic by directing allocations towards those regions of the 
country where they could have the highest rate of political returns, allowing the 
administration to recover from a slow down in popularity after the constitutional 
referendum of 1993 had shown a challenging 48% of disapproval. 
A fourth mechanism is that of institutional imperviousness, which aims at 
restricting public monitoring of government activities through internal mechanisms. 
Institutional imperviousness was only addressed earlier in relation to the changes 
introduced during the transitional government of President Paniagua. This coping 
mechanism, however, is better evidenced by looking directly at the content of Law 
No. 27806, Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information, of 2002. Set to 
follow on the footsteps of the normativity developed during the previous government, 
the Toledo administration nonetheless introduced certain restrictions that effectively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Translated from Spanish. 
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challenged the public right to access information considered as secret or strictly secret 
by the Council of Ministers (article 15, section a). The norm, furthermore, did not 
clearly address the conditions and requirements for such classification, or the 
distinction between both categories. As a consequence of such implicit effort to 
control the free availability of public records that may be threatening to the 
government, the Office of the Ombudsman presented an action of unconstitutionality 
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2010). Facing multiple challenges against Law No. 27806, 
Congress finally decided to go back on its decision and modified the norm through 
Law No. 27927. 
A fifth and final coping mechanism that could not be identified in the data 
presented in previous chapters is that of corruption tolerance, which aims at altering 
the social meaning of corrupt activities in a way that makes it difficult for citizens to 
recognize the illegality of government actions or the responsibility of those actors 
involved. Being a long-term measure, just like the stimulation of new cultural norms, 
outputs trying to increase the general level of corruption tolerance among the 
constituency are extremely difficult to ascertain. However, the former anti-corruption 
procurator Julio Arbizu reported the identification of such a strategy as part of a dirty 
pre-electoral campaign carried out not by the government, but by political forces 
looking to take office in 2016. He found that many of the corruption-related news 
broadcasted during the first semester of 2015 responded to a logic of political 
demolition, through which it was “clear that there exists an interest to equal the 
allegations of corruption against this government [of President Humala] to those that 
took place during the second government of the APRA and during the disastrous 
period of Fujimori”380 (Aguilar, 2015). According to Arbizu, the existence of a hidden 
discourse that was trying to instill the idea that, “if everyone is corrupt, then nobody 
is”381 was a shame and a responsibility affecting the government. Arbizu’s argument, 
however, can also be read as the same kind of effort to stimulate corruption tolerance 
that he seems to repudiate: By comparing corruption allegations affecting the Humala 
administration to more serious events of the past, Arbizu effectively downplays the 
relevance and even the veracity of those allegations, sending the message that the 
Humala administration is actually an honest one when we compare it to the APRA or 
the Fujimori governments. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Translated from Spanish. 
381 Ibid. 
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Turning to environmental pressure activities, only two strategies failed to find 
representation in the cases studied: technical corruption related reports and 
corruption awareness activities from domestic non-governmental actors. Both, 
however, are evidently easy to identify not in the cases exposed in the previous 
chapters, but in regular and constant forms of pressure exerted by NGOs in Peru, 
particularly TI’s national chapter Proética. Indeed, Proética carries out every two 
years a National Survey about (the Perceptions of) Corruption, counting eight editions 
so far (Proética, 2015), which has become the primary source of empirical data 
regarding the corruption perception, incidence and characteristics of bribery, 
corruption tolerance, and other variables relevant to the issue. More importantly, 
Proética has become the leading NGO in terms of corruption awareness campaigns, 
becoming the go-to interlocutor from civil society in government-sponsored 
roundtables in recent years. This leading role was formally recognized by USAID 
during its Anti-Corruption Threshold Program, when Proética was provided with US$ 
1 million in grants to build the National Anti-Corruption Network (Proética, 2011), 
which has the aim to strengthen the capacities of social actors in decentralized 
spheres. Thus, the above activities show the existence of pressure activities that, for 
the reasons expressed earlier, could not be mentioned during the main analysis. 
Perhaps more significant than the empirical exhaustion of coping mechanisms 
and pressure activities might be the seeming underrepresentation of certain 
environmental and systemic actors. This might be the case of the business community 
and the judiciary, for example. However, the reason behind the lack of concern with 
these actors stems from the general level of abstraction inherent in this stage of the 
theoretical model and the economic and political peculiarities of Peru, rather than 
from a neglect to include them in the empirical analysis.  
As it is, the Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform serves 
to highlight the opposition between the private interests of the political leadership and 
the demands from actors in the environment, thus focusing on the characteristics of 
this tension to explain the stability of the NACS. From this basis, the NACS can be 
studied by addressing the total level of strength that push on each side of the reform 
agenda: environmental actors (championed anti-corruption advocates) demanding 
improved anti-corruption standards, and political actors (particularly the executive 
branch) trying to defuse those demands. Beyond these two variables and the core 
actors that consistently react according to the tenets of the theoretical model, 
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peripheral (or secondary) groups are only important to the stability of the NACS to 
the degree in which they strengthen the value of one of those variables. In other 
words, their only worth in terms of the model is that of adding to the position of the 
actors that are permanently on each side of the reform agenda, i.e. anti-corruption 
advocates and the executive branch. The reason why these two groups in particular 
have been at the core of the reform-stability confrontation in Peru, while others like 
the business community or the judiciary have behaved as freelancers, aligning behind 
one side or the other only provisionally, have more to do with the latter’s historic 
interests and level of political independence, however, than from purely analytical 
reasons. 
During most of the Fujimori administration (1990-2000), the business 
community played a key role in supporting the government and its agenda of 
economic reform and liberalization, despite the political and institutional maneuvers 
of the executive branch to consolidate power and capture other branches of 
government (Arce, 2003). By the end of the decade, its support became increasingly 
skewed as the government developed a network of corrupt clientelistic relations with 
several members of the private sector, particularly those in the media and the banking 
sector, in order to obtain illegal benefits and to advance Montesinos’ political project.  
With the fall of Fujimori in November of 2000, the public-private partnership 
in relation to the NACS was severed, and the business community moved to a 
position of seeming indifference to these matters, staying away from any institutional 
participation in the anti-corruption movement for the rest of the decade, with the sole 
exception of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The decision to 
join this Initiative, furthermore, was a measure adopted by the government of 
President Toledo in September of 2004 (EITI, 2013) amidst a series of corruption 
scandals that brought his administration to the second lowest level of popular 
approval of his entire term,382 and did not originate from a position of anti-corruption 
support from the mining sector. In fact, according to an article published by the EITI 
International Secretariat (EITI, 2015/08/06), “[i]n the early years of reporting, there 
were considerable challenges in convincing all companies that make material 
payments [to the Peruvian government] to participate [in the process of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 The Toledo administration approved the Action Plan for the implementation of the EITI in Peru, and 
created a Commission to oversee its execution, in May of 2006, less than three months before leaving 
office (Supreme Decree No. 027-2006-EM). This was in turn part of the framework of international 
commitments found by the new government of President Alan García in July of that year. 
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transparency].”  
More recently, the business community has been engaged by the national 
government to participate in important anti-corruption fora of the country, such as the 
CAN and the commission for the follow-up of the OGP Plan. The National 
Confederation of Private Business Institutions (CONFIEP), for example, has been 
from the beginning a member of the anti-corruption commission launched in 2010, 
resulting in clear synergies between the position of that organization and that of 
Proética in relation to the necessity to show more concrete actions from the CAN; in 
2013, the National Society of Industries too joined the commission as associate 
member. From this interaction, the CAN has been able to successfully promote the 
adoption of symbolically significant integrity pacts in the justice, health, and 
transportation sector, with the participation of the National Association of 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, the Banks Association, and others. Additionally, the 
private sector has been publicly approached to discuss the future agenda regarding 
Peru’s interest in joining the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention (PCM, 2013/09/18; 
Andina, 2015/03/24); in this case, however, the CONFIEP has given signs of 
opposing the introduction of required national legislation that would introduce the 
figure of criminal liability of private entities in cases of corruption383 (this is, 
independently from the liability of people involved) (Acosta, 2014). 
In summary, the effect of the business community on the stability of the 
NACS over the past fifteen years have been minimal, departing from its clear support 
of the government agenda in the 1990s only to adopt a passive and inconsequential 
role so far in the new millennium. In the words of a FCPAméricas’ expert (Ellis, 
2013):  
 
“Foreigners doing business in Peru sometimes encounter a considerable 
degree of tolerance for corruption among the business community, or a 
willingness to look the other way. Some might say this is directly linked to 
opinions of Fujimori and his legacy. Many in the business community revere 
the former president for the stability he brought... These attitudes, in certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383  To avoid conflicts, the Executive Branch presented Legislative project No. 4054/2014.PE, 
proposing the criminal liability of legal entities with the exception of those that, prior the commission 
of the crime, had adopted and implemented preventive anti-corruption programs. However, on May 28, 
2015, a multi-party congressional commission approved the project without the excemptions included 
in the original document (Clavijo, 2015). The issue is still pending discussion in plenary session.  
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situations, can lead business people to view anti-corruption compliance efforts 
with skepticism, interpreting them as little more than the usual political 
criticisms.” 
 
Contrary to the lack of involvement of the business community in matters of 
anti-corruption reform, the judiciary can be said to have been at least partially active 
in its systemic role of protecting the NACS. Yet, its performance was not as 
consistent as that of the executive branch, nor was it as significant.  
By nature the judiciary is expected to remain as a politically independent 
organization of the public apparatus, guaranteeing the legal accountability of 
members of the executive branch and the national parliament. This role was 
particularly evident during the early years of the anti-corruption subsystem, with the 
expansion of the anti-corruption court system between 2004 and 2005 
notwithstanding increasing tensions with (and within) the government. However, the 
performance of the judiciary over the 2000-2014 period analyzed also reflects a high 
degree of political infiltration that guaranteed a weak implementation of corruption 
control measures. Examples of this behavior are too copious to review them all: from 
closing the case on the fraudulent registration of Fujimori’s party for the 2000 
elections, to helping President Toledo in the Zaraí case; from annulling the use of 
primary evidence in the Petrogate case, to making every effort so that First Lady 
Nadine Heredia could not be investigated for money laundering, the judiciary 
(including here the Public Ministry) has shown to be as much an agent of stability for 
the NACS as one of change.  
Thus, its empirically inconsistent role makes it a secondary actor for the 
protection of the NACS, complementary in its overall impact to that of the executive 
branch. In fact, aside from its participation in the dismantlement of the anti-corruption 
subsystem from 2009 onwards, the judiciary can be better described as implementing 
the NACS rather than protecting them, making the deficiencies in corruption control 
mentioned above corruption-enablers with no support-inducing or demand-reducing 
potential in reality. For this reason, the analysis conducted in chapters V~VIII was 
able to test the validity of the research hypothesis without forcing a deeper review of 
this systemic actor.  
Future work on the theoretical model, however, could benefit from studying 
individual corruption and anti-corruption events more deeply in order to refine the 
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functional and structural relationships between the judiciary and other systemic actors 
with the government in general, and the executive branch in particular. While this 
venue of work would not necessarily impact on the model’s capacity to explain the 
overall stability of the NACS in regards to its resistance to environmental demands, it 
could provide a better understanding of the processes inside the political system that 
explain why certain mechanisms, and certain events, are prioritized in the political 
agenda. 
 
The identification in additional empirical cases of previously missing 
theoretical elements, or their recusation based on the historical characteristics of 
Peruvian politics, lends strength to the argument in support of the Systems Model of 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform. A final and important element theorized in 
the model, however, still remains unaddressed: the existence of scenarios of 
‘corruption in processes’ stressing the political system. The discussion turns to this 
issue now. 
 
Problems in the Identification of Instances of ‘Corruption in Processes’ 
 If corruption is hard to empirically analyze due to its secretive nature, and 
coping mechanisms are even harder to differentiate from common, unrelated 
government actions, the identification of cases dubbed as scenarios of corruption in 
processes are riddles, wrapped in mysteries, inside enigmas (to use an old and famous 
quote from Winston Churchill). There are forms of stress suffered by the political 
system that are almost identical to cases of economic popular dissatisfaction, except 
for their origin: corruption in processes have an important component of corruption 
underpinning them, while other economic issues do not. The problem of identification 
arises from the fact that, in order to address these cases, corruption must not have 
been widely perceived by environmental actors, otherwise we would move to a 
scenario of ‘corruption perception’; in other words, once the scenario is openly 
recognized, it ceases to exist as such. How, then, is it possible to address the presence 
of corruption in processes, and even worse, the activation of related coping 
mechanisms? Two possible circumstances could provide a way to assert the presence 
of this type of stress scenarios: First, cases of economic decline that prove important 
enough as to generate clear demands over the political system and a significant 
reduction in popular support, paired with an underdeveloped public administration 
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apparatus, will most likely shed light on the presence of corruption affecting the 
economy without prioritizing popular attention on this component, thus allowing 
stress to remain in the scenario of corruption in processes without evolving into one 
of corruption perception. Second, a case-by-case analysis of public agencies related to 
economic variables in which the country is performing poorly can be able to identify 
the presence of corruption without gaining enough public recognition as to evolve 
into a corruption scandal. 
 Despite their potential for providing a way to empirically assess our 
theoretical tenets, the above two options present evident constraints: a case-by-case  
analysis is technically demanding, and require a level of access to information, 
procedures and personnel usually restricted to government officials and hired 
consultants; without the free availability of data, it is unlikely that the presence of 
corruption could be reasonably identified as to proceed from there to the analysis of 
coping mechanism. Simply put, we are hindered again by the secretive nature of 
corruption, with the added hindrance of not being able to turn to the mechanisms 
possessed by the scenario of corruption perception. To require an instance of 
economic crisis, on the other hand, does not do much more to help with our 
identification issues, especially in the case of Peru as we can infer from Figure 11. 
Over the period considered for the present study, the Peruvian economy has been 
Figure 11. Annual Growth of GDP Per Capita 
Source: The World Bank data. 
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growing 4.3% on average, with a steady increase of its GDP per capita from less than 
US$ 2,000 in the year 2000 to over US$ 6,500 in 2014. Other indicators, such as 
unemployment (less than 7%) and inflation (less than 6% annual), has also been kept 
in check, while overall poverty has been reduced from 55% of the population in 2001, 
to 24% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). Thus, it is not possible to find an anecdotal case 
with the characteristics suggested above for the identification and analysis of coping 
mechanisms under a scenario of corruption in processes, at least not between 2000 
and 2014.  
Certainly, over the period the government has promulgated several norms with 
the objective of improving the efficiency of administrative structures, such as the 
legislative decrees creating the Centre for Public Procurement384 and the National 
Authority of Civil Service385 in 2008, but their connection to public malfeasance 
cannot be asserted without conducting a specialized study. Furthermore, as the 
international financial crisis did not have any major impact on the stability of the 
Peruvian economy (except for a 0% GDP per capita growth in 2009) there was no 
environmental pressure forcing the government to activate coping mechanisms, be in 
the form of demand-satisfactory measures or others. 
There is, however, an instance in the past where it is possible to identify a 
scenario of corruption in processes effectively forcing the government to activate 
coping mechanisms: the administrative reforms introduced by President Fujimori in 
the first years of the 1990s. In Figure 11 it is possible to appreciate that the transfer of 
power between the governments of President Alan García Pérez (1985-1990) and 
President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) took place amidst a deep economic crisis, 
with the GDP per capita contracting by -14% in 1989 and -7% in 1990, and inflation 
soaring in the levels of 3,398% and 7,481% in the same years (World Bank, 2015). A 
great part of the problem were the catastrophic financial and economic policies 
implemented by the García administration, but another aspect of the crisis was the 
partisan depredation of administrative structures that had reached dangerous levels 
under the control of the APRA. A diagnosis done at the time of initial recovery 
described the situation (Cáceres and Paredes, 1991, p. 143):  
 
“The grave decline in the State’s management capacity is manifested in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Legislative Decree No. 1018, published on June 4, 2008. 
385 Legislative Decree No. 1023, published on June 21, 2008. 
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multiple ways: increasing incapacity to monitor and supervise compliance 
with the law, incapacity to design and execute coherent programs of economic 
policy, vulnerability and devaluation of the administrative career, and increase 
in the immorality and corruption in many institutions of the public sector.” 
 
 To confront the situation, part of the strategy of the new administration 
included the implementation of demand-satisfactory measures 386  with a big 
component of real anti-corruption actions aimed at controlling bureaucratic 
malfeasance. Such approach was possible because, for the government of President 
Fujimori, the stability of the NACS did not include the presence of rapacious party 
structures in the lower levels of the State apparatus; rather, Fujimori’s government 
would turn to the centralization of political power and corrupt networks in the higher 
spheres of the Executive branch (Peña-Mancillas, 2011). Therefore, more than the 
actual implementation of anti-corruption reforms, what the new government did was 
to address the economic crisis through specific control measures in order to reduce 
demands, generate support, and generate sufficient financial resources to feed a new 
corrupt network with President Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos at the center. 
Petty corruption in the revenue service (Baca, 2000) was immediately addressed, as 
this source of income represented by 1990 only 7.9% of the country’s GDP; this 
agency and the National Bank were structurally reformed, while others simply saw a 
massive dismissal of bureaucrats that had entered and fattened the State apparatus 
through the party channels of the APRA (Durand, 2005); and different regulatory 
agencies were soon created “characterized for having a high degree of autonomy from 
political processes, qualified human resources, results-based management, and their 
own financial sources” (Straface and Basco, 2006, p. 10). These measures were 
effective only as far as needed and they would not be extended to other organizations 
of the State equally affected by pervasive corruption, such as the judiciary, for these 
were not directly responsible for economic recovery and could actually threaten the 
stability of the NACS. According to Carol Wise (Santiso, 2004, p. 294), “the 
president had little choice but to overhaul those state institutions which were critical 
for economic recovery,” and in doing so he effectively reduced petty corruption 
(Hunt, 2005), but this improvement was carefully implemented in order to pursue the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 As described under the scenario of corruption in processes, coping point of stress amelioration. 
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private agenda of the political leadership and not create any obstacles. In fact, it is 
reported that the government went so far as to cancel an already approved loan for 
US$ 25 million from the World Bank for the implementation of reforms in the 
judiciary because it was not willing to accept certain conditions regarding improved 
autonomy and independence for this State organization (Guerra García, 1999). 
 As time went by, Fujimori’s government would deploy an increasingly 
complex array of both coping mechanisms and plain corrupt activities to secure the 
flow of support from the environment, particularly from low economic sectors of 
society and key international actors. Mot of the bulk of government measures during 
the 1990s, however, fall back on to the problems of identification of scenarios of 
corruption in processes that were described earlier, and so it is not possible to 
continue the assertions that were made for the first, initial mechanisms for economic 
recovery without a specialized study of their own that could unveil their connection to 
administrative corruption and inefficiencies.  
Although further testing becomes necessary to assess the activation of other 
coping mechanisms beyond that of demand-satisfactory measures, at the very least 
the case identified above shed some light regarding the feasibility of the scenario of 
corruption in processes to stimulate the kind of responses from the government that 
were theorized by the systems model of corruption and anti-corruption reform early 
on this work. Future work on the subject will have to include additional 
considerations to data gathering in order to get over the obscurity of government 
activities in coping with corruption and economic dissatisfaction. 
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Chapter X 
Conclusions:  
Possible Ways Out of the Deadlock and towards a Status Upgrade 
 
 The present study began with a common problem and a straightforward 
question: if Peru has proven to stagnate in general terms in the adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption measures over the past decade and a half, just as 
much of Latin America has... What can be said to explain such a state? Is it that there 
were not sufficient technical resources to instruct policy makers into the steps needed 
for reforming the NACS? Or perhaps the Peruvian economy did not allow for such a 
spending? The study proposed that the reason for Peru’s lack of anti-corruption 
progress was not a consequence of either technical or financial constraints, but rather 
an inherent absence of political will from the government and the existence of 
alternative actions at its disposal through which to keep a minimum level of support 
flowing into the political system. These tenets were embodied in the Systems Model 
of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform, based on the work of political scientist 
David Easton, which in turn produced a substantially different analytical frame to 
assess the past history of Peru, its governmental and environmental actors, from what 
has been previously suggested by academic literature. The result was the 
identification of coping mechanisms in almost every scenario of anti-corruption 
pressure assessed, all of them with different levels of investment and effectiveness but 
having the same purpose: to control the introduction of anti-corruption demands into 
the system, and to keep the provision of support from the population steady. 
Certainly, the amount of instances of stress affecting the political system over 
the fifteen years period reviewed here was too great to analyze them all. To give an 
idea of the persistent presence of corruption-related stress in the country, it suffices to 
look at the scenario of corruption perception and to count the number of days that 
corruption news were presented in the front page of popular newspaper La República: 
Between July 29, 2000 and December 31, 2014, there were news of public 
malfeasance getting wide coverage up to 49% percent of the time, with 35% of them 
involving the participation of one or more actors related to the Executive branch of 
government; this is, for 1,299 days (or 3.5 years) between the years 2000 and 2014, 
Peruvian citizens were exposed to news of corruption involving public officials of the 
government. The number and variety of scandals these news reported on, clearly, is 
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too high to review them all in the limited space of the present study, and they do not 
even include the instances of anti-corruption stress originated from corruption 
intolerance or corruption in processes. Nonetheless, it is the opinion of the present 
study that the cases selected throughout the empirical chapters were heterogeneous 
enough to present a clear depiction of the government reaction to anti-corruption 
demands: the activation of the most suitable coping mechanism available to the 
leadership. 
 Although not every single stress-inducing scenario needed to see the 
activation of a coping mechanism from the government, the response (or in this case 
lethargy) only represented the willingness of the political leadership to pay with 
political support rather than to invest in coping outputs. As it was seen in Chapter 
VIII, for example, the Humala administration decided to ignore the admonition letter 
from the Steering Committee of the Open Government Partnership and the public 
exhortations of Proética and other societal actors, and to hijack the process of 
creation of a new Action Plan. While no coping mechanisms were detected, this only 
proves that the scenario was not important enough to merit their activation (which 
naturally has costs of its own), and that it was more convenient to let political support 
decline momentarily. A similar argument can be made for cases of corruption scandal 
that were not reviewed in the previous chapters, but that may have taken place 
without the clear presence of coping strategies. For this reason, the study selected 
major corruption scandals as well as minor ones in order to show the rationale behind 
government activities in both types of events, and the specific characteristics of the 
response at different levels of intensity and persistence. Naturally, some mechanisms 
proved to be more effective than others, such as those pertaining to stress 
amelioration compared to the ones at the point of output perception attenuation. And 
the same could be said of the five administrations commented on, i.e. Fujimori’s, 
Paniagua’s, Toledo’s, García’s, and Humala’s: Although the last three could be said 
to have confronted direly low levels of political support at one point or another, 
particularly around the third and fourth years in office, only in the case of President 
Alejandro Toledo did the government temporarily fail to stimulate enough support as 
to keep the two essential variables of the system (the making of decisions and 
compliance with them) out of danger.  
 In May of 2004, before the scandal for the forgery of signatures of Toledo’s 
party Perú Posible had grown into a full-blown event, Congressmember of National 
	   301	  
Unity Rafael Rey Rey proposed for the first time to have Toledo removed from office 
through constitutional means. Taking into account that President Toledo’s popular 
approval was closing an all time low, descending to under 10%, Rey’s proposal was 
promptly followed by other political leaders, forcing the incumbent party in Congress 
to push for the passing of legislation in order to increase the legal requirements for 
approving a presidential overthrown. The threat against the political system was taken 
up again in October of the same year, turning to the possibility of holding early 
presidential elections as a way out of the political crisis; and then again in February of 
2005, when the APRA party tried to reduced once more the requirements for a 
presidential overthrown in Congress (Caretas, 2005/04/28). Thus, the low level of 
popular support flowing into the political system for almost a year (presidential 
approval stayed under the 10% level) produced the kind of situation that was 
suggested at the core of the systems model, and highlights the significance of coping 
mechanisms. A former senior official of NGO Proética commented on the reasons 
that drove the government of President Toledo to keep the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission, even if only as a symbolic mechanism, instead of having it formally 
deactivated as it was the case of the National Anti-Corruption Office created and 
dissolved under the García administration (Interview No. 20): “Toledo never pushed 
the battles until their last consequences. He had no interest in making great decisions 
or taking on great enemies. He was very fearful of getting overthrown, so he did not 
want to open new battlefronts. ”387 
 Regardless of the dangers of not choosing and adopting coping mechanisms 
properly, it is evident that without them the political leadership would not be able to 
protect the political system while securing the stability of the NACS. Furthermore, the 
review of cases throughout the empirical chapter has shown that these mechanisms 
are not only pervasive in their employment, but that they are in most cases more 
effective than the pressure activities carried out by international and/or societal actors, 
with the sole exception of different forms of international aid conditionalities. The 
argument in defense of financial pressure, however, is not one easy to make 
considering the obvious costs it entails for anti-corruption actors, and the lack of 
necessary data on the scenario of corruption in processes throughout the period 
analyzed in the present study. Without more information on the stressing capabilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Translated from Spanish. 
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of the economy-based stress scenario and the rate of success of consequent coping 
mechanisms, the picture for the reformist forces of society and the international anti-
corruption movement remains indeed bleak, with the political system holding the 
NACS under control. 
 The NACS, however, were shown to remain stable only when considered in 
general terms, with every administration providing signs of a specific value assigned 
to them, and even of this value changing during a single government period due to 
reasons external as well as internal to the political system. Thus, although it is 
appropriate to talk about the same NACS persisting since their introduction by the 
transitional government of President Paniagua, it is clear that they have suffered 
subtle variations throughout time brought by political preferences of the incumbent 
leadership.  
Starting with a surge of anti-corruption efforts during the Paniagua 
administration, which responded to a scenario of prolonged stress, the NACS were 
stabilized by adopting additional efforts from non-Executive political actors between 
2001 and 2006, but the Toledo administration itself dropping the issue of corruption 
prevention and seizing the Ad Hoc Public Procurator’s Office from 2004 onwards to 
prevent the emergence of further scenarios of corruption perception. Afterwards, 
during the administration of President Alan García, the aggressive activation of 
coping mechanisms and the introduction of countermeasures managed to weaken the 
NACS with the intention of shielding the government from corruption scandals, 
leaving as a consequence the control and preventive functions of the State threatened. 
Finally, the government of President Humala began in 2011 by investing in the 
recovery of the NACS, managing to improve the state of the preventive anti-
corruption body of the country, the ONA, and the anti-corruption procurator’s office; 
this recovery, however, was curtailed in 2014, and from then on the NACS saw a 
stagnation brought by scenarios of corruption intolerance and corruption perception, 
on the one hand, and the government’s unwillingness to jeopardize the stability of the 
NACS any further, on the other. 
 Through this summary of small but telling variations suffered by the NACS 
during the post-Paniagua period, therefore, it is possible to perceive the necessary 
flexibility inherent to the essential variable of the analytical system, i.e. the stability of 
the NACS. Additionally, the above account also highlights the significance of the 
specific value assigned by different administrations, at different moments, to the 
	   303	  
stability of the NACS. That value, as it will be suggested in the following section, 
might hold the key to break the deadlock and move towards a general status upgrade. 
 	   Possible Ways Out of the Deadlock and towards a Status Upgrade	  
Through the empirical analysis, the challenges of this systems approach to the 
problem of anti-corruption reform became apparent, but also its future potential.  
The former arise from an inherent problem with data collection regarding the 
motivations of political actors and activities that are otherwise open and public: a high 
degree of obscurity persists during the stage of policy formulation that cannot be 
cleared through the analysis of formal procedures; although structures, actors and 
patterns of behavior can be identified, the rationale behind decisions made in the 
political system remain hidden in the individuals that partake in these events, leaving 
only the factual imprint of official measures as a clue. Thus, data becomes not only 
scarce, but it is in many cases circumstantial and amenable to political interpretations.  
It is by tracing the adoption and outcomes of policy measures back to the 
contextual factors that gave birth to them, that the present study has tried to preserve 
scientific rigor in the process of identification of different stress scenarios and coping 
mechanisms. This process required the detailed analysis of multiple instances of 
behavior in order to reproduce the chain of events as closely as possible. Under these 
circumstances, the efforts of data collection carried for the present study faced two 
specific types of challenges: First, it needed to rely heavily on personal accounts 
provided by actors that directly or indirectly participated in the events; and when 
these accounts were not available, the tracing of policies back to their particular 
rationale had to be informed by media reports and statistical information as primary 
sources of information. Overall, the study showed a high degree of correlation 
between the expectations of the theoretical model and the public actions taken by the 
political leadership; nonetheless, the analysis could still be improved provided that 
more data became available. The possibility of improved analytical power brings us in 
turn to the second challenge encountered by the study: while information regarding 
exclusively domestic events and actors was relatively easy to obtain, and multiple 
sources (such as the media, personal interviews, and official reports) were constantly 
available, the role and impact of foreign actors could not be exhaustively researched 
in some cases due to the reservation or unavailability of the actors, the lack of media 
coverage, and/or the confidentiality of relevant documentation.  
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Painstaking as data collection is in this subject, however, the empirical 
analysis finally managed to lend support to a model with considerable potential for 
the future. Although still amenable to future improvement, this study offers both a 
new way of understanding the political dynamics inherent to the problem of 
corruption and the implementation of anti-corruption reforms, and a new direction for 
domestic and international advocacy actors to invest their limited resources. It is 
necessary to recognize the real political conditions that are precluding nations from 
controlling corruption before growing evidence of failed implementation makes the 
current global anti-corruption era fall to the threat of skepticism and tip over. Thus, 
the Systems Model of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reform highlights the dire 
reality regarding political will for fighting public malfeasance, showing through the 
Peruvian experience that conventional strategies to fight corruption need to be 
updated and protected from a political leadership whose partnership cannot be 
presumed any longer.  
 Indeed, the result of reviewing the past decade and a half of Peruvian politics 
through the lenses of this systems model presents a bleak scenario. If national 
governments are able to activate a wide variety of coping mechanisms, and are even 
willing to some extent to face the loss of support when those mechanisms are not 
effective, how can the NACS be pushed towards a status upgrade? There is no easy 
way to answer this question, but based on the cases reviewed in the present study 
three possible strategies can be suggested.  
First, international pressure activities have proven to be more effective when 
including financial incentives easily convertible into political capital. It is not enough 
to provide technical assistance, which invariable relies on the will of public managers 
and government actors, and the same could be said of financial support for anti-
corruption activities. Incentives need to engage the political interests of the leadership 
in a way that makes it actually profitable for the government to adopt and implement 
measures against public malfeasance. In this sense, aid conditionalities represent a 
stronger argument than any other direct or indirect pressure activity, and it is even the 
principal drive behind some of them. For example, while the free trade agreement 
with the United States was effective in forcing legislative changes in Peru, it did so 
for what it represented for the economic growth of the country and, consequently, for 
	   305	  
the popular approval of the government.388 Currently, the government is also pursuing 
access to the OECD, and for that reason it has expressed its interest in becoming a 
party to the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (Ayres, 2013), which will naturally require the 
adoption of improved anti-corruption legislation in line with the convention’s 
standards. Thus, a fundamentally economic national objective can produce political 
will for anti-corruption reforms in the same way explicit aid conditionalities do. The 
reason behind such willingness to exchange the stability of the NACS for national 
economic prosperity is at the root of the systems model developed in Chapter III: anti-
corruption will only be chosen when it provides more political capital than the sum of 
the resources spent and any loss in corrupt profits. Thus, for a developing country 
with an obvious ambition to improve the living standards of society, money can buy 
more political support than almost any other government activity, including coping 
mechanisms, and can also leave some funds to feed any persistent corruption network. 
At this point the argument brings us back to the value of corrupt profits for a specific 
set of leaders, which is the critical factor that brings down an exchange rationale 
based solely on political capital; but before we address it, it is necessary to discuss the 
other two possible strategies. 
 A second strategy involves the creation of advocacy networks and alliances 
between organized societal actors and opposition parties with representation in the 
national parliament. Through these networks and alliances, domestic pressure 
activities can concentrate in developing and introducing legislative initiatives, and 
directly attempt to reform the NACS. Such strategy proved to be the primary engine 
of the limited progress made during the government of President Alejandro Toledo, 
and was found to be equally effective in other cases throughout the past decade and a 
half. The differentiated behavior of parties in and outside the Executive branch does 
not contravene the logic exposed earlier regarding the relative weight of political 
capital and corrupt benefits, but rather exploits the presence of multiple political 
groups, all struggling for influence but most without actual possibilities of becoming 
government. Opposition parties and groups, just as their counterpart in the 
government, are primarily motivated by a logic of benefits in exchange for political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 A national poll conducted at the end of 2007 found that 57% of respondent were in favor of the free 
trade agreement with the United States (APOYO, 2007d); by the beginning of 2009, 33% approved of 
President García for the way private investment was being promoted, and 28% expressed their support 
due to the good state of the economy (APOYO, 2009). 
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investment, but ultimately deviate in two crucial aspects: First, parties in Congress are 
not as capable of extracting corrupt benefits from the political system as the 
incumbent party, and so the main currency they deal in is that of political capital, not 
corrupt profits. Notwithstanding the recurrent break of scandals of corruption 
involving members of the national Congress, the events usually involve the abuse of 
office for petty gain, and do not affect the position of those congressmembers in 
issues regarding the stability or reform of the NACS. Second, the nature of the 
electoral system in Peru has made it possible for multiple parties to obtain 
representation in parliament, with up to nine different political groups present in 
Congress at any given period over the past fifteen years. The sheer number of 
agendas, strategies and ideological positions makes it possible for honest actors to 
appear and openly push for anti-corruption actions without necessarily displaying 
reservations for the impact these may have on the affairs of the political leadership. In 
fact, as long as reformist actors in Congress do not face the possibility of becoming 
government in the future, there is an increased stimulus for passing legislation that 
may reduce the chances of the incumbent party to obtain illegal profits and invest 
them in future elections. Thus, Congress provides a potentially improved channel for 
the penetration of external reformist forces into the political system. However, for this 
possibility to be actually effective, the number of actors in Congress with the 
minimum characteristics to form an anti-corruption network or alliance needs to be as 
high as possible; otherwise, the reformist members of Congress will have to 
compensate their weak numbers with increased activity. Both options, unfortunately, 
are equally contested by the number and characteristics of congressmembers 
belonging to political parties invested in gaining access to the Executive branch, 
without even counting the ranks of the incumbent party, which in the case of Peru 
usually form the first majority in Congress. Under these circumstances, the discussion 
necessarily has to turn to considerations on the specific set of actors elected for 
parliament, bringing us once again to the individual characteristics of the leadership, 
only this time regarding those in parliament. 
 A third and final strategy to counteract the pervasive effectiveness of coping 
mechanisms is to decrease the overall levels of corruption tolerance in society. As it 
was shown, corruption scandals are the most recurrent events stressing the political 
system of the four scenarios identified by the theoretical model, but due to the variety 
and effectiveness of coping mechanisms, they seldom manage to push the political 
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agenda past the first round of anti-corruption enforcement. By decreasing corruption 
tolerance, cases of corruption perception would spark a larger amount of public 
demands and cause the withdrawal of dangerous levels of political support (Tverdova, 
2007), consequently reducing the range and potential of alternative coping 
mechanisms and threatening the stability of the NACS more frequently. Corruption 
tolerance, after all, is usually the difference between countries with pervasive 
corruption and countries with clean and transparent bureaucracies, and it was 
identified to be a crucial element of the Fujimori-Montesinos network that captured 
the Peruvian State during the 1990s: according to former minister of Justice Diego 
García-Sayán (Zileri, 2001), “the mafia took over Peruvian institutions with the 
tolerance and interference of a big part of Peruvian society... [We need to], then, 
identify the objective conditions that existed in our institutionalization and the 
citizens’ behavior that tolerated this situation to get produced and progress.”389  
Environmental actors such as NGOs and international cooperation agencies 
could provide a source of intervention over those political variables that tend to be 
more commonly associated with high-level corruption tolerance, in particular media 
exposure, political awareness, democratic values, self-efficacy, and others. 
Furthermore, the focus on high-level corruption tolerance allows for interventions to 
be exerted on three different points along the process of vertical accountability: (1) 
accurate perception of corruption; (2) corrected attitude about corrupt actors; and, (3) 
actual punishment behavior against corrupt actors (Pozsgai Alvarez, 2013). To these 
three we may add a preceding point, which is the availability of information about 
corrupt activities, which although does not represent a direct intervention on citizen 
corruption tolerance, it is the condition that puts the vertical accountability process in 
motion.  
USAID’s Anti-Corruption Threshold Program, notwithstanding failing to 
stimulate successful implementation in public agencies, reported the successful 
employment of funds by NGO Proética, thus showing how the two types of actors 
can combine and consolidate efforts in political activism on the ground and 
successfully implement a strategy focused on promoting diminishing levels of 
corruption tolerance (Interview No. 25): 
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“[Proética’s activities were] excellent. They did carry out activities that 
effectively produced visible results for the purpose of our cooperation. They 
made and consolidated the National Anti-Corruption Network and developed 
anti-corruption activities and initiatives all over the country (and published the 
successful experiences). Furthermore, it was a sustainable activity as the 
networks keep operating today. That is something well-regarded here; I mean, 
that they used your money, the money of the American tax payer to 
consolidate their project, and that this project has produced results in line with 
their strategic goals... That is a successful project. ”390 
 
 Corruption tolerance does not only affect the level of demands and support for 
the political leadership, but also plays a crucial role in the creation of that leadership: 
by driving attention onto the role of corruption résumé during electoral processes, the 
tolerance of the national constituency towards high-level malfeasance distributes 
support among different presidential and congressional candidates, thus influencing 
electoral results. In other words, the overall level of corruption tolerance could make 
society either permissive or unwilling to have a dishonest set of actors in government, 
with the consequent effect on the stability of the NACS that has been described 
earlier. Therefore, by focusing on the traditional vertical accountability function of 
national elections and the role played by corruption tolerance in it, the third strategy 
proposed here could also address the shortcomings of the previous two strategies in 
regards to the individual characteristics of the leadership.  
Previous research has already suggested the possibility of conducting 
scientific assessments of the distribution of political support during electoral 
processes across national levels of corruption tolerance (Pozsgai Alvarez, 2014). By 
taking into account the corruption-related résumé and anti-corruption offer of 
electoral candidates, and comparing the composite value of this indicator to first-
preference opinion polls, it is possible to identify the precise factors that are driving 
corruption tolerance in the constituency and develop strategies to modify them. If 
environmental actors succeed in reducing the level of corruption tolerance during 
electoral periods, the effort could create the right circumstances for all three potential 
strategies to have a higher success rate. By making sure that a more honest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Translated from Spanish. 
	   309	  
government is elected, activists can obtain an improved position and expect more of 
their efforts to be replied with real anti-corruption measures rather than pure coping 
mechanisms. Interventions on popular corruption tolerance could be the key to unlock 
a status upgrade for the NACS, given that environmental actors recognize its 
importance and redirect financial, technical, and human resources to address it on 
time before a new set of leaders is elected; after that, whatever progress or regress has 
been made in changing public willingness to empower corrupt officials will set the 
conditions under which environmental actors will have to work for the next five 
years, with the evident cost in time and resources that it implies. 
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